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international peace and joint security 
3. Evolution of the situation in Poland 
Ill. Defence Questions 
I. Application of the Brussels Treaty -
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IV. Technical and Scientific Questions 
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guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 
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Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
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Document 903 
Morning 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the First Part of the Twenty-Eighth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 14th-17th June 1982 
MONDAY, 14th JUNE 
Meetings of Political Groups. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
I. Opening of the twenty-eighth ordinary session by the Provisional President. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Election ofthe President of the Assembly. 
4. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
2nd June 1982 
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary 
session. 
7. Ratification of decisions of the Presidential Committee. 
8. Twenty-seventh annual report of the Council : 
presentation by Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations and Chairman-in-
Office of the Council. 
9. Political activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Vecchietti on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
10. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the 
Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
11. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - reply to the twenty-
seventh annual report of the Council : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Fiandrotti on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
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TUESDAY, 15th JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - reply to the twenty-
seventh annual report of the Council : 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
11 a.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of the French Republic. 
3. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe : 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Disarmament: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Vohrer on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Morning 10 a.m. 
WEDNESDAY, 16th JUNE 
1. The Falklands crisis : 
11.30 a.m. 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Address by Mr. Leister, Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
3. Evolution of the situation in Poland: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Michel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Evolution of the situation in Poland : 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. International aeronautical consortia - Conclusions drawn from the colloquy on 9th and I Oth 
February 1982 : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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THURSDAY, 17th JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van Eekelen on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Outline booklet on WEU and its activities : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Berchem on behalf of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments. 
Debate. 
2. Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments. 
Debate. 
3. Revision of the Rules of Procedure : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft resolution. 
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Document 904 
The Assembly, 
Evolution of the situation in Poland 
REPORT1 
submitted to the Presidential Committee• 
on behal/ of the General Affairs Committee2 
by Mr. Michel, Rapporteur 
Draft Recommendation 
011 tlte evol11tio11 of tlte sit11tdio11 ill Poltuul 
Recalling its Order 53 and Recommendation 370; 
20th January 1982 
Considering that the existence of a military dictatorship in Poland constitutes a flagrant viola-
tion of the final act of the Helsinki conference; 
Considering that Poland's serious economic difficulties do not justify the replacement of the 
dialogue between the state authorities and Solidarity by a policy of repression; 
Considering that the public acts of the Soviet Union reveal interference in the internal affairs of 
Poland and pressure on the Polish Government for the establishment of that dictatorship; 
Noting that the situation thus created in Poland is such as to cause Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty to be applied; 
Regretting that no member government of WEU has judged it necessary to examine in the 
framework of the Council the implications of this situation for the security of Europe; 
Believing that as long as repression persists in Poland there can be no question of re-
establishing normal relations with Poland and its allies, starting with the Soviet Union; 
Firmly recalling that the re-establishment of such normal relations depends on : 
(a) the termination of martial law in Poland; 
(b) the release of all political prisoners and in particular of Solidarity members; 
(c) the resumption of the dialogue between the government, Solidarity and the Catholic church, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Ensure close exchanges of views between the European and American members of the North 
Atlantic Alliance in order to co-ordinate measures taken and to be taken in respect of both Poland 
and the Soviet Union in accordance with the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 11th 
January 1982; 
• In accordance with the provisions of Rule 14, para-
graph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. 
l. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to l with 1 absten-
tion. 
2. Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett 
(Chairman); MM. De Poi, Urwin (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. 
Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile, 
14 
Mrs. Boniver, MM. Conti Persini, van Eekelen, Gessner, 
Hanin (Alternate: Miche[), Hardy, Kurt Jung, Lagneau, 
Lagorce, Lord McNair, MM. Mangelschots, Mommersteeg, 
Gunther Muller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, 
Thoss, Valiante, Vecchietti, Wilquin. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
DOCUMEN.T 904 
2. To this end, continue to work out in the most appropriate European framework a joint policy 
towards the Soviet Union and Poland, particularly in economic and financial matters, in both the 
long and short term; 
3. Further, invite member countries to suspend economic and financial assistance to Poland as 
long as political freedom is not re-established in that country; 
4. Also invite member countries to pursue and develop their humanitarian assistance to the 
Polish people insofar as it does not strengthen the authorities responsible for the military coup d'etat 
on 13th December 1981; 
5. Meet to follow closely the development of the situation in Poland and hold a continuing dialo-
gue with the Assembly on this question, inter alia by answering without delay the statement commu-
nicated to it by the Presidential Committee on 8th January 1982; 
6. Conduct talks with the countries of Eastern Europe on the application of the final act of the 
conference on security and co-operation in Europe particularly in connection with serious exami-
nation of events in Poland. 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(sllbmitted by Mr. Michel, Rapportellr) 
The explanatory memorandum, brought up to date, is in Document 915. 
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Twenty-Se,enth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly 
of Western European Union on the Council's acti,ities for the period 
1st January to 31st December 1981 
INTRODUCfiON 
1st April 1982 
l. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the Twenty-Seventh 
Annual Report on their activities, covering the period I st January to 31st December 1981. 
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters: 
I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
11. Activities of the Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Ill. Armaments Control Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
V. Public Administration Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 
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CHAPTER I 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY 
Addressing the Assembly to present the 
Council's twenty-sixth annual report on behalf 
of the Chairman-in-Office, the Minister of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs for the 
United Kingdom, Mr. Hurd, said: "The 
Council continues to appreciate the role played 
by the Assembly in watching over the evolution 
of the problems of security and European union 
and in submitting its thoughts to governments 
for their attention. We believe that the 
standard of these reports is generally high and 
that the Assembly, which is the only parlia-
mentary institution empowered to debate 
defence questions, exercises this prerogative 
with remarkable consistency and insight." 
The importance the Council attach to the 
work of the Assembly was again stressed in 
their reply to Recommendation 365 on the 
application of the Brussels Treaty. 
During 1981, the Council have been 
concerned to maintain close and constructive 
relations with the Assembly. To this end, they 
have continued their dialogue with it on 
questions relating to the application of the 
treaty including - in accordance with the 
undertaking given in 1972 and subsequently 
renewed - those dealt with by the member 
governments of WEU in other international 
fora. 
A. Annual report of the Council 
. to the Assembly 
1. In their twenty-sixth annual report, the 
Council have sought to give as much infor-
mation as possible on the various aspects of co-
operation between the member states during 
1980. A detailed report on the activities of the 
ministerial bodies of WEU was given. Some 
additional information on armaments control 
was provided to the Assembly in accordance 
with the procedure applied since 1971 1• 
They noted with satisfaction that the 
Assembly had appreciated the content of this 
document. 
2. Taking account of the wish expressed by 
the Assembly, the Council have done their 
utmost to expedite the procedure for preparing 
this twenty-seventh report. 
l. Cf. Council reply to Written Question 123. 
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B. Assembly recommendations to the Council 
and written questions put to the Council 
by members of the Assembly 
1. The Council took note, with interest, of the 
reports presented by Assembly committees 
during the two parts of the twenty-seventh 
ordinary session and carefully followed the 
debates on those reports. 
2. The Council gave careful consideration to 
the seventeen recommendations• adopted by the 
Assembly during the second part of the twenty-
sixth ordinary session and the first part of the 
twenty-seventh ordinary session and to five 
written questions2 put by members of the 
Assembly in 1981. 
3. They replied in a detailed manner to all 
these recommendations and questions. 
Wherever possible, they also reported on 
activities in which the member states of WEU 
participate elsewhere. 
Thus, they gave the Assembly a consi-
derable amount of information on the consulta-
tions in which the representatives of the 
member states had taken part in the framework 
of European political co-operation and in the 
North Atlantic Council. They appreciate the 
Assembly's satisfaction in this connection. 
In reply to the recommendations on co-
operation in armaments matters, the Council 
referred to the work of the Independent Euro-
pean Programme Group, wherever they judged 
this possible. As they have pointed out from 
time to time, informing the Assembly on this 
raises a delicate problem, since the IEPG 
collects information, which is often confi-
dential, provided by countries, some of which 
are not members of WEU. It is therefore 
essentially national parliamentarians who can 
be given information and this is the responsi-
bility of each of the governments which parti-
cipate in the activities of the IEPG. 
4. The Council fully understand that the 
Assembly would like the time taken to reply to 
its recommendations or questions to be 
reduced. They have done their best to meet 
the Assembly's wishes. However, as the 
Assembly is aware, preparation of the best 
possible text requires thorough consultation 
between governments. Inevitably, in many 
cases, this will take some time. 
l. Nos. 355 to 371. 
2. Nos. 224 to 228. 
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C. Informing the Assembly about the Standing 
Armaments Committee's study on the 
armaments sector of industry 
in the member countries of WECJI 
1. A presentation of the economic study 
carried out by the SAC within the framework of 
its mandate was communicated to the Assembly 
on 21st May 1981. This document contains 
data for the years 1972 to 1977. The Council 
informed the Assembly that they would send it 
an updated version as soon as possible. 
2. Further, in reply to Recommendation 365, 
the Council confirmed that, when the final 
report of the SAC was received, they would not 
fail to -consider how the Assembly might be 
informed of its content and principal conclu-
sions. 
D. Meetings between the Council and Assembly 
bodies 
Three informal meetings took place at The 
Hague on 3rd June 1981, after the ministerial 
session held under the chairmanship of Mr. 
van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
the Netherlands. On the same day, the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council also received 
the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee 
of the Assembly. 
1. The members of the Council met the 
Assembly Presidential Committee at a working 
lunch. 
2. During the afternoon, the Council met two 
Assembly Committees in succession and 
discussed with each the matters which it had 
proposed. Exchanges of views with the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
covered security in Europe and in the Mediter-
ranean, the question of theatre nuclear 
weapons, and European co-operation on arma-
ments matters, and those with the General 
Affairs Committee covered the activities of 
WEU, political co-operation in Europe, security 
in the Persion Gulf, and Poland. 
On this occasion, explanations were given 
to both Committees regarding the presentation 
of the SAC's economic study, which the 
Council had recently forwarded to the 
Assembly. 
E. Meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee 
on joint production of armaments 
1. The purpose of meetings of this body, 
which was set up in 1959 and comprises the 
1. See also points D and E of this chapter. 
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members of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, the members of the 
Standing Armaments Committee and Council 
representatives, is to provide the Committee 
with information of a technical nature on ques-
tions concerning armaments co-operation dealt 
with by the SAC. 
2. The eleventh meeting of the sub-committee 
was held in Paris on 16th November 1981, 
under the chairmanship of Mr. Cavaliere, 
Chairman of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments, for the parliamentary 
side and, for the Standing Armaments 
Committee, Mr. Armstrong, Chairman-in-
Office of that body ; the Council were represen-
ted by the Secretary-General of WEU. This 
meeting was concerned firstly with the current 
work of the SAC and its working groups and, 
secondly, with the SAC's study of the arma-
ments sector of industry in the WEU member 
countries. It brought out the high degree of 
technical complexity of the problems dealt with 
by the SAC. 
F. Speeches to the Assembly by Ministers 
of member gorernments 
I. The Council are well aware of the impor-
tance which the Assembly attaches to participa-
tion in its debates by Ministers, who attend 
whenever their numerous commitments allow. 
2. In June 1981, Mr. Hurd, Minister of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs for the 
United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly to 
present, on behalf of the Chairman-in-Office, 
the Council's twenty-sixth annual report. In 
his capacity as a member of the British Govern-
ment, he also spoke on the main aspects of his 
country's defence policy. 
In December, three government representa-
tives responsible for defence analysed and 
commented upon current questions relating to 
European security, before the Assembly: Mr. 
Lagorio, the Minister of Defence of the 
Republic of Italy, Mr. Blaker, Minister of State 
for the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom, 
and Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the 
Minister of Defence of the French Republic. 
On this occasion, Mr. Lagorio commented that 
WEU was the only institution in which there 
was continuity in discussing and dealing with 
security and it was the only truly " European " 
link for defence and armaments control 
matters. He said this was why Italy regarded 
WEU as an important European forum that 
could not be given up. Mr. Blaker confirmed 
that the United Kingdom would stand by its 
modified Brussels Treaty commitment and 
maintain 55,000 troops in the British Army of 
the Rhine. Mr. Lemoine stressed that, in his 
government's view, the authentically European 
institution of WEU, set up by a specific treaty, 
the topicality of which no one could question, 
must have a special role with regard to Euro-
pean security. He said it was the organisation 
within which France would wish to discuss the 
19 
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aims of her policy in this field. In the light of 
the needs and opportunities of the moment, the 
Minister made some suggestions to the 
Assembly. 
Following their speeches, Ministers ans-
wered numerous questions put to them by 
members of the Assembly. 
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CHAPTER 11 
ACfiVITIES OF THE COUNCIL 
Introduction 
1. In 1981, the Council met at ministerial 
level in The Hague on 3rd June under the 
chairmanship of Mr. C. van der Klaauw, Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. 
They held sixteen meetings at permanent 
representative level. Their working group met 
twenty-three times. 
2. In accordance with their mission, the 
Council ensured that the provisions of the 
modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols were 
applied and observed. 
In pursuing their activities, they were 
concerned both to ensure proper implementa-
tion of the obligations defined by the treaty and 
- as is indeed required by the treaty - to avoid 
duplication of work with that in which the 
member states of WEU participate, in other 
international fora. 
Taking account particularly of co-opera-
tion among the Ten, within the North 
Atlantic Council and in the framework of the 
Independent European Programme Group, they 
have kept their sphere of activities within the 
limits observed in previous years. 
Various aspects and phases of the imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreements have 
appeared twenty-three times on the Council's 
agenda. 
On 3rd June 1981, the Ministers discussed 
the development of East-West relations since 
their previous meeting. They had an ex-
change of views on the situation in the Mediter-
ranean. They also considered the progress of 
the Standing Armaments Committee's study on 
the armaments sector of industry in the mem-
ber countries ofWEU. 
4. The dialogue with the Assembly 1, which 
constitutes an important part of the Council's 
activity, was continued. 
5. Within the framework of this dialogue they 
reaffirmed on a number of occasions the 
member countries' attachment to the modified 
Brussels Treaty and its Protocols and their 
determination to fulfil the obligations they have 
entered into. In reply to concern expressed 
and views put forward by the Assembly in its 
1. See Chapter I. 
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Recommendations 358 on the future of Euro-
pean security and 365 on the application of the 
Brussels Treaty, the Council stated in parti-
cular: 
The member states of WEU remain 
convinced of the importance attached both to 
realising the objectives of the treaty, in which 
they expressed their resolve to promote the 
unity and to encourage the progressive integra-
tion of Europe, and maintaining the commit-
ment to collective self-defence which they made 
in Article V. 
Article VIII gives the Council adequate 
scope to discuss a wide variety of subjects. 
The Council continue to be flexible and have 
sufficiently wide powers to embrace any debate 
relevant to the application of the treaty. 
The participation of Ministers of Defence, 
or their representatives, in Council meetings 
would certainly not be without its value. This 
would be possible where matters which are the 
direct responsibility of these Ministers were 
being discussed ; where this is not the case, 
their participation in essentially political deb-
ates would not appear to be strictly necessary. 
In the matter of armaments control, the 
Council are aware of the fact that in applying 
the provisions of Protocol No. Ill and its 
annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest 
extent possible, of the evolution of the situation 
in Europe. Thus, in accordance with the pro-
cedures laid down in Article 11 of Protocol No. 
Ill, which are still available, Annex Ill of this 
Protocol has been amended on several occa-
sions since 1961. 
Furthermore, it is clear that if the Council 
considered at a given moment that it would be 
appropriate to review the list contained in 
Annex N of Protocol No. Ill, this could only 
be done by following the procedure laid down 
in Article V of this Protocol. The question of 
the pattern of field control measures could also 
arise, for example in the form of an examina-
tion of the present level of sampling used for 
verifying the member countries' declarations. 
Finally, the Council are still willing to 
improve European consultation and co-
operation in the sphere of armaments, " with a 
view to finding joint solutions which would 
assist governments of member countries in 
meeting their equipment requirements " (Art-
icle 10 of the decision of the Council of 7th 
May 1955 setting up the Standing Armaments 
Committee). 
A. Political questions 
1. EGSt-West rellltions 1 
(a) At their meeting at ministerial level, held 
in The Hague on 3rd June 1981, the Council 
discussed in depth developments in East-West 
relations since their previous meeting. 
They were mainly concerned with multila-
teral aspects of the question. However, as at 
every WEU ministerial meeting, the German 
delegation reported on the state of relations 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the countries of Eastern Europe, in particular 
with the German Democratic Republic. 
Ministers noted with concern that East-
West relations were still seriously impaired as a 
result of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
and were being subjected to new tensions ; in 
this connection, they referred, among other 
matters, to the continued increase in Soviet 
military potential and the uncertainty over 
Poland's future. 
They stressed that the improvement in 
these relations which was desired by their 
governments required that the Soviet Union 
should, by taking tangible measures, show res-
traint and responsibility in international affairs. 
They stated that their governments, 
together with their western partners, would 
continue the dialogue begun with the USSR 
and its allies and would continue to work to 
bring about genuine detente, based on stable 
foundations, indivisible and world-wide. 
On the subject of Poland, Ministers stressed 
their governments' firm determination that the 
principles enshrined in the final act of Helsinki 
should be respected by all the signatory states. 
In conclusion, the Council noted the great 
importance members attached to continued 
close co-operation between Europeans and 
western countries in order to adopt common 
positions. 
(b) With this in view, the governments of the 
member states of WEU played an active part in 
the consultation which took place throughout 
1981, in the framework of European political 
co-operation and within the Atlantic Alliance 
on matters connected with East-West relations, 
two of them in particular which the Council 
discussed with the Assembly 'on various occa-
sions: the situation in Poland ; and the CSCE 
negotiations in Madrid. 
(l) In their twenty-sixth annual report, the 
Council restated the position expressed by the 
European Council in Luxembourg on 2nd 
l. See also point 2 below and Part B, point 4, of this 
chapter. 
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December 1980, with regard to Poland. That 
Council, in a statement published at the 
conclusion of its meeting in Maastricht on 23rd 
and 24th March 1981, reaffirmed the need for 
Poland to solve her internal problems in a 
peaceful manner and without outside interfe-
rence, in the interest of the Polish people and 
also of stability in Europe. It underlined again 
the obligation of all states signatory to the 
Helsinki final act to base their relations with 
that country on the strict application of the 
Charter of the United Nations and the prnci-
ples of the final act. It emphasised that any 
other attitude would have very serious conse-
quences for the future of international relations 
in Europe and throughout the world. 
A statement along the same lines was made 
by the Ministers of the member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance, at the conclusion of their 
first meeting of the year, in Rome on 4th and 
5th May. 
In October, in their reply to Assembly 
Recommendation 370, the Council referred to 
the position thus expressed by their members, 
together with their partners in the European 
Community and the Atlantic Alliance. 
Referring to the economic aid already 
accorded to Poland by the WEU member 
countries, they pointed out that these countries 
had responded positively to Polish requests and 
that, in addition to the provision of new credits, 
they had agreed to a substantial rescheduling of 
Polish debt repayments in 1981. They noted 
that, in addition to this, the European Commu-
nity had, in response to specific requests, made 
available large amounts of Community food-
stuffs to Poland at special prices and member 
,states had assisted with credits to purchase 
these. 
In a statement published in London on 
27th November, the European Council reaffir-
med the will of the member states of the Euro-
pean Community to support Poland's efforts to 
revive her economy. 
The North Atlantic Council, at the conclu-
sion of its meeting on 11th and 12th December, 
reiterated its earlier statement and stressed that 
the allies remained totally attached to the 
human dimension of detente and thus to the 
tangible benefits which it must offer to the 
individual. 
Immediately following the grave measures 
taken by the Polish leaders on 13th December, 
the representatives of the WEU member coun-
tries joined in consultations within the Council 
of Europe in Strasbourg on 14th December, in 
the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 14th 
and 16th December and among the Foreign 
Ministers of the European Community who met 
on 14th and 15th December in London. At 
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their meeting on 16th December, in replying to 
Written Question 228 put to them by the Presi-
dent of the Assembly, the Council expressed 
their deep concern over the development of the 
situation in Poland. They drew the Assem-
bly's attention to the declaration by the Ten, 
the text of which is attached at annex 1• 
The governments of the WEU member 
countries have maintained close contact with 
their partners in the European Community and 
the Atlantic Alliance and held further consulta-
tions with them in the closing days of the year 
under consideration. 
(iz) With regard to the CSCE negotiations 
in Madrid, to. which they referred in their 
replies to Recommendations 361 (points 2 to 
4), 366 (point 9) and 367 (point 5), the Council 
wish to point out the following: 
During the first phase of the Madrid 
meeting, held from 11th November to 19th 
December 1980 and devoted to reviewing the 
implementation of the final act of Helsinki 
since the Belgrade meeting, the representatives 
of the WEU member countries had made firm 
statements asserting the importance their 
governments attached to full implementation of 
the principles and provisions of the act. 
Their speeches during the second phase of 
this meeting, which opened on 27th January 
1981 and was devoted to the discussion of new 
proposals, were guided by their determination 
to achieve substantial and' balanced results, in 
the form of progress in all spheres of the final 
act of Helsinki and in particular in the field of 
human rights, human contacts, information and 
military aspects of security. 
As to the latter field, the WEU member 
countries fully supported the French proposal 
for a conference on disarmament in Europe to 
negotiate initially militarily significant verifi-
able and binding confidence-building measures 
applying to the whole of Europe, from the 
Atlantic to the Urals. Together with the other 
western countries, they endeavoured to obtain 
an agreement by the thirty-five participants in 
the Madrid meeting to convene a conference 
with a specific mandate incorporating the above 
criteria. However, negotiations on this ques-
tion came to a standstill because of the difficul-
ties made by the USSR about accepting uncon-
ditionally for all its territory situated in Europe 
the same treatment as had been agreed already 
by the other participating European states, i.e. 
the Soviet Union would not accept without 
conditions extension to the Urals of the area of 
application of the measures to be negotiated at 
the conference. 
Since it was not possible to complete the 
work of the Madrid conference by the end of 
1. See Annex I. 
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the year as the western countries had hoped, 
the meeting was adjourned on 18th December. 
The serious events in Poland, concerning 
which a very large number of delegations made 
firm statements, cast a shadow over the closing 
debates. 
2. Afghanistan 
The member countries of WEU have 
played an active part in efforts made within the 
framework of European political co-operation 
to encourage a political settlement of the 
Afghan question, and in consultations within 
the Atlantic Alliance during 1981. Their posi-
tion was explained to the Assembly on two 
occasions during the year under consideration. 
In their reply to Recommendation 361 in 
May, the Council recalled that, since the 
invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, the 
member countries of WEU had unceasingly and 
vigorously denounced this act of intervention 
which had been condemned by the great 
majority of the international community and 
which constituted an unacceptable violation of 
the United Nations Charter and the principles 
enshrined in the final act ~of Helsinki. The 
Council declared: 
The WEU member states call for an 
immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan, and ~ll upon all parties 
concerned to work for the urgent achievement 
of a political solution and the creation of the 
necessary conditions which would enable the 
Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their 
homes in safety and honour. They reconfirm 
the right of the Afghan people to determine 
their own form of government and to choose 
their economic, political and social system free 
from outside intervention, subversion, coercion 
or constraint of any kind whatsoever. They 
repeat that preservation of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, political independence and 
neutral and non-aligned character of Afghan-
istan is essential for a peaceful solution of the 
problem. 
The Council stressed that member coun-
tries of WEU were aware that the occupation of 
Afghanistan by Soviet troops brought severe 
hardship to the Afghan people and caused a 
massive outflow of refugees. They reaffirmed 
their readiness to take and to support any 
initiative designed to promote a political solu-
tion which would provide for the withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Afghanistan, ensure the free 
exercise by the Afghan people of the right of 
self-determination and enable Afghanistan to 
recover its traditional position as an indepen-
dent, neutral and non-aligned state. The 
Council noted that it was in this spirit that they 
welcomed the initiative which formed the 
subject of the United Nations resolution of 20th 
November 1980, and that which had been put 
forward by France. 
In their reply to Recommendation 371, in 
November 1981, the Council said they wel-
comed the initiatives taken by the Islamic 
Conference, the European Council and the 
United Nations Secretary-General to promote a 
political solution in accordance with the two 
resolutions which had been adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly. 
The Council recalled the proposals put for-
ward by the European Council, in its declara-
tion of 30th June 1981, the text of which is 
attached at annex 1 ; they noted that these pro-
posals remained on the table and offered a 
reasonable, practical framework for moving 
towards an internationally acceptable settle-
ment of this problem. They said that, for their 
part, the member countries of WEU awaited, 
from the Soviet Union, a positive and construc-
tive response to this initiative. 
The Council told the Assembly they 
believed that one of the major elements of the 
situation in Afghanistan was the existence of a 
nationwide movement of resistance to Soviet 
intervention and to the setting-up of a puppet 
r~gime in Kabul. They noted that the opposi-
tion of the Afghan people to the Soviet inva-
sion had also been demonstrated by the conti-
nuing exodus of Afghan refugees into Pakistan 
and Iran. 
They expressed their regret that the Inter-
national Red Cross had not been allowed to 
~arry out its humanitarian mission in Afghan-
Istan. 
The Council also wish to recall that within 
the framework of the United Nations, the mem-
ber countries of WEU voted for a resolution 
which was adopted by an overwhelming majo-
rity by the General Assembly on 18th Novem-
ber 1981 and which confirmed its two previous 
resolutions. 
Furthermore, the European Council, at its 
meeting of 26th and 27th November in 
London, confirmed its conviction that the pro-
posals of 30th June 1981 offered a reasonable 
and practical approach to the solution of the 
Afghan question. 
3. Situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East 
(a) The Council, replying to Assembly Recom-
mendation 366 on European security and the 
Mediterranean, recalled that WEU member 
states were trying to dissuade those countries 
which were not members of NATO from 
l. See Annex II. 
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granting port facilities to the armed forces of 
the Warsaw Pact. They noted their particular 
concern at recent attempts by the USSR to 
acquire important naval bases in the Mediter-
ranean. In 1980 a member state of WEU 
undertook to support the status of neutrality 
declared by the Government of Malta (which is 
thus pledged not to permit any foreign military 
base on its territory and, except in certain 
exceptional circumstances, not to grant to 
foreign armed forces the use of any of its mili-
tary facilities). The same member state invited 
other countries to make similar declarations 
recognising the neutrality of the island, which 
still plays a military and strategic role of 
primary importance. The Council pointed out 
that although the subject of recognition of 
Maltese neutrality remained a matter that 
primarily concerned Mediterranean powers, it 
was a matter of no less importance to the inter-
national community. 
Finally, the Council declared that they 
would ask the member governments to har-
monise national policies as far as possible, 
within the various Community bodies, to 
contribute to peace and security in the Mediter-
ranean region. 
(b) As was stated in the Council's reply to 
Recommendation 371 on the situation in the 
Gulf and security, the member countries of 
WEU, concerned about the preservation of 
stability in this area, have noted the wish of the 
Gulf states to co-operate among themselves 
without asking for external support. They 
therefore heartily welcomed the creation, in 
May 1981, of the Gulf Co-operation Council 
and the objectives which it is pursuing. 
They recognised the need for continuous 
and close contacts of every kind between 
Europe and the Gulf states, as evidenced by the 
increased number of high-level visits between 
the two regions. They attached much impor-
tance to the continuation of contacts through 
such means as the Euro/ Arab dialogue. 
The Council stated that Europe's greatest 
contribution to the stability of the Gulf can be 
made by the continuation of European Council 
efforts on the Arab/Israel dispute, the core of 
which is the Palestinian problem and which 
remains the primary concern of all Arab Gulf 
states. 
(c) The member states of WEU have played an 
active part in the efforts made during 1981 
within the framework of European political 
co-operation to encourage a comprehensive 
peace settlement of the Middle East conflict. 
As the Council noted in their reply to 
Recommendation 361, the Foreign Ministers of 
the Ten, meeting in Brussels on 20th January, 
instructed the Netherlands Presidency to conti-
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nue the European action carried out on the 
basis of the declaration adopted by the Euro-
pean Council at Venice on 13th June 1980 
and the decisions taken at its meeting of 1st and 
2nd December 1980 in Luxembourg. 
On the occasion of WEU's ministerial 
meeting in The Hague, on 3rd June 1981, Mr. 
van der K.laauw referred to the visit he had 
made to the Middle Eastern states bordering the 
Mediterranean, as a part of his information 
mission. 
The European Council, meeting in Luxem-
bourg on 29th and 30th June, noted the report 
of the Presidency as well as Mr. van der 
K.laauw's oral comments on his contacts with 
the parties concerned with the Middle East 
conflict. It instructed Ministers to elaborate 
further the practical possibilities available to 
Europe to make an effective contribution 
towards a comprehensive peace settlement in 
the Middle East, through internal reflection, 
appropriate contacts being maintained with all 
parties concerned, including the United States. 
As regards the attack by the Israeli air force 
on the Iraqi nuclear plant on 7th June 1981 the 
European Council could only endorse the reso-
lution adopted unanimously by the United 
Nations Security Council. 
The governments of the member countries 
of WEU learned with deep sorrow of the tragic 
death of President Sadat on 6th October. They 
paid tribute to him individually and, together 
with their partners in the European Commun-
ity, at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of 
the Ten, on 12th and 13lJI October in London. 
The Ministers stressed the great importance 
of the preservation of internal stability in Egypt 
and expressed their countries' support for the 
Egyptian Government and people. They also 
asked Lord Carrington, the President-in-Office, 
to visit Prince Fahd, the Crown Prince of Saudi 
Arabia, to study the proposals for a comprehen-
sive peace settlement in the Middle East which 
had been put forward by the Head of the Saudi 
Government at the beginning of August. In 
this connection, they confirmed their govern-
ments' firm attachment to the principles set 
forth in the Venice declaration, namely the 
right of all states in the region to exist in secur-
ity and the right of the Palestinian people to 
justice and self-determination. 
On 23rd November 1981, in a declaration 
the text of which is attached at annex 1, the 
Governments of France, Italy, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom stated that they had 
decided to accede to the request of the Govern-
ments of Egypt, Israel and the United States to 
contribute to the multinational force in Sinai ; 
they specified how their participation in this 
l. See Annex Ill. 
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force was to be understood. A declaration by 
the Ten on this subject was published on the 
same day ; this text is also attached at annex 1• 
At its meeting in London on 26th and 27th 
November, the European Council noted Lord 
Carrington's report on his talks in Riyadh and 
discussed the latest developments in the Middle 
East situation. 
Following the decision taken on 14th 
December by the Israeli Government and the 
Knesset to extend Israeli law, jurisdiction and 
administration to occupied Syrian territory in 
the Golan Heights, the member countries of 
WEU, together with their partners in the Euro-
pean Community, stated that they strongly 
deplored this decision. In the statement made 
by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten following 
their meeting of 14th and 15th December in 
London, it was noted that such an extension, 
which was tantamount to annexation, was 
contrary to international law and therefore 
invalid in their eyes. It was observed that this 
step prejudiced the possibility of the implemen-
tation of Security Council Resolution 242 and 
was bound to complicate further the -search for 
a comprehensive peace settlement in the 
Middle East to which the member states of the 
European Community remained committed. 
France and the United Kingdom, as perma-
nent members of the United Nations Security 
Council, supported the resolution unanimously 
adopted by that body on 17th December, which 
enjoined Israel to rescind her decision. 
(d) As they stated in their reply to Recommen-
dation 3 71, the Council welcomed the efforts 
being made to solve the Iran/Iraq war by the 
Islamic Conference, the Special Representative 
of the United Nations Secretary-General and by 
the Non-Aligned Movement. They were ready 
to support any measures which seemed likely to 
be effective in bringing an end to the hostilities 
and which could command the necessary inter-
national approval. 
The Council noted that on 23rd September 
1980, immediately after the worsening of the 
conflict between Iran and Iraq, the Foreign 
Ministers of the Nine at their meeting in New 
York had recalled, in a declaration concerning 
the conflict, the supreme importance that the 
entire international community attached to 
ensuring the freedom of navigation in the Gulf 
which should in no way be impeded. 
B. Defence questions 
It will be seen, from Chapters I and 11 
(introduction and part A) of this report, that the 
Council have been very much concerned, 
l. See Annex Ill. 
during 1981, with problems of defence and 
security as they affect member states. 
Thus Mr. Hurd, Minister of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the 
United Kingdom, representing the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council, in the course of 
presentation of the Council's twenty-sixth 
annual report to the Assembly, drew attention 
to the significance of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. He declared that the treaty, Article V 
of which required the member states to offer 
each other mutual assistance in the event of 
aggression, was one of the keystones of the 
security system embracing the signatory coun-
tries. The validity of all .the provisions of the 
treaty and its protocols, and the determination 
of member countries to carry them out, had 
been reaffirmed in the annual report. He 
added that the Council had continued to keep a 
close watch on the application of the provisions 
of the treaty and its protocols concerning the 
levels of member states' forces, and the proce-
dures for that purpose had functioned normally. 
In answer to a question concerning the 
level of the British Army of the Rhine, Mr. 
Hurd had the opportunity to confirm that it 
was the intention of the United Kingdom 
Government to maintain its obligations under 
the treaty. 
The Council were gratified by the manner 
in which their annual report was received by 
the Assembly, and specifically in the reply by 
the latter on the application of the Brussels 
Treaty, which formed the basis for Recommen-
dation 365. 
In their reply to this recommendation, the 
Council again noted with satisfaction the posi-
tive role played by the Assembly, which is the 
sole European parliamentary body where 
members of national parliaments debate, under 
the terms of a treaty, the problems of security 
common to the member states. 
1. Level of forces of member states 
(a) Forces under NATO command 
The maximum levels of ground, air and 
naval forces which member states of WEU 
place under NATO command are fixed in Arti-
cles I and 11 of Protocol No. 11 to the modified 
Brussels Treaty. Article Ill of the protocol 
provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to 
enable these levels to be increased above the 
limits specified in Articles I and 11. 
So that they may satisfy themselves that 
the limits laid down in Articles I and 11 of 
Protocol No. 11 are not exceeded, the Council 
receive information every year concerning the 
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levels in question, in accordance with Article 
IV of that protocol. This information is obtai-
ned in the course of inspections carried out by 
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and is 
transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking 
officer designated by him to that end. 
The information, as at the end of 1980, 
was conveyed by Lt.-Gen. M. Gariboldi, whose 
appointment, in succession to Vice-Amiral U. 
Masetti, as SACEUR's representative to the 
Council, was notified to the latter in February. 
The Council examined this information at 
their meeting on 1st April. Similar informa-
tion giving the status of these forces as at the 
end of 1981 was called for in December, and it 
is expected that the presentation to the Council 
will be made at the usual time. 
Futhermore, the Council take the necessary 
steps to implement the procedure laid down in 
their resolution of 15th September 1956, where-
by the levels of forces under NATO command 
are examined in the light of the annual review. 
For the year 1980, the permanent represen-
tatives to the North Atlantic Council of 
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, at a meeting held on 26th 
January in Brussels, examined the levels of 
forces of WEU member states and reported to 
the Council. 
The Council, at their meeting of 11th 
March, noted that the level of forces of the 
member states of WEU, as set out in the 
NATO force plan, fell within the limits speci-
fied in Articles I and 11 of Protocol No. 11 as at 
present in force. They also took note of a 
declaration on French forces made by the 
representative of France. 
The same procedure is under way for the 
year 1981. 
(b) Forces under national command 
The strength and armaments of forces of 
member states maintained on the mainland of 
Europe and remaining under national com-
mand - internal defence and police forces, 
forces for the defence of overseas territories, and 
common defence forces - are fixed each year in 
accordance with the procedure specified in the 
agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 
1957 in implementation of Article V of Proto-
col No. 11. 
* 
* * 
By means of the methods set out in para-
graphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been 
able, for the 1981 control year, to carry out 
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their obligations under Protocol No. 11 to the 
modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of 
forces. 
2. United Killgdomforua stationed 
on tAe continent of Europe 
In accordance with the Council's reply to 
Assembly Recommendation 331, the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom have informed 
the Council that the average number of British 
land forces stationed on the mainland of Eur-
ope in 1981 in accordance with the commit-
ment in Article VI of Protocol No. 11 of the 
modified Brussels Treaty was 58,885. The 
Role 
Strike/ Attack 
Offensive support 
Reconnaissance 
Air defence 
Buccaneers 
Jaguars 
Harrier 
Jaguars 
Phantom 
continued need for the presence of troops in 
Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of 
the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed 
for short tours of duty there. In 1981 there 
were on average 1 ,899 men in Northern Ire-
land. As has been previously stated, these 
units would be speedily returned to their duty 
station in an emergency affecting NATO. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the Coun-
cil's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348, 
the Government of the United Kingdom have 
informed the Council that the strength of the 
United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force in 
1981 was: 
Aircraft/Equipment Squadrons 
2 
4 
2 
2 
Bloodhound surface to air missiles 
Rapier surface to air missiles 4 
1 Puma Air transport 
Ground defence RAF Regiment 
3. Study of tu sitllatioll of tu at'llltlments sector 
of illdustry ill member countries 1 
The Council, at both permanent and 
ministerial level, have kept this question under 
review. 
With regard to . the economic part of the 
study, the Head of the International Secretariat 
of the SAC, reporting to the Permanent Council 
on 29th April on the activities of the Commit-
tee, recalled that its second section was to be 
prepared on the basis of data resulting from the 
survey made by the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group. He added, in connection with 
the matter of updating the legal and economic 
parts already prepared, that in his view the 
need to carry out this work clearly appeared to 
be in the interests of governments. 
At their meeting on 20th May, the Perma-
nent Council approved the draft of the declassi-
fied version of the SAC's economic study, 
which was forwarded to the Assembly on 21st 
May. 
On the occasion of the ministerial meeting 
held on 3rd June in The Hague, Ministers 
agreed to the updating of the declassified 
version of the study, the data in which stopped 
at 1977. 
I. See also Chapters I and N. 
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On 4th July, the Permanent Council agreed 
that the data in the legal study and in the first 
part of the economic study should be updated, 
on the basis of work to be carried out by the 
International Secretariat of the SAC using 
public documentation internationally available. 
4. A88embly recommelldations 
As stated in Chapter I of this report, 
detailed replies providing a considerable 
amount of information were given by the Coun-
cil to the recommendations adopted by the 
Assembly, eight of which were concerned with 
defence questions. 
(a) The theme of European security ran stron-
gly through the dialogue between the Council 
and the Assembly. 
Thus, in their reply to Recommendation 
359, the Council, recalling that peace and stabi-
lity are best preserved by a policy based on 
deterrence, defence and detente, underlined 
their continuous awareness of the allied dimen-
sion of all security issues. They noted that the 
close and intensive consultations provided for 
by the allied countries which participated in the 
decision of 12th December 1979 in the field of 
both defence and arms control and disarma-
ment were welcomed. They stressed that the 
aim of negotiations on arms control was to 
improve security by attaining a stable balance 
at the lowest possible level. 
The Council also welcomed the fact that, 
as a result of the continuous implementation of 
both elements of the December decision, 
serious preliminary discussions towards agreed 
limitations of theatre nuclear forces (TNF), now 
renamed intermediate-range nuclear forces 
(INF), could be started between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. These discus-
sions served to continue the SALT process 
which was of great importance for the achieve-
ment of a stable balance in the nuclear field 
and for the stabilisation of East-West relations 
in general. 
The Council took the opportunity afforded 
by their reply to Recommendation 366 on 
European security and the Mediterranean to 
recall that although the obligations of the 
NATO members remained limited to the area 
indicated by the treaty, consultations among the 
allies were however envisaged in the event of a 
crisis outside the NATO perimeter, likely to 
have repercussions on the security of its mem-
ber states. Member countries of the integrated 
military structure had recognised that the possi-
ble deployment of forces of some NATO part-
ners outside NATO boundaries might require 
increased defence efforts of others within the 
NATO area. 
The urgent need to modernise Greek and 
Turkish military power, the long-term defence 
plan itself, and the issue of naval bases and port 
facilities in the Mediterranean were also stres-
sed by the Council. 
(b) Although Recommendation 361 was 
concerned chiefly with the political implica-
tions for Europe of the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan, the Council's reply inevitably 
touched on the military aspects of the situation 
that had arisen as a result of the Soviet Union's 
action. The Council recalled that NATO had 
clearly shown its will to improve its military 
potential, particularly following the events in 
Afghanistan and the Gulf. Implementation of 
the modernisation part of the decision of 
December 1979 about theatre nuclear weapons 
in Europe was being continued by the countries 
concerned in line with the time-table designed 
to see the entry into service of the first systems 
by the end of 1983. The countries concerned 
again stressed the importance of pursuing arma-
ments modernisation and arms control negotia-
tions as a parallel and complementary 
approach. 
The Council also reiterated their support 
for the SALT process and referred to proposals 
that had been tabled by the West on MBFR. 
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(c) The problem of strategic arms limitation 
and the role of the British and French nuclear 
forces was the subject of Recommendation 360. 
Having, in their reply, recognised the 
importance of maintaining deterrence through 
political determination, adequate military 
strength and cohesion, ·whilst at the same time 
pursuing effective balanced and verifiable mea-
sures of arms control and disarmament, the 
Council recalled that the member states of the 
Alliance " supported further negotiations and 
remained deeply committed to the SALT 
process as a way of achieving meaningful 
mutual limitations on United States and Soviet 
strategic nuclear forces that would help enhance 
western security and preserve East-West stabi-
lity ". 
The Council also referred to the terms of 
the Ottawa declaration of 1974, whereby it was 
recognised that the British and French nuclear 
forces were " capable of playing a deterrent 
role of their own, contributing to the overall 
strengthening of the deterrence of the 
Alliance ". 
(d) Answering Recommendation 355 on the 
subject of the northern flank and the Atlantic 
and Channel commands, the Council acknow-
ledged the vital role of naval forces in the 
defence of the area and welcomed the attention 
which the Assembly's report focused on the 
rapidly increasing maritime capability of the 
Soviet forces. They also acknowledged the 
value of long-term national naval construction 
programmes, m.ountain and arctic warfare 
training, and agreements for stockpiling ammu-
nition and heavy equipment. 
(e) The important implications of chemical 
and nuclear attacks were underlined by the 
Council in their reply to Recommendation 
356. The need for a proper defensive capabi-
lity in order to deal effectively with these impli-
cations was realised. 
Observing that no member country of 
WEU was in possession of chemical weapons, 
the Council stated that they shared the Assem-
bly's concern about the imbalance between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact in this field. In 
their opinion an effective international agree-
ment to ban the production and stockpiling of 
chemical weapons should be sought with great 
vigour. The Council noted that, in a resolution, 
which met with their full approval, the United 
Nations General Assembly had urged the 
Committee on Disarmament to continue nego-
tiations on a multilateral convention on chemi-
cal weapons as a matter of high priority. 
(/) With regard to collaborative arrangements 
for the production of high technology military 
equipment (Recommendation 362), the Council 
referred, inter alia, to the work of the IEPG. 
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The latter had intensified its efforts towards 
implementing the transatlantic dialogue, and 
member states were using this organisation to 
achieve, to the maximum extent possible, inter-
operability and standardisation of defence 
equipment. 
(g) In replying to Recommendation 365 on the 
application of the Brussels Treaty, the Council 
stated that they had no objection to examining, 
on a case-by-case basis, the possibility of co-
operation between the SAC and the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments. How-
ever, they could only give their agreement to 
such co-operation for studies relating to subjects 
within the competence of the SAC as defined in 
the decision of 7th May 1955. 
5. SHA.PEX 81 
On 7th and 8th May, the Council attended 
SHAPEX 81 at Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe. This conference, whose theme 
was " Allied Command Europe in the 80s ", 
gave representatives a useful opportunity to be 
kept informed on a variety of topics that were 
important for their work. 
C. Scientific, technological and aerospace 
questions 
The Council noted with interest the reports 
produced by the Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Committee and have followed close-
ly the Assembly's debates on these reports. 
In their replies to Recommendations 363, 
368 and 369, the Council stated that their 
concerns and views broadly corresponded with 
those of the Assembly; as in previous years, 
they provided t~e Assembly with detailed infor-
mation regarding the policies of WEU member 
countries on energy, aeronautics, and space 
questions. 
1. The eMTtlY probkm 
(a) In their reply in April to Recommendation 
363 on energy and security, the Council stated 
inter alia the following: 
The member countries of WEU are fully 
aware of the practical constraints on the deve-
lopment of an energy policy common to all 
western countries. They are making the maxi-
mum effort, both in the European Community 
and together with other western countries inclu-
ding the United Stat~s. Canada and Japan in 
the framework of the International Energy 
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Agency (lEA), towards the adoption of conver-
gent energy measures. 
They have acknowledged the need to move 
towards energy self-sufficiency by reducing 
dependence on imported oil, more rational and 
efficient use of energy, and where possible, the 
development of alternative sources. To this 
end, they have agreed energy policy guidelines 
for the decade to 1990 and they have agreed 
action on energy conservation. Member states 
are also pursuing research and development 
activity in the energy sector. The key role of 
economic energy pricing in achieving agreed 
objectives has been recognised. 
The energy ministers of the member coun-
tries of the lEA, as reported in the communi-
que resulting from their meeting of 9th Decem-
ber 1980, agreed with the main conclusions of 
the Coal Industry Advisory Board (CIAB) and 
undertook to examine closely the recommenda-
tions put forward and adopt, if appropriate, the 
required measures. 
In line with the results of the International 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) study, 
which highlighted the need to apply techniques 
leading to the maximum economies in the use 
of uranium, most member countries agreed on 
the need for wider use of fast breeder reactors 
and on making provision also for the possibility 
of thermal recycling of plutonium. The EEC 
also demonstrated its sympathy with this orien-
tation by approving the three-point nuclear 
plan. 
In order to ensure the continuity of supply 
of energy and raw materials as much as possi-
ble, the Council consider diversification of 
sources of supply to be desirable. The ques-
tion of imports of energy from Eastern Euro-
pean countries is to be carefully examined. 
In their declaration of 23rd September 
1980 dealing with the conflict between Iran and 
Iraq, the Foreign Ministers of the member 
countries of the Community emphasised, inter 
alia, the need for freedom of navigation in the 
Gulf to be respected. 
(b) It should be added that at its meeting of 
27th October 1981, the Council of Energy 
Ministers of the European Communities 
approved a procedure applicable in the event of 
limited or temporary shortage of oil supplies, as 
well as a series of measures that could be 
adopted according to the situation. It was 
agreed that these procedures and measures 
would be re-examined in the light of consulta-
tions to be held with other western countries. 
They would be additional to the machinery 
already set up a few years ago within the frame-
work of the European Communities and of the 
lEA, to ensure the supply of oil to the countries 
concerned in the event of a crisis. 
2. European aeronautics 
As recalled in their reply to Recommenda-
tion 368 on the European combat aircraft and 
other aeronautical developments, the Council 
welcome the interest which the Assembly, by 
virtue of its competence in defence matters, 
shows in projects arising from European co-
operation in the field of military aeronautics. 
(a) As regards the future combat aircraft, they 
share the Assembly's view that it is necessary 
to design a technologically advanced multi-
purpose aircraft able to meet the various forms 
of threat to which European countries may be 
subjected. 
Having noted other matters of concern 
expressed by the Assembly regarding this 
aircraft, the Council made the following obser-
vations: 
The development of co-operative arma-
ments programmes is a long and arduous task 
calling for consensus at national level between 
industrial, economic, military and political 
interests. The countries concerned with the 
combat aircraft are fully apprised of the impor-
tance of flexibility and efficiency in organisa-
tion, taking into account its requirements. Co-
operation in the matter of armaments, which is 
the fruit of pragmatic and patient efforts, 
naturally draws upon the lessons of the past, 
even if the programmes present themselves 
under the same configuration. 
At the preliminary design stage, definition 
of characteristics and harmonisation procedures 
must involve using with maximum efficiency 
the already existing machinery for concerted 
action in the sphere of armaments and in parti-
cular the IEPG, the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors, the Standing Armaments 
Committee. 
The future combat aircraft is notably the 
subject of intense tripartite discussions between 
the French, German and United Kingdom 
Governments. In addition, because of the 
interest shown by various European govern-
ments, a project group for this aircraft has been 
set up within the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group, thus providing a vehicle for 
concerted action and exchanges of informa-
tion. Although the interest of the various 
countries within the IEPG has been stressed 
and regularly reaffirmed, the fact remains that 
any further progress within this project group 
will be dependent on harmonisation of charac-
teristics, a matter currently being discussed in 
detail between the military authorities and the 
staff of the armaments directors of the various 
countries. 
(b) Furthermore, the Council informed the 
Assembly that talks had started in connection 
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with helicopters and transport aircraft. They 
stated that initial studies had led to the setting-
up, within the IEPG, of an exploratory group 
whose terms of reference were to determine the 
long-term requirements of the various European 
countries in the matter of transport aircraft. 
3. SJ111Ce questions 
The Council wish to recall the main 
elements of the detailed reply given in Novem-
ber to Recommendation 369 on the future of 
European space activities: 
A common European programme for the 
1980s has been presented by the Director-
General of the European Space Agency, in 
which, as the Assembly is aware, several states, 
not members of WEU, also participate. This 
programme, which is preliminary in nature and 
had not yet been approved by the delegations of 
the various member states at the time when the 
Council replied to the Assembly, defines the 
guidelines of future European space policy. 
Its principal limiting factor is the level of 
funding, fixed at 450 million accounting units 
per year (at 1979 price levels). The drawing-
up of long-term European plans and the defini-
tion of the European space strategy must 
necessarily take account of this funding basis. 
Europe is developing various remote 
sensing/earth observation programmes within 
both the ESA framework and the national 
framework. A microgravity research programme 
covering a period of five years has been 
finalised as an ESA optional programme. In 
addition, the execution of the Spacelab follow-
on development programme has been approved 
by the ESA Council. 
Through the development of the Ariane 
programme, Europe has acquired an indepen-
dent and competitive launch capability for the 
coming decade. This European launch capabi-
lity has led to an increase in requests for utilisa-
tion by both government and commercial users. 
Following the final test flight (which took 
place on 20th December 1981) and the qualifi-
cation of the launcher, Ariane will provide 
significant short-term capability (Series 1, 2 and 
3) and a basis for subsequent improvements in 
services and costs through the development of 
possible successor series. A start has been 
made to the construction of a second launch 
site which will allow the present interval 
between successive launches to be considerably 
reduced and will represent a safeguard against 
the risk of accidental damage on the existing 
site. 
The Council have also stated that a 
programme for the improvement of the Space-
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lab system and for the development of experi-
ments on retrievable shuttle-based platforms 
was currently under discussion. Studies were 
also being conducted on manned, unmanned, 
recoverable and non-recoverable systems as 
well as on a propulsion module with engines 
that can be switched on and off for in-flight 
low-orbit modifications. 
The Council also pointed out that various 
programmes had been started or were in the 
project phase in the field of earth observation. 
As regards meteorological satellites beyond 
the preoperational basis of Meteosat I and 11, 
seventeen countries have for some time been 
considering the setting-up of Eumetsat, a Euro-
pean system of operational meteorological 
satellites. 
For the study of earth resources, ESA 
intends to earmark 20 % of its budget and aims 
to meet user requirements with three or four 
types of programme: ocean monitoring, clima-
tology, advanced earth surveillance, earth 
physics. 
A related programme for a preoperational 
satellite (ERS-1) to be launched in 198 7 is 
under discussion. 
As regards advanced earth surveillance, 
ESA is studying in detail user requirements in 
order to present concrete proposals for specific 
programmes. 
Finally, as regards communication satelli-
tes, the approved programmes are in the imple-
mentation phase: ECS and MARECS, launch 
and exploitation of the multi-mission satellite 
within the framework of ESA or on a national 
or bilateral basis; new communications missions 
and techniques for linking with the ground 
segment. 
ESA together with its member states is 
actively participating in the preparation of the 
second conference on the exploration and 
peaceful uses of outer space, Unispace 82, 
which will be held in Vienna from 9th to 21st 
August 1982. In this context, various publicity 
operations will be started in order to familiarise 
the general public with the current and poten-
tial advantages offered by space technology and 
its applications in furthering economic and 
social development. 
In addition, the Council noted that the 
possibility was being considered by some 
member states of convening in due course a 
space conference at ministerial level aimed at 
providing, at the highest level, the guidelines 
for a European space policy designed to meet 
future scientific and industrial requirements. 
Thus, as the Council pointed out, fresh impetus 
would be given to co-operation within ESA 
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and to informing both the public and the Euro-
pean Parliament of the benefits and aims of 
the ESA programmes. 
D. Secretariat-General 
During the year 1981, the Secretary-
General or his principal officers, representing 
Western European Union, attended a number 
of meetings of other international organisations, 
as observers, when questions of concern to 
WEU were under consideration. 
As in previous years the most frequent of 
the Secretariat General's contacts were with 
authorities of the Atlantic Alliance and the 
Council of Europe. 
ANNEX I 
Declaration on Poland 
issued by the Foreign Ministers 
of the member states of the European 
Community on 15th December in London 
1. The Foreign Ministers of the member states 
of the European Community are concerned at 
the development of the situation in Poland and 
the imposition of martial law and the detention 
of trade unionists. They have profound sym-
pathy for the Polish people in this tense and 
difficult time. They look to all signatory states 
of the Helsinki final act to refrain from any 
interference in the internal affairs of the Polish 
People's Republic. They look to Poland to 
solve these problems herself and without the 
use of force, so that the process of reform and 
renewal can continue. 
2. Foreign Ministers of the Ten are conti-
nuing to follow events in Poland with particular 
attention, and agreed to remain in close consul-
tation on this question. 
ANNEX 11 
Declaration on Afghanistan 
issued by the European Council 
on 30th June 1981 
in Luxembourg 
The European Council notes with deep 
concern that the situation in Afghanistan 
remains an important cause of international 
tension, that Soviet troops remain in Afghan-
istan and that the sufferings of the Afghan 
people continue to increase. 
The European Council recalls its earlier 
statements, notably those issued at Venice on 
13th June 1980 and Maastricht on 24th March 
1981, which stressed the urgent need to bring 
about a solution which would enable Afghan-
istan to return to its traditional independent 
and non-aligned status free from external inter-
ference and with the Afghan people having the 
full capacity to exercise their right to self-
determination. In keeping with the resolutions 
voted by the United Nations, the Islamic 
Conference and the New Delhi Conference of 
the Non-Aligned Movement, the European 
Council has made it clear on several occasions 
that it will support any initiative which could 
lead to the desired result. 
The European Council considers that the 
time has come for a fresh attempt to open the 
way to a political solution to the problem of 
Afghanistan. They therefore propose that an 
international conference should be convened as 
soon as possible, for example in October or 
November 1981, and that the conference should 
consist of two stages, each stage being an 
integral part of the conference. 
The purpose of stage one would be to work 
out international arrangements designed to 
bring about the cessation of external interven-
tion and the establishment of safeguards to 
prevent such intervention in the future and thus 
to create conditions in which Afghanistan's 
independence and non-alignment can be 
assured. 
The European Council proposes that in 
due course the permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council, Pakistan, Iran 
and India and the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations and the Secretary-General of 
the Islamic Conference, or their representatives, 
be invited to participate in stage one of the 
conference. 
The purpose of stage two would be to 
reach agreement on the implementation of the 
international arrangements worked out in stage 
one and on all other matters designed to assure 
Afghanistan's future as an independent and 
non-aligned state. 
Stage two would be attended by the partici-
pants in stage one together with representatives 
of the Afghan people. 
The member states of the European 
Community will be ready at a later stage to 
make further proposals on the detailed arrange-
ments for the proposed conference. 
The European Council firmly believes that 
the situation in Afghanistan continues to 
demand the attention of the international 
community. It is convinced that this proposal 
offers a constructive way forward and therefore 
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calls on the international community to support 
it fully with the aim of reducing international 
tension and ending human suffering in Afghan-
istan. 
ANNEX Ill 
Statements published on 23rd November 1981 
by the Governments of France, Italy, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
and by the Ten 
Statement by the Four: 
The Governments of France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, after 
consulting their partners in the Ten, have 
decided, subject to their constitutional proced-
ures and to agreement on the practical and legal 
arrangements, to accede to the request of the 
Governments of Egypt, Israel and the United 
States to contribute to the multinational force 
and observers in Sinai. 
The four governments state that their 
participation in the multinational force and 
observers in Sinai is based on the understanding 
that: 
(i) the force exists solely for the purpose 
of maintaining peace in Sinai follow-
ing Israeli withdrawal. It has no 
other role; 
(ii) the force is being established in its 
present form in the absence of a 
United Nations decision on an inter-
national force and its position will be 
reviewed should such a decision 
become possible; 
(iii) participation by the four govern-
ments in the force will not be taken 
either as committing them to or exclu-
ding them from participation in such 
other international peacekeeping ar-
rangements as have been or may be 
established in the region; and 
(iv) participation by the multinational 
force and observers in Sinai by the 
four governments is without prejudice 
to their well-known policies on other 
aspects of the problems of the area. 
This decision is a symbol of our determina-
tion to achieve a comprehensive peace settle-
ment following negotiations between the parties 
which would bring justice for all the peoples 
and security for all the states of the area. They 
welcomed the achievement of peace between 
Israel and Egypt as a first step towards that 
goal. Similarly we welcomed the Israeli with-
drawal from Sinai as the first step towards the 
realisation of the call for withdrawal contained 
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in Security Council Resolution 242, which 
specifically declared inadmissible the acquisi-
tion of territory by war, and we believe that the 
international community has a duty to play its 
part, as necessary and with the agreement of the 
parties concerned, in peace arrangements in the 
Middle East. We are ready to participate also 
in such arrangements in the other territories 
currently occupied in the context of Israeli 
withdrawal. They regard their support for the 
arrangements associated with the implementa-
tion of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty as quite 
distinct from and independent of the rest of the 
Camp David process. 
In addition, we wish to express our firm 
support for the Egyptian Government and 
people and our belief in the need for stability 
and continuity in Egypt. Our decision to 
participate in the MFO follows from the policy, 
as stated in the declaration issued at Venice in 
June 1980 and in subsequent statements. This 
policy, while insisting on guarantees for the 
security of the state of Israel, places equal 
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emphasis on justice for the Palestinian people 
and their right to self-determination. It also 
holds that the PLO must be involved in the 
process leading to a comprehensive peace. 
We pledge ourselves to support the MFO. 
We also repeat that, together with our part-
ners in the Ten, we will continue to work for 
the achievement of a comprehensive peace in 
the Middle East in all ways consistent with the 
principles to which they hold. 
Statement by the Ten: 
The Ten consider that the decision of 
France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom to participate in the multinational 
force in Sinai meets the wish frequently expres-
sed by members of the Community to facilitate 
any progress in the direction of a comprehen-
sive peace settlement in the Middle East on the 
basis of mutual acceptance of the right to exis-
tence and security of all the states in the area 
and the need for the Palestinian people to 
exercise fully its right to self-determination. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY 
A. Introduction 
Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency is required: 
- firstly, to control the level of stocks of 
armaments held by member countries on 
the mainland of Europe, this control 
extending to production and imports to 
the extent required to make the control 
of stocks effective; 
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the under-
takings given by the Federal Republic of 
Germany not to manufacture certain 
types of armaments on its territory are 
being observed. 
In 1981, the Agency's activities continued 
at the same level as in previous years. 
Subject to the comments made under point 
B.2 below, the programme drawn up by the 
Agency for 1981, the twenty-sixth year of 
control, was carried out satisfactorily. 
B. General remarks on control activities 
1. General operating methods 
The methods used by the Agency are deter-
mined by the provisions of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and by Council decisions on the 
subject. During the year under review they 
remained basically uncha_nged. 
Within the Agency's terms of reference, 
controls from documentary sources serve 
mainly for checking levels of armaments as a 
whole. They also contribute to the prepar-
ation of field measures for the control of levels 
and of the non-production of certain categories 
of armaments. This aspect covers all activities 
concerned with processing, for the purposes 
defined above, any useful documentary material 
including, in particular, countries' replies to the 
Agency questionnaire, and the results of field 
control measures carried out earlier. 
The execution of test checks, visits and 
inspections, and all that is linked with these 
functions, constitutes that part of control 
carried out physically wherever there are activ-
ities and stocks subject to control and, more 
generally, wherever this is necessary to ensure 
that the information supplied is correct and 
that undertakings are observed. 
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The control system is based primarily on 
controls from documentary sources, the purpose 
of field control measures being to verify, physi-
cally, the accuracy of all the information collec-
ted in implementation of Part Ill of Protocol 
No. IV. 
Documentary and field control measures 
are complementary, and equally essential for 
the accomplishment of the Agency's task. 
Traditionally, the annual report has always 
presented documentary and field control 
measures separately, in the interests of both 
convenience and clarity. However, it must not 
be forgotten that these measures together make 
up a single control function. 
The Agency draws great benefit from the 
continuity of its methods; by its steadily-
growing knowledge of the organisation of the 
forces of each member state, of the progress of 
armaments production or procurement pro-
grammes, the Agency develops its control 
activity efficiently and logically, both in the 
fixing of levels and quantities of armaments and 
in the choice and assessment of its control 
measures. 
2. Atomic, chemical and biological weapons 
The position described in earlier annual 
reports remained basically unchanged. 
The activities of the Agency cover neither 
nuclear nor biological weapons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter do not, therefore, concern these two 
categories of armaments. 
In the case of chemical weapons, only non-
production controls take place ; no quantitative 
controls are made since the member states have 
always declared they possessed no such arma-
ments (in this connection, for 1981, see point 
E.5 of this report). 
C. Controls from documentary sources 
In this field of control, the Agency studies 
the relevant documents with the main purpose 
of comparing the quantities of armaments held 
by the member states with the levels fixed by 
the Council and thus establishing whether these 
constitute appropriate levels within the terms of 
the modified Brussels Treaty. 
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1. Information proce66ed by the Agency 
During 1981 documentary controls were 
carried out in the normal way by studying, 
processing and collating documents and infor-
mation obtained from various sources. 
The principal and essential official source 
of information available to the Agency is the 
reply sent by each member state to its annual 
questionnaire. A scrupulous and thorough 
analysis of the results constituted again in 1981 
a sufficiently firm working basis. The results 
of this analysis were cross-checked with the 
data communicated by NATO for the forces 
placed under its authority. 
Furthermore, the information provided by 
the defence budgets published by the states on 
the budgetary resources assigned to production 
programmes relative to armaments subject to 
control enabled the Agency to keep itself 
informed of the financing of these programmes. 
In addition to official documents, published 
material provides an appreciable source of 
information of great assistance to the Agency in 
accomplishing its studies. The study of this 
documentation is essential to the Agency in 
meeting one of the responsibilities assigned to it 
by Article XX of Protocol No. IV. 
(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies 
by member states 
Follow-up action on the replies to the 
questionnaire sent to member states as in all 
previous years was twofold. It is recalled that 
some of the facts reported are checked physic-
ally by means of field control measures. In 
addition, all the replies are studied by the 
Agency experts, and compared with the other 
sources of information available, including 
member countries' earlier replies to Agency or 
NATO questionnaires and budgetary docu-
ments. 
(b) Request for annual information 
Control of undertakings by one of the 
member states regarding the non-production of 
certain types of armaments takes the form of 
field control measures. 
These measures are partly prepared from a 
study of documents based on the replies of the 
country concerned to the annual questionnaire 
and to the Agency's requests for annual 
information. 
As in previous years, the replies received 
from the country concerned in 1981 were taken 
into consideration for selecting and preparing 
visits, inspections and agreed control measures 
for inclusion in the Agency's programme of 
control measures. 
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(c) Information provided by NATO 
See point 2 (a) below. 
(d) Information provided by the United States 
of America and Canada 
(Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV) 
The Agency received, through the Council, 
information supplied by the Governments of 
the United States and Canada concerning their 
programmes of external aid in military equip-
ment to the forces of member states stationed 
on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these 
countries have provided no aid to the forces 
concerned. 
(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information 
The budgetary studies called for by Article 
VII, Protocol No. IV are one of the aspects of 
armaments control carried out by the Agency. 
These studies are not only based on the 
examination of the budgetary data supplied to 
the Agency by the governments of the member 
states, but also on the unclassified documents 
reproduced in the press and specialised period-
icals and on the reports on the annual budget-
ary discussions in national parliaments. 
In 1981 the Agency's studies in this field 
were pursued under the same conditions as in 
the past; after a general examination of defence 
expenditures, the attention of the Agency 
turned more particularly towards the use of 
credits assigned to production of controllable 
materiel. 
The conclusions of budgetary studies in 
respect of control only serve to confirm the 
results of other work conducted by the Agency 
on the evolution of armament levels. 
(j) Use of published material 
By systematic study of the daily press, 
about sixty specialised magazines and books 
and catalogues published in the WEU member 
countries and in the United States, as well as 
bulletins from NATO and, as the case may be, 
from other international organisations, the 
Agency's Central Documentation Office made 
every effort to provide the Directorate and its 
experts with information of value for their 
activities. 
The daily press review, prepared by the 
office, is also sent to the international secret-
ariat of the SAC. 
The constant acceleration of technical 
progress and the increasing complexity of eo-
production agreements, makes this document-
ary work increasingly important. 
2. Verifrcation of approprillte levels of armaments 
(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
placed under NATO command 
After receiving and processing the member 
states' replies to the annual questionnaire and 
studying the statistical reports furnished by the 
authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
isation (Article VII, 2 (a), of Protocol No. IV) 
and, in particular, by the NATO international 
staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the 
annual consultations with the NATO military 
authorities called for by Article XIV of Pro-
tocol No. IV. 
As in previous years, these consultations 
included a joint study session at Casteau, on 
27th November 1981, attended by Agency 
experts and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, 
and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 11th 
December 1981; at this meeting, which was 
attended by the representatives of the Agency, 
of SHAPE and of the international military 
staff of NATO, it was concluded that the levels 
of armaments for the forces of member states · 
placed under NATO authority and stationed on 
the mainland of Europe represented appropriate 
levels for the control year 1981 within the 
terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV, for 
those armaments over which the Agency has so 
far been placed in a position to exercise its 
mandate of controlling levels. 
(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
maintained under national command on the 
mainland of Europe 
In accordance with the procedure in force 
for the implementation of the Agreement of 
14th December 1957, the Agency supplied the 
Council with the elements of information 
gathered on the quantities of armaments for 
these forces, notified to the Agency by the 
member states in their replies to the 1981 
questionnaire. 
Under the same procedure, the Council 
accepted or approved for 1981 the maximum 
levels of armaments of these forces and notified 
the Agency accordingly for the purpose of the 
drawing-up of the final tables of the above-
mentioned forces. 
D. Field control measures 
1. PriiiCiples govemillg the application of freld control 
measures and general methods of execution 
As recalled in the introduction to this 
chapter, the treaty requires the Agency: 
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- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not 
to manufacture certain types of arma-
ments are being observed; 
- to control the level of stocks of certain 
armaments. 
Field control measures continued during 
1981 on the same basis as during previous 
years, as an essential part of the Agency's work, 
in accordance with Article VII of Protocol 
No. IV. 
(a) Initial studies 
When drawing up its programme of control 
measures, the Agency again worked on the 
basic assumption, which is supported by the 
observations of previous years, that the under-
takings and declarations of member countries 
are being honoured. The accumulated exper-
ience and information and the results of its 
controls in 1980 led the Agency to draw up a 
1981 programme on the same scale and lines as 
those of recent years, i.e.: 
- for non-production field control mea-
sures, a limited programme was consi-
dered adequate for verifying the under-
takings of a member state not to 
manufacture specified armaments. The 
Agency took due account in forming this 
view of both the reply to its request for 
information from the member states 
concerned and of the cancellation of 
paragraph V of Annex Ill to Protocol 
No. Ill; 
- for quantitative field control measures, 
sampling methods were again thought 
adequate to verify the accuracy of data 
declared by member states and so to 
provide an acceptable level of confidence 
in the Agency's documental control. No 
factor had emerged to vary significantly 
the distribution of the field control 
measures. However, national budget 
problems were already foreshadowing 
procurement delays or reductions in 
1981 that might eventually reduce the 
number of control measures appropriate 
in production plants. 
(b) Programme definition 
Depot and unit stock patterns were reasses-
sed in the light of known organisational changes 
and of declared re-equipment programmes. 
The basic programme of quantitative field 
control measures then emerging was examined 
in the light of production declarations. Where 
these studies suggested the need to extend such 
controls to factories, their production program-
mes were reviewed to ensure that each inspec-
tion was planned to take place at the most 
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appropriate time. For those factories where 
non-production and/or repair depot stock 
controls were also indicated, all types of control 
measures were co-ordinated, so keeping the 
frequency of the Agency's measures at these 
private concerns to an acceptable minimum. 
To avoid duplication, Article VIII of Pro-
tocol No. IV provides for control measures to 
be undertaken by the appropriate NATO 
authorities themselves for those forces placed 
under NATO authority. Thus, the forces 
under the control of the Agency vary from 
country to country, a factor weighed in the 
preparation of the programme. Depots, to 
which Article VIII equally applies, are subject 
to different considerations. Since logistic 
support for forces under NATO authority 
remains a wholly national responsibility, diffi-
culties could arise in defining which armaments 
in some depots are or will be assigned to forces 
under NATO authority and which armaments 
remain under national command. According-
ly, the system of joint Agency/SHAPE inspec-
tions introduced in, and used each year since, 
1957 was again authorised for 1981 and certain 
of these depots were therefore programmed for 
inspection by Agency /SHAPE teams. 
As the Convention for the due process of 
law' has not yet entered into force, the control 
measures carried out by the Agency at private 
concerns had, in 1981, as in previous years, to 
take the form of " agreed control measures ". 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the agreement of the firms 
concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' 
notice. This agreement has never been with-
held. The 1981 programme of control mea-
sures at privately-owned plants was therefore 
drawn up with full confidence that it could be 
implemented as in previous years. 
In May, the Director presented the Agen-
cy's annual report for 1980 to ·the Council and 
stated his general intentions regarding the 1981 
programme. Subsequently this programme was 
changed only in a few instances as a result of 
the replies to the Agency's questionnaire. 
2. Methods, type and extent of field co11trol metUIIns 
In 1981, no major changes were made in 
the Agency's established procedure for the 
conduct of its field control measures. 
1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by 
member states of Western European Union in order to 
enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry 
out its control effectively and making provision for due 
process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the 
Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris 
on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 
1957). 
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The teams selected for the Agency's field 
control measures all included one member of 
the nationality of the establishment visited, the 
Head of Mission and other experts all being of 
different nationalities. 
The total number of control measures was 
seventy. 
These measures fall broadly into the 
following categories: 
(a) quantitative control m~asures at depots; 
(b) quantitative control measures at units 
for forces under national command; 
(c) control measures at production plants: 
(i) quantitative control measures: 
In 1981, these control measures 
were carried out at plants manufac-
turing aircraft, ammunition, missi-
les and materiel for rockets, and at 
shipyards; 
(ii) non-production control measures: 
These control measures related to 
chemicals, missiles and certain air-
craft. 
It should be stressed that the reports on 
field control measures are protected by the most 
stringent security measures at all stages of their 
preparation, custody and analysis. 
3. Co~~elusiolfS 
(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exer-
cise its mandate, the Agency was able effect-
ively to carry out its task of applying control 
measures. Such problems as arose in this very 
complex field of inspections were dealt with 
satisfactorily through the excellent relations 
maintained with the national authorities. 
(b) On the basis of all the field control mea-
sures carried out in 1981, the Agency was able 
to report to the Council: 
- the measures taken for the control of the 
stocks of armaments at depots, units 
under national command and production 
plants amply confirmed the data obtai-
ned from documentary control measures; 
- the measures taken for the control of 
non-production revealed no production 
contrary to undertakings. 
E. State and problems of control in certain 
particular fields 
1. Armt1111e11ts for ltutd forces 
(a) Current production and purchases 
During 1981, member countries continued 
the modernisation of their land forces by 
renewing the equipment of front line forma-
tions and by relegating, more often than not, 
the replaced matenel to reserve units. Arma-
ments were also being modernised by fitting 
guns of longer range and thus of larger calibres. 
Within this setting two major features 
emerge: the completion of the mechanisation of 
the front line formations of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany with the formation of a Panzer 
division and two Panzer Grenadier divisions; 
the reorganisation of BAOR by a redistribution 
of resources (materiel and other) without any 
reduction of combat potential. 
Armoured materiel 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
full rate of production of the Leopard 11 battle 
tank (120 mm gun) has been attained this year. 
Production of the TPZ 1 six-wheeled armoured 
troop carrier has now reached the planned 
level. 
The modernisation of M -48 battle tanks 
has been completed this year. 
In France, the first of the AMX-30-B2 
battle tanks has come off the production 
line. At the same time, a number of 
AMX-30-B tanks have been converted to 
AMX-30-B2 standards. Series production of 
two versions of the AMX-10 family of armou-
red vehicles is continuing with the AMX-10-P 
(infantry combat vehicle) and the AMX-10-RC 
(six-wheeled reconnaissance vehicle armed with 
105 mm gun). A first light cavalry regiment 
has been equipped with the AMX-10-RC. 
Production of the Panhard Sagaie light armou-
red vehicle (six wheels, 90 mm gun) has been 
launched. A first combat regiment has been 
equipped with this vehicle. · 
In Italy the programme for the production 
of Leopard I for the national forces continues. 
These tanks will gradually replace the last 
M-47s. 
Artillery materiel 
The trilateral programme for the produc-
tion of the FH-70 involving the United 
Kingdom, Italy and the Federal Republic of 
Germany is almost completed. A self-propelled 
version (SP-70) is being developed and proto-
types are being manufactured. 
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In France, pending delivery of the new 
155 TR-F-1 towed gun, a number of regiments 
have replaced their old 105-SP guns by the 
155-M-50 towed howitzer. 
In the Netherlands, the modification of 8" 
SP-M-110 and 175-SP guns into 8" M-111-A2 
howitzers has been completed. 
Anti-tank materiel 
Member states continued to allocate a 
significant proportion of their defence budgets 
to the purchase of second-generation anti-tank 
weapons. 
Anti-aircraft materiel 
The Guepard programme is complete. 
This gun tank is in service with the German, 
Belgian and Netherlands armies. 
Ammunition 
The member countries have continued 
their major efforts to improve stocks. 
(b) Control activity in 1981 
Quantitative control measures have been 
carried out at a number of depots, at several 
units under national command and at a plant 
manufacturing armaments for land forces. 
2. Gflided missiles tuUI other self-propelled missiles 
(a) Current production and purchases 
In most WEU member countries, the rate 
of increase in stock levels of the most up-to-
date missiles has been influenced somewhat by 
the effects of the worldwide economic recession 
with the inevitable reductions in defence 
expenditure. Nevertheless, there have been 
notable improvements in selected areas where 
deliveries of previously budgeted production 
orders have been maintained. Again the most 
discernible improvements have been in the 
anti-tank guided weapon field. Belgium has 
increased its stocks of Milan, France has 
acquired more Milan and Hot missiles, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the United 
Kingdom forces in Europe have improved their 
Milan and Tow holdings and the Netherlands 
have been equipping their forces with the 
United States Dragon missile system. With 
surface-to-air missiles, France has continued its 
build-up of Roland for the army and Crotale 
for the navy. The United Kingdom forces in 
Western Europe have increased their stocks of 
the shoulder-launched Blowpipe anti-aitcraft 
missile and obtained more Rapier weapons. 
The Belgian army has been receiving its final 
delivery of improved Hawk missiles. The 
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Federal Republic of Germany has added to its 
holdings of the air-launched Kormoran anti-
ship missile. 
In conclusion, 1981 has been more a year 
of consolidation than one of major change, 
where member states of WEU have gradually 
improved their guided weapon capability and 
simultaneously ensured that their missile pro-
duction facilities, where applicable, have main-
tained their viability during this period of 
economic depression. 
The following guided missiles were manu.: 
factured in the member countries during 1981: 
Milan and Hot anti-tank missiles (produced 
jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany 
and France}, SS-11 (France) and Mamba 
(produced jointly by the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Italy); the surface-to air missiles 
Roland (produced jointly by the Federal 
Republic of Germany and France), Indigo 
(Italy); Matra R-440, Crotale, Masurca and 
Hawk-Helip surface/ship-to-air missiles (Fran-
ce); the ship-to-ship missiles Exocet MM-38 
and MM-40 (France), Sistel Seakiller MK-2 
(Italy) and Otomat (produced jointly by France 
and Italy); the air-to-ship missiles Exocet 
AM-39 (France) and Kormoran (Federal 
Republic of Germany); the air-to-air missiles 
Matra Magic 550, Matra 530 and Matra Super 
530 (France) and Sidewinder AIM-96 (produced 
jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy and the United Kingdom); the surface/ 
ship-to-air missile Aspide (Italy); AS-12 air-to-
surface missiles and Malafon anti-submarine 
rocket motors (France). 
In addition · to the guided weapons listed 
above, other self-propelled weapons were 
produced: Zuni air-to-ground rockets (Belgium), 
110 mm Lars rockets (Federal Republic of 
Germany) and ASM-375 rockets (France). 
During 1981 a number of guided weapons 
were imported by WEU member countries from 
the United States: Tow anti-tank weapons by 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Netherlands; Dragon anti-tank and Harpoon 
ship-to-ship missiles by the Netherlands; Side-
winder air-to-air missiles by the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany. 
(b) Control activity in 1981 
Quantitative control measures were carried 
out at a number of depots, at units under 
national command and at plants. One of these 
measures was carried out jointly with a non-
production control measure. 
3. Air force armaments 
(a) Current production and purchases 
Numbers of combat aircraft have remained 
about the same but quality has been consider-
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ably improved. Modern combat aircraft, fully 
equipped with computers and avionics produ-
ced after 1970, such as Jaguar, F-16, Tornado, 
etc., now represent 20 % of the total as against 
14 % previously. 
In France the Jaguar A and B programme 
was completed. In the Federal Republic of 
Germany the new Alpha and Tornado combat 
aircraft were delivered regularly in spite of 
some delays for budgetary reasons; in turn, a 
number ofF-104G and G-91 aircraft were with-
drawn from service. Italy has confirmed its 
order for a number of Tornado aircraft and the 
first series production model from the Aeritalia 
assembly line has been delivered to the air 
forces; at the Macchi plant, series production 
for export of the MB-339K combat aircraft has 
begun; the air force has also signed a contract 
with MBB for the purchase of the Kormoran 
anti-ship missile weapons system to equip the 
Tornado. The Netherlands have continued to 
replace F-104G aircraft by the F-16; the F-104 
all-weather interceptors were all removed from 
service by the end of 1981. The United King-
dom air forces on the mainland of Europe have 
remained almost unchanged; the only develop-
ment has been the appearance of the new 
Skyflash missile. 
(b) Control activity in 1981 
Control measures were carried out at 
depots, at a number of units under national 
command and in factories. One of the latter 
was subjected jointly to a production control 
measure, a control measure at a depot and a 
non-production control measure. 
4. Naral armaments 
(a) Current production 
As new construction and modernisation 
have continued, a modest number of new and 
modernised units have joined the fleets of the 
member countries. 
In France the Rubis (originally named 
Provence), the first French nuclear attack 
submarine, has entered on sea trials; the Saphir, 
second of this class, has been launched; a third 
one is under construction. The destroyer 
Dupleix, second of the Georges Leygues class, 
became operational; a third and fourth are 
under construction. The aircraft carrier Cle-
menceau completed her extensive refit and can 
now operate Super Etendard aircraft. The 
replenishment ship Var, the third ship of the 
Durance class, is still under construction. 
Deliveries of Super Etendard attack aircraft 
have continued in 1981. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany the 
modernisation programme for the Lutjens class 
destroyers has continued. The refit of the 
Rommel has entered its final phase. The 
frigate Bremen, the first ship of the F-122 class, 
has begun sea trials; others have been launched 
and are being fitted out or are under construc-
tion. The manufacture of fast attack craft of 
the 143-A type has continued. The moderni-
sation programme of the Atlantic maritime 
patrol aircraft has also continued. 
In Italy, the Sauro and Di Cossato sub-
marines have become operational; Da Vinci is 
on sea trials. The helicopter carrier Garibaldi 
is under construction. As regards frigates, 
Maestrale, the first of a class, was commissio-
ned end 1981, while Grecale has commenced 
sea trials; other vessels of this class are under 
construction. The fast attack craft (hydrofoil) 
and Spaviero and Nibbio are operational and 
others of this type are on sea trials. 
In the Netherlands, construction of sub-
marines of the Walrus class has continued. 
Several of the Kortenaer class have become 
operational and some of them joined the fleet 
in 1981; others are under construction. 
(b) Control activity in 1981 
Quantitative control measures were carried 
out at naval shipyards. 
S. Chemical weapons 
(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control 
As in previous years, the Agency asked 
member countries whether they wished to 
renew in 1981 the list of chemical weapons 
subject to control. 
The member countries agreed to this 
renewal. This was reported to the Council 
who noted the fact. 
The Agency therefore continued to use this 
list for its control activities during 1981. 
(b) Control activity in 1981 
In application of Article Ill of Protocol No. 
Ill, which lays down conditions to enable the 
Council to fix the levels of chemical weapons 
that may be held on the mainland of Europe by 
those countries which have not given up the 
right to produce them, and in accordance with 
the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked 
the countries concerned in its questionnaire 
whether production of chemical weapons on 
their mainland territory had passed the exper-
imental stage and entered the effective produc-
tion stage. 
All the member countries concerned once 
again gave an explicit negative reply in 1981. 
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In addition, in the covering letter to its 
questionnaire, the Agency, as in previous years, 
asked the member states to declare any chemi-
cal weapons that they might hold, whatever 
their origin. In reply to this questionnaire no 
country reported holding any chemical weapons 
and because of this the quantitative control of 
weapons of this nature raised no problems in 
1981. 
As in each year, in accordance "'with the 
resolution approved by the Council in 1959 
and in application of the Council directive 
extending to chemical weapons the provisions 
laid down for the control of non-production of 
the armaments listed in Annex Ill of Protocol 
No. Ill, the competent authorities of the coun-
try concerned provided the Agency with a 
detailed, precise and complete reply. In addi-
tion, the temporary procedure· applied with 
these authorities since 1973 was again used 
with success in 1981. All the information 
supplied in this way was a major factor in 
selecting chemical plants at which to carry out 
agreed control measures in 1981. 
For each control measure carried out, a 
delegation from the national authorities was 
present. 
None of these measures revealed any indi-
cation of production of chemical weapons 
within the terms of Annex 11 to Protocol 
No. Ill. 
6. Biological weapons 
All member countries reported their agree-
ment to the entry into force in 1981 of the list 
of biological weapons subject to control as 
revised by Council decision. The Council 
noted the fact. 
However, it will be recalled (see point B. 2 
of the present chapter) that the Agency exer-
cises no control in the field of biological 
weapons. 
7. Atomic weapons 
Since the situation remained the same as in 
previous years, the Agency is unable (as stated 
in point B. 2 of this chapter) to exercise any 
control in the atomic field. 
F. Technical information visits and other 
means of improving the efficiency of the experts1 
1. During the year, the Agency conducted a 
number of studies designed to improve and to 
update its working documents as well as to 
maintain the level of knowledge of its experts. 
l. See also point C. I (F). 
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2. At the invitation of the national author-
ities, technical information visits were arranged 
in 1981. 
The Agency land force experts were able to 
visit the Royal Armament Research and Devel-
opment Establishment at Fort Halstead in the 
United Kingdom. A series of full briefings was 
given in various aspects of research and devel-
opment in the field of armaments subject to 
control !Dd in particular on the United King-
dom's role in the development of the SP-70 
howitzer. A presentation of new gun shells 
was also given. The experts then visited the 
Royal Armoured Corps Centre at Bovington for 
briefings on current trends in the field of 
armoured materiel. Finally, they visited the 
Royal Ordnance Factory in Nottingham to wit-
ness the manufacture of tube artillery and its 
supporting platform and to observe the forging 
of " electric slag refined " steels into barrels. 
The visit to the lnstitut Franco-Allemand 
at St. Louis in France afforded the experts the 
opportunity to see work on the research and 
development of shells and other weapons. 
The Head of the Inspection and Control 
Division and the naval expert attended the 
Royal Navy Exhibition in Portsmouth (United 
Kingdom). They were also able to visit a 
number of the most recent warships and study 
the integration of weapons systems and the 
advances in the field of electronics. 
The air armament experts visited the 
RAF's major overhaul facility for aircraft and 
aero-engines at Royal Air Force, St. Athan 
(United Kingdom). Next, they proceeded to 
the IMI Kidderminster establishment which 
produces rocket motors for the United King-
dom Ministry of Defence. They ended their 
stay in the United Kingdom by a visit to 
Hunting Engineering Ltd. in Bedford where 
they were briefed on several projects concerned 
with the development and production of air-
launched weapons. 
Finally, certain experts visited the Manu-
facture beige de lampes e/ectriques in Brussels 
which produces no controllable armaments but 
which manufactures major electronic installa-
tions for tanks and combat aircraft. The 
experts were thus able to update themselves in 
the basic technology of these sub-systems, 
which are increasing in importance for arma-
ments subject to control, and their production 
methods. 
The Agency considers that technical infor-
mation visits, in the same way as studies, 
contribute greatly towards keeping up to date 
and even enhancing the technical expertise that 
it has acquired by its policy of recruiting highly 
qualified personnel. 
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G. Contacts 
I. On 20th May 1981, the Director of the 
Agency presented the Agency's report on its 
activities in 1980 to the Council. 
2. For the satisfactory conduct of its mission, 
the Agency must carry out its duties in an 
atmosphere of trust and close co-operation with 
the national authorities. To this end, the 
Director and the principal members of his staff 
in 1981, as in previous years, maintained 
frequent contacts with these authorities. 
3. As laid down in the modified Brussels 
Treaty, the Agency has maintained close 
contacts with the appropriate NATO author-
ities. 
In this connection, mention should be 
made in particular of the two meetings held to 
fix the level of armaments of the forces under 
NATO command, already referred to in point 
C. 2 (a) of this chapter and of the im!)lementa-
tion of the system of combined Agency/SHAPE 
inspections mentioned in point D. 1 (b). 
In addition, the Director of the Agency and 
the principal members of his staff have made 
the usual contacts with the office of the Secret-
ary-General, the International Military Staff of 
NATO with SHAPE, on the occasion of 
SHAPEX 81, during the North Atlantic Treaty 
Assembly and in the course of liaison visits. 
H. General conclusions 
In accordance with Articles VII and XIX 
of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to 
report to the Council that, as a result of the 
control exercised in 1981, the figures obtained 
in accordance with Article XIII of Protocol 
No. IV: 
- for armaments of forces under NATO 
command under the terms of Article 
XIV of Protocol No. IV; and 
- for armaments of forces maintained 
under national command under the 
terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of 
Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 
14th December 1957, concluded in exe-
cution of Article V of Protocol No. II, 
represented for the control year 1981 and for 
each of the member states, the appropriate 
levels of armaments subject to control for these 
categories of armaments over which the Agency 
has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate. 
As required by Article XX of Protocol No. 
IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of 
field control measures carried out at force units 
and military depots and during agreed control 
measures at production plants, it did not detect 
for the categories of armaments which it 
controls: 
- either the manufacture of a category of 
armaments that the government of the 
member state concerned had undertaken 
not to manufacture; 
- or the existence, on the mainland of 
Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess 
of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of 
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Protocol No. N) or not justified by 
export requirements (Article XXII of 
Protocol No. IV). 
In 1981, the Agency again applied controls 
effectively in those fields which are open to 
it. In this connection, as in the past, the help 
and co-operation of national and NATO 
authorities, and of heads and staff of both the 
private firms and military establishments visited 
played an important part. 
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CHAPTER IV 
STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE 
A. Activities of the Standing Armaments 
Committee 
The Standing Armaments Committee met 
in plenary session on 8th May, 3rd July, 2nd 
October and as an ad hoc group on 16th 
November 1981. 
The main items on its agenda were the 
study of the situation in the armaments sector 
of industry in the member countries of WEU, 
the WEU Agreement 4.FT .6 and the activities 
of Working Group No. 8 on operational 
resea:rch. 
In addition, the members of the SAC and 
the Head of the International Secretariat, to-
gether with his senior staff, attended the 
meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on the 
joint production of armaments1 on 16th 
November. 
1. Study of the situation of the armaments sector of 
industry in the member countries of WEU 
(a) After preparing the " Presentation of the 
economic study of the armaments sector of 
industry in the WEU member countries", 
which was forwarded to the Assembly by the 
Council on 21st May 1981, the SAC was 
instructed by the Council to update it on the 
basis of publicly available documentation2• 
Under the authority and on the instructions 
of the SAC, the international secretariat under-
took the preparatory work necessary for this 
updating, which will bring together in one 
series the data covering the years 1972 to 1980 
but retain the data for 1972 to 1977 which have 
been given in the initial version. 
At the end of the year, it was planned that 
the drafts already prepared by the international 
secretariat would be considered by the SAC at 
its January 1982 meeting, with a view to 
releasing to the Assembly the document prepa-
red for it in time for the first part of its twenty-
eighth session. 
(b) Following the Council decision on this 
matter3, the international secretariat hopes to be 
in a position to undertake the preparatory work 
necessary to enable the SAC to update the data 
contained in the legal part and the first section 
of the economic part of its study. 
I. See Chapter I, E. 
2. See Chapter I, C and 11, B.3. 
3. See Chapter 11, B.3. 
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(c) With regard to preparation by the SAC of 
the second section of the economic part of its 
study, the Chairman-in-Office of the SAC, at 
the meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee, 
gave the following explanations to the members 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments: 
It was intended that this section should be 
concerned with the capabilities of the industrial 
sector of the WEU member countries, in the 
armaments sphere. A similar kind of study 
was, however, planned in the IEPG and, in 
order to avoid unnecessary work, it was decided 
to wait for the data provided by nations for the 
IEPG study to be made available. As this 
information is not yet available, the WEU study 
cannot be completed. The SAC will take stock 
of the position again once the data of the IEPG 
study are available. 
2. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 
(a) On the SAC's instructions, the Group of 
National Experts on Agreement 4.FT.6 met in 
Paris on 26th February 1981 with the following 
terms of reference: to study the American 
proposals for co-operation with a view to 
drawing up international trials standards for 
wheeled and possibly tracked vehicles, taking 
account of the work going on in NATO; to 
submit proposals to the SAC on the updating of 
Agreement 4.FT.6 and the group's future 
activities. 
After their discussion, the experts agreed 
on the need to achieve wide standardisation of 
trials methods on the basis of Agreement 
4.FT.6, beginning with wheeled vehicles. · 
(b) In accordance with the SAC's decision, the 
text of the agreement was despatched to the 
United States authorities, who were asked to 
give their comments on it and to provide, on a 
reciprocal basis, descriptions of their own trials 
methods, together with proposals for future co-
operation. 
The Committee agreed that the questions 
of updating the agreement, the future activities 
of the Group of National Experts and how 
further co-operation with the United States 
should best be pursued should be reconsidered 
subsequently, when the reply expected from the 
United States authorities had been received. 
(c) The members of the Assembly Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments were 
informed of the above, at the meeting of the 
Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production 
of armaments. 
B. Activities of the working groups 
1. Working Group No. 8 on operational research 
As the Chairman-in-Office of the SAC 
pointed out at the meeting of the Liaison Sub-
Committee, Working Group No. 8 is constitu-
ted to exchange the findings of national opera-
tional research studies and to organise symposia 
on operational research methods and techni-
ques, and visits to national operational research 
centres. The group has also done considerable 
work over five years in editing a glossary of 
operational research terms in five languages. 
The group held two meetings in 1981, on 
14th May and 9th October. These were linked 
with a symposium in Paris, in the first case, 
and a visit to the Netherlands, in the second. 
(a) Exchanges o.finformation 
During the meeting in the first half-year, 
information was exchanged on the studies 
described in the forms sent in 1980 and in the 
first months of 1981, viz: eight documents, 
which have led to requests for exchanges of 
reports; new forms have also been presented. 
The international secretariat introduced the 
1981 edition of the summary of exchanges of 
information carried out within Working Group 
No. 8. The new edition is not only a repertory 
of the forms sent in by the delegations and the 
bilateral exchanges of reports on operational 
research studies, but also lists the talks given 
during the six symposia on methodology 
organised by the group from 197 5 to 1980. It 
is a very valuable working tool, since it 
contains all the information exchanged since 
the group was set up. 
During the second half of 1981, there was a 
bilateral exchange of twenty-six study reports; 
two new reports have been added to the opera-
tional research library; two documents on new 
forms were presented to the group at its 
meeting on 9th October. 
(b) Symposium 
The subject chosen for the seventh 
symposium of Working Group No. 8, which 
took up the whole of 15th May, was " tactical 
and command post exercises and war games ". 
Eighteen experts on operational research 
took part. 
The talks gave rise to exchanges of views 
and a large number of questions, which showed 
the lively interest aroused by the subjects 
considered. 
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(c) Visit to the Netherlands 
At the invitation of the Netherlands autho-
rities, the members of Working Group No. 8, 
together with other operational research 
experts, were received by the TNO Physics 
Laboratory in The Hague on 8th October and 
by the National Aerospace Laboratory in 
Amsterdam on 9th October. 
In addition to the visits to the two labora-
tories arranged for them, eleven illustrated talks 
on operational research studies were given, 
which covered a very wide field and were rela-
ted to the three services. Each of these talks 
was followed by a large number of questions 
put by the participants, thus showing their great 
interest in the subjects dealt with. 
(d) Lexicographical activity 
The international secretariat is listing the 
corrections to the five-language glossary of 
operational research terms, on the basis of 
information supplied by the delegations 
concerned. 
With a view to further work on the 
glossary, Working Group No. 8 has prepared a 
programme, comprising three stages, which has 
been submitted to the SAC. The SAC has 
authorised it to continue its work, which for the 
time being will be limited to two tasks: the 
preparation of an addendum to the glossary as 
it now stands ; a pilot study relating to the 
preparation of a new improved and completed 
edition of this glossary. 
2. Group of experts on the evaluation of military 
equipment 
The group of experts is still awaiting a 
decision by the SAC regarding the second stage 
of its work, i.e. the evaluation, using different 
methods, of new equipment which has not yet 
been evaluated. 
At its meeting on 28th November 1980, 
the SAC decided that although the question of 
the evaluation of military equipment would no 
longer be on its agenda, it could be retabled at 
the request of any government wishing to 
submit a work proposal. 
C. International Secretariat 
1. Contacts with the Council and the authorities of the 
WEU member countries 
The Head of the International Secretariat 
presented to the Council, on 29th April 1981, 
his annual verbal report on the activities of the 
Standing Armaments Committee and its 
working groups. 
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In November, he went to Rome, where he 
met authorities from the Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Ministries. 
2. WEU Assembly 
The Head of the International Secretariat 
informed the SAC of the discussions on arma-
ments questions which had taken place during 
the second part of the twenty-sixth ordinary 
session and the first part of the twenty-seventh 
ordinary session of the Assembly. 
Extracts from speeches, reports, debates 
and recommendations on these questions were 
collected in two documents and circulated to 
the members of the SAC. 
3. Relations with NATO 
The Head of the International Secretariat 
was present, as observer, at the session of the 
North Atlantic Assembly which was held in 
Munich in October. 
He was represented by a member of the 
inte~ational secretariat, as observer, at the 
meetmgs of the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors which took place in April 
and October at the NATO headquarters in 
Brussels. 
A member of the secretariat was present at 
the June and December meetings of the NATO 
Naval Armaments Group. 
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4. Relations with FINABEL 
As the Chairman-in-Office of the SAC 
recalled at the Liaison Sub-Committee meeting, 
FINABEL is a co-ordinating committee 
between the army chiefs of staff of the WEU 
member countries and its vocation is to reach 
agreement among them on the military 
characteristics of future land forces' equipment, 
whereas the SAC is an official body of an inter-
national organisation with a tri-service voca-
tion. A joint meeting between FINABEL and 
the SAC was held in 1973 in order to divide the 
work and set up close contacts between the two 
secretariats. These contacts enable the interna-
tional secretariat of the SAC to encourage the 
study of certain FINABEL agreements in order 
to stimulate co-operation between member 
countries. A range of questions has thus been 
discussed within the SAC in recent years. 
Relations between the secretariats of the 
SAC and FINABEL have continued in 1981 in 
accordance with the provisions for co-operation 
between these two bodies worked out in 1973. 
The international secretariat was repre-
sented at the annual meeting of the FINABEL 
Co-ordinating Committee where the discussion 
revealed certain areas in which co-operation 
between the SAC and FINABEL could be 
improved, particularly with regard to informing 
the FINABEL working groups, while taking 
account of the need to avoid duplication of 
work between the two bodies. 
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CHAPTER V 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
A. Meetings of the Committee 
In 1981, the Public Administration 
Committee held its two annual meetings, which 
take place in each of the member countries in 
turn, in Brussels from 28th to 30th April and in 
Middelburg from 7th to 9th October. The 
Committee continues to hold some of its 
meetings in towns other than the capital of the 
host country, so as to have the opportunity for 
contacts with local authorities, which are useful 
in the context of its work. 
These meetings are devoted mainly to 
exchanges of information on important admi-
nistrative developments in the member coun-
tries during the preceding six months and the 
preparation of the next multilateral course for 
government officials organised under the auspi-
ces of the Committee. 
One aspect of discussion within the Com-
mittee concerns administrative organisation in 
the member countries, the factors governing 
such organisation and the principal new prob-
lems, generally problems common to the 
majority of the member countries, which have 
to be faced by the administration. In this 
context, members of the Committee keep each 
other informed about the various changes 
occurring in the state and administrative machi-
nery of their countries in consequence of 
changes or reshuffiing of government. The 
principal laws whose impact on the administra-
tion is significant are reported and, where 
appropriate, their texts circulated. 
Among problems which are in the forefront 
in several countries and which have important 
administrative consequences, those raised 
during the year under consideration concerned 
ethnic and cultural minorities, sometimes invol-
ving public disturbances, the problems of large 
agglomerations, often in areas of industrial 
decline : housing, urban renewal. Soil pollu-
tion and the need for the administration to 
intervene in this field was another of the 
subjects raised. 
A second aspect of the exchanges of views 
and information within the Committee natur-
ally relates to the activities and terms of service 
of state employees and efforts to improve the 
quality and efficiency of the civil service. The 
importance of good recruiting in this connec-
tion need not be stressed ; mention was made of 
the possible introduction of new techniques, 
using computers, for civil service recruitment 
and promotion examinations, as well as new 
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systems for assessing ability and output. 
Finally, concern was expressed to have a better 
definition of the requirements for the various 
categories of staff (A, B, C, ... ). Among other 
subjects referred to at meetings, mention should 
be made of the introduction and regulation of 
part-time employment in the civil service in 
some countries, the introduction of flexi-time 
and social protection for unestablished staff. 
Finally, as in the previous year, the 
members of the Committee discussed the effect 
on the administration of the unfavourable 
economic situation in -the member countries. 
In the majority of them, the adoption of 
austerity budgets has, to a greater or lesser 
degree, imposed reductions on public expen-
diture and a variety of measures has been taken 
to effect economies in the public service. In a 
number of countries, there has been a critical 
survey of various fields of government activity 
and strict limits have been placed on recruit-
ment policy. However, measures to combat 
unemployment have led, elsewhere, to the 
creation of new public service jobs. As already 
stated in the twenty-sixth annual report, 
policies to combat inflation and unemployment 
have continued, throughout the year under 
consideration, to form the background to 
administrative life in the member countries. 
B. 1981 course for government officials 
The thirtieth multilateral course for 
government officials, sponsored by the Public 
Administration Committee, was held at Siena 
from 18th to 24th October, on the topic of 
unemployment among young graduates in 
Europe. 
The objective of the course was to give a 
selected group of public officials from the 
member countries with at least ten years' 
seniority, the opportunity of comparing their 
professional experience regarding a grave 
problem which affects all countries in varying 
degrees. This confrontation was to be 
achieved: 
- by means of documented evidence of 
unemployment in Europe in the last 
decade, with particular reference to the 
proportion of unemployment among 
young graduates and its economic and 
social importance; 
- by an analysis of the typology and the 
results of any ad hoc public inter-
ventions; 
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- by an analysis of the specific impact of 
unemployment among young graduates 
on the structures of public administra-
tions (quantitative and qualitative effects 
on competitive recruitment, direct 
appointments, etc.); 
- by an effort of imagination with a view 
to suggesting changes to the interventions 
effected or new projects for dealing with 
the problem. 
The course, which brought together 
twenty-two participants at the Col/egio univer-
sitario Bracci di Pontignano (Siena), was orga-
nised as follows: information on the general 
problems of unemployment among young gra-
duates in Europe, by means of two lectures by 
experts; discussion of experience in the various 
countries, on the basis of a paper submitted by 
each delegation; meetings with the local 
authorities concerned; group study of the 
suggestions made during the course. 
At the time of drafting this chapter, 
national delegations' comments on the interest-
value and usefulness of the course have not yet 
been received. However, it is worthy of note 
that, quite apart from the importance of the 
subject considered and the .. technical " results 
of the joint work, the valuable point about 
courses for government officials is that they 
bring together national officials who otherwise 
would be unlikely to have the opportunity to 
meet. This was very clearly expressed in one 
of the reports received after the 1980 course in 
the United Kingdom: .. We are agreed that for 
us the main value of the course lay in the 
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opportunity it gave us to make close personal 
acquaintance with other European civil 
servants. It is often difficult in dealing with 
colleagues from abroad to reach a stage where a 
perfectly frank and confident exchange of views 
is possible. One of the results of this was that 
we found a great deal more in common than we 
would previously have expected. " 
C. Study visits 
Study visits, which enable an official to 
spend one or two weeks in the administration 
of one of the other member countries, studying 
his own speciality, are organised bilaterally 
between the national delegations of the sending 
and host countries. However, the Committee 
devotes a part of its time at each meeting to this 
subject and each delegate can comment or draw 
upon the experience of his colleagues in this 
field. 
These visits cover a wide variety of 
subjects, as is shown by the following few 
examples of visits carried out during 1981: 
control of bargain offer claims; health and 
safety at work legislation (subjects studied in 
Germany); official social surveys in France; 
administration and distribution of European 
regional development funds (subjects studied in 
France); marketing of agricultural commodities; 
problems of radioactive waste disposal; future 
energy choices and public consultation thereon; 
use of mini- and micro-computer networks in 
government administration (subjects studied in 
the Netherlands). 
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CHAPTER VI 
BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS 
A. Budget 
As pointed out by the Council in their 
reply to Recommendation 365, the budget 
situation in the member countries at the present 
time calls for rigorous economies. 
The budgets of the WEU ministerial bodies 
for 1981, which were still under scrutiny when 
the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council 
was transmitted to the Assembly, were 
approved by the Council in April; they came 
within the limits of the rates of inflation fore-
cast for France and the United Kingdom. 
Recapitulatory tables for these budgets, as 
adopted and then revised, are annexed to this 
document. 
Also in April 1981, the Council charged 
an ad hoc working group with a study aimed at 
identifying all acceptable measures that might 
be taken to achieve economies, together with 
greater efficiency in the organisation's methods 
of work and use of the staff of the WEU minis-
terial bodies, without impairing the organisa-
tion's ability to meet its obligations under the 
modified Brussels Treaty, the Protocols and the 
Council's Decision of 7th May 1955. 
During this study, it was noted that as a 
result of excellent co-operation, certain expen-
diture effected for the benefit of the Assembly 
was borne by the budgets of the two WEU 
ministerial bodies. 
The recommendations of the ad hoc group 
were taken into account by the Council in the 
detailed discussions which they devoted to the 
preparation of the budgets of the WEU minister-
ial bodies for 1982. 
B. Social security of staff members serving 
in the United Kingdom 
An agreement with the United Kingdom 
authorities was concluded in September 
1981. It exempts from compulsory contribu-
tions to the national social security scheme 
(class 1) those members of the staff who are 
members of the organisation's pension scheme. 
They may, if they so choose, contribute 
voluntarily (class 3) for a reduced range of 
benefits. 
As for the agreement to be concluded with 
the United Kingdom Government to regulate 
the situation of staff members wishing to 
remain in the Provident Fund, the Council's 
discussions have led to the conclusion that 
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these members should also be exempted from 
affiliation to class 1 of the United Kingdom 
scheme, on the understanding that they would 
have the opportunity of contributing to class 3 
of the scheme on a voluntary basis. 
As the Council pointed out in their 
previous annual report, a meeting of national 
experts was held in October 1980 to discuss, in 
relation to general social security principles, the 
effects of exempting WEU staff members. It 
was concluded that, even if they contributed to 
class 3 of the United Kingdom scheme on a 
voluntary basis, there would be certain gaps in 
their benefits and cover during their service 
with WEU and/or after their departure from the 
organisation. The Council approved palliative 
measures for most of these gaps. Furthermore, 
discussions on other points are being held 
within the framework of co-ordination. 
Under arrangements agreed with the 
United Kingdom authorities, the social security 
contributions collected from all staff members 
since April 1975 and up to the end of the last 
insurance year in March 1981 were paid over 
to the Department of Health and Social 
Security from the WEU suspense account in 
September 1981. The balance of these contri-
butions for the current tax year will be paid in 
March 1982. 
C. Provident Fund 
The short-term policy of investment in 
French francs only was discontinued in the 
spring of 1981 and the investment is now diver-
sified over four currencies to minimise the risk 
arising from fluctuations in rates of exchange 
and their consequent effect upon the value of 
the fund. 
D. WEU administrative meetings 
The need for frequent meetings between 
the administrative staff of the London and Paris 
offices of WEU has again been further reduced 
in 1981. Many of the initial problems arising 
from the introduction of the pension scheme 
have now been overcome and, in that connec-
tion, much credit is due to the assistance pro-
vided now by the Joint Pensions Administrative 
Section. 
The good working relationship with the 
WEU Staff Association has continued as before. 
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The retired staff of the co-ordinated organi-
sations have in the course of 1981 instituted an 
" Association of pensioned staff of the co-
ordinated organisations and of their depen-
dants", with a secretariat in Paris, to take care 
of their interests with respect to the pension 
scheme, and working in close co-operation with 
the existing staff associations of the active staff 
members. 
E. Activities in the framework of the 
co-ordinated organisations 
The Co-ordinating Committee held eight 
meetings in 1981, each of two days' duration. 
In addition there were eleven meetings of the 
Committee of Heads of Administration, nine 
joint meetings of the Standing Committee of 
Secretaries-General and the Standing Commit-
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tee of Staff Associations, as well as one of the 
Committee of Secretaries-General. 
The main problem areas that were 
discussed during these meetings and resulting in 
seven reports by the Co-ordinating Committee, 
were: 
- the periodical review and adjustment of 
salaries and allowances; 
- the comparison of grade equivalencies in 
order to judge a parameter in the trend 
of salaries, with one member country; 
- the problems associated with any form of 
extension of co-ordination to other inter-
national organisations; 
- the conduct of periodic salary surveys in 
some member countries; 
- the particular impact on salaries and 
allowances of the current economic 
recession. 
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APPENDIX 
Summary of WEU main budget for 1981 
A* B* C* Total B+C 
£ Frs Frs Frs 
Salaries and allowances ................. 1,218,582 9,010,600 18,658,300 27,668,900 
Pensions .............................. 104,160 861,800 2,217,100 3,078,900 
Travel ................................ 34,790 129,500 489,250 618,750 
Other operating costs ................... 177,315 509,670 728,020 1,237,690 
Purchase of furniture, etc. 0 ••••••••••••• 2,675 16,550 31,850 48,400 
Buildings •• 0 ............. 0 ••••••••••••• - 68 750 123 750 192 500 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE .................. 1 537 522 10 596 870 22 248 270 32 845 140 
WEU tax •••••••• 0 ••• 0 ••••••••••• 0 0 0 •• 443,402 3,164,900 6,487,000 9,651,900 
Other receipts ......................... 43,870 85,200 187,800 273,000 
Pension receipts •••••••• 0 •••••••••••••• 29 090 312 100 666 000 978 100 
TOTAL INCOME ....................... 516 362 3 562 200 7 340 800 10 903 000 
NET ToTAL ......................... 1,021,160 7,034,670 14,907,470 21,942,140 
National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1981 
600ths 
Belgium ••••••••• 0 •••• 0 0 0 •••• 0 •••••••• 59 
France ................................ 120 
Germany •••••••••••• 0 •• 0. 0 ••••••••••• 120 
Italy .................................. 120 
Luxembourg 0 •••••••••••••••••• 0 •••••• 2 
Netherlands •••••••• 0. 0 •• 0 •••• 0. 0 •••••• 59 
United Kingdom ....................... 120 
TOTAL • 0 •••••••••••••••••• 0. 0 ••••••• 600 
*A Secretariat-General. 
8 International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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£ F. frs. 
100,414.07 2,157,643.77 
204,232.00 4,388,428.00 
204,232.00 4,388,428.00 
204,232.00 4,388,428.00 
3,403.86 73,140.46 
100,414.07 2,157,643.77 
204 232.00 4 388 428.00 
1,021,160.00 21,942,140.00 
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S11mmary of revised WEU b11dget for 1981 
A* 
£ 
Salaries and allowances ................. 1,218,582 
Pensions .............................. 104,160 
Travel ................................ 29,715 
Other operating .costs ................... 204,815 
Purchase of furniture, etc. .............. 2,675 
Buildings ............................. -
TOTAL EXPENDITURE .................. 1 559 947 
WEU tax ............................. 443,402 
Other receipts ••••••• 0 ••••••••••••••••• 43,870 
Pension receipts ....................... 29 090 
TOTAL INCOME ....................... 516 362 
NET ToTAL ......................... 1,043,585 
*A Secretariat-General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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B* 
Frs 
9,010,600 
861,800 
129,500 
509,670 
16,550 
68 750 
10 596 870 
3,164,900 
85,200 
312 100 
3 562 200 
7,034,670 
APPENDIX 
C* Total B+C 
Frs Frs 
18,658,300 27,668,900 
2,217,100 3,078,900 
489,250 618,750 
728,020 1,237,690 
31,850 48,400 
123,750 192 500 
22 248._270 32,845,140 
6,487,000 9,651,900 
187,800 273,000 
666_,000 978 100 
7 340,800 10 903 000 
14,907,470 21,942,140 
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Revision of Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure 
REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges2 
by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RESOLUTION 
4th March 1982 
on the revision of Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Grieve (Chairman); 
MM. Miche/, Schulte (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Beix, Bras-
seur, Mrs. Chepy-Uger, MM. Eastham (Alternate: Cox), 
Edwards, Eijsink (Alternate: Aarts), Giust, Glesener, Howell 
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(Alternate: Osborn), Mondino, Pucci, Manfred Schmidt, 
senes, Spies von Biillesheim (Alternate: Wittmann), Sterpa, 
Unland, Vial-Massat, van der Werff. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Draft Resolution 
on the revision of Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 tuUl 40 of the Rules of Procedure 
The Assembly, 
DECIDES 
To draft Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 and 40 as follows: 
1. Rule 14 
Paragraph 1 shall read: 
"The Presidential Committee shall consist of the President of the Assembly, who shall be Chair-
man ex officio, his predecessors as long as they remain Representatives or Substitutes of the 
Assembly without interruption, the Vice-Presidents, and the Chairmen of the permanent commit-
tees. If absent, or unable to discharge his duties, the President may be replaced by one of the 
Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, and the Chairman of a permanent committee by a Vice-
Chairman of that committee. The President may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to 
attend meetings of the Presidential Committee. " 
2. Rule 29 
The second sentence of paragraph 3 shall read: 
" Unless otherwise decided by the President of the Assembly, they shall relate to only one 
paragraph at a time. " 
3. Rule 34 
Paragraph 2 shall read: 
" However, the vote shall be taken by roll-call whenever ten or more Representatives or Substi-
tutes present request it. " 
4. Rule 38 
The French text of paragraph 4 shall read: 
"Un groupe ne peut comprendre moins de neuf Representants ou Suppleants. ",the English text 
not being revised. 
5. Rule 40 
Paragraph 1 shall read: 
" Committees shall examine questions and documents which are referred to them by the 
Assembly or by the Presidential Committee. " 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. Rule 14, paragraph 1 
Provision for former Presidents of the 
Assembly to sit on the Presidential Committee 
was included in Rule 14, paragraph 1, through 
an amendment adopted by the Assembly on 
1Oth December 1969. 
Its purpose was to allow the Presidential 
Committee to benefit from the experience 
gained by former Presidents of the Assembly as 
long as they remained members of the 
Assembly. 
However, at the December 1981 session 
this provision was criticised. It was in fact 
pointed out that a former President who left the 
WEU Assembly and who then returned to the 
Assembly a few years later would become a de 
jure member of the Presidential Committee 
again although he would have been unable to 
keep in touch with the Assembly's business. 
The Committee therefore feels that the 
Rules of Procedure should specify that a break 
in the term of office of a Representative or 
Substitute has the effect of making a former 
President ineligible for de jure membership of 
the Presidential Committee. It therefore pro-
poses to amend paragraph 1 by replacing 
" former Presidents of the Assembly who are 
Representatives or Substitutes to the Assem-
bly " by " his predecessors as long as they 
remain Representatives or Substitutes of the 
Assembly without interruption". 
Some Committee members, however, 
would have preferred it to be stipulated that 
only the President's immediate predecessor is 
entitled to de jure membership of the Presiden-
tial Committee and that this would be limited 
to a period of one year. 
2. Rule 29, paragraph 3 
In spite of the provisions of this paragraph, 
the President sometimes has to submit to the 
Assembly, with its agreement, amendments 
grouped together. 
It is thus possible, in certain cases, to 
shorten a discussion which an unduly large 
number of amendments would have made 
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tedious and to improve the clarity and coher-
ence of debates. 
In order to take account of exceptional 
circumstances which may arise, the Committee 
unanimously proposes that the second sentence 
of paragraph 3 be amended to read: 
"Unless otherwise decided by the President 
of the Assembly, they shall relate to only 
one paragraph at a time. " 
3. Rule 34, paragraph 2 
Paragraph 2 has been criticised for its lack 
of precision and complexity. 
(i) It seems to lack precision because it does 
not indicate whether the request for a roll-call 
vote must be made in writing or whether it may 
be made by a Representative of Substitute from 
the floor. 
It is in fact by counting the number of 
Representatives endorsing the request for a roll-
call vote that the President notes that at least 
ten Representatives or Substitutes are making 
the request. 
(ii) It seems complex insofar as it seeks to avert 
the danger of a manreuvre by which members 
of the Assembly could request a roll-call and 
then withdraw from the chamber to prevent 
there being a quorum and thus make a vote 
impossible. This fear is unfounded since the 
rules relating to the quorum have been revised 
to make the quorum depend not on the number 
of Representatives or Substitutes taking part in 
the vote but on the number of signatures on the 
attendance register. 
The Committee proposes to clarify and 
simplify paragraph 2 by drafting it as follows: 
"However, the vote shall be taken by 
roll-call whenever ten or more Represent-
atives or Substitutes present request it. " 
Some Committee members thought, how-
ever, that if several authors of the request are 
absent when the vote is taken the President of 
the Assembly should be able to revert to 
normal procedure. 
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4. Rule 38, paragraph 4 
The present text of this paragraph is not 
absolutely identical in the two languages since 
the French text seems to refer only to the 
formation of political groups. But the mini-
mum number of Representatives or Substitutes 
required by the Rules of Procedure applies not 
only to the formation of a group but also to its 
continued existence. Any properly-formed 
group whose numbers fall below this threshold 
ceases to exist. 
This is clear in the English text of the rule. 
The French text should therefore be 
brought into line with the English text, which is 
more comprehensive. 
The Committee unanimously proposes to 
draft the French text of paragraph 4 as follows: 
'' Un groupe ne peut comprendre moins de 
neuf Representants ou Suppleants. " 
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S. Rule 40, paragraph 1 
Rule 40 was not amended in the general 
revision of the Rules of Procedure. Its wording 
corresponded to that of former Rule 26 which 
provided that unless the Assembly decided 
otherwise the examination of a matter in 
Committee should be preceded by a general 
debate. 
But Rule 16, paragraph 2, revised in 
December 1980, now lays down that: 
" Any item referred to a committee by 
decision of the Assembly or of the Presi-
dential Committee shall also be included in 
the Assembly's register. " 
The Committee therefore unanimously 
proposes that paragraph 1 read as follows: 
" Committees shall examine questions and 
documents which are referred to them by 
the Assembly or by the Presidential 
Committee." 
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Amendment 1 
Rerision of Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Cox 
1. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, add: 
"Paragraph 3 shall read: 
3. The vote on: 
(a) the draft reply to the annual report; 
(b) a motion to disagree to the annual report or to any part of it; or 
(c) a draft recommendation or draft ·opinion considered as a whole, 
shall, if there is opposition, be taken by roll-call. 
16th June 1982 
If there is no opposition, the names of any representatives who signify their wish to abstain by 
standing in their places will be recorded in the minutes. " 
l. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (report removed from the orders of the day). 
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Signed: Cox 
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The Falklands crisis 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur 
The Assembly, 
(z) Firmly condemning the armed invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina on 2nd April 
1982 in flagrant violation of international law; 
(iz) Welcoming the rapid and effective operation of European political consultation leading to the 
statement issued by the Ten on 2nd April and the declaration of lOth April; 
(iiz) Fully endorsing those declarations, but regretting that the Council did not meet in application 
of Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(iv) Welcoming the initiative of the United States Secretary of State to seek accommodation 
between the two powers concerned; 
(v) Noting that the Soviet Union and certain of its allies have not hesitated to afford Argentina, 
after condemnation by the United Nations Security Council, certain assistance; 
(vi) Concerned at the weakening of allied forces in the North Atlantic following the necessary dis-
patch of large British forces outside the area, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
1. To implement fully the decision of the Ten to ban the export of arms and military equipment 
to Argentina and to ban all imports into the Community originating in Argentina; 
2. To concert their political, economic and diplomatic efforts in all countries and appropriate 
international bodies to secure the immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands in 
accordance with Security Council Resolution 502, the peaceful settlement of the dispute in full 
accord with the wishes of the inhabitants of the islands, and the widest support for the foregoing deci-
sion of the Ten; 
3. To study the lessons for European security which may be drawn from the crisis, including: 
(a) ways of ensuring that governments obtain earlier warning of impending military attack; 
(b) the need for the vital interests of the Alliance to be defended outside the area prescribed in 
Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty; 
(c) the compensatory measures to be taken by the allies within that area forthwith following 
the dispatch of large British forces outside the area; 
4. To draw the attention ofthe Council to Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 1 with 0 absten-
tions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); 
MM. van den Bergh, Mayoud (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr, 
Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bemini, Bizet, Blaauw, Bonnet 
(Alternate: van der E/st), Cox, Dejardin, Duraffour (Alter-
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nate: Baume[), Edwards, Fosson, Grant, Kittelmann, Lemm-
rich, Maravalle, Menard (Alternate: Louis Jung), Pecchioli 
(Alternate: Amade1), Pignion, Prussen, Hermann Schmidt, 
Scholten, Smith, Tanghe, Vohrer. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
Document 907 Revised 19th May 1982 
The Falklands crisis 
REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments2 
by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the Falklands crisis 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur 
APPENDICES 
I. Draft recommendation adopted by the Committee on 20th April 1982 
11. History of the Falklands 
(a) British interpretation 
(b) Argentinian interpretation 
Ill. Negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom 
N. Official texts 
(a) Agreed statement by the President of the United Nations Security 
Council, Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, Zaire- 1st April1982 
(b) European political co-operation - Communique issued by the ten 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs - 2nd April 1982 
(c) Statement by the Secretary-General of NATO after the urgent meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council - 2nd April 1982 
(d) United Nations Security Council Resolution 502- 3rd April 1982 
(e) European political co-operation - Declaration by the Ten - lOth April 
1982 
(f) European Communities - Text of the regulation promulgated by the 
Council on economic sanctions against Argentina- 14th April 1982 
(g) Eurogroup - Communique issued after the meeting of the eleven 
Defence Ministers - 5th May 1982 
(h) NATO Defence Planning Committee - Communique issued after the 
meeting of Defence Ministers - 7th May 1982 
l. Adopted in Committee by 11 votes to 2 with 4 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Cavaliere (Chair-
man) ; MM. van den Bergh, Mayoud (Vice-Chairmen) ; Mr. 
Bahr, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini (Alternate: 
Martino), Bizet, Blaauw, Bonnel (Alternate: De Decker), 
Cox (Alternate: Brown), Dejardin, Duraffour, Edwards, 
57 
Fosson (Alternate: De P01), Grant (Alternate: Hill), 
Kittelmann, Lemmrich (Alternate: Wittmann), Maravalle 
(Alternate: Del/a Briotta), Menard, Pecchioli, Pignion, 
Prussen, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, Smith, Steverlynck, 
Vohrer. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the Falkltutds crisis 
(z) Firmly condemning the armed invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina on 2nd April 
1982 in flagrant violation of international law ; 
(iz) Welcoming the rapid and effective operation of European political consultation leading to the 
statement issued by the Ten on 2nd April and the declaration of lOth April ; 
(iiz) Fully endorsing those declarations, but regretting that the Council did not meet in application 
of Article VIII.3 of the· modified Brussels Treaty ; 
(iv) Regretting that the initiatives of the United States Secretary of State, the President of Peru and 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations to seek accommodation between the two powers concer-
ned have not so far succeeded ; 
(v) Noting that the Soviet Union and certain of its allies have not hesitated t{) afford Argentina, 
after condemnation by the United Nations Security Council, certain assistance ; 
(vz) Concerned at the weakening of allied forces in the North Atlantic following the necessary dis-
patch of large British forces outside the area, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
1. To implement fully the decision of the Ten to ban the export of arms and military equipment 
to Argentina and to ban all imports into the Community originating in Argentina ; 
2. To concert their political, economic and diplomatic efforts in all countries and appropriate 
international bodies to secure the immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands in 
accordance with Security Council Resolution 502, the peaceful settlement of the dispute in full 
accord with the wishes of the inhabitants of the islands, and the widest support for the foregoing 
decision ofthe Ten; 
3. To study the lessons for European security which may be drawn from the crisis, including: 
(a) ways of ensuring that governments obtain earlier warning of impending military attack ; 
(b) the need for the vital interests of the Alliance to be defended outside the area prescribed in 
Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty; 
(c) the compensatory measures to be taken by the allies within that area forthwith following 
the dispatch of large British forces outside the area ; 
4. To draw the attention of the Council to Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Ca11aliere, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. On 2nd April 1982 Argentine forces 
attacked and occupied the Falklands Islands. 
2. The Presidential Committee referred the 
matter to the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments, requesting it to report to the 
Presidential Committee in time for it to be 
considered by that committee on 19th May. 
3. The committee adopted a draft recom-
mendation on 20th April1 and subsequently 
adopted the present report with revised draft 
recommendation on 19th May immediately 
prior to the meeting of the Presidential Com-
mittee on that day. In the revised draft recom-
mendation now submitted - revised only in 
paragraph (iv) of the preamble to take account 
of mediation initiatives subsequent to 20th 
April - the committee first and foremost calls 
on the Assembly to condemn the unprovoked 
aggression committed by Argentina, in flagrant 
violation of international law. The use of 
force in pursuit of territorial claims must be 
universally condemned. Almost no corner of 
the world would be free of the threat of hostili-
ties, and there would be a grave risk of world 
war, if nations could resort to force with 
impunity in such circumstances. The commit-
tee particularly deplores the fact that the 
Argentine attack on the Falklands took place 
on 2nd April in defiance of the agreed state-
ment from the President of the United Nations 
Security Council on 1st April: 
"The Security Council accordingly calls 
on the Governments of Argentina and the 
United Kingdom to exercise the utmost 
restraint at this time and in particular to 
refrain from the use or threat of force in 
the region and to continue the search for 
a diplomatic solution. " 2 
4. The committee's text welcomes the rapid 
and effective operation of European political 
co-operation, which condemned the armed 
intervention the same day that it occurred, and 
led to the European Communities agreeing on 
economic sanctions 3; it calls for the widest 
support for that decision. It regrets, however, 
that the Council of WEU was not convened 
under Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels 
Treaty which provides for consultation " with 
regard to any situation which may constitute a 
threat to peace, in whatever area this threat 
should arise ... ". 
l. Text at Appendix I. 
2. Full text at Appendix IV (a). 
3. Texts at Appendix IV (b), (e) and(/). 
59 
5. The committee notes that the position of 
the United States, and of NATO, was originally 
less clearly defined than that of the European 
Community. At the outset the United States 
sought to maintain an impartial status for its 
Secretary of State while Mr. Haig was acting as 
intermediary between the United Kingdom and 
Argentina, but the United States would also 
have preferred, if possible, to have secured a 
withdrawal of Argentine forces without impair-
ing United States-Argentine relations, because 
of their importance to the present United States 
administration in its policy of resisting commu-
nist penetration of Latin America. With the 
failure of the Haig mission on 30th April, how-
ever, the United States fmally took sides, 
offering "material" assistance to the United 
Kingdom, and denying military and economic 
assistance to Argentina, although not imposing 
economic sanctions. 
6. Comment by NATO has shifted simi-
larly. At British request the North Atlantic 
Council held a special meeting on 2nd April 
after a statement issued by the Secretary Gene-
ral noted merely that " Members of the Council 
expressed deep concern at the dispute ... ". The 
Defence Ministers of the eleven European 
NATO countries, members of Eurogroup, at 
their meeting on 5th May " condemned 
Argentina's armed invasion", and the ministe-
rial meeting of the NATO Defence Planning 
Committee on 7th May endorsed the Euro-
group statement 1• 
7. The basis for an end to hostilities is 
Security Council Resolution 502, adopted with 
only one vote against (Panama) and four 
abstentions (Soviet Union, China, Poland, 
Spain) on 3rd April. It " 1. Demands an 
immediate cessation of hostilities ; 2. Demands 
an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine 
forces from the Falkland Islands; 3. Calls on 
the Governments of Argentina and the United 
Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to their 
differences and respect fully the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations " 2• This report does not examine 
subsequent attempts by various persons, alluded 
to in paragraph (iv) of the preamble, to secure 
the application of Resolution 502, which has 
not been accepted by Argentina, and a nego-
tiated settlement of the crisis. While these 
efforts continue, any report on their progress 
would be out of date before it was distributed. 
1. Texts at Appendix IV (c), (g) and (h). 
2. Full text at Appendix IV (d). 
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The recommendation calls simply for the 
withdrawal of Argentine forces in accordance 
with the resolution, and the peaceful settlement 
of the dispute in full accord with the wishes of 
the inhabitants. 
8. While deploring the loss of human life 
that has so far resulted from the conflict, the 
committee is also aware that many conclusions 
can be drawn for European security, not least 
the need for early warning of impending 
military attack ; the need to ensure that 
political authorities make proper use of warning 
when received and take proper measures to 
prevent a threat materialising; and the compen-
satory measures that need to be taken in the 
area covered by the Alliance when national 
forces are necessarily sent outside the area in 
the defence of vital interests. The committee 
calls for these and other lessons to be studied. 
It is too soon to attempt to draw such conclu-
sions in the present report. 
9. The present report does not examine the 
substance of the Argentine claim to the 
Falklands ; there is a summary of the rival his-
torical claims at Appendix I and of recent 
Anglo-Argentine negotiations at Appendix II. 
The committee merely notes that United 
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Kingdom administration of the islands has been 
effective and uninterrupted since January 1833; 
that the population is of British stock and seeks 
no change in the status enjoyed by the islands 
prior to the Argentine invasion. 
Opinion of the minority 
10. The original draft recommendation of 
20th April was adopted by 15 votes to 1 with 
0 abstentions. The minority on that occa-
sion, while supporting much of the recommen-
dation, was opposed to the reference to the 
Soviet Union in paragraph (v) of the preamble, 
and to paragraph 3 of the operative text calling 
for the lessons for European security to be 
studied. The revised recommendation of 19th 
May was adopted by 11 votes to 2 with 4 
abstentions. A proposal of the minority on 
this occasion was that the report should 
examine the history of the rights of the inhabi-
tants of the Falklands. Some of those abstain-
ing believed the report should have examined 
longer-term political solutions to problems 
raised by the crisis, including the improvement 
of relations between Europe and Latin America 
in general. 
APPENDIX I 
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The Assembly, 
APPENDIX I 
The Falklands crisis 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur 
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20th April 1982 
(z) Firmly condemning the armed invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina on 2nd April 
1982 in flagrant violation of international law; 
(iz) Welcoming the rapid and effective operation of European political consultation leading to the 
statement issued by the Ten on 2nd April and the declaration of lOth April; 
(iii) Fully endorsing those declarations, but regretting that the Council did not meet in application 
of Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(iv) Welcoming the initiative of the United States Secretary of State to seek accommodation 
between the two powers concerned; 
(v) Noting that the Soviet Union and certain of its allies have not hesitated to afford Argentina, 
after condemnation by the United Nations Security Council, certain assistance; 
(vz) Concerned at the weakening of allied forces in the North Atlantic following the necessary dis-
patch of large British forces outside the area, 
REcOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
i. To implement fully the decision of the Ten to ban the export of arms and military equipment 
to Argentina and to ban all imports into the Community originating in Argentina; 
2. To concert their political, economic and diplomatic efforts in all countries and appropriate 
international bodies to secure the immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands in 
accordance with Security Council Resolution 502, the peaceful settlement of the dispute in full 
accord with the wishes of the inhabitants of the islands, and the widest support for the foregoing deci-
sion of the Ten; 
3. To study the lessons for European security which may be drawn from the crisis, including: 
(a) ways of ensuring that governments obtain earlier warning of impending military attack; 
(b) the need for the vital interests of the Alliance to be defended outside the area prescribed in 
Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty; 
(c) the compensatory measures to be taken by the allies within that area forthwith following 
the dispatch of large British forces outside the area; 
4. To draw the attention ofthe Council to Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
l. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 1 with 0 absten-
tions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); 
MM. van den Bergh, Mayoud (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr, 
Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini, Bizet, Blaauw, Bonnel 
(Alternate: van der E/st), Cox, Dejardin, Duraffour (Alter-
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nate: Baumel), Edwards, Fosson, Grant, Kitte/mann, Lemm-
rich, Maravalle, Menard (Alternate: Louis Jung), Pecchioli 
(Alternate: Amadez), Pignion, Prussen, Hermann Schmidt, 
Scholten, Smith, Tanghe, Vohrer. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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APPENDIX 11 
History of the Falklands 
(a) British interpretation 1 
14th August 1592 
The islands are believed to have been 
first sighted by the English captain, John Davis; 
from the ship "Desire". Two years later, in 
1594, Sir Richard Hawkins sailed along their 
northern coast. In 1598, the Dutch sailor, 
Sebald van Weerdt, is said to have visited some 
of the islands of the archipelago (probably the 
Jason Islands). 
27th January 1690 
Captain John Strong of the British Royal 
Navy made the first known landing on the 
islands, which had never been inhabited, and 
named the sound between the western and 
eastern islands Falkland after Viscount 
Falkland, the Treasurer of the Royal Navy. 
French seal-hunters from St. Malo were 
frequent visitors to the islands in the eighteenth 
century, hence their French name of lies 
Malouines and their Spanish name of Is/as 
Malvinas. 
31st January 1764 
A French sailor-explorer, Bougainville, · 
founded the first settlement on East Falkland in 
the name of France and at his own expense : 
Fort St. Louis on East Falkland. 
12th January 1765 
Commodore John Byron, sent by the 
British Admiralty to survey the islands, 
proclaimed that they were uninhabited and 
claimed them for Great Britain. In January 
1766, after deciding that the occupation of the 
islands was " the key to the whole of the Pacific 
Ocean ", the Admiralty sent Captain John 
MacBride to complete the occupation with a 
settlement of about a hundred people at Port 
Egmont on Saunders Island off West Falkland 
and build a fort. He discovered the French 
settlement in December and told the settlers to 
leave. 
1767 
France relinquished its claim to the 
islands in return for the equivalent of a 
I. Sources: United Kingdom Central Office of Informa-
tion, Document 152/82, March 1982; the Falkland Islands 
and their dependencies, article by David Cross in the 
Times, 15th April 1982. 
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£24,000 payment by Spain under a Franco-
Spanish treaty of 1761: the Pacto de familia; 
Fort (now Port) Louis was renamed Puerto de 
Soledad. 
4th June 1770 
The Spaniards compelled the British to 
leave Port Egmont. The action brought 
Britain and Spain to the brink of war. In 
1771, Port E~ont was returned to Britain and 
British settlers came back, before leaving volun-
tarily in 1774 for economic reasons. However, 
the British claim to sovereignty was maintained 
and a plaque was left on the islands. 
Spain placed the islands under the juris-
diction of Buenos Aires, then a Spanish colony, 
and appointed nine successive governors. The 
last governor and the Spanish settlers left East 
Falkland in March 1811. 
9th July 1816 
The United Provinces of the Rio de la 
Plata, whose capital is Buenos Aires, declared 
their independence from Spain, claiming 
sovereignty over Spanish lands in the region. 
In 1816, the United Provinces consisted of 
Bolivia, Uruguay, Argentina and Buenos Aires 
(as a separate entity) but the first two territories 
seceded in 1825 and 1828. A Federal State of 
Argentina was proclaimed by the 1852 consti-
tution but this was not ratified by Buenos Aires 
until 1880, thus conferring its present form on 
the country. 
1820 
The Buenos Aires government sent a ship 
under the command of Colonel Jewitt to take 
possession of the islands. 
1826 
Louis Vernet, a Hamburg merchant, was 
granted land and fishery rights by the Buenos 
Aires authorities and founded a settlement at 
Puerto de Soledad ; he was appointed governor 
by these authorities in 1828 in spite of British 
protests. 
August 1831 
An American warship, the Lexington, 
commanded by Captain Duncan, destroyed the 
fort of Soledad as a reprisal, Vernet having 
seized three American schooners in a dispute 
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over fishery rights. The islands seem to have 
been under no apparent authority until Septem-
ber 1832, when a new governor was appointed 
by the Buenos Aires government. 
January 1833 
The British Government reasserted its 
sovereignty by sending out a warship, HMS 
Clio, under the command of Captain Onslow. 
On reaching Soledad, Captain Onslow ordered 
the some fifty inhabitants to leave the 
islands. Soledad then became Port Louis. 
Britain claims that the colony was established 
as of this date. Naval officers remained in 
charge until the formation of a civil administra-
tion in 1841. 
Twentieth century 
Buenos Aires did little about its claim to 
sovereignty over the Falklands in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. 
The election of Juan Peron in 1946 led 
to a revival of Argentina's claims to the 
Falklands, their dependencies and the Antarctic 
continental shelf off Argentina. The matter 
was placed before the United Nations in 1965. 
(b) ArgentiniGn interpretation 1 
Argentina's claims to the Falklands are 
based on the following de facto and de jure 
circumstances: 
I. " Priority of diseovery ", although not 
sufficient to establish dominion, belongs to the 
Spanish or the Dutch but not to the British. 
The accounts of Captains Davis and Hawkins 
are too vague and circumstantial. Moreover, 
before their discovery by van Weerdt in 1598 
l. Source: La cuestion Malvinas by R.S. Martinez 
Moreno, 1965. 
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there were maps of the Falklands (discovered 
and published in the 1960s) drawn up by Diego 
Ribeiro, a Portuguese mapmaker, in 1529 and 
by Bartolome Olives in 1562, and therefore 
well before 1592 or 1594. Finally, according 
to the Argentinian historian Hector Rato, a 
Portuguese sailor in Magellan's expedition, 
Esteban Gomes, discovered the islands during 
his journey back to Spain in 1520. 
2. The first effective occupation, in January 
1764, the sole basis for dominion over territo-
ries which had never been inhabited, was by 
France, which ceded them to Spain, recognising 
the latter's sovereignty over the islands. 
3. The Falkland Islands have belonged to 
Spain since America was discovered and were 
included in the domains assigned to Spain by 
the Papal Bull of Alexander VI in 1493 appor-
tioning Spanish and Portuguese land, this 
domain being ratified with some changes by the 
Treaty of Tordesillas signed by the Portuguese 
and Spanish states. 
It was under the Pacto de Familia of 
1761 in which Spain and France gave each 
other mutual guarantees in respect of all the 
territories in their possession without reserve or 
exception that France returned the Falkland 
Islands to Spain. 
4. Under the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), 
Britain recognised Spanish sovereignty over 
territories colonised by the latter. 
5. Spain's devolution to Britain following 
the 1770 war concerned only Port Egmont with 
a secret verbal agreement that Britain would 
subsequently evacuate it, which it did in 1774, 
the agreement being intended to allay British 
susceptibility following the expulsion of British 
settlers in 1770. 
6. Argentina inherited all Spain's rights by 
emancipation. It was dispossessed by force and 
its original rights remain intact. 
DOCUMENT 907 REVISED APPENDIX Ill 
APPENDIX Ill 
Negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom 
(1965-Febn~ary 1982) 
16th December 1965 
The twentieth session of the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 
2065 (XX) which noted the existence of a 
dispute between Argentina and the United 
Kingdom about sovereignty over the Falkland 
Islands: it invited the two governments to 
negotiate and seek a peaceful solution. 
(This resolution is one of a series of resolutions 
on ending colonialism.) Argentina voted for 
the resolution and the United Kingdom 
abstained. 
1966 
On 18th July, the two countries started 
preliminary talks in London. For the British, 
there was no question of discussing the question 
of sovereignty. 
On 28th September, there was a symbolic 
invasion of the Falklands by Argentinian 
commandos. The Argentinian Government 
dissociated itself from this invasion and from 
the anti-British demonstrations. 
1967-71 
On 19th December 1967, the twenty-first 
session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly unanimously adopted a resolution urging 
the two countries to continue negotiations and 
find a peaceful solution as soon as possible. 
The negotiations were continued in 
1968 ; the British Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs undertook, in the 
various parliamentary assemblies and during a 
visit to the Falklands (23rd-28th November), 
not to relinquish sovereignty over the islands to 
Argentina against the wishes of their inhabi-
tants. 
On 12th December, Argentina said it 
could not accept this position. The negotia-
tions were continued in 1969 and 1970 with 
more particular attention being paid to the 
problem of communications since in 1969 
Argentina said it was prepared to study ways of 
establishing and improving direct links between 
the continent and the islands. 
On 1st July 1971, the two countries 
reached agreement on measures for establishing 
regular sea and air communications, improving 
postal, cable and telephone connections and 
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accepting inhabitants of the Falklands in 
schools and hospitals in Buenos Aires. 
1973-77 
The return to power of General Juan 
Peron revived the controversy between the two 
countries at the end of 1973. On 14th Decem-
ber 1973, the United Nations General Assem-
bly adopted another resolution, No. 3160 
(XXVIII), urging the two parties to find a solu-
tion in order to put an end to the colonial 
situation. Relations deteriorated seriously at 
the end of 1973 when the United Kingdom 
announced its intention of sending an economic 
delegation to the Falklands: the Argentinian 
Ambassador in London was recalled on 28th 
October 1975 and the British Ambassador in 
Buenos Aires on 19th January 1976. In 
December 1976, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted another resolution which 
recalled earlier resolutions " and called upon 
the two parties to refrain from taking decisions 
which would imply introducing unilateral 
modifications in the situation while the islands 
were going through the process recommended 
in the abovementioned resolutions ". The 
United Kingdom voted against it. 
The conclusions of the report of the 
economic delegation in 1976, which mentioned 
the need for closer relations with Argentina, led 
the United Kingdom to resume negotiations in 
1977. After a series of consultations with the 
inhabitants of the Falklands and with Argentina 
in February, the two parties issued a memo-
randum preparing for Anglo-Argentinian nego-
tiations on political relations, including the 
questions of sovereignty and economic co-
operation in the archipelago, the dependencies 
and the South Atlantic as a whole. Two 
working groups were set up to this end, but 
with no concrete result (15th December 1977). 
1978-82 
Negotiations were resumed in February 
1978 and again in April 1979 (inter alia with a 
representative of the islands' legislative council 
present) but without great success. It was not 
until 16th November 1979 that diplomatic rela-
tions were re-established at ambassadorial level. 
In April 1980, a series of preparatory 
talks was organised on very varied subjects. 
On 26th and 27th February 1981, further talks 
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were held in New York, two members of the 
islands' council being present. Argentina 
refused the British proposal to freeze the 
dispute for an agreed period, allowing the two 
countries to co-operate in exploiting the 
archipelago's resources. In the United 
Nations, Argentina warned the United 
Kingdom that it would not allow the Falklands 
to continue to exist as a British colony and 
asked for further serious negotiations. 
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In February 1982, a second series of offi-
cial talks was held in New York. Argentina 
proposed measures for advancing the negotia-
tions (creation of a standing committee). The 
United Kingdom refused. However, both 
parties asserted their determination to find a 
solution. The joint communique issued on 
27th February declared that the talks had been 
held " in a cordial and positive spirit ". 
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Official texts 
(a) Agreed statement by the President 
of the United Nations Security Council, 
Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, Zaire 
1st April1982 
After holding consultations with mem-
bers of the Council, I have been authorised to 
make the following statement on behalf of the 
Council: 
" The Security Council has heard state-
ments from the representatives of the United 
Kingdom and Argentina about the tension 
which has recently arisen between the two 
governments. 
The Security Council has taken note of 
the statement issued by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, which reads as follows: 
The Secretary-General, who has already 
seen the representatives of the United 
Kingdom and Argentina earlier today, 
renews his appeal for maximum restraint 
on both sides. He will, of course, return 
to headquarters at any time, if the situa-
tion demands it. 
The Security Council, mindful of its 
primary responsibility under the Charter of the 
United Nations for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, expresses its 
concern about the tension in the region of the 
Falkland Islands (lslas Malvinas). The Secur-
ity Council accordingly calls on the Govern-
ments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to 
exercise the utmost restraint at this time and in 
particular to refrain from the use or threat of 
force in the region and to continue the search 
for a diplomatic solution. 
The Security Council will remain seized 
of the question. " 
(b) European political co-operation -
Communique issued by the ten Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs 
21Ul April1982 
The Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Ten 
condemn the armed intervention of the Argen-
tinian Government in the Falkland Islands, 
violating the declaration made on 1st April by 
the President of the Security Council of the 
United Nations which is now dealing with the 
matter. They urgently call upon the Argentine 
Government to withdraw its forces immediately 
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and to abide by the United Nations Security 
Council appeal asking it to refrain from the use 
of force and to continue efforts towards a diplo-
matic solution. 
(c) Statement by the Secretary-General of 
NATO after the urgent meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council 
21Ul April1982 
Members of the Council expressed deep 
concern at the dispute between a member of the 
Alliance and a state with which all have 
friendly relations and reiterated the call made 
to the parties by the President of the Security 
Council yesterday to refrain from the use or 
threat of force and to continue the search for a 
diplomatic solution. 
(d) United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 502 
3rd April1982 
The Security Council, 
Recalling the statement made by the 
President of the Security Council at the 2345th 
meeting of the Security Council on 1st April 
1982 (S/14944) calling on the Governments of 
Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to refrain from the 
use or threat of force in the region of the 
Falkland Islands (lslas Malvinas), 
Deeply disturbed at reports of an invasion 
on 2nd April 1982 by armed forces of Argen-
tina, 
Determining that there exists a breach of 
the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands 
(lslas Malvinas), 
1. Demands an immediate cessation of 
hostilities, 
2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of 
all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands 
(lslas Malvinas), 
3. Calls on the Governments of Argen-
tina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplo-
matic solution to their differences and to 
respect fully the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
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(e) European political co-operation-
Declaration by the Ten 
lOth Apri/1982 
1. Representatives of the Ten discussed the 
grave situation resulting from the invasion of 
the Falkland Islands by Argentina. 
2. They recalled that in their declaration of 
2nd April the Ten had already condemned the 
flagrant violation of international law which the 
Argentine military action constituted. 
3. The Ten remain deeply concerned by the 
continuation of this crisis, which endangers 
international peace and security. They there-
fore attach the greatest importance to the 
immediate and effective implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 502 in all its 
aspects, namely an immediate cessation of 
hostilities, an immediate withdrawal of all 
Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands, and 
a search for a diplomatic solution by the 
Governments of Argentina and the United 
Kingdom. 
4. To these ends, and in a spirit of solidarity 
among the member countries of the Commun-
ity, the Ten decide to take a series of measures 
with respect to Argentina which should be put 
into operation as soon as possible. They will 
likewise take the measures necessary to ban all 
imports of Argentine origin into the Commun-
ity. In this context the Ten noted that their 
governments have already decided to apply a 
complete embargo on the export of arms and 
military equipment to Argentina. 
5. With respect to economic measures, these 
will be taken in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Community treaties. 
6. Given that the situation resulting from 
the invasion of the Falkland Islands by the 
Argentine armed forces is a cause of grave 
concern for the entire international community, 
the Ten call on other governments to associate 
themselves with their decisions, so as to ensure 
the full implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 502 with the least possible delay. 
(/) European Communities- Text of the 
regulation promulgated by the Council 
on economic sanctions against Argentina 
14th April 1982 
The Council of the European Commun-
ities, 
Whereas the serious situation resulting 
from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by 
Argentina, which was the subject of Resolution 
502 of the Security Council of the United 
Nations, has given rise to discussions in the 
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context of European political co-operation 
which have led in particular to the decision 
that economic measures will be taken with 
regard to Argentina in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Community treaties; 
Whereas following the measures already 
taken by the United Kingdom the member 
states have consulted one another pursuant to 
Article 224 of the treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community; 
Whereas in the context of these consulta-
tions it has proved important to take urgent and 
uniform measures and whereas the member 
states have therefore decided to adopt a Council 
regulation pursant to the treaty; 
Whereas in these circumstances the 
interests of the Community and the member 
states demand the temporary suspension of 
imports of all products originating in Argentina; 
Whereas import documents issued and 
contracts concluded before the entry into force 
of this regulation should not be affected by it; 
whereas, however, transitional provisions 
should not be applied to imports into the 
United Kingdom which were the subject of 
United Kingdom measures with effect from 
7th April; 
Having regard to the treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community, and in 
particular Article 113 thereof; 
Having regard to the proposal from the 
Commission, 
Has adopted this regulation: 
Article 1 
Imports of all products originating in 
Argentina for the purpose of putting them into 
free circulation in the Community are hereby 
suspended. 
Article 2 
1. This regulation shall not preclude the 
putting into free circulation of products origin-
ating in Argentina 
- accompanied by import documents 
issued before the date of its entry into 
force which mention Argentina as the 
country of origin, or 
- to be imported in execution of 
contracts concluded before that date, or 
- in course of shipment to the Commun-
ity at that date. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not 
apply to imports into the United Kingdom of 
products covered by this regulation which were 
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the subject of measures adopted by the United 
Kingdom with effect from 7th April. 
Article 3 
This regulation shall enter into force on 
the day of its publication in the Official Journal 
of the European Communities. 
It shall apply until 17th May 1982. 
Before that date, the Council, acting on a 
proposal from the Commission, shall examine 
whether it is appropriate to extend, amend, or, 
if necessary, repeal this regulation. 
This regulation shall be binding in its 
entirety and directly applicable in all member 
states. 
(g) Eurogroup - Commu•ique issued after the 
meeti•g of the eleve• Defe•ce Mi•isters 
5th May 1982 
(Extract) 
Ministers condemned Argentina's armed 
invasion of the Falkland Islands and the depen-
dencies as well as her failure to comply with 
Security Council Resolution Number 502. 
Ministers noted the importance of maintaining 
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the principle that aggression or occupation of 
territory by force should not be allowed to 
succeed, and urged the need to seek a nego-
tiated solution acceptable to all parties 
concerned on the basis of the implementation 
of Security Council Resolution Number 502 in 
all its parts. 
(h) NATO Defe~~ee Pla•m•g Committee -
Commu•ique issued after the meetiDg 
of Defe•ce Mi•isters 
7th May 1982 
(Extract) 
Ministers endorsed the statement by 
Eurogroup Ministers, in their communique of 
the previous day, in which they condemned 
Argentina's armed invasion of the Falkland 
Islands and the dependencies as well as her 
failure to comply with Security Council Resolu-
tion Number 502; noted the importance of 
maintaining the principle that aggression or 
occupation of territory by force should not be 
allowed to succeed; and urged the need to seek 
a negotiated solution acceptable to all parties 
concerned on the basis of the implementation 
of Security Council Resolution Number 502 in 
all its parts. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
The Falklands crisis 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 21 
tabled by MM. Stoffelen and Miller 
1. Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
2. Leave out sub-paragraph 3 (b) of the draft recommendation proper. 
I. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (report referred back to committee). 
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14th June 1982 
Signed: Sto.ffelen, Miller 
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Amendments 3, 4, S, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 
The Falklands crisis 
AMENDMENTS 3~ 4, S, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 101 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
15th June 1982 
3. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Welcoming the position adopted by the United States after the failure of the attempted 
negotiations;". 
4. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert new paragraphs as 
follows: 
"Expressing its solidarity with the United Kingdom concerning its decision to restore interna-
tional order and to secure the application of Resolution 502 of the Security Council; 
Expressing its solidarity with the United Kingdom concerning its decision to invoke Article 51 
of the Charter of the United Nations;". 
5. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "assistance" and 
insert " support". 
6. After paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Concerned at the possible deterioration in relations between Western Europe and North 
America and Latin America; ". 
7. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert " in accordance with the 
decisions of the Council of the European Communities; ". 
8. In paragraph 2, line 2, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the immediate" and 
insert " after the ". 
9. In paragraph 2, lines 2 and 3, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "in accordance 
with Security Council Resolution 502 ". 
10. In paragraph 2, line 4, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "islands" to the 
end of the paragraph and insert " and to safeguard relations with the countries of Latin America, so 
as to avoid any extension of Soviet influence in that continent; ". 
l. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (report referred back to committee). 
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Signed: Cavaliere 
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Amendment to Amendment 6 
The Falklands crisis 
AMENDMENT TO AMENDMENT 61 
tabled by Mr. Dejardin 
15th June 1982 
In Amendment 6, line 1, leave out " the " and insert " a " and in lines 2 and 3 leave out " and 
North America ". 
1. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (report referred back to committee). 
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Signed: Dejardin 
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Amendment 11 
The Falklands crisis 
AMENDMENT 11 I 
tabled by Mr. Maravalle 
15th June 1982 
11. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " and to ban all imports into the 
Community originating in Argentina". 
I. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (report referred back to committee). 
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Signed: Maraval/e 
Document 907 Revised 
Amendments 12 and 13 
The Falklands crisis 
AMENDMENTS 12 and 131 
tabled by Mr. Dejardin 
15th June 1982 
12. After paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
" Expressing its relief at the announcement of the end of fighting and paying tribute to all the 
victims of the conflict;". 
13. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"To concert their political, economic and diplomatic efforts in all countries and appropriate 
international bodies: 
(a) with due respect for United Nations resolutions, to work out a solution which is fair for all 
the parties involved in the Falklands dispute, including, above all, the inhabitants of 
these islands, on the one hand to avoid the subsequent outbreak of further fighting and on 
the other hand to guarantee all the democratic rights of the inhabitants; 
(b) to safeguard relations with the Latin American countries, inter alia with a view to promot-
ing democratic ideals and avoiding any extension of Soviet influence;". 
1. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (report referred back to committee). 
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Application of the Brussels Treaty 
Reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council 
REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments2 
by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
20th April1982 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-seventh annual 
report of the Council 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
II.B Activities of the Council - defence questions 
I. Amendments to Annexes Ill and IV to Protocol No. Ill 
2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe 
3. Adapting WEU to the 1980s 
Ill. Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(a) Non-application of controls 
(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(c) Conclusion on the control of armaments 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee 
V. Conclusions 
VI. Opinion of the minority 
APPENDIX 
Recommendation 365 and the reply of the Council 
1. Adopted in Committee by 17 votes to 1 with 0 absten-
tions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); 
MM. van den Bergh, Mayoud (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr 
(Alternate: Ahrens), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini, 
Bizet, B/aauw, Bonnel (Alternate: van der E/st), Cox, 
Dejardin, Duraffour (Alternate: Baumel), Edwards, Fosson, 
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Grant, Kittelmann, Lemmrich, Maravalle, Menard (Alter-
nate: Louis Jung), Pecchioli (Alternate: Amadez), Pignion, 
Prussen, Hermann Schmidt, Scho/ten, Smith, Tanghe, 
Vohrer. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
- reply to the twenty-se11enth annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of 
the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 365 and the Council's reply thereto; 
(ii) Noting that the Council and Assembly alike recognise that the fundamental provisions of the 
Brussels Treaty, particularly the mutual security provisions of Articles IV, V and VIII.3, retain their 
full value, and that there is interest in making greater use of Western European Union as an instru-
ment of European security; 
(iii) Believing that most arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer serve any 
useful purpose, and noting the Council's view that " in applying the provisions of Protocol No. Ill 
and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the 
situation in Europe "; 
(iv) Believing therefore that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. In application of Article V of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel the list 
at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill; 
2. Call on member countries which participate in the integrated system of NATO, and are not 
already bound by Article VI of Protocol No. 11, to make unilateral declarations concerning the level 
of forces they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and station as agreed 
with him, and not to withdraw against the wishes of a majority of the high contracting parties; 
3. To include in future annual reports a statement on the levels of all assigned forces; 
4. To communicate its annual report, as in the past, before the end of February. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Prusse11, Rqporteur) 
I. Introduction 
l.l. In application of Rule 27(2) of the Rules 
of Procedure, Chapters lLB. Activities of the 
Council - defence questions; Ill. Agency for the 
Control of Armaments and IV. Standing Arma-
ments Committee of the annual report of the 
Council are referred to the Committee. The 
present report replies to these three chapters. 
1.2. As Chapter Ill of the annual report did 
not reach the Office of the Clerk until 5th 
April, your Rapporteur had very little time to 
examine it when this report was drafted. 
1.3. 1981, to which the annual report of the 
Council relates, was marked by a definite 
rapprochement between the views of the 
Assembly and those of the Council about the 
operation of Western European Union. Thus, 
the chapter of the report on relations between 
the Council and the Assembly quotes the flat-
tering words of Mr. Hurd, Minister of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, when 
presenting the previous annual report to the 
Assembly: 
" The Council continues to appreciate 
the rOle played by the Assembly in 
watching over the solution of the prob-
lems of security and European union 
and in submitting its thoughts to govern-
ments for their attention. We believe 
that the standard of these reports is 
generally high and that the Assembly, 
which is the only parliamentary institu-
tion empowered to debate defence ques-
tions, exercises this prerogative with 
remarkable consistency and insight. 
The value which the Council attaches to 
the Assembly's work was again under-
lined in its reply to Recommendation 
365 on the application of the Brussels 
Treaty." 
1.4. The text of Recommendation 365, 
adopted by the Assembly on the basis of the 
Committee's previous report1, and the Council's 
reply are given at appendix. 
I. Document 875: Application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council, 
Rapporteur: Mr. Tanghe, 4th May 1981. 
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II.B. Activities of the Council 
- defence questions 
1. Amendments to Annexes Ill tuUl IV to Protocol No. Ill 
2.1. The chapter of the annual report on the 
defence activities of the Council in 1981 
contains no section on amendments to Annex 
Ill to Protocol No. Ill (the list of conventional 
weapons whose production is forbidden in 
Germany) because this list was not reduced 
during the year. However, in the introduction 
to this chapter, the Council quotes part of its 
reply to Recommendation 365 in which the 
Assembly had recommended the progressive 
reduction of the two lists of conventional 
weapons - those in Annex Ill, already mentio-
ned, and in Annex IV - weapons of all the 
member countries on the mainland of 
Europe which are subject to control by the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments: 
" In the matter of armaments control, the 
Council are aware of the fact that in 
applying the provisions of Protocol No. 
Ill and its annexes account should be 
taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the 
evolution of the situation in Europe. 
Thus, in accordance with the procedures 
laid down in Article 11 of Protocol No. 
Ill, which are still available, Annex Ill of 
this protocol has been amended on seve-
ral occasions since 1961. 
Furthermore, it is clear that if the Coun-
cil considered at a given moment that it 
would be appropriate to review the list 
contained in Annex IV of Protocol No. 
Ill this could only be done by following 
the procedure laid down in Article V of 
this protocol. The question of the pat-
tern of field control measures could also 
arise, for example in the form of an 
examination of the present level of 
sampling used for verifying the member 
countries' declarations. " 
2.2. For several years the Committee has 
noted that the usefulness of the controls of 
armaments provided for in Protocols Nos. Ill 
and N of the Brussels Treaty was questioned. 
Devised in 1954 in the framework of the 
agreements which sanctioned the rearmament 
of Germany, these controls, which are partly 
reciprocal, partly discriminatory, have now 
been overtaken by events and the political cli-
mate in the Atlantic Alliance. The Committee 
has recommended in the past that in applica-
tion of the provisions of these protocols the 
Council invoke the powers conferred on it in 
Articles 11 and V of Protocol No. III to reduce 
or delete the lists of conventional weapons 
whose production is forbidden in Germany or 
of weapons which are subject to the control of 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
2.3. As for the Council's suggestion that "the 
question of the pattern of field control measures 
could also arise, for example, in the form of an 
examination of the present level of sam-
pling ... ", the Committee notes that the 
frequency of field controls carried out by the 
Agency is already at the lowest level that might 
be considered necessary. As the twenty-second 
report of the Council1 indicates: 
" The Agency's basic assumption in this 
respect, which is supported by the obser-
vations of previous years, is that the 
undertakings and declarations of member 
countries are being honoured. Clearly, if 
any doubt existed on this point, control 
measures would have to be increased. In 
any case, the measures taken by the 
Agency must provide a sufficiently high 
probability of detecting any contraven-
tion. " 
As noted in the sections of the annual report 
referred to below, the controls provided for in 
the treaty are already not applied in many 
fields. 
2.4. For these reasons, and anxious to respect 
the treaty in force, failing which the credibility 
of all treaties is called in question, the Commit-
tee could not endorse a further reduction in the 
rare controls now carried out in the fields 
where they are applicable. It is for the Coun-
cil to act in accordance with the treaty by 
deleting the lists of weapons subject to control, 
so that controls cease to be applicable. 
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2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent 
of Europe 
2.5. Under Article VI of Protocol No. 11, the 
United Kingdom initially undertook "to main-
tain on the mainland of Europe ... the effective 
strength of the United Kingdom forces which 
are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe, that is to say four divisions 
and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such 
other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander, 
Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting 
capacity... not to withdraw these forces 
against the wishes of the majority of the high 
contracting parties ... ". Following successive 
decisions of the Council, the level of this 
commitment is now down to 55,000 men plus 
the Second Tactical Air Force. 
2.6. The Committee notes with satisfaction 
that the information concerning this commit-
ment given in the Council's annual report for 
1981 again fully meets its wishes as expressed 
inter alia in the Assembly's Recommendations 
331 and 348. The report states in fact that the 
average number of British land forces stationed 
on the mainland of Europe in 1981 in accor-
dance with Article VI of Protocol No. 11 was 
58,885. However, it continues: "The conti-
nued need for the presence of troops in 
Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of 
the British Army of the Rhine to be deployed 
for short tours of duty there. In 1981 there 
were on average 1,899 men in Northern Ire-
land. As has been previously stated, these 
units would be speedily returned to their station 
in an emergency affecting NATO. " It may be 
deduced that the average number of British 
troops stationed in Germany was 56,986 men, 
whereas the commitment is for 55,000. In the 
previous year, 56,985 were declared for 
Germany and 2,480 for Northern Ireland, 
making an average of 54,505 actually on the 
spot. 
2.7. Like last year, the annual report gives the 
following details on the strength of the United 
Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force: 
" Furthermore, in accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommen-
dation 348, the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the 
strength of the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force in 1981 was: 
Role 
Strike/ Attack 
Offensive support 
Reconnaissance 
l. Document 731, 11th March 1977. 
Aircraft/Equipment 
Buccaneer 
Jaguar 
Harrier 
Jaguar 
77 
Squadrons 
2 
4 
2 
DOCUMENT 908 
Air defence Phantom 
Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles 
Rapier surface-to-air missiles 
2 
1 
4 
Puma Air transport 
Ground defence RAF Regiment 1 " 
2.8. However, the Committee had expected 
the words of the Council's previous report 
" these strengths will remain unchanged in 
1981 " (but referring to 1982) to be included in 
the present report. But they are not there. 
2.9. As far as aircraft are concerned, it may 
be deduced that British forces stationed on the 
mainland of Europe include eleven squadrons 
of tactical aircraft plus a squadron of Puma 
helicopters which have replaced the previous 
year's Wessex helicopters. 
2.10. The Committee again welcomes the 
strength of British forces stationed on the main-
land of Europe and in particular the standard of 
the aircraft, which include the Harrier, the first 
vertical take-off aircraft to become operational 
in the world. 
2.11. The Committee recalls that under Article 
VI of Protocol No. 11 to the modified Brussels 
Treaty, the United Kingdom alone undertook 
" to maintain on the mainland of Europe the 
effective strength of the United Kingdom forces 
which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe". It undertook "not to 
withdraw these forces against the wishes of the 
majority of the high contracting parties". 
3. Adapthlg WEU to the 1980s 
2.12. The annual report draws attention inter 
alia to the addresses in the Assembly by 
Mr. Lagorio, Italian Minister of Defence, and 
Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French 
Minister of Defence, in December 1981. 
Mr. Lagorio pointed out that WEU was the only 
real " European " liaison for problems of defence 
and armaments control. Mr. Lemoine stressed 
that " Western European Union, as a genuine 
European institution, must have a special role 
to play " in Europe's security. These speeches, 
particularly the one by Mr. Lemoine, found 
some response, and several European leaders, 
including Chancellor Schmidt, Mrs. Thatcher 
and Mr. Dankert, President of the European 
Parliament, have since referred to the concept 
of European consultations on defence matters, 
although not all see them in the framework 
ofWEU. 
2.13. The Committee does not discuss here the 
question of the framework in which Europeans 
should consult each other on defence ques-
tions. It is at present being examined by the 
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General Affairs Committee1• However, the 
Committee proposes that henceforth WEU be 
adapted to the real requirements of the eighties, 
on the one hand by abolishing certain obsolete 
control functions (referred to in paragraphs 2.1 
to 2.4 and 3.11), and on the other hand by 
the tacit extension of commitments designed 
to maintain adequate forces under allied 
command. 
2.14. As indicated in paragraph 2.11, under the 
provisions of the treaty only the United King-
dom entered into such a commitment, which 
offset its exemption from controls provided for 
in the same treaty which are applied only " on 
the mainland of Europe". Parallel with the 
abolition of controls on conventional weapons, 
the Committee proposes: (i) that the remaining 
member countries which participate in the 
integrated military structure of NATO make 
unilateral solemn declarations in the Council 
concerning the level of forces they undertake to 
assign to SACEUR and station as agreed with 
him, and not to withdraw against the wishes of 
a majority of the High Contracting Parties; (ii) 
that future Council reports refer to the level of 
forces of all member countries assigned to 
SACEUR and stationed in agreement with him, 
as the present report does in the case of the 
United Kingdom. 
2.15. Thus adapted to the requirements of the 
day, WEU would appear to be the ideal instru-
ment for all European consultations on defence 
matters, should member countries unanimously 
feel that was appropriate. 
Ill. Agency for the Control of Armaments 
3.1. As the Committee has pointed out on a 
number of occasions most of the arms control 
provisions contained in Protocols Nos. Ill and 
IV of the modified Brussels Treaty - which date 
from 1954 - no longer serve any useful pur-
pose. In perpetuating discrimination against 
one member country or in hampering the 
defence effort they may be detrimental. The 
Council in its reply to Recommendation 3652 
has gone some way to accepting that view, 
saying " that in applying the provisions of 
Protocol No. Ill and its annexes account should 
l. Report on the political activities of the WEU Council. 
2. At Appendix. 
be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the 
evolution of the situation in Europe". 
3.2. Th~ exten~ of the Brussels Treaty 
controls 1s not wtdely understood, nor is the 
fact that the Council failed to apply many of the 
control provisions from the outset. The 
control provisions of the treaty may be 
summarised as follows: 
(i) Germany undertook not to manufac-
ture atomic, biological or chemical 
weapons on its territory; 
(ii) Germany also undertook not to 
manufacture certain conventional 
weapons, the list of which may be 
amended or cancelled in accordance 
with a special procedure, the Coun-
cil deciding by a two-thirds majority; 
(iii) the Council determines the level of 
stocks of atomic, biological and 
chemical weapons which countries 
manufacturing them may hold on 
the mainland of Europe1; 
(iv) levels of atomic, biological and 
chemical weapons and certain 
conventional weapons held by mem-
ber countries on the mainland of 
Europe1 are subject to verification 
by the WEU Agency for the Control 
of Armaments. The list of such 
atomic, biological and chemical 
weapons and of conventional wea-
pons may be modified by a unani-
mous decision of the Council; 
(v) the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments verifies that the above 
provisions are respected, except for 
the weapons of forces assigned to 
NATO, which are verified by the 
latter. 
(a) Non-application of controls 
3.3. In the earlier days when the controls 
could be held to serve some purpose, the Com-
mittee had frequent occasion to draw attention 
to the major shortcomings in their application 
by the Council. The twenty-seventh annual 
report of the Council indicated no change in 
this situation. 
3.4. Like earlier reports, the Council's present 
report refers to fields where the Agency does 
not exercise its activities: 
l. The expression " on the mainland of Europe " 
excludes British weapons on British metropolitan territory. 
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"Atomic, chemical and biological wea-
pons 
The position described in earlier annual 
reports remained basically unchanged. 
The activities of the Agency cover neither 
nuclear nor biological"weapons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter do not, therefore, concern these 
two categories of armaments. 
In the case of chemical weapons, only 
non-p.rod.uction controls take place; no 
quantitative controls are made since the 
member states have always declared they 
possessed no such armaments. " 
Previous reports have included a statement to 
the effect that: 
" The non-nuclear components of such 
[nuclear] weapons (namely the missiles 
themselves and other specially designed 
equipment) are subject to control 
except as regards the weapons qualified 
as " strategic " by one member state. 
Furthermore, as this state has declared 
that its nuclear capability as a whole is 
directed to one and the same objective of 
deterrence, its missiles with nuclear capa-
bility and tracked launchers are no longer 
subject to control. " 1 
The Committee has noted2 that the state in 
question was France and that Pluton tactical 
nuclear missiles had been withdrawn from 
Agency control as from 1979. 
3.5. The Council's report goes on to say: 
" As the convention for the due process 
of law3 has not yet entered into force, the 
control measures carried out by the 
Agency at private concerns had, in 
1981, as in previous years, to take the 
form of 'agreed control measures'. 
One consequence of this situation is that 
. ' 
m order to obtain the agreement of the 
firms concerned, the Agency has to give a 
few weeks' notice. This agreement has 
never been withheld ... " 
l. Document 833, 28th March 1980. 
2. Document 875, 4th May 1981. 
3. Convention concerning measures to be taken by 
member states of Western European Union in order to 
enab!e the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry 
out Its control effectively and making provision for due 
process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the 
Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris 
on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 
1957 but ratified by only six states: Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom). 
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3.6. The annual report also specifies that: 
" In application of Article Ill of Protocol 
No. Ill, which lays down conditions to 
enable the Council to fix the levels of 
chemical weapons that may be held 
on the mainland of Europe by those 
countries which have not given up the 
right to produce them, and in accordance 
with the Council decision of 1959, the 
Agency asked the countries concerned in 
its questionnaire whether production of 
chemical weapons on their mainland ter-
ritory had passed the experimental 
stage and entered the effective production 
stage. 
All the member countries concerned once 
again gave an explicit negative reply in 
1981. 
In addition, in the covering letter to its 
questionnaire, the Agency, as in previous 
years, asked the member states to declare 
any chemical weapons that they might 
hold, whatever their origin. In reply to 
this questionnaire no country reported 
holding any chemical weapons and be-
cause of this the quantitative control of 
weapons of this nature raised no pro-
blems in 1981." 
3. 7. On the subject of biological weapons the 
Council's report states: 
" All member countries reported their 
agreement to the entry into force in 1981 
of the list of biological weapons subject 
to control as revised by Council 
decision. The Council noted the fact. " 
The Committee calls for the revised list of 
biological weapons subject to control to be 
communicated to the Assembly, together with 
the list of chemical weapons subject to control 
which has been published by SIPRI, but never 
communicated to the Assembly. 
(b) Activitks of the Age~~cy for the Control of A171Ul111ents 
3.8. Although the WEU controls have lost 
their usefulness, and the Agency's true areas of 
activity remain limited solely to conventional 
weapons, the number of inspections carried out 
by the Agency each year shows that generally 
speaking there has been no reduction in its acti-
vities, as may be seen from the following 
table. Non-production controls no longer 
apply to German shipyards because, following a 
recommendation to that effect by the Assembly, 
the Council has deleted warships from the list 
of armaments not to be produced in Germany. 
Qualitative controls still apply to shipyards of 
all member countries on the continent. 
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3.9. Once again, the Committee finds particu-
larly useful the lists of armaments currently 
being produced, set out in parts 1 to 4 of 
Section E " State and problems of control in 
certain particular fields " which is a summary 
of current armaments production programmes 
in member countries. 
(c) Conclusion on the control of a171Ul111ents 
3.10. The annual report of the Council stresses 
the limited nature of the field control pro-
gramme, particularly visits to private firms, but 
it is clear that the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments performs its tasks efficiently in 
those fields which are open to it. 
3.11. For the reasons given in paragraphs 2.13 
and 3.1 above, the Committee now recom-
mends that quantitative controls on the main-
land of Europe be abolished. The Council is 
empowered to take this step under the terms of 
Article V of Protocol No. Ill of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, by cancelling the list at Annex 
IV to Protocol No. Ill. This step will leave in 
force the unilateral undertaking by Germany 
not to manufacture nuclear,· biological or 
chemical weapons on its territory. The Com-
mittee understands that it continues to be the 
policy of the Federal Republic of Germany not 
to manufacture such weapons and that it wel-
comes these treaty provisions. While controls 
on these non-production undertakings would 
remain in force under the treaty, as noted above 
they are applied only in the case of chemical 
weapons, and then under certain restrictions. 
The unilateral undertaking by Germany not to 
manufacture specified conventional weapons on 
its territory would also remain in force, but 
following some eight deletions made by the 
Council to the list concerned (Annex Ill to 
Protocol No. Ill) this now covers only long-
range surface-to-surface missiles and bomber 
aircraft for strategic purposes. 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee 
4.1. As in recent years the work of the 
Standing Armaments Committee in 1981 was 
concentrated chiefly in exchange of information 
by countries in Working Group No. 8 on oper-
ational research and will be updating the eco-
nomic (first section) and legal parts of its study 
of the situation of the armaments sector of 
industry in the member countries of WEU. An 
unclassified version of the first section of the 
economic part was communicated to the 
Assembly on the occasion of the joint meeting 
between the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments and the Council on 21st May 
1981. That version too is to be updated from 
1977 to 1980. 
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Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
Non-production 
Quantitative control measures control 
measures Total 
control 
at units (of which measures 
at under at at non- (all 
depots national production Sub-total production production categories) plants plants of chemical 
command weapons) 
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1961 29 15 12 66 7 (2) 63 
2 26 20 11 57 7 (2) 65 
3 35 13 13 61 10 (4) 74 
4 39 19 13 71 9 (4) 80 
5 26 16 11 53 7 n.a. 60 
6 * * * * * n.a. 78 
7 * * * * * n.a. 70 
8 * * * * * n.a. 79 
9 * * * * * (3) 77 
a b a b a b a b a b a b 
1970 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 
1 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 
2 * * * * * n.a. 66 
3 * * * * * n.a. 66 
4 * * * * * n.a. 71 
5 * * * * * n.a. 72 
6 * * * * * n.a. 71 
7 * * * * * n.a. 70 
8 * * * * * n.a. 68 
9 * * * * * n.a. 70 
1980 * * * * * n.a. 70 
1 * * * * * n.a. 70 
Notes a, b: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth 
counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of 
inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of 
figures (old and new style- a and b) for the years 1970 and 1971. 
n.a.: Information not available. 
Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the 
Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns I to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the 
published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those 
for 1970 to 1981 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permis-
sion to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and 
are without significance. 
* Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report. 
4.2. The Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments held a joint meeting with the 
Standing Armaments Committee in the Liaison 
Sub-Committee on the Joint Production of 
Armaments on 16th November 1981. 
4.3. The Council has agreed, in its reply to 
Recommendation 331, to consider the possibil-
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ity of the SAC ass1stmg the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments to undertake 
specific studies " within the competence of the 
SAC as defined in the decision of 7th May 
1955" (the Council decision whereby the Stan-
ding Armaments Committee was established) 
but suitable topics have not yet presented them-
selves. 
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V. Conclusions 
5.1. The Committee's principal conclusions 
are set forth in the draft recommendation. At 
appendix are the texts of Recommendation 365 
and the Council's reply which record the wide 
agreement between the Council and Assembly 
referred to in the preamble. The Committee's 
main proposals in the substantive paragraphs 
are designed to adapt WEU to meet the require-
ments of the 1980s. 
5.2. The scope of the Committee's proposal 
(substantive paragraph 1 of the recommenda-
tion) that the Council cancel the list of weapons 
subject to control on the mainland of Europe is 
explained in paragraph 3.11 above of this 
explanatory memorandum. The proposal in 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the recommendation for 
unilateral declarations on the assignment of 
forces to SACEUR, with corresponding state-
ments in the Council's annual report, is descri-
bed in paragraph 2.14 of the explanatory 
memorandum. 
5.3. In paragraph 4 of the recommendation 
the Committee calls for annual reports of the 
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Council to be communicated in their entirety 
before the end of February of the year following 
that covered by the report. As noted in para-
graph 1.2 above, Chapter Ill of the annual 
report for 1981 was received only on 5th April 
1982. From 1975 to 1977 annual reports for 
the preceding years were received in their entir-
ety before the end of February or in the first 
week of March. 
5.4. The Committee in paragraph 3.7 of the 
explanatory memorandum also calls on the 
Council to communicate to the Assembly the 
revised list of biological weapons, and the list of 
chemical weapons subject to control. 
VI. Opinion of the minority 
6.1. The report as a whole was adopted by 
17 votes to 1. The minority would have 
deleted paragraph 1 of the operative part of the 
draft recommendation, believing that quantita-
tive controls on the mainland of Europe on 
weapons listed at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill 
of the modified Brussels Treaty should be 
retained. 
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RECOMMENDATION 365 1 
on the llpplication of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-sixth 11nnual report of the Council 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty, particularly those in 
Articles IV, V and VIII.3, have retained their full value and are one of the key factors in the security 
system of the signatory countries; 
(iz) Noting however that for greater effectiveness the material organisation of collective defence is 
undertaken in the wider framework of the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European 
Programme Group; 
(iii) Considering that a continuing and tangible activity in the framework of the treaty is essential to 
its credibility and that at the present time this activity is chiefly ensured by the Assembly and by its 
dialogue with the Council; 
(iv) Considering further, for the abovementioned reasons, that at a time of economic difficulty for 
member countries the resources they make available to the WEU organs should be redeployed to 
adapt the latter to present conditions; 
(v) Congratulating the Council for its response to paragraphs 1 to 6 of Recommendation 348 ofthe 
Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Conduct an investigation into: 
(a) the extent of the controls provided for in Protocols Nos. Ill and IV that should be 
maintained and the decisions the Council should take under Articles 11 and V of Protocol 
No. Ill; 
(b) the appropriate allocation of financial resources and_ staff among all the WEU organs in the 
light of the present scope and importance of their respective activities; 
(c) the possibility of extending to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly the current practice 
of close co-operation between the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments 
Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments; 
2. Entrust the international secretariat of the SAC with the research necessary for the report on 
the role and contribution of armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime 
which is referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments; 
3. Communicate to the Assembly the completed chapters of the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee's study on the European armaments industry. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1981 during the First Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (1st Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 875). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 365 
l.(a) The Council recall the important contribution that Western European Union has made, since 
its foundation, to the development of co-operation between the member states, in accordance with 
the objectives of the modified Brussels Treaty, the parties to which stated their resolve, inter alia, to 
promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe. They emphasise that the 
member states remain convinced of the importance attached both to realising these objectives and 
maintaining the commitment of collective self-defence under Article V ofthe treaty. 
The Council note with satisfaction the positive role played by the Assembly, which is the sole 
European parliamentary body where members of national parliaments debate, under the terms of a 
treaty, the problems of security common to the member states. 
That said, the Council are aware of the fact that in applying the provisions of Protocol No. Ill 
and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the 
situation in Europe. Thus, in accordance with the procedures laid down under Article 11 of Protocol 
No. Ill, which are still available, Annex Ill of that Protocol has been amended on several occasions 
since 1961. 
Furthermore, it is clear if the Council considered at a given moment that it would be 
appropriate to review the list contained in Annex IV of Protocol No. Ill, this could only be done by 
following the procedure laid down in Article V of Protocol No. Ill. The question of the pattern of 
field control measures could also arise, for example in the form of an examination of the present level 
of sampling used for verifying the member countries' declarations. 
(b) The budget situation in the member countries at the present time calls for rigorous 
economies. It is within this context that the Council charged an ad hoc working group with the task 
of carrying out a study aimed at identifying all acceptable steps that might be taken to achieve 
economies, together with greater efficiency in methods of work and use of staff in WEU's 
ministerial bodies, without impairing the organisation's ability to meet its obligations under the 
modified Brussels Treaty, the Protocols and the Council's decision of 7th May 1955. 
In this connection, it should be recalled that, as a result of excellent co-operation, certain 
expenditure effected for the Assembly is borne by the budgets of two of the WEU ministerial bodies. 
(c) The Council might examine the possibilities of extending to the Office of the Clerk of the 
Assembly the current practice of administrative co-operation between the international secretariat of 
the Standing Armaments Committee and the Armaments Control Agency. Indeed, a measure of 
administrative co-operation already exists. However, rules of security, which differ in scope for the 
Assembly and the executive bodies of WEU, limit the extent to which such co-operation could be 
realised. 
2. As pointed out to the Assembly in their reply to Recommendation 331, the Council have no 
objection to examining, on a case-by-case basis, the possibility of co-operation between the SAC and 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. However, they could only give their agree-
ment to such co-operation for studies relating to subjects within the competence of the SAC as 
defined in the decision of 7th May 1955. In this connection, the Council regret to have to state that 
the subject proposed in the present recommendation does not meet this criterion. 
3. A presentation of the economic study carried out by the SAC within the framework of its 
mandate was communicated to the Assembly last May. 
The Council confirm the assurance given in their reply to Recommendation 335, namely, 
when the final report of the SAC is received, the Council will not fail to consider how the Assembly 
might be informed of its content and principal conclusions. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 18th November 1981. 
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Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 41 
tabled by Mr. De Poi 
2nd June 1982 
1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft r~commendation, leave out " most " and insert 
" several ". 
2. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
" 1. In the light of the political evolution of Europe and of military technological develop-
ments, make a critical reassessment of the list of armaments at Annexes Ill and N of Protocol 
No. Ill and subject to control by the Agency; ". 
3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper. 
4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper. 
1. See 2nd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendment 1 agreed to; amendments 2, 3 and 4 negatived). 
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Signed: De Poi 
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AmendmentS 
Application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Co•ncil 
AMENDMENT 51 
tabled by Mr. Pr•ssen 
14th June 1982 
5. In the draft recommendation proper, betore paragraph I insert a new paragraph as follows: 
"In application of Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel para-
graphs IV and VI of the list at Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill;". 
Signed: Prussen 
1. See 2nd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment 6 
Application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 61 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
14th June 1982 
6. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " cancel " and insert " vary by 
reducing ". 
l. See 2nd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows : 
2nd November 1981- London 
Mr. Christoph Bertram, Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
23rd and 24th February 1982- MBFR negotiations, Vienna 
H.E. Mr. Edward Jackson, Ambassador, Head of the United IGngdom Delegation ; 
H.E. Dr. Waiter Boss, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany; 
H.E. Mr. Richard Starr, Ambassador, Head of the United States Delegation; Mr. Leo Reddy, 
Political Adviser ; 
H.E. Mr. Andre Wieland, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the German Democratic 
Republic; 
H.E. Baron W. J. de V os van Steenwijk, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Valerian V. Mikhailov, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the USSR; 
H.E. Mr. Stanislav Przygodzki, Amabassador, Head of the Polish Delegation ; 
25th and 26th February 1982- Committee on Disarmament, Geneva 
H.E. Dr. Henning Wegener, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of 
Germany; 
Mr. Pedro Nufiez Mosquera, Second Secretary, Cuban Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Louis G. Fields, Ambassador, Head of the United States Delegation; Mr. Jack 
Leonard; Dr. P. Corden ; 
H.E. Curt Lidgard, Ambassador, Deputy Head of the Swedish Delegation ; 
H.E. Mr. Anisse Salah-Bey, Ambassador, Head of the Algerian Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Rikhi Jaipal, Ambassador, Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal 
Representative of the Secretary-General, United Nations; 
H.E. Mr. V. Issraelyan, Ambassador, Head ofthe Delegation of the USSR; 
Mr. Lawrence Middleton, Counsellor, United IGngdom Delegation; 
Mr. G. Corea, Secretary-General, UNCTAD. 
The Committee as a whole met in Ottawa on 8th March when it discussed a first draft of this 
report. It was addressed by the Hon. J. Gilles Lamontagne, Canadian Minister of National Defence, 
and, with particular relevance to the present report, was briefed by Mr. T. C. Hammond, Director, 
Defence Relations Division, Department of External Affairs, on Canadian policy on arms control. 
The Committee next met at NATO headquarters, Brussels, on 19th April where it was addressed 
by Mr. Fredo Dannenbring, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs ; Admiral R. H. 
Falls, C.F., Chairman of the Military Committee; and Lt.-Gen. Lewis Melner, US Army, Deputy 
Chairman of the Military Committee. At Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe the same 
day the Committee was briefed by Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Terry, RAF, Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe; Lt.-Gen. Mario Gariboldi, Italian Army, DCOS Logistics, Armaments and 
Administration ; Lt.-Gen. Hans-Joachim Mack, DCOS Plans and Operations ; Air Vice Marshal 
Tony Skingsley, ACOS Plans and Policy; Colonel Hans-Peter Heck, German AF, Nuclear Policy 
Section; Colonel John Craig, USAF, Nuclear Policy Section; and Colonel Roelof Ubels, Netherlands 
Army, Arms Control Section. The meeting was resumed at NATO headquarters, Brussels, on 20th 
April when the Committee discussed a revised draft and adopted the report as a whole. 
The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials, senior 
officials and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the Committee and replied to 
questions. 
The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the 
Committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on disarmament 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to 
disarmament is to open on 7th June 1982 ; 
(ii) Aware that since the first special session in 1978 there is negligible progress to report on arms 
control and none on disarmament ; 
(iii) Aware that in the meantime world military expenditure has increased to$ 455 billion a year; 
(iv) Recalling its Recommendation 323 of 21st November 1978, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments to take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the 
following objects in view: 
1. To establish preconditions for disarmament: 
(a) by fostering wider but balanced commercial relations between East and West, and between 
North and South ; 
(b) by investigating the possibility of developing weapons systems that would be manifestly 
defensive; 
2. To secure a substantial reduction in the level of nuclear weapons in the world as a whole, and 
in Europe the " zero option " in the INF talks and the establishment of a proper balance of 
conventional forces ; 
3. To seek the earliest agreement on the following specific disarmament, arms control and 
confidence-building measures: 
(a) at the world level: 
(l) a complete ban on the production, stockpiling and use of chemical and mycotoxin 
weapons, through a resumption of the bilateral negotiations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union in the first place; 
(ii) a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing, through a resumption of the trilateral 
talks between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union in the 
first place, to conclude an agreement on the terms already agreed in 1980 ; 
(iii) amendment of the 1967 outer space treaty to ban all weapons for use in or from outer 
space; 
(iv) the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency on the lines of the 
report of the United Nations Secretary-General ; 
(v) the establishment of a register to be prepared and published by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations of international transfers of armaments; 
(vi) the appointment of a United Nations working group of experts to examine alternative 
defence systems excluding nuclear weapons ; 
(b) at the European level: 
(vii) a phase 1 agreement on MBFR together with permanent measures of verification to 
remain operative for the duration of the agreement ; 
(viii) a conference on disarmament in Europe on the lines of the French proposal of 1978; 
(ix) enhanced confidence-building measures in Europe ; 
4. To secure reductions in armaments in third world countries through the example to be set by 
the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in reducing their nuclear and conventional forces, and, when 
measures of actual disarmament are implemented, in diverting to developing countries the funds thus 
released. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Vohrer, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
(a) Terms of reference 
1.1. The Committee intends the present 
report to be a general report on all aspects of 
arms control and disarmament with reference to 
the second special session of the United Nations 
General Assembly on disarmament which is to 
be held from 7th June to 9th July 1982. Like 
the reports adopted in 1978 1 at the time of the 
first special session on disarmament of the 
General Assembly, which lasted from 23rd May 
to 1st July 1978, this report deals chiefly with 
the disarmament issues most likely to be consi-
dered at the forthcoming special session and in 
the Geneva Committee on Disarmament. 
1.2. The report deals also with certain 
regional aspects of arms control of more direct 
concern for European security - the negotia-
tions on mutual and balanced force reductions, 
which have now been going on for eight years ; 
experience with the confidence-building mea-
sures agreed within the framework of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe in Madrid, and the French proposal for 
a conference on disarmament in Europe. 
1.3. The Committee is reporting separately on 
the NATO dual decision of December 1979 ; 
the associated United States-Soviet Union nego-
tiations on intermediate nuclear forces and on 
the prospects for the continuation of the SALT 
process, now referred to by the United States as 
START (Strategic Armaments Reduction 
Talks) 2• These topics are not therefore 
discussed in detail in the present report. 
(b) General political considerations 
1.4. The problems of armaments on a global 
scale should not be limited to a more quantita-
tive analysis. No doubt quantitative facts, like 
number and type of certain weapon systems, 
1. Disarmament, Document 778, Rapporteur: Mr. Roper, 
adopted on 20th June 1978 during the first special session 
on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, 
but referred back to the Committee during the first part of 
the twenty-fourth session of the Assembly. Disarma-
ment, Document 788, Rapporteur: Mr. Roper, 31st October 
1978, containing a revised version of the draft Recommen-
dation in Document 778, taking account of the conclusions 
of the United Nations special session. On Document 788, 
the Assembly adopted Recommendation 323 on 21st 
November 1978 (text at Appendix I). 
2. See the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe, 
Rapporteur: Mr. Mommersteeg. 
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lead to qualitative assumptions, but they have 
to be inserted into the existing, or yet to be 
created, political framework. The reason for 
this is equally self-evident as trivial: defence 
efforts result from economic, social and general 
political conditions. 
1.5. Where East-West antagonism is concer-
ned, the determining factors are ideological and 
political rivalry, social and economic diffe-
rences and the existence in both major systems 
of an exceptional military potential. Both sys-
tems regard their existence threatened by the 
other. The arguments are well known. It 
does not matter in this context whether the 
threat is real. The assumption of a threat, or a 
belief in one, is sufficient. In this tense situa-
tion, the control of armaments is an attempt to 
facilitate the settlement of differences by peace-
ful means with the aim of giving tangible form 
to the principle of renunciation of violence set 
out in the United Nations Charter 1• 
1.6. In both systems an armaments industry 
has established itself which, under different 
structural conditions, produces comparable 
quantities. In the democratic, market-oriented 
states the armaments industry has gained 
economic power and thus a dynamism of its 
own. In the states with a centralised economy 
the armaments industry lays claim to the entire 
techhological and intellectual elite and its 
know-how without regard to market-oriented 
profit. Neither side appears able to bring the 
other to its knees economically. Neither do 
massive and military attempts by the super-
powers to achieve hegemony seem possible in 
the face of nuclear arms technology. Thus it is 
essential to find the ways and to create the 
general political conditions which could lead to 
disarmament. In the western industrialised 
countries, the employment situation, alarming · 
in political and social terms because of the high 
rate of unemployment, must not be quoted as 
an argument for maintaining or increasing 
armaments production or even for justifying an 
expansion of armaments exports. 
(i) Avoiding conflict and securing peace 
1. 7. The fundamental political condition is 
agreement between the democratic and commu-
nist states, as well as the third world, about the 
1. See Riistungskontrol/e und Abriistung. Instrument der 
Friedenssicherung (Armaments control and disarmament: 
Instruments of the establishment of peace), Friedrich Ruth, 
Aussenpolitik, 33rd edition, Hamburg, January 1982, 
page 5. 
credible intention to avoid war. If the theoreti-
cal claim of the communist states, and in parti-
cular of the Soviet Union, is taken seriously, 
the notion of class struggle specific to commu-
nist ideology means that social conflicts must 
be solved by revolution. This revolutionary 
element involves a strong tendency towards 
geographical expansionism. The theoretical 
claim of the western democracies consists inter 
alia of defending freedom in an atmosphere of 
peace. Social conflicts must be solved by 
means of reforms. The western concept of a 
democratic state is thus not based on a form of 
conflict and is moreover free of expansionist 
claims. Because of certain historical events 
and of a few isolated exceptions to this theoreti-
cal claim, the communist side attributes 
imperialist aims to the West. 
1.8. As stated above, East-West antagonism 
has many levels. Hence it must be settled on 
many levels. The control of armaments 
directly affects only military potential and 
indirectly East-West social and economic 
differences. A means must therefore also be 
found of allowing a direct influence on social 
and economic differences. Previous decades 
showed that the prevailing idea of economic 
harmony could not come about. What is 
known as the theory of convergence proved 
unrealistic. Faced with different systems, there 
is thus a possibility of strengthening trade to the 
benefit of both parties. In order for the 
ensuing advantages for the two parties to be 
evident, it must be possible to apply the reverse 
principle according to which a breakdown in 
trade relations would involve major disadvanta-
ges for the population on both sides. A system 
of East-West trade association would thus make 
a fundamental contribution to the establish-
ment of a security association. 
1.9. Only under such general conditions for 
avoiding conflict can one construct a policy of 
disarmament in order to secure peace. 
Attempts to secure real disarmament are impor-
tant because the quantity and quality of today's 
weapon systems create problems of security 
which, independent of political decisions, lie in 
the sphere of technology as well as in the realm 
of possible misunderstandings. Attempts to 
disarm are also crucial because the economic 
disparity in the world will lead any further 
arming and the associated tying-up of capital 
and labour into a global economic conflict of 
immensurable size. 
(ii) East- West versus North-South 
1.10. The inclusion of the third world in the 
debate on armaments is not only important 
because these countries are almost exclusively 
the battlefield, but because the economic 
tensions between North and South, as well as 
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between third world countries with a different 
level of development, have led directly and 
indirectly to an ideological conflict between the 
major democratic and communist systems. 
The involvement of the great powers, which 
had consequences in the sphere of the arms 
transfer, creates a potential for conflict inside 
the third world and has repercussions for the 
original relationship between the great powers. 
1.11. After having analysed in quantitative 
terms the armaments and arms-transfer policy, 
and after having presented the measures pro-
posed at various conferences, this study will 
present proposals which, on the basis of a 
trading relationship between East and West and 
between North and South, could lead to a new 
partnership in security matters. 
(c) Approach to disarmament 
1.12. Historically debates on disarmament or 
arms control in the framework of the United 
Nations, and in the Geneva-based Committee 
on Disarmament, have tended to focus on pro-
posals for general and complete disarmament or 
on the general abolition or prohibition of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction. These issues have been the main 
preoccupation of many non-aligned countries, 
and the Soviet Union and its allies have found 
it convenient to pay lip-service to them. 
Regional negotiations of more direct interest to 
the western Alliance, such as MBFR; the confi-
dence-building measures of the CSCE ; and the 
proposed conference on disarmament in 
Europe, often appear distant and parochial 
negotiations to the many non-aligned members 
of the United Nations who now form a majority 
of its membership. Calling on the major mili-
tary powers to take the lead in reducing the 
level of their armaments, particularly their 
nuclear armaments, the non-aligned countries 
have often been sceptical of purely bilateral 
negotiations between the Soviet Union and the 
United States (SALT; a chemical weapons ban) 
or trilateral negotiations including the United 
Kingdom (on a comprehensive nuclear test 
ban), pointing to their failure to make progress. 
1.13. The importance of the limited negotia-
tions was in fact recognised at the first special 
session of the General Assembly which called 
for priority to be given to nuclear disarmament 
and to a chemical weapons ban. To meet that 
demand it would be important for the partici-
pants in the limited negotiations to be able to 
report progress to the second special session. 
If the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons enshrined in the non-proliferation 
treaty is to be preserved, it is equally impor-
tant for the superpowers to show progress in the 
reduction of their nuclear forces, in accordance 
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with Article VI of the non-proliferation 
treaty. Unfortunately, there is no prospect of 
genuine progress being reported under either of 
these heads. 
11. Armaments and expenditure 
on armaments 
(a) Assessing levels of armtlllltllts, 
exports and imports 
2.1. Almost all data concerning the defence 
posture of both political systems come from one 
source only, namely the western one. 
Although those institutes which are concerned 
with this subject consider themselves academic, 
it is doubtful whether calculations, made by 
one side, can in fact be objective or academic. 
The institutes cannot be blamed for this state 
of affairs, but the unwillingness on the part of 
the communist side to offer transparency and 
openness. 
2.2. The only way to achieve some objectivity 
is to compare the data of the established institu-
tes. The limited usefulness of data prepared in 
this way can be shown by tabulating different 
estimates of both quality and quantity. The 
reaction of the politicians so far has been clear. 
Faced with the alternative estimates for the 
opposite side, they have, as a rule, taken the 
highest estimates as the basis of their political 
concepts and the consequent defence efforts. 
When judging the security pros and cons it has 
so far been regarded too dangerous to consider 
equal or even lower estimates of armaments 
levels on the other side. In practical terms this 
has meant that each side has felt the high 
levels attributed to the other side. This is the 
relationship between available data and the 
armaments spiral. 
2.3. On the other hand, however, purely poli-
tical choices made without due consideration of 
technical military data are quite irrational. A 
demonstration of goodwill in the form of unila-
teral disarmament cannot be made without 
serious security risks for both sides, on the basis 
of a single set of estimates. Data must form 
the basis of any structural change in security 
policy. Numerical arguments, saying for 
example that since the world can now be des-
troyed four times over when once is sufficient, 
therefore present arms levels can be reduced to 
one quarter, are naive in the face of qualitative 
interrelationship between weapon systems. 
The following data should therefore serve as the 
basis for the politico-structural conditions in 
the field of security and their possible 
alteration. 
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(b) Defenu spending and governmental development aid 
2.4. In 1980 $450 billion (OM 1 million 
million) was spent on armaments in the world 
as a whole and only $ 17 billion (DM 40 
billion), that is to say 4 % of the defence expen-
diture, on development aid. To cite only one 
figure: for $ 0.5 billion all the children in the 
world could receive full vaccination. 
2.5. The figures of misery are disheartening. 
Every year 12 million children in the third 
world die of hunger under the age of five. 
Two out of three people do not receive suffi-
cient food. Almost one in two is illiterate. 
The population in the third world increases ten 
times ·as fast as in the developed world. Every 
second human being lives in dwellings unfit for 
human habitation. Hundreds of billions are 
being spent to further the cause of antagonism, 
yet 4 % of this sum must suffice to support the 
common cause and survival of the human race: 
2.6. According to SIPRI 81/82, NATO coun-
tries account for 43 % of world defence expen-
diture including 24% for the United States 
alone; 26% can be attributed to the Warsaw 
Pact countries, including 24 % for the USSR. 
The other industrialised countries account for 
6 % on defence ; the third world for 16 % and 
China 9 %. With regard to arms exports, the 
United States takes first place in SIPRI's annual 
review 1981/82 with about 45%, before the 
Soviet Union with about 27%. 
2. 7. Defence expenditure in 1980 at constant 
prices is given by SIPRI as follows (in US $ 
million at 1978 prices and 1978 exchange 
rates): 
NATO (excluding the United 
States) .................. . 
NATO (including the United 
States) .................. . 
Warsaw Pact (excluding the 
Soviet Union) ............ . 
Warsaw Pact (including the 
Soviet Union) ............ . 
Other European countries ... . 
Middle East ............... . 
South Asia ................ . 
Far East ................... . 
Oceania ................... . 
Africa ..................... . 
Central America ........... . 
South America ............. . 
78,929 
193,910 
12,250 
119,550 
17,821 
37,900 
4,902 
25,767 
3,369 
9,859 
2,186 
6,050 
2.8. The figures of the IISS are incomplete. 
It is thus impossible to establish data for the 
Alliance or the regions for 1981. The follow-
ing figures have been established from the latest 
available data without applying fictitious rates 
of increase (figures in US $ million): 
Warsaw Pact (total) ......... . 
NATO (total) .............. . 
Other European states (total) . 
Middle East ............... . 
Africa ..................... . 
Asia ...................... . 
Latin America 
143,080 
282,019 
14,948 
3,419 
5,087 
93,653 
8,999 
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2.9. The data from "World Military Expendi-
tures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978 " is as 
follows (figures in US $ billion). In 1978, the 
world as a whole spent 479.9 on armaments; of 
which the industrialised countries used up 
370.3 and the developing countries 109.6. In 
terms of Alliance figures, this means: NATO-
Europe 68.9 and Warsaw Pact 177.4; the 
expenditure of NA TO-total amounted to 181.7, 
that of the Warsaw Pact to 177.4 ; OPEC coun-
tries spent 29.9 and the OECD 199.8. More 
interesting, however, are the rates of increase 
during the decade. 
Regional shares of the major weapons supplied 
to the third world, 1970-79 
Central 
America 
1.4% 
South 
Asia 
6.4% 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
9% 
Shares of the supplier countries in the exports of 
major weapons to the third world, 1970-79 
UK 
5% 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1981 (Figures 4.4 and 4.5). 
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Governmental development aid 
Aid from major groups of donor countries (1980) 
United States ..................... . 
France ........................... . 
Germany ........................ . 
Japan ............................ . 
United Kingdom .................. . 
Netherlands ...................... . 
Canada .......................... . 
Sweden .......................... . 
Italy ............................. · 
Australia ......................... . 
Belgium ......................... . 
Norway .......................... . 
Denmark ........................ . 
Switzerland •...................... 
Austria .......................... . 
Spain ............................ . 
Finland .......................... . 
New Zealand ..................... . 
Ireland .......................... . 
OECD Total• .................... . 
of which: 
DAC ........................ . 
EEC countries ................ . 
OPEC ........................... . 
of which: 
Arab donors ................. . 
Saudi Arabia ................. . 
Kuwait ...................... . 
UAE ................ oo····o· 
Iraq ....... 0 0 0 •••••••• 0 ••• 0 ••• 
Qatar ..... 0 0 0 •••••••••• 0. 0 0 ••• 
Libya 0 0 0. 0 0 •••••••• 0 •••• 0 ••••• 
Algeria . 0 ••••••••• 0 0 ••• 0 •••••• 
Non-Arab donors ............. . 
CMEA .......................... . 
of which: 
USSR ....................... . 
GDR ........................ . 
Eastern Europe ............... . 
a Countries above. 
ODA 
$million 
7,138 
4,053 
3,517 
3,304 
1,781 
1,577 
1,036 
923 
672 
657 
581 
473 
468 
246 
173 
146 
106 
71 
31 
26,962 
26,767 
12,680 
6,978 
6,802 
3,040 
1,188 
1,062 
829 
319 
281 
83 
175 
1,817 
1,580 
72 
165 
Share 
in world ODA 
% 
19.9 
11.3 
9.8 
9.2 
5.0 
4.4 
2.9 
2.6 
1.9 
1.8 
1.6 
1.3 
1.3 
0.6 
0.5 
0.6 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
75.4 
74.9 
35.5 
19.5 
19.0 
8.5 
3.3 
3.0 
2.3 
0.9 
0.8 
0.2 
0.5 
5.1 
4.4 
0.2 
0.5 
ODAas 
per cent of GNP 
% 
0.27 
0.62 
0.43 
0.32 
0.34 
0.99 
0.42 
0.76 
0.17 
0.48 
0.49 
0.82 
0.72 
0.24 
0.23 
0.07 
0.22 
0.32 
0.18 
0.36 
0.37 
0.46 
1.35 
2.34 
2.60 
3.88 
3.96 
2.12 
4080 
0.92 
0.21 
0.08 
0.12 
0.14 
0.06 
0.06 
Source: Development co-operation, OECD Review 1981, Paris 1981, So 78 (Table VI-2)0 
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Per capita 
GNP 
$ 
11,540 
12,140 
13,400 
8,900 
9,390 
11,240 
10,290 
14,620 
6,910 
9,420 
12,050 
14,030 
12,620 
16,260 
10,250 
5,730 
10,320 
7,090 
5,160 
10,480 
10,770 
10,660 
2,620 
5,540 
9,410 
22,790 
27,890 
2,930 
26,900 
10,280 
2,110 
1,640 
4,000 
4,140 
6,750 
3,040 
(c) Qualitative tusessment of data 
2.10. A comparison between the data is almost 
impossible. Besides the problem, already men-
tioned, of obtaining reliable figures, especially 
in the case of the Soviet Union, there is the 
additional problem of conflicting methods of 
analysing and interpreting the data. The first 
problem concerns the non-convertibility of cer-
tain currencies, notably that of the Soviet 
Union. In addition, the comparison of indus-
trial and economic costs between market 
economy and socialist-oriented states is almost 
impossible. The CIA assesses Soviet defence 
production as if it had been produced by the 
United States industrial base. If one assesses 
the cost of personnel in this way, the basic 
performance of the Soviet Union increases 
enormously. 
2.11. The Soviet Union on the other hand 
refers constantly to its own, published budget, 
which, with regard to defence and armaments 
exports, only amounts to one-sixth of the real 
amount, even at the most conservative esti-
mate. Thus Soviet figures are about 80 % 
below those for the Soviet Union given by the 
United States. Until 1978, SIPRI increased all 
Soviet data by 30 %. The new SIPRI formula 
(from 1978 on) is based on a 1970 CIA calcula-
tion which has been computed by using a rate 
of increase of 1.5% until now. Conversion to 
US $ has been accomplished by applying an 
artificial purchase factor of 2.2. 
2.12. It is noteworthy that there is no objective 
data available. Also the data arrived at by the 
various institutes is inconsistent. Since the 
publication of these figures already implies a 
World military expenditure 
$ billion at 1978 constant prices and 1978 
exchange rates (percentages in brackets) 
1978 1980 
World ............... 435.3 455.3 
(100 %) (100 %) 
NATO .............. 189.7 193.9 
(43.6 %) (42.6 %) 
Warsaw Pact ......... 115.8 119.6 
(26.6 %) (26.3 %) 
Non-oil-producing 
developing countries 30.5 38.4 
(7.0 %) (8.4 %) 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute: "World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook 
1981 ". 
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judgment, the figures become even more subjec-
tive when assessing weapon systems. This 
shows that disarmament talks are encumbered 
with unreliable data. 
2.13. In its report for the 1978 special session, 
the Committee pointed out that over the 
previous decade the greatest increase in military 
expenditure had come from the poorest third 
world countries whereas expenditure of the two 
military blocs had been roughly constant in real 
terms but had decreased from 80 % to 70 % as a 
proportion of world military expenditure. The 
same source for figures of world military expen-
diture in 1978 and 1980, the last year for which 
figures are available, shows the same trend as 
the above table shows. 
Ill. The 1978 special session on disarmament of 
the United Nations General Assembly 
Final document 
3.1. The special session was convened largely 
at the instigation of the non-aligned countries 
which took a very active part in the delibera-
tions. As the Committee noted in its previous 
report, a number of concrete proposals were 
put forward by several of the allied countries, 
particularly France, but the two superpowers, 
who had been sceptical of the usefulness of the 
special session, took a less active part. 
3.2. The final document adopted by consen-
sus at the end of the special session reflects 
these different attitudes. It is a rambling docu-
ment of 129 paragraphs containing something 
for everybody, in a mixture of pious but 
unrealistic intentions with a few concrete 
proposals. 
3.3. Paragraph 17 of the final document 
recognises realistically enough that " no real 
progress has been made so far in the crucial 
field of reduction of armaments". It cites only 
the convention on the prohibition of bacteriolo-
gical and toxin weapons as an agreement limi-
ting or eliminating certain weapons. It notes 
that " for more than a decade there have been 
no negotiations leading to a treaty on general 
and complete disarmament " which, in para-
graph 19, is identified as the final goal. 
General priorities 
3.4. In paragraphs 20-24 of the final docu-
ment can be found general priorities for disar-
mament as identified by the special session, 
which can be succinctly enumerated as follows: 
(i) nuclear disarmament and the pre-
vention of nuclear war ; 
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(ii) the prohibition of other weapons of 
mass destruction, with " high prior-
ity " to be given to the elimination 
of all chemical weapons ; 
(iii) " the balanced reduction of armed 
forces and of conventional arma-
ments ", and " the limitation of 
international transfer of conventional 
weapons"; 
(iv) the prohibition or restriction of 
excessively injurious conventional 
weapons; 
(v) collateral measures in both the 
nuclear and conventional fields and 
confidence-building measures. 
The final document in paragraph 28 declares 
that "the nuclear weapons states have the pri-
mary responsibility for nuclear disarmament 
and, together with other military significant sta-
tes, for halting and reversing the arms race ". 
Programme of action 
3.5. Seventy paragraphs of the final document 
are devoted to a programme of action which 
calls for a range of measures of varying feasibi-
lity. Some of these measures, usually formula-
ted in different language, were taken up by the 
WEU Assembly in paragraph 1 of Recommen-
dation 323 1• The chief points in the pro-
gramme of action are summarised in paragraphs 
3.6 to 3.15 below. 
3.6. Nuclear disarmament is to be achieved 
through the cessation of the improvement and 
development of nuclear weapons ; the cessation 
of production of nuclear weapons and means of 
delivery ; and through progressive reduction of 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and means of 
delivery. 
3. 7. Cessation of nuclear weapon tests is to be 
achieved through the negotiations between the 
United Kingdom, the United States and the 
Soviet Union on a comprehensive test ban 
which will be submitted to the Committee on 
Disarmament so that a draft treaty can be 
submitted to the United Nations General 
Assembly. 
3.8. Strategic arms limitation requires the 
earliest conclusion of SALT 11 by the United 
States and the Soviet Union, to be followed by 
significant reductions and qualitative limita-
tions on strategic weapons. 
3.9. Measures to prevent nuclear war should 
include arrangements " to assure to non-nuclear 
weapons states against the use or threat of use 
of nuclear weapons". Nuclear weapon-free 
l. Text at Appendix I. 
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zones and zones of peace are to be achieved by 
agreement among states in the region concerned 
and the existing Tlatelolco Treaty prohibiting 
nuclear weapons in Latin America is cited. 
3.10. The section on non-proliforation of 
nuclear weapons refers to the obligations of 
nuclear weapons states to stop the nuclear arms 
race and achieve nuclear disarmament, as well 
as obligations of non-nuclear weapons states in 
preventing proliferation. It is noted in passing 
that adherence to the non-proliferation treaty 
" has increased in recent years ", but the right 
of all countries to participate in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy is stressed. 
3.11. The section on other weapons of mass 
destruction calls on all states to adhere to exis-
ting treaties including the 1925 Geneva Proto-
col on gas and bacteriological warfare and the 
1972 Biological Weapons Convention. The 
conclusion of a convention on the total prohibi-
tion of chemical weapons " is one of the most 
urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations ". A 
convention banning radiological weapons is 
called for, and further measures in addition to 
those in the two treaties concerned should be 
taken to prevent an arms race on the seabed or 
in outer space. 
3.12. In the field of conventional weapons, 
there should be agreements on appropriate 
mutual reductions and limitations in Europe 
and there should be consultations " among 
major arms supplier and recipient countries on 
the limitation of all types of international trans-
fer of conventional weapons based in particular 
on the principle of undiminished security of the 
parties ... ". There should be an agreement to 
restrict the use of certain particularly injurious 
conventional weapons. 
3.13. The programme of action also calls for 
reduction of military expenditures ; confidence-
building measures; and a strengthening of insti-
tutions for maintaining peace. 
3.14. Two paragraphs recognise briefly the 
importance of measures of verification for disar-
mament agreements. The French proposal for 
the establishment of an international satellite 
monitoring agency is noted in the final 
document. 
3.15. Lastly, the programme of action calls for 
a considerable programme of studies, informa-
tion, education and training on various aspects 
of disarmament both through the secretariat of 
the United Nations ; through the establishment 
of a semi-independent research centre and 
through UNESCO. 
Machinery 
3.16. The last section of the final document 
provided for a revision of disarmament machi-
nery in the United Nations and associated 
frameworks. In particular the previous confe-
rence of the Committee on Disarmament (origi-
nally the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disar-
mament), which met under the authority of, 
and at the invitation of, the United States and 
the Soviet Union as eo-chairmen, was modified 
to become the Committee on Disarmament 
with a membership enlarged to forty countries 
under a chairmanship rotating on a monthly 
basis among all of its members. This is the 
principal negotiating (as opposed to delibera-
ting) forum. 
IV. Prospects for the 1982 special session 
on disarmament of the 
United Nations General Assembly 
4.1. Six months after the conclusion of the 
first special session on disarmament, the United 
Nations General Assembly decided that its 
second special session devoted to the same 
subject should be held in 1982, and in 
December 1980 established a Preparatory 
Committee composed of 78 member states to be 
appointed by the President of the General 
Assembly on the basis of appropriate geogra-
phic distribution. That Preparatory Commit-
tee on 14th October 1981 reported to the 
General Assembly its proposals for the agenda 
and organisation of the 1982 special session. 
Among the 78 members of the Preparatory 
Committee are the following 12 NATO coun-
tries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
4.2. The special session is to be held from 7th 
June to 9th July 1982 and the substantive items 
on the present draft of the agenda read as 
follows: 
"8. General debate including: 
- Review and appraisal of the 
present international situation in 
the light of the pressing need for 
specific generally agreed measures 
to eliminate the danger of war, in 
particular nuclear war, halt and 
reverse the arms race and to 
achieve substantial progress in the 
field of disarmament, especially in 
its nuclear aspects, taking due 
account of the close interrelation-
ship between disarmament, inter-
national peace and security, as well 
as between disarmament and eco-
nomic and social development, 
particularly of the developing 
countries. 
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9. Review of the implementation of the 
decisions and recommendations 
adopted by the General Assembly at 
its first special session devoted to 
disarmament: 
- status of negotiations on disarma-
ment as contained in the program-
me of action and bearing in mind 
the priorities set out in the 
programme; 
- consideration of the report of the 
Committee on Disarmament, in 
particular any draft instruments 
transmitted by the Committee; 
- consideration of the report of the 
Disarmament Commission; 
- consideration of the implementa-
tion of resolutions of the General 
Assembly on specific tasks, in par-
ticular studies, aimed at the reali-
sation of the final document and 
their follow-up. 
10. Consideration and adoption of the 
comprehensive programme of dis-
armament. 
11. Implementation of the declaration of 
the 1980s as the Second Disarma-
ment Decade as well as consideration 
of initiatives and proposals of 
member states. 
12. Enhancing the effectiveness of machi-
nery in the field of disarmament and 
strengthening the role of the United 
Nations in this field, including the 
possible convening of a world disar-
mament conference. 
13. Measures to mobilise world public 
opinion in favour of disarmament: 
- disarmament education, seminars 
and training (United Nations pro-
gramme of fellowship on disarma-
ment); 
- world disarmament campaign ; 
- other public information activities. 
14. Adoption, in an appropriate format, 
of the document(s) of the second 
special session of the General Assem-
bly devoted to disarmament." 
4.3. The Preparatory Committee recommends 
that member states should be represented at the 
special session at the highest possible level. 
The 1978 special session attracted the highest 
level of participation on the part of many coun-
tries, including several NATO countries for 
whom the following spoke: Belgium - Mr. 
Simonet, Foreign Minister; Denmark - Mr. 
Ostergard, Minister without Portfolio; France -
President Giscard d'Estaing, President of the 
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Republic; Germany - Mr. Helmut Schmidt, 
Chancellor; United Kingdom -Mr. Callaghan, 
Prime Minister. However, both the United 
States and the Soviet Union played a less 
prominent role. Mr. Mondale, Vice-President 
of the United States, made an address which 
was chiefly critical of the Soviet Union. 
4.4. It is understood that President Mitterrand 
of France, Chancellor Schmidt of Germany, 
Mrs. Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, and President Reagan of the United 
States will be addressing the 1982 special 
session in person. Decisions concerning other 
western leaders have not yet been announced. 
4.5. Among the items on the foregoing draft 
agenda, the following can be expected to attract 
particular attention especially from the non-
aligned who are the principal protagonists of 
the special sessions: 
- Status of negotiations contained in the 
programme of action of the first special 
session, bearing in mind the priorities 
in the programme. 
- Report of the Committee on Disarma-
ment, in particular any draft treaties 
that it may have prepared. 
- Implementation of special tasks and 
studies referred to in the final 
document. 
- The comprehensive programme of 
disarmament. 
The following section summarises present 
progress on some of these specific topics which 
will be of particular relevance in the 1982 
special session. 
V. Status of certain specific arms control 
or disarmament subjects 
( 11) The Mrious distumtU~~ent coll/ereiiCes IIIUl negotiations 
5.1. The various disarmament conferences 
and armament control negotiations are not of 
purely military concern. They are - and this 
has been emphasised especially by the West -
embedded in certain wider considerations. 
Negotiations on the control of armaments 
should seek to bring about the renunciation of 
force which is enshrined in the United Nations 
Charter. Secondly, these negotiations should 
contribute, together with relevant military 
agreements, to securing peace on the basis of a 
stable balance, possibly at a lower level of 
armaments. Thus where world stability is 
concerned, the third world has to be included. 
These are the preconditions for all negotia-
tions. They are neither options nor scenarios; 
they are concrete, political foundations for 
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security which are derived from the real situa-
tion, including the fact that different contrac-
tual ties between states have led to economic, 
military and political alliances. The dominant 
position within the Alliance of the United 
States, based upon superior economic, military 
and political might, is a matter of fact, yet it 
does not result in the Alliance partners being 
held in tutelage, or in discrimination against 
them. In contrast the dominance of the Soviet 
Union inside the eastern alliance is more 
coercive. 
(b) Committee on Disarmament 
5.2. Designed as a negotiating body - one in 
which specific disarmament treaties can be 
drafted - the Committee on Disarmament and 
its predecessor, originally the Eighteen Nation 
Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), has met 
regularly in the United Nations headquarters in 
Geneva since 14th March 1962. The ENDC 
arose originally from a 1961 agreement between 
the United States and the Soviet Union to 
establish the negotiating body comprising repre-
sentatives of five NATO countries, five Warsaw 
Pact countries, and eight non-aligned countries 
to meet under the joint chairmanship of the 
two superpowers. France, however, objected 
to the dominant role thus assumed by the two 
superpowers and did not accept the seat offered 
to it. China was not among the countries 
invited to attend. 
5.3. The ENDC was progressively enlarged to 
30 participants, changing its name to the 
"Conference of the Committee on Disarma-
ment" and succeeded in negotiating a number 
of international agreements, in particular the 
non-proliferation treaty signed in 1968. One 
of the most positive outcomes of the 1978 
special session of the General Assembly was 
agreement to change the basis of the Committee 
by replacing the original eo-chairmanship of 
the United States and the Soviet Union by one 
that rotates each month among all members, 
the number of which was increased to 
40. Thus reconstituted as the "Committee on 
Disarmament" both France and China have 
joined it so that in one sense it is a more realis-
tic negotiating body because all five nuclear 
weapon powers are represented on it. At the 
same time, the 40-nation membership has 
undoubtedly made it a more unwieldy body. 
Cuba, for example, claims membership of the 
non-aligned group of 21 countries while 
attending meetings of the Soviet bloc, as does 
Ethiopia unofficially. 
5.4. The Committee on Disarmament is the 
primary body in which any substantive progress 
will be made on disarmament subjects which 
have to be referred to the 1982 special session. 
In its 1982 session, which opened on 2nd 
February, it had the following substantive items 
on the agenda: 
(i) nuclear test ban; 
(ii) cessation of the nuclear arms race 
and nuclear disarmament; 
(iii) effective international arrangements 
to assure non-nuclear weapons states 
against the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons (so-called "nega-
tive security assurances"); 
(iv) chemical weapons; 
(v) new types of weapons of mass 
destruction and new systems of such 
weapons; radiological weapons; 
(vi) comprehensive programme of dis-
armament; 
(vii) prevention of an arms race in outer 
space. 
In addition to its work in plenary session, the 
Committee on Disarmament for 1982 has 
established four ad hoc working groups on: a 
comprehensive programme of disarmament; 
negative security assurances; chemical weapons 
ban; and radiological weapons. In 1981 there 
was a further "ad hoc group of scientific experts 
to consider international co-operative measures 
to detect and identify seismic events" and in 
1982 the non-aligned, publicly supported by 
Australia, the Netherlands and Japan, called for 
the establishment of a working group on a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, but the 
proposal was vetoed by the United States 
although that country subsequently indicated 
that it would not oppose a working group limi-
ted to verification and compliance with a test 
ban. 
5.5. There is a reasonable working atmo-
sphere within the Committee on Disarmament 
but progress in preparing specific draft treaties 
in its framework will be very limited, because 
of the present state of East-West relations. 
Specific subjects are dealt with in the following 
section. 
(c) Subjects discussed in the Committee on Disarmament 
(i) Nuclear test ban 
5.6. The partial test ban treaty concluded in 
1963 prohibits the conduct of nuclear explo-
sions in the atmosphere, in outer space, or 
under water. It has been adhered to by 112 
countries including three nuclear weapons 
powers, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, who, since its conclu-
sion, have conducted all their nuclear testing 
underground and there have been no reported 
violations. Radioactive contamination of the 
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atmosphere has significantly declined with the 
cessation of nuclear weapon tests in other 
environments by these three powers. France, 
although not a party to the treaty, has in fact 
conducted all its nuclear tests underground 
since the beginning of 197 5 and the single 
Indian nuclear explosion (claimed to be a 
"peaceful device") in 1974 was also conducted 
underground. China continues to conduct a 
few tests in the atmosphere. 
5.7. On 3rd July 1974 the United States and 
the Soviet Union concluded a threshold test ban 
treaty banning underground tests in excess of 
150 kt, and on 28th May 1976 the two powers 
signed a treaty on underground nuclear explo-
sions for peaceful purposes. These treaties 
were submitted to the United States Senate for 
ratification by President Ford on 29th July 
1976, but have not so far been ratified although 
in 1976 the two powers stated that they would 
abide by their terms. 
5.8. Independent trilateral negotiations bet-
ween the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom 
and the United States began in Geneva in 1977 
and the three countries have made regular joint 
reports to the Committee on Disarmament, the 
last on 30th July 1980 reporting the status of 
the tripartite negotiations on "a treaty prohibi-
ting nuclear weapon test explosions in all 
environments and its protocol covering nuclear 
explosions for peaceful purposes". At that 
time this undoubtedly appeared to be the most 
important arms control treaty on which agree-
ment was then imminent. It had been agreed 
that the treaty would prohibit any nuclear 
explosions and prohibit assistance to any other 
country to conduct explosions. A separate 
peaceful nuclear explosion protocol would be 
attached to the treaty providing for a morat-
orium on peaceful explosions until agreement 
was later reached on arrangements for such 
explosions consistent with the comprehensive 
test ban. 
5.9. Significantly, agreement had been rea-
ched on the fundamental aspects of verification 
which would combine national means of verifi-
cation; the international exchange of seismic 
data; on-site inspection by request and further 
verification measures with procedures for on-
site inspection of suspicious events, including 
"the installation and use by the three parties of 
high quality national seismic stations of agreed 
characteristics". It was agreed in principle that 
ten seismic stations would be installed on the 
territory of each of the United States and the 
Soviet Union,_ but negotiations were continuing 
on the demand by the Soviet Union to install 
ten such stations on United Kingdom territory 
- including one in Hong Kong - to which the 
United Kingdom, for some unexplained reason, 
was objecting. It was anticipated that final 
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agreement would be reached on a total of 
some 21 of these stations - which were to be 
sealed "black boxes" installed by one party on 
the territory of another with a right of period-
ical access to check readings and ensure against 
tampering by the host country. 
5.10. It was understood that a treaty would 
initially be of limited duration, the Soviet 
Union calling for five years, the United States 
for three (although the original demands of 
these two countries had been the opposite), but 
would become of unlimited duration on the 
accession of the two remaining nuclear powers, 
France and China, which had not agreed to 
renounce testing. The question of initial 
duration was the only substantive issue on 
which agreement had not been reached when 
the negotiations last met on 18th November 
1980. 
5.11. There has been considerable opposition 
within the United States to the very concept of 
a comprehensive test ban, both from the w~a­
pons design establishment and from the Jomt 
Chiefs of Staff, chiefly on the grounds that the 
reliability of existing nuclear weapons stocks 
cannot be ensured without periodical "confi-
dence" testing, and that a ban would hamper 
new designs of nuclear weapons. Typical of 
evidence given to United States Senate Com-
mittees is that of Dr. H.M. Agnew, Director of 
the Los Alamos Laboratory which designs and 
manufactures nuclear weapons: 
" .. .I do not believe we can maintain a 
technology base or the necessary cadre of 
first-class scientists and engineers to 
enable the United States to have a 
nuclear weapons design capability for 
more than a few years if testing ceases. " 1 
Senator Bartlett, for example, submitted a 
report opposing a comprehensive test ban in 
19782. The Reagan administration has taken a 
year to review its test ban policy, during which 
time the tripartite negotiations have been 
suspended, and on 9th February 1982 Mr. 
Eugene Rostow, Director of the United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
informed the Committee on Disarmament in 
Geneva that: 
"It is clear that any consideration of a 
complete cessation of nuclear explosions 
must be related to our ability to maintain 
credible deterrent forces... It is equally 
clear that a test ban cannot of itself end 
l. Letter of 19th April 1977 appended to Hearings before 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 28th July, 
3rd August and 8th and 15th September 1977. 
2. "The consequences of a comprehensive test ban 
treaty", report to ihe Senate Committee on the Armed 
Services, 11th August 1978. 
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the threat posed by nuclear weapons. 
Direct means for achieving progress 
towards that objective are the negotiation 
of significant reductions, the restoration 
of Article 2(4)1 of the United Nations 
Charter as an effective element of world 
politics, and the eventual elimination of 
the weapons themselves. Thus, while a 
comprehensive ban on nuclear testing 
remains an element in the full range of 
long-term United States arms control 
objectives, we do not believe that, under 
present circumstances, a comprehensive 
test ban would serve the twin objectives 
of eliminating the threat of nuclear 
weapons and maintaining the stability of 
the nuclear balance. Nevertheless, the 
United States will continue to work with 
the Committee in its efforts to deal with 
the issues involved." 
5.12. Thus negotiation of a comprehensive test 
ban has ceased to be an aim of United States 
policy at the present time. The United States 
has refused to resume the trilateral negotiation 
and has opposed the establishment of a 
working group in the Committee on Disarma-
ment to negotiate such a ban2. The decision to 
continue nuclear testing is closely linked with 
the new United States nuclear warhead pro-
gramme. According to press reports3, Mr. 
Charles Gilbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Nuclear Materials in the United States Depart-
ment of Energy, implied in Washington on 28th 
February 1982 that the total stock of United 
States nuclear warheads was to be increased 
from the present 24,000 to about 
40,000. Other reports, however, refer to the 
production of about 17,000 new warheads to 
replace existing warheads in a stockpile of 
25,000 without significant net increase in total 
numbers. President Reagan's warhead produc-
tion programme signed on 5th March 1982 
included only about 380 more warheads than 
the programme for increased production signed 
by President Carter in October 1980. 
5.13. The Committee calls for a resumption of 
the trilateral negotiations which offer the best 
forum for agreement, and in which it has to be 
recognised that the Soviet Union has made 
several concessions. 
(ii) Chemical weapons 
5.14. The United States and the Soviet Union 
commenced bilateral negotiations on a conven-
tion to ban chemical weapons in 1974; as in the 
case of the test ban negotiations, periodical 
I. Article on refraining from the threat or use of force. 
2. See paragraph 5.4 above. 
3. The Guardian, lst March 1982; International Herald 
Tribune, 23rd March 1982. 
reports on the progress of the negotiations were 
made to the Committee on Disarmament, the 
last on 7th July 1980 which showed agreement 
on the scope of a convention to ban develop-
ment, production or stockpiling of chemical 
weapons. Agreement had been reached on 
definitions of chemical weapons and the (small) 
amounts of specified chemicals that might be 
held for non-military purposes. It was agreed 
that adequate verification measures would be 
required in a convention, including the right of 
on-site inspection by request, but the necessary 
procedures for on-site inspection, including the 
rights and functions of inspection personnel and 
the functions of the host side, had not been 
agreed. These bilateral negotiations have not 
been resumed by the Reagan administration. 
5.15. Pressure for more progress in the bilateral 
talks had been growing both in the United 
Nations General Assembly and in the Commit-
tee on Disarmament, and in 1980 that Commit-
tee finally established the ad hoc working group 
on chemical weapons which could discuss the 
matters to be included in a convention, but was 
not supposed to draft actual treaty language. 
Under the chairmanship of Sweden, this group 
worked hard during 1981 and produced a docu-
ment which falls not far short of a draft conven-
tion. It concluded in its report to the Disarma-
ment Committee, adopted on 20th August 
1981, that "while it was generally agreed that 
the group made substantive progress during its 
1981 session, many delegations regretted that it 
was not possible to obtain a revised mandate 
which would enable the group to initiate nego-
tiations on the text of a convention". As the 
Committee on Disarmament under its rules of 
procedure appoints working groups by consen-
sus, opposition from a few countries, including 
the United States, has so far prevented the 
working group from being authorised to draft 
an actual convention, in spite of the fact that 
no draft treaty has emerged from the bilateral 
negotiations. Reconstituted in 1982 the work-
ing group under Polish chairmanship is consi-
dering "elements" for inclusion in a treaty, 
including the all-important verification mea-
sures on which working papers have been 
submitted by the United Kingdom and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
5.16. The Republican administration in the 
United States under President Nixon in 1969 
suspended production of chemical weapons 
when stockpiles of nerve gases were very 
large1• An accident with the experimental 
testing of these gases had killed a large number 
of sheep, leading to public protests. 
5.17. Since 1979, the United States has been 
claiming that there is evidence of the use of 
chemical weapons by the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan and by Vietnam in South-East 
103 
DOCUMENT 909 
Asia, but analysis had not established the use of 
chemical agents. It also claimed in 1979 that 
an outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk could 
have originated in a bacteriological warfare 
plant. The present administration, most 
authoritatively in the evidence given by Mr. 
Richard Burt, Director of the Bureau of Poli-
tico-Military Affairs in the State Department, 
claimed on 1Oth November 1981 2 that the 
substances detected by United States experts in 
samples from South-East Asia were trichothe-
cene mycotoxins - poisonous chemicals pro-
duced by living organisms - which were 
prohibited by the 1972 convention banning 
biological and toxin weapons. The United 
States has asked British scientists and aid 
officials working in areas of South-East Asia to 
which refugees have fled from Laos and 
Cambodia to assist in securing evidence of the 
use of toxins known locally as "yellow rain". 
On 22nd March 1982 the United States 
released a 32-page document in support of its 
claims. 
5.18. So far, however, the United States claim 
has not been universally accepted; expert 
evidence at the Senate hearings was in conflict3, 
and the 22nd March publication has also been 
found non-conclusive4• In December 1980, the 
United Nations General Assembly, against the 
opposition of the Soviet Union and its allies, 
established a group of experts to investigate the 
allegations. In a report to the General Assem-
bly on 24th November 1981, these experts 
(from Egypt, Kenya, the Philippines and Peru) 
rejected the United States findings that analyses 
proved the use of chemical weapons in Laos 
and Cambodia; they were unable to confirm or 
deny such use; they had also visited Thailand 
from 31st October to lOth November but were 
unable to investigate areas where chemical 
attacks were alleged to have occurred. The 
l. Total chemical weapon agent estimated at from 
42,000* to 38,000** tons; total filled chemical munitions at 
150,000 to 200,000 tons** in about 3~ million 
items (bombs, shells, rockets, etc.) of which 4,000 tons 
reportedly stored in Germany at Pirmasens, Massweile, 
Mannheim and Hanan***. 
(* Lt.-Col. G. Eifrid, Chemical Officer, in "Army", 
December 1979, quoted by Julian Perry-Robinson in "Sur-
vival", January/February 1982; **E.M. Kallis "Chemical 
Warfare", Issue Brief 18 81081, United States Congressio-
nal Research Service, updated lOth February 1982; ***Arti-
cle in "Der Spiege/", 22nd February 1982.) See also the 
Committee's earlier report "Nuclear, biological and chemi-
cal protection", Rapporteur: Mr. Banks, Document 838, 
29th April 1980. 
2. "Yellow rain and other forms of chemical and biologi-
cal warfare in Asia", hearings of the Arms Control Sub-
Committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
3. "Yellow rain and other forms of chemical and biologi-
cal warfare in Asia" op. cit - see evidence of Dr. Matthew 
Meselson, Professor of Biochemistry, Harvard University. 
4. Sunday Times, 28th March 1982, "Poison 'proof 
under fire". 
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report noted that more time would be required 
for a conclusive investigation and that access to 
the regions concerned was required. On 9th 
December 1981 the mandate of the experts was 
extended by the General Assembly; they were 
to visit Pakistan in the area of the Afghanistan 
border in February 1982. 
5.19. Western estimates of Soviet chemical 
weapon stocks have varied widely. United 
States estimates have been expressed in the 
form of " from 5 % to 30 % of conventional 
munitions " or in terms of United States stock-
piles - from 4 to 1 up to 10 to 1 superio-
rity 1• But these estimates are reported to be 
based on assumptions concerning presumed 
Soviet chemical warfare tactics, not on direct 
estimates of stocks or production which are 
inaccessible to western intelligence. Other 
analysts have implied that Soviet stocks are 
smaller than those of the United States 1• A 
Rapporteur of the Committee, after extensive 
investigation in 1980, was informed merely that 
Soviet stocks were " sufficient for their require-
ments" 2• Recently the United Kingdom 
Minister of State for Defence Procurement, 
Viscount Trenchard, said " I can confirm that 
our belief is that the USSR has a stock of 
[chemical] weapons, much of it deployed in for-
ward stores, of over 300,000 tons, and that by 
any estimation it has well over 10 times the 
amount of the United States ", but said it would 
not be in the public interest to indicate the 
evidence on which the belief was based 3• 
Well-documented, of course, is the presence of 
a large number of well-equipped chemical 
defence troops in the Soviet forces. This 
emphasis on chemical defence is consistent with 
Soviet fear of the large United States chemical 
stockpile, and the heavy Russian gas casualties 
of World War I; it would also be consistent 
with Soviet readiness to initiate the use of 
chemical weapons. 
5.20. Since the 1969 ban on the manufacture 
of chemical weapons in the United States, there 
has been an intense debate between the chemi-
cal warfare lobby within the Pentagon and the 
opponents of chemical weapons - which also 
include much of the military establishment 
- over proposals to resume production of a new 
form of chemical weapons - known as " bin-
ary " weapons. Binary weapons would not 
contain the highly toxic nerve gases as such, 
but two less toxic chemicals which would be 
caused to mix during the flight of the projectile 
so as to combine to form nerve gas which 
would be released on impact. In 1981, the 
1. See Congressional Research Service paper op. cit. 
2. Document 838, Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 
2.50. 
3. Hansard, House of Lords, 18th February 1982. 
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Reagan administration secured congressional 
approval of a $ 23 million budget to build faci-
lities for the production of binary chemical 
weapons at the Pine Bluff Chemical Weapons 
Centre in Arkansas. The total chemical 
weapons budget for fiscal year 1982 is $ 455 
million, mostly for defensive purposes. The 
planned chemical weapons budget for FY 1983 
would be $ 810 million of which $ 104 million 
for binary weapon production. In 1984 total 
chemical funding is planned to rise to $ 1.4 
billion to permit full-scale production in that 
year. On 18th January, further press reports 
said that in addition to plans for binary chemi-
cal shells and bombs for aircraft, the United 
States was studying the feasibility of chemical 
warheads for cruise missiles. 
5.21. The Pine Bluff binary production facility 
will not be completed before mid-1983, and on 
8th February 1982 President Reagan officially 
certified to Congress (as he was required to do 
by legislation if production was to begin) that 
production of the new chemical weapons " is 
essential to the national interest". In 1980, 
the United States Defence Science Board 
recommended the production of binary chemi-
cal weapons and proposed that they be stored 
in the United Kingdom, but both Britain and 
the United States have confirmed that no offi-
cial proposal has been made for storage in 
the United Kingdom. Military strategy will 
require storage in the European theatre, but it 
is clear that because of political opposition the 
United States administration will delay formal 
requests to European allies until after the 
deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing 11 
under the December 1979 decision has been 
completed. 
5.22. The debate on the advisability of resu-
ming production of chemical weapons is a 
serious issue in the United States, and the 
scepticism which has greeted some United 
States allegations concerning the use of toxin 
weapons in South-East Asia and Afghanistan 
arises from the belief that the allegations have 
been made to justify United States manufacture 
of chemical weapons. However, a number of 
European experts now consider it likely that 
there has been experimental use of chemical or 
toxin weapons by the Soviet Union or its 
agents ; others no less qualified remain 
sceptical. 
5.23. Pravda, on 22nd January, denied again 
United States allegations on the use of chemical 
or toxin weapons in Afghanistan and in Cam-
bodia, called for a complete ban on their pro-
duction and use, and blamed the United States 
for breaking off the bilateral negotiations. The 
United States press 1 on 26th January reported 
government officials as saying that the United 
1. International Herald Tribune. 
States would now propose new multilateral 
negotiations among the (some 1 00) signatories 
of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the prohibition 
of the use of poison gas in war, with a view to 
negotiating a treaty to eliminate chemical 
weapons, albeit in the belief that such negotia-
tions could not succeed before production of 
binary weapons began. The negotiations were 
needed however " to head off allegations in 
Western Europe... that the United States was 
starting an arms race in chemical weapons ". 
5.24. In the past, the Committee has recom-
mended that production of chemical weapons 
in the United States should still be held in 
abeyance pending a further attempt at success-
ful bilateral negotiations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union on a chemical 
weapons ban. 
(iii) Radiological weapons 
5.25. Under the agenda item "New types of 
weapons of mass destruction and new systems 
of such weapons ; radiological weapons ", the 
Committee on Disarmament has chiefly consi-
dered a possible ban on radiological weapons. 
These are hypothetical weapons which would 
contain highly radioactive material but employ 
a bursting charge of purely conventional explo-
sive in order to scatter radioactivity over a large 
area. There is no evidence that any country 
has ever produced such weapons because the 
problem of shielding such intensely radioactive 
material in weapons prior to their employment 
would make it virtually impossible to handle 
them outside laboratory or factory conditions. 
However, as the final document of the first 
United Nations General Assembly special 
session on disarmament called for a convention 
prohibiting the development, production, stock-
piling and use of radiological weapons, many 
countries who were sceptical of the practical 
value of such a convention have been prepared 
to subscribe to the principle as a cosmetic 
gesture. 
5.26. The Committee on Disarmament estab-
lished an ad hoc working group on radiologi-
cal weapons under the chairmanship of Hun-
gary which last reported to the plenary 
Committee on 20th August 1981. It has been 
reconstituted in 1982 under the chairmanship 
of the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
United States and the Soviet Union agreed in 
July 1979 on a joint proposal on the major 
elements to be included in a treaty banning 
radiological weapons. Discussion in the 
working group has shown that some countries 
led by Sweden believed that the specific 
weapons as defined in the joint Soviet-United 
States proposal were so theoretical as not to 
merit a treaty in themselves, but that such a 
treaty could be a useful vehicle for prohibiting 
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attacks on civilian nuclear facilities such as 
nuclear reactors which could present a very real 
risk of mass destruction from the spread of 
radioactivity. The Israeli attack on the Iraqi 
reactor lends urgency to this view. Other 
countries preferred a merely cosmetic treaty 
banning radiological weapons and the nuclear 
weapons powers have not so far supported the 
Swedish position. 
5.27. It is now unlikely that a draft convention 
on radiological weapons will be ready for 
submission to the special session - unless 
strictly limited to such weapons, with 
provision for further negotiation on an optional 
protocol to ban attacks on nuclear installations. 
(iv) Negative security assurances 
5.28. Under the agenda item "Effective inter-
national arrangements to assure non-nuclear 
weapon states against the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons ", the Committee on Disarma-
ment has been discussing what is known collo-
quially as " negative security assurances ". 
The General Assembly had recommended to 
the Committee on Disarmament that it 
continue negotiations on " effective interna-
tional arrangements... to assure non-nuclear 
weapon states against the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons ... ". Another ad hoc working 
group, under the chairmanship of Italy in 1981 
and now under that of Pakistan, has been consi-
dering this matter. 
5.29. The five nuclear weapon powers have at 
various times made unilateral declarations 
undertaking not to use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon 
countries, but each in a different form and with 
different provisos. Documentation of the 
working group provides the following list: 
(1) China: "Complete prohibition and total 
destruction of nuclear weapons are essential for 
the elimination of nuclear war and nuclear 
threats. We are aware that its realisation is no 
easy matter. This being the case, we hold that 
the nuclear-weapon states should at least 
undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon states 
and nuclear-free zones. On its own initiative 
and unilaterally, China long ago declared that 
at no time and in no circumstances would it be 
the first to use nuclear weapons. " 
(2) France: To negotiate with nuclear-free 
zones participants in order to contract effective 
and binding commitments, as appropriate, pre-
cluding any use or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons against the states of those zones. 
(3) USSR: To offer a binding commitment in 
a new international convention not to use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear states parties to such a convention 
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which renounce the production and acquisition 
of nuclear weapons and which have no nuclear 
weapons in their territory or under their juris-
diction or control, and to consult whenever any 
party to the convention has reason to believe 
that the actions of any other party are in viola-
tion of this commitment. 
" I wish also solemnly to declare that the 
Soviet Union will never use nuclear 
weapons against those states which 
renounce the production and acquisition 
of such weapons and do not have them 
on their territory. " 
(4) United Kingdom: Not to use nuclear 
weapons against states which are parties to the 
non-proliferation treaty or other internationally 
binding commitments not to manufacture or 
acquire nuclear explosive devices except in the 
case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its 
dependent territories, its armed forces or its 
allies by such states in association or alliance 
with a nuclear-weapon state. 
(5) United States- of America: Not to use 
nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-
weapon state party to the non-proliferation 
treaty or any comparable internationally 
binding commitment not to acquire nuclear 
explosive devices, except in the case of an 
attack on the United States, its territories or 
armed forces or its allies by such a state allied 
to a nuclear-weapon state or associated with a 
nuclear-weapon state in carrying out or sustai-
ning the attack. 
5.30. The Netherlands has submitted a sugges-
ted " common formula " for negative security 
assurances to be incorporated in a Security 
Council resolution. 
5.31. Discussion in the working group has 
turned both on the content of such under-
takings that non-nuclear weapons countries 
would prefer, as well as on the form in which 
undertakings should be incorporated - an inter-
national convention; a resolution of the United 
Nations General Assembly merely noting the 
different forms of undertaking given by the five 
nuclear weapon countries ; or a resolution of 
the Security Council have all been mentioned. 
5.32. The last report of the ad hoc working 
group to the Committee on Disarmament was 
adopted on 20th August 1981 recommending 
that a search should continue in 1982 for a 
" common approach " and for a " common 
formula " to be included in an international 
instrument of a legally-binding character. 
(v) Comprehensive programme of disarmament 
5.33. The concept of "general and complete 
disarmament " was a favourite theme of disar-
mament discussion in the United Nations 
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framework, especially in the period 1959 to the 
mid-1960s. On 20th September 1961, the 
United States and the Soviet Union issued a 
joint statement of agreed principles as a basis 
for multilateral negotiations on disarmament 
and in 1962, in the newly-constituted ENDC in 
Geneva, the two superpowers tabled two impor-
tant texts - the United States an "outline of 
basic provisions of a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament in a peaceful world " 
and the Soviet Union a " draft treaty on general 
and complete disarmament under strict interna-
tional control ". Amended from time to time, 
these documents remained the basis of discus· 
sion on the concept of world-wide disarmament 
for the rest of the decade but there have been 
no new initiatives from the superpowers whose 
efforts subsequently became concentrated on 
more restricted negotiations in the SALT pro-
cess, the comprehensive test ban and the chemi-
cal weapons ban, and in regional negotiations 
such as MBFR. 
5.34. There has been widespread demand from 
the non-aligned countries in the General 
Assembly, especially in its 1978 special session, 
for attention to be turned again to general disar-
mament in the form of a " comprehensive pro-
gramme of disarmament". 
5.35. Another ad hoc working group on a 
comprehensive programme of disarmament, 
under the chairmanship of Mexico, has been 
established in the Committee on Disarmament. 
It has studied more than thirty different pro-
posals put forward by member countries. In 
1980, it adopted an outline programme inclu-
ding chapters on objectives, principles, priori-
ties, measures, stages of implementation and 
machinery and procedures. 
5.36. On 6th August 1981, Australia, Belgium, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and 
the United Kingdom jointly submitted a 
working paper on a " comprehensive pro-
gramme for disarmament " to the working 
group. The ultimate objective of the pro-
gramme is complete disarmament under strict 
and effective international control ; its achieve-
ment is to be based on confidence-building 
measures. One motive for this global pro-
gramme would be the desire to render an effec-
tive contribution to the economic and social 
development of all states, especially in the third 
world, by disarming. The process of disarma-
ment, according to the above proposal, is to 
take place in accordance with the final docu-
ment of the 1978 special session of the General 
Assembly on disarmament. The following 
principles should be particularly noted: 
- The security of all states must be safe-
guarded and guaranteed throughout all 
phases of this process of disarmament. 
Each phase should attempt to pro-
vide undiminished security at a lower 
level of armament and forces. The 
geo-strategic and geo-social factors 
should be taken into account. In 
order to avoid destabilising consequen-
ces a balance between the conventional 
and nuclear spheres should be created. 
The international verification of these 
steps must be guaranteed. 
- The main r~sponsibility for nuclear 
disarmament lies with the nuclear 
powers. 
- The Charter of the United Nations 
must be strictly adhered to. 
5.37. The working group on a comprehensive 
programme intends to resume its discussion of a 
draft programme in 1982 in time for submis-
sion to the General Assembly special session. 
It promises to be a lengthy list of measures of 
disarmament which should be agreed in various 
stages, all of which have eluded agreement so 
far. 
(vl) Outer space 
5.38. The last item on the current agenda of 
the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva is 
" Prevention of an arms race in outer space " 
but the Committee will not have found time for 
more than a preliminary discussion before its 
anticipated adjournment on 20th April. It is 
understood that two allied countries would 
have tabled proposals on this subject but were 
dissuaded by the United States because the 
present administration has still not completed 
its review of policy on defence and arms control 
in outer space. 
5.39. The 1967 outer space treaty, to which 
there are 82 parties including, with minor 
exceptions, all militarily significant states, in 
particular all NATO and Warsaw Pact 
countries 1, prohibits the stationing in space in 
orbit or on celestial bodies of nuclear weapons 
or other weapons of mass destruction, and 
prohibits any military installations, operations 
or tests on celestial bodies. It would not 
prohibit the use in space of weapons other than 
" weapons of mass destruction " taken to mean 
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. At 
the present time, however, there are no 
weapons designed for use in outer space except 
presumably the few ABM missiles permitted 
under the 1972 ABM treaty. The superpowers 
maintain communications, navigation, and 
many types of observation and detection 
satellites in orbit - systems which have become 
very important for verification " by national 
means " of arms control treaties in force. 
1. China and Portugal are not parties ; India signed but 
has not ratified the treaty. 
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5.40. There are now, however, a number of 
proposals in the United States -and it must be 
assumed there are similar unpublicised moves 
in the Soviet Union - for the development of 
weapons systems for use in or from outer 
space. These include systems to destroy 
satellites, and space platforms to carry high 
energy lasers capable in their turn of destroying 
anti-satellite weapons or ballistic missiles in 
flight. Such systems would be destabilising if 
they resulted in the destruction of observation 
and detection satellites on which confidence in 
existing and future arms control agreements 
depends ; or if the possibility of an anti-missile 
capability resulted in the abrogation of the 
1972 ABM treaty. They would certainly be 
very costly - estimates range from $ 15 to 20 
billion per system or up to $ 400 billion for a 
full space weapons capability. 
5.41. Such weapons are at least a decade 
away. Once operational it would be imposs-
ible to verify any arms control agreements to 
limit them, but like MIRV s they would be 
readily observable during development testing. 
Hence an agreement to ban such weapons 
would have to enter into force before develop-
ment testing begins, just as any agreement to 
ban MIRVs would have had to have been effec-
tive before they entered service in the 1970s. 
5.42. The Committee recommends urgent steps 
to ban space weapons by simple amendment of 
the existing outer space treaty as Article XV of 
that treaty permits. Such a ban must not inter-
fere with existing observatiQn and detection 
satellites. 
(d) Other disarmament subjects not de~~lt with 
in the Commiffee on Disarmament 
(vii) Specially injurious weapons 
5.43. International conferences to update the 
1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of 
war victims culminated in a United Nations 
conference held in Geneva from 15th Septem-
ber to lOth October 1980 which adopted a 
" Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on 
the use of certain conventional weapons which 
may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to 
have indiscriminate effects " together with 
Protocol I on non-detectable fragments ; 
Protocol 11 on prohibitions or restrictions on 
the use of mines, booby traps and other 
devices ; and Protocol Ill on prohibitions or 
restrictions on use of incendiary weapons. The 
convention has been open for signature since 
1Oth April 1981 when it was signed by 34 
states ; more have signed since. 
5.44. The body of the convention reinforces 
general humanitarian rules of war contained in 
the 1949 Geneva Convention. Protocol I pro-
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hibits the use of weapons producing fragments 
(e.g. plastic) which cannot be detected by X-
rays. Protocol 11 provides guidelines for recor-
ding the location of mines and booby traps with 
a view to reducing civilian injury. Protocol Ill 
seeks to limit injury to civilian population 
through the use of " incendiary weapons " 
which include flamethrowers as well as shells 
and bombs. States wishing to accede to the 
convention are required to accede to at least 
two of the three protocols. 
5.45. This convention, and just possibly a 
limited treaty to ban radiological weapons, will 
provide the only concrete arms control achieve-
ments to be reported to the 1982 special session 
of the General Assembly. 
(viii) Mutual and balanced force reductions 
5.46. The parties to the MBFR negotiations are 
the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 
Direct participants on the western side are: 
Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United King-
dom, United States. Indirect participants on 
the western side are: Denmark, Greece, Italy, 
Norway, Turkey. Direct participants on the 
eastern side are: Czechoslovakia, German 
Democratic Republic, Poland, Soviet Union. 
Indirect participants on the eastern side are: 
Bulgaria, Romania. The status of Hungary is 
open. The negotiations aim at reducing forces 
on both sides in the reduction area comprising 
the territory of the following direct participants: 
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and the 
Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand, 
the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslo-
vakia and Poland on the other. The negotia-
tions have been going on in Vienna since 1973 
and have so far been extended to over twenty 
rounds of talks, the latest resuming on 28th 
January 1982. So far no concrete agreement 
has been reached on a number of specific 
points. 
5.47. On 19th December 1979, the western 
side tabled the most recent NATO proposals 
which were for a reduction of 13,000 United 
States and 30,000 Soviet ground forces in a first 
phase interim agreement to be followed in a 
second phase by reductions to provide mutual 
collective ceilings of 700,000 ground troops and 
a total of 900,000 combined ground and air 
forces on each side. A balanced package of 
associated measures was incorporated in the 
proposals to provide for " greater transparency 
of military postures and activities of the two 
alliances ... as well as to enhance the security of 
all participants including those with special 
status " in the words of the Netherlands 
Ambassador to the negotiations speaking on 
behalf of the NATO countries in Vienna on 
I Oth December 1981. There was still no 
agreement on a data base for negotiations, 
NATO claiming that the Warsaw Pact ground 
forces in- the area exceeded those of NATO by 
more than 150,000 and that the discrepancy 
between NATO and Warsaw Pact figures for 
numbers of Soviet ground forces in the area was 
more than 50,000 men. 
5.48. Disagreement on data and on "associated 
measures " to provide for adequate verification 
have been main obstacles to agreement in 
Vienna. At the outset in November 1973 the 
NATO participants introduced data concerning 
both NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces in 
the area, showing Warsaw Pact superiority of 
more than 150,000 troops. However, it was 
not until June 1976 that the East agreed to 
provide some data on its ground and air force 
manpower in the area which was significantly 
different from the NATO estimates. The East 
does not appear to have challenged the NATO 
estimates of NATO manpower. Somewhat 
more detailed (disaggregated) data appear to 
have been exchanged by both sides in 1978 but 
neither side has made public the details of the 
exchange of data - this is one hopeful indica-
tion that both sides are genuinely seeking 
agreement. The following unofficial table is 
believed to be a fairly reliable reflection of the 
gross data comparisons as they stood in 1978: 
1978 gross data comparisons 
NATO forces Warsaw Pact forces Warsaw Pact superiority 
Ground Air Total Ground Air Total Ground Air Total 
NATO 
estimate ...... 791,000 193,000 984,000 962,000 200,000 1,162,000 +171,000 + 7,000 +178,00C 
Warsaw Pact 
estimate ..... ~791,000) ~193,000)1 984,000Y 805,000 182,000 987,000 + 14,000 -11,000 + 3,00C 
Discrepancy .... (nil)1 157,000 17,700 174;000 + 157:000 + 18,000 +175,00C 
1. NATO estimates tacitly accepted by Warsaw Pact. 
Source: Adapted from: " Mutual and balanced force reduction, issues and prospects ", William B. Prendergast as quoted in 
" Prospects for the Vienna force reduction talks " prepared for the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Reiations by the 
Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, lOth October 1978. 
108 
United States forces represented about 25 % and 
Soviet forces about 50 % of the above ground 
force figures. 
5.49. It appears that agreement has been 
reached over the years on the following three 
points - that the aim of reductions should be to 
leave common collective ceilings on each side 
in the reductions area of 900,000 men, inclu-
ding a sub-ceiling of 700,000 ground forces. 
Reductions would be carried out in two phases ; 
in Phase 1 only United States and Soviet forces 
would be withdrawn. To r:each the agreed 
ceilings reductions would have to be unequal. 
5.50. However, the Warsaw Pact countries 
have called for an additional ceiling of 200,000 
for air forces (the NATO position would leave 
open the option to increase air force manpower 
if ground force manpower were correspondingly 
reduced) ; they have called a further limitation 
whereby the forces of any single country would 
not exceed 50 % of the total ; they have also 
called for " proportional " reductions instead of 
the " asymmetrical " reductions demanded by 
NATO in order to reach the common ceilings. 
NATO had proposed that phase 1 reductions 
should be 13,000 United States ground forces 
and 30,000 Soviet forces. The Warsaw Pact 
has not accepted NATO proposals for associa-
ted measures, including permanent observers at 
entry and exit points and an annual quota of 
on-site inspections. 
5.51. On 18th February 1982, Poland, on 
behalf of the Warsaw Pact countries, submitted 
a draft phase 1 agreement which, it is under-
stood, codified for the first time in writing a 
number of concessions which the Warsaw Pact 
countries had accepted during the course of the 
negotiations. It specifically proposed that 
phase 1 reductions should be 13,000 United 
States troops and 20,000 Soviet troops. It has 
been pointed out that the Soviet Union in 
October 1979 announced a unilateral reduction 
of 20,000 Soviet ground forces which were said 
to have been carried out in January 
1980. While the western position remains that 
in the absence of proper means of verification 
there is no certainty that those troops were 
removed, it is understood that on a unit count 
basis, unverified western estimates show reduc-
tions of at least 15,000 men to have been 
actually carried out. 
5.52. The 18th February proposals for a 
phase 1 agreement can be summarised as 
follows: 
- The United States and the Soviet 
Union would remove 13,000 and 
20,000 troops respectively from the 
area each including one complete divi-
sion and sub-units equivalent to an 
armoured brigade together with all 
their armaments and combat equip-
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ment. The reductions would be com-
pleted within one year, the troops 
being withdrawn to their own countries 
and located so as not to threaten the 
security of other (indirect) participants 
(e.g. Turkey). 
- All other parties to the negotiation 
would freeze their forces in the reduc-
tion area for the duration of phase 1. 
- The duration of the agreement would 
be three years. 
- (Linkage to phase 2) Parties would 
agree that in a subsequent phase 2 
there would be proportionate reduc-
tions of forces of all direct participants 
to common collective ceilings of 
900,000, reductions of each country to 
be proportionate to the country's pro-
portionate contribution to the total 
forces in the area ; the forces of no par-
ticipant would ever exceed 50 % of the 
900,000 ceiling. 
- Measures associated with reductions 
would be commensurate with the 
volume of the reductions ; parties with-
drawing forces would notify the start of 
the reductions and monitoring posts 
would be established at exit points 
during the actual period of reductions, 
comprising one representative from 
each of the United States and the 
Soviet Union and one representative of 
the country from which the forces were 
being withdrawn. Other associated 
measures would include notification of 
troop movements and exercises, and 
prohibition of exercises in excess of 
50,000 men. 
- It is understood that the proposals 
further provided that the 900,000 
common collective ceiling should never 
be exceeded even temporarily in the 
course of exercises or the rotation of 
troops. 
5.53. The draft phase 1 agreement puts in 
writing a number of Warsaw Pact concessions 
to the western position. In the view of the 
Rapporteur the proposed reductions should 
provide a useful basis for negotiating an 
acceptable phase 1 agreement which would, 
however, require provision for the monitoring 
posts to remain in position for the whole of the 
duration of the agreement - not merely for the 
period during which reductions would take 
place. If the size of reductions can be effect-
ively monitored, agreement on disputed data 
can be postponed until phase 2, but it will then 
become crucial to agree data on remaining 
troop levels to ensure that agreed common 
collective ceilings are effectively met. 
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(ix) Confidence-building measures and CSCE 
5.54. In the Helsinki final act of the Confe-
rence on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
signed on 1st August 1975, a number of 
confidence-building measures were agreed on 
the implementation of which the Committee 
last reported in detail a year ago 1• A table of 
mutual notification of military exercises and 
invitations extended to observers under the 
terms of the final act is at Appendix V. 
5.55. The review conference on the implemen-
tation of the final act opened in Madrid on 
22nd November 1980 and discussion of confi-
dence-building measures there has turned on 
the French proposal for a conference on disar-
mament in Europe discussed below. Before 
the year-end recess agreement was near on a 
concluding document on the basis of the draft 
submitted by the eight neutral countries on 
16th December 1981 under which the partici-
pating states would have agreed to convene a 
conference on confidence- and security-building 
measures and disarmament in Europe in 
1982-83. Following the declaration of martial 
law in Poland, however, when the Madrid 
conference reconvened on 9th February it 
discussed the Polish situation in the context of 
the human rights provisions of the Helsinki 
final act, and then decided to adjourn until 9th 
November, any agreement on a concluding 
document being postponed until then. 
(x) Conforence on disarmament in Europe 
5.56. In January 1978, the French Government 
for the first time proposed a conference on 
disarmament in Europe (CDE) from the Atlan-
tic to the U rals. At the special session 
of the United Nations General Assembly on 
disarmament in May 1978, the French Presi-
dent presented this plan for a conference and 
communicated details to the CSCE partici-
pants on 19th May 1978. In the summer of 
1979 France agreed that a mandate for a CDE 
should be obtained at the CSCE follow-up 
conference in Madrid. 
5.57. Important features of the CDE are that 
France proposed to exclude nuclear and naval 
forces ; that unlike the negotiations which cover 
only Central Europe, CDE should extend from 
the Atlantic to the U rals ; and that the 
conference should proceed in phases - first on 
90nfidence-building measures, second on force 
reductions. Initially the Soviet Union reserved 
its position on the geographical area. At the 
26th party congress of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union it was agreed, however, that 
European territory of the Soviet Union could 
l. State of European Security, Document 859, 17th 
November 1980, Rapporteur: Mr. Brown. 
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be included in the CDE area of application, and 
a conditional offer has been made. 
5.58. The essential feature of the CDE is a 
package of confidence-building measures. There 
are three main proposals: 
The French package: 
- Measures of mutual information (-
multilaterally): exchange of data on 
command structures and location of 
major formations. 
Exchange of data on military budgets (-
and bilaterally): exchange of observers 
for exercises, visits and naval visits. 
Exchange of military instructors and 
lecturers. 
Facilitating the work of military 
attaches. 
- Measures against surprise attack on the 
basis of one month's advance notice of 
exercises and troop movements to 
cover the following: exercises of 
land, air and amphibious forces invol-
ving one or two divisions, with details 
of numbers of troops and major equip-
ment ; mobilisation exercises. 
Movement of land and air forces of 
similar size over a distance of more 
than 200 km including details of the 
major points of passage, especially 
border crossings. 
- More stringent measures of stabili-
sation: upper limits for exercises of 
land and air forces of, e.g., 60,000 men 
under defined conditions of space and 
time. Establishing a system of air-
borne or satellite supervision. 
The Warsaw Pact package: 
- One month's advance notice of major 
exercises involving more than 20,000 
men. 
- Notification of movement of land 
forces (more than 20,000) without 
details of distance or time. 
- Notification of major naval exercises 
close to territorial waters of other parti-
cipating states (without details of time, 
size or area involved). 
- Limits on military exercises to 
40,000-50,000 men. 
- Readiness to examine further confi-
dence-building measures. 
The Warsaw Pact proposals, in contrast to the 
French, are not to be compulsory and do not 
provide for verification. Further Soviet confi-
dence-building measures consist of readiness to 
dissolve NATO and the Warsaw Pact simulta-
neously ; non-acceptance of any new members 
in the respective alliances, and a treaty against 
the first use of nuclear and conventional 
weapons. 
The Yugoslav package: 
- Renunciation of military exercises, 
movements or other activities in areas 
of crisis. 
- Prohibition of exercises with more than 
30,000 men in Europe and the adjacent 
waters. 
- Prohibition of increases in armed forces 
or armaments. 
- Stopping the increase of defence 
expenditure. 
- Withdrawal of foreign troops from host 
countries. 
- Closing down of foreign military bases. 
These Yugoslav points do not, in fact, amount 
to real disarmament measures ; only during a 
second phase would there be real disarmament 
measures for conventional and tactical nuclear 
weapons. 
5.59. The non-aligned compromise proposal 
for the Madrid concluding document, referred 
to in paragraph 5.43 above, would have referred 
to a first-stage conference devoted to confi-
dence- and security-building measures with 
adequate means of verification, covering the 
whole of Europe and, in respect of activities 
which it is agreed to notify, the adjoining 
sea and air space, and covering also the non-
European part of the territory of participating 
states, as defined in the Helsinki final act 
concerning prior notification of military 
manoeuvres. 
5.60. To sum up, it can be said that binding 
and verifiable confidence-building measures 
would lower the risk of surprise conventional 
attack and would help to prevent war. 
The French proposals, moreover, would facili-
tate greater transparency. All confidence-
building measures, which are binding and veri-
fiable, pose a fundamental threat to the 
Warsaw Pact since they tend to level up the 
differences between an open society - the 
western states in the Alliance - and a closed 
society - the states of the Warsaw Pact. Also 
the geographical area is of importance ; a 
binding agreement on force reductions would 
oblige countries like France and the United 
Kingdom to make reductions while the Soviet 
Union could comply in pro forma fashion by 
withdrawing the formations in question 
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behind the Urals. Appropriate electronic 
supervision by satellite would, however, detect 
any redeployment in its early stages. 
5.61. According to recent press reports 1, East 
Germany on 12th January had replied posit-
ively to a West German suggestion of 11th 
December that the two Germanies should 
make joint disarmament proposals in the 
United Nations designed to make the intentions 
of each country more " transparent ". The 
measures would be verifiable and aimed at 
achieving a balance of forces. The Federal 
Republic of Germany is keeping its allies infor-
med on these proposals which arise from arti-
cles of the inter-German agreement of 1972. 
(xi) International satellite monitoring agency 
5.62. Arising from a proposal made by France 
in the first special session of the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1978, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations has submitted 
for the 1982 special session a detailed report by 
a group of governmental experts on the 
incidences of the establishment of an internatio-
nal satellite monitoring agency 2• The experts 
were provided by the Governments of Argen-
tina, Austria, Colombia. Egypt, France, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Romania, Sweden, Tunisia, 
Upper Volta and Yugoslavia, and met under 
the chairmanship of the French member, Mr. 
Bortzmeyer of the French Centre National 
d'Etudes Spatiales. The French proposal was 
for an international agency to collect and distri-
bute information from observation satellites to 
be used for verifying both disarmament agree-
ments and security agreements. The origins of 
this proposal are to be found in two earlier 
reports of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments 3 and the concept had also 
been proposed by the Swedish Minister for 
Disarmament, Mrs. Myrdal 4• 
5.63. The Secretary-General's group of experts 
concludes that surveillance satellites would 
make a valuable contribution to verification of 
arms control, disarmament and security agree-
ments ; that technically the proposal is feasible ; 
that there are no juridical obstacles to the 
establishment of an international governmental 
organisation for satellite observation ; and that 
the cost would vary widely according 
to which of a number of technical options were 
to be adopted. 
1. FrankfUrter Rundschau, 15th January 1982. 
2. United Nations Document A/AC 206/14, 6th August 
1981. 
3. East-West relations and defence, Document 587, 8th 
November 1972, Rapporteur: Mr. Destremau ; Security and 
the Mediterranean, Document 637, 21st May 1974, Rap-
porteur: Mr. Jung. 
4. Scientific American, Volume 231, No. 4, October 
1974. 
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5.64. Thus in phase 1, in which the ISMA 
would operate only an image-processing and 
interpretation centre, utilising data to be 
supplied by member countries, the capital cost 
would be approximately $ 8 million and opera-
ting costs $25 million to $ 30 million per year, 
exclusive of any fees payable to countries provi-
ding data. In phase 2 ISMA would also . 
operate its own ground receiving stations to 
receive data from satellites operated by member 
countries ; capital cost for a global system of 
ten stations would be $ 60-80 million and ope-
rating costs of $ 20 million per year 
exclusive of any fees to countries granting 
access to satellites. In phase 3 ISMA, opera-
ting a three satellite system of its own, would 
cost about $ 0.9-$ 1.2 billion over four to six 
years plus from $ 50 million to $ 200 million 
per year replacement costs. A low altitude 
manoeuvrable satellite for close look would cost 
$ 1.5 billion over ten years with $ 120 
million per year replacement and operating 
costs. As the report points out in its conclu-
sions, even the most complete and expensive 
phase 3 " would cost the international 
community each year well under I % of the 
total annual expenditure on armaments ". 
5.65. The attempts by the space powers to 
produce so-called killer satellites gravely 
endanger current satellite reconnaissance facili-
ties. As in the provisions concerning the pro-
duction of anti-missile systems, in the ABM 
treaty contained in SALT I, binding and veri-
fiable agreements have first to be reached on 
satellites. The ability of modem technology to 
supply data on troop movements, military faci-
lities, production of armaments factories, etc., 
calls for a world-wide United Nations satellite 
reconnaissance programme. Much will depend 
on the willingness of the two space powers to 
make their technological expertise available to 
the United Nations. For the great powers 
themselves such a unified system would have 
the advantage of sharing out the operating 
costs. Against a satellite programme is the 
argument that national secrecy is diametri-
cally opposed to the purpose of this programme 
which makes for transparency. 
5.66. The Committee endorses proposals for an 
international satellite monitoring agency as an 
important contribution to confidence-building 
measures and the avoidance of conflict. 
(xii) START (SALT) and INF 
5.67. The chapter on specific arms control or 
disarmament topics is not complete without a 
reference to the bilateral talks between the 
Soviet Union and the United States on the 
reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces 
(INF) which began in Geneva on 30th Novem-
ber 1981, and to the prospects for a resumption 
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of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), now 
to be known as strategic arms reduction talks 
(START). The Committee reports in detail on 
these matters elsewhere 1• 
5.68. The INF talks had held ten sessions up to 
the meeting between the United States Secre-
tary of State, Mr. Haig, and the Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Mr. Gromyko, in Geneva on 
26th January which lasted eight hours. At a 
press conference afterwards, Mr. Haig said the 
United States would not embark on START 
until " conditions permit " - before the military 
coup in Poland, these talks had been 
expected to begin in March ; an announcement 
is not now expected until the NATO summit 
meeting to be held in Bonn on lOth June. 
Meanwhile the levels of United States 
and Soviet strategic weapons are still within the 
lrmits laid down in SALT 11, although that 
agreement has not been ratified by the United 
States. 
(e) Amuunents and development aid 
5.69. Although proposals for comprehensive 
disarmament consider the developing countries, 
they do not establish a direct link between 
armaments and development aid. But it is not 
by chance that there is a link between disarma-
ment and development assistance. Develop-
ment policy must be considered as a contribu-
tion to the policy of peace since it facilitates the 
elimination of social conflicts. Moreover, the 
western countries are continuously insisting on 
the fact that their military expenditure must 
help to establish peace while preserving 
freedom, on the basis of a military balance. 
Disarmament therefore has no meaning unless 
East and West reduce their military expenditure 
in equal proportions. The reduction of mili-
tary expenditure would then free funds which 
until now have been considered as devoted to 
stabilising peace. Development policy makes a 
major contribution to the policy of peace and 
the use of sums originally assigned to military 
purposes for the development policy purposes 
would be a logical means of earmarking credits 
to serve the cause of peace. Sums becoming 
available through economies due to disarma-
ment would play a part in attaining an aim 
which is just as important, i.e. stabilising 
peace. At the present time, eight third world 
countries spend more than 10 % of the GNP on 
armaments and thirteen between 5 % and 
10% 2• Thus, for the third world countries a 
I. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe, Rappor-
teur: Mr. Mommersteeg. 
2. Total expenditure on armaments is twenty-five times 
higher than that on development assistance. In the third 
world, more than 130 conflicts have been recorded since the 
second world war which have caused more than twenty 
million deaths. 
reduction in military expenditure would lead 
directly to an automatic reduction in their 
budgets, consequently helping to finance 
domestic social and juridical reforms. This 
social-political causality naturally also exists in 
the industrialised countries. In the latter case, 
priority given to internal policy might be an 
obstacle to the establishment of a link between 
development assistance and disarmament. In 
the industrialised countries, the influence on 
peace of savings in the armaments field should 
be defined in political terms. We must there-
fore clearly show our intention of continuing to 
earmark for peace amounts hitherto earmarked 
for that purpose. External peace has a direct 
effect on peace inside our countries. For 
economic reasons in particular, it is not evident 
that a handful of industrialised countries should 
in the future be able to form stable islands of 
relative prosperity in an ocean of poverty. 
5.70. If a link were to be established between 
disarmament and development aid, the arms 
exporting nations would have to agree, as a first 
step, on restrictions. It would be absurd if the 
countries of the first and second world were to 
invest in the third world the money released by 
disarmament, only to see that money spent on 
weapons. 
(/) Political analysis 
5.71. Political analysis of disarmament negotia-
tions should concentrate on the results or likely 
results. It can safely be said that, so far, no 
negotiations have led to real disarmament ; if 
anything they have led to limited rearmament. 
The central political problem of all these 
negotiations lies in the absence( of mutual trust 
among the participants as well as in the lack of 
generally acceptable confidence-building mea-
sures. Proposals have been made principles 
like renouncing the use of force ; not striving 
for hegemony ; awareness of international inter-
dependence ; readiness for dialogue and for 
bridging the North-South gulf. Terms like 
confidence-building, openness, verification and 
balance are controversial since so far the Soviet 
Union has been against confidence-building, 
openness and verification. In fact, the problem 
for totalitarian states is that transparency, 
openness and verification measures closely 
affect their own legitimate security aspirations 
to the point of threatening them. A totalita-
rian state cannot function unless the above-
mentioned conditions are fulfilled. If it accepts 
such conditions at the external policy level, it is 
almost certain of having to face a reaction at 
the internal policy level. 
5.72. On the other hand, there is no logical 
reason why any nuclear power should not dis-
close its destructive options. If nuclear 
weapons serve a strategy of deterrence, then it 
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is necessary to declare what systems are avail-
able, what effect they would have and under 
what circumstances they would be used. 
Deterrence may be a matter of debate among 
politicians and the military, yet for the popula-
tion of the state against which such weapons 
might be used the principle of deterrence 
becomes mere terror. As it becomes increas-
ingly apparent that the existing nuclear systems 
are sufficient to extinguish the human race, the 
principle of nuclear deterrence loses its base of 
consensus within society. Political principles-
even in the field of security - which are no 
longer supported by society are subject to 
dispute. It is impossible to secure inter-
national agreements to avoid conflic;:t if the 
foundation of these agreements leads to conflict 
among the people concerned. Deterrence is 
not a constant principle of security. Moreover, 
today's satellite warning technology renders any 
international attack futile. 
5.73. Secrecy in the field of nuclear options is 
thus a fatal danger. In order to start off the 
process of confidence-building measures all 
great powers should agree to disclose their 
entire nuclear potential (much of which is 
already known through satellite supervision) to 
make deterrence credible and verifiable. This 
will be a decisive step. 
5.74. As far as armaments exports and deve-
lopment aid are concerned, the export and 
import of weapons have to be controlled. A 
decisive, objective step would be a register to be 
compiled by the United Nations on the basis of 
the former League of Nations " Statistical 
Yearbook of the Trade in Arms and Ammuni-
tion" published in the 1930s which the Assem-
bly proposed in Recommendation 323 adopted 
in November 1978, and which was also propo-
sed by Mr. Genscher, the German Foreign 
Minister at the 36th session of the United 
Nations General Assembly on 23rd September 
1981. The decisive reasons for armaments lie 
in economic confrontation of which account 
must be taken in proposals for disarmament if 
they are to have any true chances of 
success. What applies for the great powers in 
the nuclear field is equally valid for other coun-
tries in the conventional sphere. Since 
effective modern weapon technology can be 
supplied only by a handful of countries, the 
receiving countries should, in fact, have a vital 
interest in their neighbours knowing of their 
defence capabilities. In this context, the 
negotiations, on every level, have to go beyond 
numerical definitions of balance. 
VI. Proposals 
6.1. The general aims are the elimination of 
conflict and securing peace. In order to 
achieve these aims, it is not sufficient to discuss 
marginal disarmament proposals. Since the 
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origins of armaments lie in an economic 
c<;mfrontation, as stated above•, proposals for 
disarmament must take this into account so 
that they can be truly successful. The follow-
ing proposals, with due regard to the earlier 
proposals of the Committee and of the Assem-
bly2, cover the whole spectrum of disarmament. 
(a) Widening trade relations 
6.2. Overall widening of trade relations 
without one-sided advantages for one partner 
leads to mutual economic interdependence. 
The southern hemisphere has to be integrated 
in these global trade relations. The need to 
restructure economic co-operation within the · 
framework of development aid for the promo-
tion of alternative energy sources and with great 
regard t!l ecological conditions has already been 
emphasised at last year's United Nations 
conference on world energy in Nairobi. 
Mutual trade relations encourage the process of 
mutual knowledge and understanding among 
the parties. 
6.3. A major obstacle, however, lies in the 
different economic systems. These trade rela-
tions should not be linked to theories of a 
certain economic order, as otherwise diametri-
cally opposed economic interests would block 
the establishment of a trade relationship. A 
further obstacle is the monopolistic or oligar-
chical attitu~es of the multinationals or giant 
state enterpnses. If all aspects are considered 
then discussion of the new global economic 
order turns on ideological and economic bids 
for hegemony. These attempts can be circum-
v~nted, how~ver, by creating mutually benefi-
cial trade lmks. The economic order then 
becomes of secondary importance. One exam-
ple of such art agreement that transcends ideo-
logies is the Soviet-German gas pipeline deal 
and the agreements with France and the 
Netherlands. Both sides can claim decisive 
advantages. 
6.4. Increased trade relations between the 
blocs, between North and South, between states 
in general, are the key to the removal of 
economic grounds for conflict. Economic 
grounds for conflict are - as has been pointed 
out - one cause of military threats. 
(b) Coll/ide~~ee-building mea11ns 
6.5. The second step to avoiding conflict and 
stabilising peace is provided by the confidence-
building measures. Any attempt to disarm is 
1. Paragraphs 1.6-1.9. 
2. Recommendation 323 and Document 788, Disarma-
ment, 31st October 1978. Rapporteur: Mr. Roper. 
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condemned to remain ineffective as long as 
opportunities for verification are blocked. The 
advantage of confidence-building measures is 
that they permit the compilation of objective 
data. Moreover, they provide the basis for 
verification of this data as well as any agree-
ments reached. In addition they form the 
general foundation for the socio-political trans-
parency of political systems. 
6.6. Closed political systems may view confi-
dence-building measures with even greater 
apprehension than the trade links, because 
transparency, openness, and means of verifica-
tion ~n counter to the tenets of closed systems 
of society. They could lead to signs of dis-
integration within the established power struc-
ture. Furthermore, dictatorships and similar 
political systems can have no interest in read-
iness for dialogue, avoidance of conflict and 
security of peace since they are by their nature 
aggressive. When weighing the arguments it 
becomes evident that conceptions of th;eat 
depend on the perception of each state. In this 
context it is of little relevance whether the level 
of threat is real. or imaginary. If, for example, 
a country demes rumours that it possesses 
nuclear weapons, the denial is tantamount as 
far as the neighbouring states are concerned to 
verified possession of such weapons. The 
potential danger or threat amounts in such a 
case almost to a real one. 
~-7. For this reaso~, objective perception, that 
IS to say the reductiOn of potential threats to 
real facts, must be striven for. For this 
purpose transparency and openness, as well as 
readiness to renounce force and readiness for 
dialogue, are essential. The option of nuclear 
attack in particular is militarily absurd since 
nuclear conflicts could hardly be limited. In 
the conventional field, a balance of forces 
- even at a lower level - is not itself sufficient. 
Here a qualitative restructuring of the forces 
must be envisaged. 
(c) Defensive weapons 
6.8. Most existing weapons, especially the 
major systems, can be used, as a rule, both for 
offensive and defensive purposes. Even if 
agreement were reached on simultaneous reduc-
tiOJ?.S of armaments, some ?ffensive systems, 
which could be used offensively, would still 
remain. Given the inventiveness of armaments 
industries in East and West, the Committee 
believes it is not utopian to propose that the 
po_ssibi~ity shoul~ be investigated of developing 
pnmanly defenSive weapons. Among existing 
weapons the hand-held anti-tank weapon can 
already be said to be defensive in some cir-
cumstances. 
6.9. The Rapporteur personally stresses that 
the main present weapons systems have three 
essential characteristics: 
(a) the cost of new systems rises expo-
nentially; 
(b) systems are more and more complex; 
(c) technically, they are increasingly 
vulnerable. 
Rising costs mean that in order to acquire the 
latest weapons for their forces the countries 
concerned are compelled to make savings, 
particularly in the social field and in invest-
ments. This phenomenon may be observed 
both in developing and in industrialised coun-
tries. It especially affects the developing coun-
tries which thereby lose almost all chance of 
establishing industrial links with the northern 
hemisphere. However, in the industrialised 
countries, too, savings in the social field are 
encountering growing resistance from the popu-
lation. In the future it may no longer be 
possible to reconcile a country's optimum 
defence policy with optimum social stability. 
Moreover, an essential feature of modem 
systems is their growing complexity. But in 
conscript armies in particular, the level of 
training in the use of these weapons is liable to 
suffer considerably. For instance, pilots of 
combat aircraft more often reach the physical 
limits of human body. Thirdly, these systems 
are also increasingly vulnerable. Many of 
them can now only be operated with a highly 
perfected electronic communication system. It 
can easily be imagined that to put out of action 
a purely electronic weapon it would suffice for 
the enemy to throw the electronic system only 
slightly out of adjustment. It must also be 
underlined that these developments apply 
exclusively to conventional systems. Rising 
costs and the complexity . and vulnerability of 
weapons systems may be alleviated by quantit-
ative and qualitative restructuring. 
6.10. The development of defensive weapons is 
a possibility worth study. The Rapporteur 
personally believes it is quite obvious that there 
would be unanimous support for this type of 
weapon in the context of peace policy since 
potential aggressors would no longer have to 
fear an attack. In addition, an offensively 
armed side would be revealed politically and 
ideologically as the potential aggressor when 
arrayed against a defensively armed one. It 
must nevertheless be underlined that the defen-
sive theory is not applicable to nuclear 
weapons. Short-range nuclear weapons have 
no defensive function since they inflict exces-
sive destruction on the territory of those posses-
sing them. Nor can longer-range nuclear 
weapons, by definition, be considered as defen-
sive. Europe must not embark upon negotia-
tions on a defensive military system before the 
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necessary conditions for creating a denuclear-
ised Europe exist. 
6.11. The Rapporteur personally suggests that 
a first stage would consist of bringing the 
Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range 
missiles to a conclusion with the adoption of a 
zero option. Once this aim has been attained, 
consideration could then be given to the perm-
anent integration of essentially defensive 
weapons in the present defence concept. Such 
a medium-term step would make an essential 
contribution to relaunching the Vienna MBFR 
negotiations, which are marking time, by giving 
them new qualitative impetus. 
6.12. The Rapporteur personally believes that 
where the third world is concerned, defensive 
weapons systems are in fact the only solution. 
Here the financial and technological prob-
lems referred to earlier should be recalled. 
The special session of the United Nations 
General Assembly seems to be the appropriate 
forum for discussing this matter. In many parts 
of the third world, purely military, geostrategic 
or geographical considerations, plus other 
factors already mentioned, militate in favour of 
defensive weapons. In this context, it also 
seems important to make a detailed examina-
tion of the possibility of concluding agreements 
on denuclearised zones. For instance, these 
might include an undertaking by the super-
powers not to threaten a country with the use 
of nuclear weapons if no such weapons were 
deployed on its territory. 
6.13. To sum up the personal views of the 
Rapporteur, it may therefore be said that it 
seems reasonable to give an army defensive 
weapons only when there is no longer any 
nuclear threat. 
(d) Satellite reconllllissance 
6.14. The Committee strongly supports the 
proposal for an international satellite monitor-
ing agency described in paragraphs 5.62 et seq. 
(e) Disarmament versus development aid 
6.15. Twenty-five times more is being spent on 
armaments than on development aid. If it 
were possible to establish a link between dis-
armament and development aid, immense sums 
could be released for the latter purpose as many 
United Nations reports have pointed out. The 
direct relationship between ideological confron-
tation on a global scale and conflicts in · the 
third world calls for such a link. Since World 
War 11 there have been 130 armed conflicts 
with over 20 million dead in the third world. 
The countries supplying the weapons carry a 
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large share of the responsibility. No govern-
ment, during a world-wide economic crisis, 
would impose disproportionate costs for deve-
lopment on its own population, to the detri-
ment of its standard of living, but it would be 
politically feasible to use the funds released 
from the armaments budget. Development aid 
too will be severely criticised in the donor 
countries when it becomes apparent that the 
recipients still have the resources to purchase 
arms. Recently a government aroused public 
anger when its leaders placed massive orders for 
modem fighter planes with a European arms 
manufacturer while attending the FAO confer-
ence on world hunger. An argument against 
linkage between disarmament and development 
aid is the economic recession in the industrial-
ised countries. Money released through dis-
armament could be spent on employment 
programmes. 
6.16. On balance, linkage between disarma-
ment and development aid is beneficial to all 
sides. If such a process were set in motion 
disarmament would become inevitable. The 
temptation to spend the money thus released 
on the national economy, however, must be 
resisted as otherwise the North-South gap 
would become even wider. On the world 
scale, it is unreasonable that in a sea of poverty 
and misery a few islands should enjoy perma-
nent aftluence. Both objectives, i.e. disarma-
ment and development aid, are contributions to 
the avoidance of conflict, to the removal of 
political tensions and to the process of securing 
peace. A combination of these two objectives 
would have a disproportionate effect on the 
process of securing peace. The double effect of 
increased demand on the part of the developing 
countries for non-military goods and greater 
efforts in the field of development aid by the 
industrialised countries strengthens the trading 
partnership between industrialised countries 
and the third world and improves the condi-
tions for a true partnership in security. 
VII. Conclusions 
7 .1. The conclusion to be drawn from this 
summary of disarmament and arms control 
talks in the four years that have elapsed since 
the first special session of the United Nations 
General Assembly devoted to disarmament is 
that there will be little or no concrete progress 
to report to the next special session in June. 
The convention on specific inhumane weapons 
and possibly a limited convention prohibiting 
radiological weapons will be the only formal 
agreements to have been concluded, and the 
latter will be of little practical value. On two 
of the most urgent matters for negotiation 
identified at the first special session - a 
chemical weapons ban and a complete nuclear 
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test ban - the promising bilateral and trilateral 
negotiations have been suspended since the end 
of 1980. This report has not discussed the 
prospects for negotiations on nuclear weapons 
in the INF or START frameworks' but it 
would be unrealistic to imagine progress in 
either of those fields by the time the next 
special session opens. 
7.2. Significantly there have been no negotia-
tions on one topic identified in the final 
document of the 1978 special session - the 
limitation of international transfer of conven-
tional weapons - chiefly because non-aligned 
countries have been as concerned to preserve 
their right to receive weapons as they have been 
ready to call for reductions in the weapons of 
the larger powers. In fact, the general attitude 
to disarmament of all states has been to point 
accusing fingers at militarily more powerful 
states - first and foremost at the nuclear 
weapons powers - and demand that they 
commence the process of disarming. 
7 .3. The Committee's proposals are set forth 
in the preliminary draft recommendation. The 
text of Recommendation 323 referred to in the 
preamble, and which was adopted by the 
Assembly on the occasion of the first special 
session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly devoted to disarmament, is at Appendix I. 
7.4. Operative paragraph 1(a) calling for 
wider but balanced commercial relations is 
explained in paragraphs 6.2-6.4 of this explan-
atory memorandum; paragraph l(b) on defen-
sive weapons is explained in paragraph 6.8 
above. Operative paragraph 2 of the recom-
mendation calling for a substantial reduction in 
the level of nuclear weapons is included for 
completeness, in view of the priority attached 
to nuclear disarmament by the United Nations 
General Assembly (paragraphs 3.4, 4.2 and 5.4 
above) but the subject of nuclear weapons is to 
be dealt with by the Committee in another 
report 2• 
7.5. The specific disarmament, arms control 
and confidence-building measures advocated in 
operative paragraph 3 of the recommendation 
are explained in this explanatory memorandum 
as follows: 
(i) 
.Sub-paragrap~ 
of recommendatzon 
Chemical weapons 
ban 
(ii) Nuclear test ban 
Par,~raphs 
o the 
exp anatory 
memorandum 
5.14 to 5.24 
5.6 to 5.13 
l. Discussed in the report on the problem of nuclear 
weapons in Europe. Rapporteur: Mr. Mommersteeg. 
2. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe. Rappor-
teur: Mr. Mommersteeg. 
(iii) Outer space weapons 
ban 5.38 to 5.42 
(iv) International satellite 
monitoring agency 5.62 to 5.66 
(v) Register of intematio-
nal arms transfers 5.74 
(vil) MBFR 5.46 to 5.53 
(viii) Conference on disar- l mament in Europe 5.54 to 5.60 (ix) Confidence-building measures 
7.6. Finally, the operative paragraph 4 of the 
recommendation on the relationship between 
third world armaments and those of the allian-
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ces is described in paragraphs 5.69, 5.70 and 
5.74 above. 
VIII. Opinion of the minority 
8.1. The report as a whole was adopted by 11 
votes to 4 with 2 abstentions. A minority of 
the Committee was opposed to any report on 
disarmament being submitted at a time when it 
considered that more resources should be 
devoted to armaments. A larger minority was 
opposed to paragraph 1 (b) of the operative part 
of the draft recommendation, believing that 
there could be no such thing as purely defen-
sive weapons. 
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RECOMMENDATION 323 1 
on disarmament 2 
The Assembly, 
(z) Aware that world expenditure on armaments has now reached $400 billion per annum and 
that some of the poorest countries are devoting more than half of their public expenditure to defence; 
(iz) Noting that, apart from the biological warfare convention of 1972, no arms control agreement 
since the war has yet achieved any measure of disarmament; 
(iiz) Believing that new impetus must be given to negotiating certain urgent and concrete measures 
of arms control and disarmament but that the ultimate objective must remain general and complete 
disarmament under effective international control; 
(iv) Welcoming the conclusions of the special session on disarmament of the United Nations 
General Assembly to the extent that it has focused world opinion on the urgency and importance of 
arms control measures, and transformed the Committee on Disarmament into a more effective nego-
tiating forum; 
(v) Recalling its proposals of 1972 and 1974 for a United Nations satellite observation capability; 
(vz) Recalling further the expertise acquired by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments 
and urging that it be placed at the disposal of any international disarmament organisation; 
(viz) Recalling the annual publications of the League of Nations: " Armaments Year Book " and 
"Statistical Year Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition"; 
(viiz) Recalling the work under the diplomatic conference of 1975-77 of the ad hoc committee on 
inhumane weapons and the associated conferences of government experts; 
(ix) Accepting the responsibility shared by WEU members with other major arms suppliers to seek 
agreements to reduce the world trade in armaments, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS 
Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view: 
1. To secure universal agreement on a programme of immediate disarmament and arms control 
measures to be concluded in the next five years, including: 
(a) a comprehensive test ban; 
(b) a chemical weapons treaty; 
(c) a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regime with rigorous safeguards at all stages of civil 
nuclear fuel cycles, linked with appropriate security assurances to non-nuclear countries; 
(d) a substantial reduction to restore the balance of forces and armaments in Europe; 
(e) agreements involving both supplier and recipient countries to restrict the international 
transfer of conventional arms which recognise the special responsibility of the major arms-
producing countries to exercise restraint in their arms transfer policy; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (I Oth 
Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 788). 
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(f) the scrupulous and systematic application of measures provided by the CSCE final act to 
strengthen mutual confidence in the military field; 
(g) the extension to other areas of confidence-building measures of the type included in the 
CSCE final act; 
(h) agreements to restrict the development of new generations of inhumane conventional 
weapons and incendiaries; 
(z) the creation of denuclearised zones and zones free of military bases in various regions of the 
world; 
and, concurrently if possible with the first agreement providing for independent verification: 
(J) the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United Nations aegis 
equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with arms control agreements and 
peacekeeping arrangements, and responsible inter alia for publishing, on the basis of its own 
sources of information as well as mandatory reports by all countries, annual reports on the 
forces and armaments of all countries and arms transfers between countries; 
2. To secure the participation of all nuclear weapon powers and previous members in the trans-
formed Committee on Disarmament and the negotiation in that body of agreements on the foregoing 
items 1 (a), (b), (e), (g) and (h); 
3. To examine sympathetically the proposals for an all-European conference on disarmament 
convened with the participation of all signatory states of the CSCE final act with a view to ensuring 
the progressive achievement of a programme of confidence-building measures and controlled limita-
tion of forces; 
4. To maintain the expectations of progress on concrete measures of disarmament engendered by 
the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, by the convening of a further special 
disarmament session in 1981 to review progress. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 323 
1. The Council take the opportunity of confirming_their frequently-repeated undertaking to sup-
port all efforts to further progress towards general and complete disarmament under close and effec-
tive international control. 
In this context and in line with the results of the special session on disarmament of the United 
Nations General Assembly, member states will continue to work for the definition of a series of prio-
rity measures for adoption as a matter of urgency. 
However, while this undertaking still holds good, there would seem to be no possibility of set-
ting a precise term for the conclusion of universally acceptable agreements on all the specific points 
listed by the Assembly, although some are now sufficiently advanced to offer the hope and possibility 
of achieving this goal in the near future. 
Furthermore, disarmament and arms limitation are usually understood to cover agreements 
aimed at preventing inter alia the use or introduction of specific types of weapons when they have 
been identified in concrete terms. Mention should, therefore, be made of the success not only of the 
convention on biological weapons but also of other agreements of undoubted significance and value 
such as the ENMOD (convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environ-
mental modification techniques). 
(a) (b) Negotiations are now in progress between three nuclear powers for the complete banning of 
nuclear tests. 
As regards the prohibition of chemical weapons, it is hoped that the Committee on Disarma-
ment will in due course produce a draft treaty. 
(c) Strong nuclear non-proliferation arrangements are among matters of vital concern to the mem-
ber countries of WEU. They are one of their primary objectives in the appropriate fora and are 1 no 
obstacle to international co-operation in the field of peaceful applications of the atom. 
(d) No practical opportunity will be neglected by the members of the Alliance participating in the 
Vienna negotiations on MBFR of strengthening stability in Europe by mutual balanced force reduc-
tions to achieve a common collective ceiling. 
(e) The problem of limiting transfers of conventional weapons should be dealt with through agree-
ments worked out on a regional basis between purchasers and forming the subject of subsequent 
consultations with supplying countries; in this connection, mention should be made of the Mexican 
proposal for an agreement to limit the acquisition of coventional weapons in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
(f) Reinforcement of the confidence-building measures provided for in the final act of the CSCE 
undoubtedly constitutes a significant factor and its progress should match that of all the measures 
provided for in the final act of the CSCE. 
(g) At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, member countries sponsored a 
resolution calling for consideration by all states of arrangements for appropriate confidence-building 
measures. 
(h) The chances of limiting the use of certain conventional weapons are to be assessed by a special 
United Nations conference which will convene in Geneva in September this year and will take appro-
priate decisions arrived at by consensus. 
(i) The creation of nuclear weapon-free zones would unquestionably make a positive contribution 
to disarmament and non-proliferation. The Council and member states reiterate their undertaking 
to support the establishment of such zones wherever nuclear weapons are not needed to maintain the 
balance and therefore to guarantee the safety of all states, and provided the countries in the region 
concerned agree. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on IIth June 1979. 
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(j) Finally, as regards the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United 
Nations aegis, equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with international arms limita-
tion agreements and peacekeeping arrangements, the Council and member states hope that it will be 
possible, in the future, to examine the substance of such a proposal, by such means as the United 
Nations may consider appropriate. 
2. During the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, member 
states gave proof of their determination to set up a negotiating body in which all nuclear weapon 
powers and major military powers can take part, taking due account of the need to keep numbers 
small so that the proceedings do not become unwieldy. To this end, the existing members of 
the CCD were reappointed in order to ensure the continuity of work already started and the total 
number of participants was increased to make the negotiating body more representative without loss 
of efficiency. 
In this context, the Council and member states are most anxious that all the states nominated 
and, in particular, the nuclear weapon powers should take up the seats reserved for them from the 
outset. As regards the agenda for the Committee there is nothing to prevent the negotiating body 
from discussing, by consensus and within the terms of its own standing orders, any question submit-
ted to it and in particular those listed by the Assembly. 
3. The proposal for a European disarmament conference on conventional weapons with all parti-
cipants in the CSCE attending is at present the subject of close study and of consultations between 
member states and all the countries concerned. 
4. The member states of WEU will make every effort to ensure that the objectives laid down by 
the tenth special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly are fulfilled as far 
as possible before the next special session fixed for 1982 by the thirty-third General Assembly for the 
purpose of reviewing the progress of work on disarmament, of reporting on its findings and possibly 
of setting new objectives. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Comparisons of defence expenditure and military manpower 1975-81 
Est. Para-
%of government Numbers in anned forces reservists< ~Hitary 
$million $per head spending" %ofGNp/> (000) (000) (000) 
,Country 1975 1980 1981 1975 1980 1981 1975 1980 1981 1975 1980 1975 1980 1981 1981 1981 
Wanawi'Jid'l 
Bulgaria 457 I 140 I 340 52 128 151 6.0 6.0 6.0 2.7 3.4 152.0 149.0 149.0 240.0 175.0 
Czechoslovakia I 706 3 520 n.a. 116 229 n.a. 7.3 7.6 n.a 3.8 4.0 200.0 195.0 194.0 325.0 157.5 
Gennany,East 2 550 4 790 6960 148 285 415 7.9 7.5 8.5 5.5 6.1 143.0 162.0 167.0 305.0 70.2 
Hungary 506 I 080 1240 48 101 115 3.5 3.8 3.9 2.4 2.3 105.0 93.0 101.0 143.0 75.0 
Poland 2011 4670 n.a. 59 131 n.a. 7.0 6.0 n.a 3.1 3.2 293.0 317.5 319.5 605.0 72.0 
Romania 707 1470 1350 33 66 61 3.7 4.0 2.3 1.7 1.3 171.0 184.5 184.5 300.0 37.0 
Soviet Union• 124000 n.a. n.a. 490 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 12-14% 3 575.0 3 663.0 3 673.0 s 200.0 560.0 
NATO' 
Belaium I 971 3 735 3 560 200 378 359 10.0 9.3 9.0 3.0 3.3 87.0 87.9 89.5 155.5 16.0 
Britain 11 118 24448 28660 198 437 512 11.6 12.3 12.3 4.9 S.l 345.0 329.2 343.6 276.4 6.9 
Canada" 2 965 4240 4990 130 177 205 11.9 n.a. 9.1 2.2 1.7 77.0 78.6 79.5 23.3 -
Denmark 939 1404 I 520 185 274 295 7.3 6.4 7.1 2.2 2.4 34.0 35.1 32.6 57.5 73.3 
France 13 984 2022()1 26008 264 374 483 20.2 20.3 20.5 3.9 3.9 562.0 494.7 504.6 450.0 88.9 
Germanyh 16142 251~~ 25000 259 410 405 24.4 22.2 22.6 3.7 3.2 495.0 495.0 495.0 750.0 -Greece I 435 177 n.a. 159 236 n.a. 25.5 19.8 n.a. 6.9 5.1 161.2 181.5 193.5 390.0 34.0 
Italy 4 700 6 580 8 887 84 n.a. 155 9.7 n.a. 5.1 2.6 2.4 421.0 366.0 366.0 738.0 193.9 
Luxembourg 22 49 51 65 134 140 3.0 3.3 3.3 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.7 - 0.5 
Netherlands 2 978 52~~ 4930 218 374 348 11.0 7.3 9.5 3.6 3.4 112.5 115.0 102.8 171.0 12.7 Norway 929 I 57 n.a. 232 383 n.a. 8.2 10.8 n.a. 3.1 2.9 35.0 37.0 37.0 162.0 85.0 
Portugal I 088 890 944 124 90 94 35.2 12.0 10.9 6.0 3.8 217.0 59.5 70.9 n.a. 37.3 
Turkey-' 2200 2 921 3106 ss 54 67 26.6 22.0 19.0 9.0 4.2 453.0 567.0 569.0 470.0 120.0 
United States 88,983 142 700 171023 417 644 759 23.8 23.3 23.7 5.9 5.5 2130.0 2050.0 2049.1 879.4 56.6 
Odter Europeu 
Austria 410 915 870 54 122 116 3.7 4.1 3.8 1.0 1.2 38.0 50.3 50.3 910.0 -
Eire 128 285 n.a. 41 86 n.a. 4.3 3.3 n.a. 1.6 n.a. 12.1 1~:: 14.0 22.5 -Finland 388 656 713 83 142 149 5.0 5.4 S.l 1.4 1.5 36.3 39. 39.9 700.0 4.0 
Spain I 701 n.a. 3980 48 129 105 14.5 12.5 12.0 1.8 n.a. 302.3 342.0 342.0 1'085.0 104.0 
Sweden 2 483 3 588 3 790 303 432 455 10.5 7.7 7.7 3.4 3.2 69.8 66.1 64.3 500.0 0.5 
Switzerland I 047 1832 I 840 160 290 154 19.3 18.9 20.2 1.8 n.a. 18.5 18.5 20.5 621.5 -
Yugoslavia I 705 3 634 3470 80 164 154 49.9 56.9 n.a. 5.6 n.a. 230.0 264.0 252.5 500.0 2'020.0 
Middle East 
Algeria 285 705 914 17 36 47 4.7 5.3 n.a. 2.2 n.a. 63.0 101.0 101.0 100.0 10.0 
Egypt 6103 n.a. n.a. 163 n.a. n.a. 42.0 n.a. n.a. 50.4 n.a. 322.5 367.0 367.0 335.0 139.0 
Iran 8800 4200 n.a. 268 110 n.a. 24.9 12.3 n.a. 17.4 n.a. 250.0 240.0 195.0 400.0 75.0 
Iraq I 064 2 700 n.a. 107 202 n.a. 43.7 24.0 n.a. 7.9 n.a. 135.0 242.3 252.3 250.0 79.8 
Israel 3 552 s 200 7 340 I 045 I 333 I 835 50.1 32.0 30.6 35.9 23.2 156.0 169.6 172.0 504.0 4.5 
Jordan 155 n.a. 420 57 n.a. 127 22.0 22.3 25.0 12.2 n.a. 80.2. 67.2 67.5 35.0 11.0 
Libya 203 n.a. n.a. 83 n.a. n.a. 13.7 n.a. n.a. 1.7 n.a. 32.0 53.0 55.0 n.a. s.o 
Morocco 224 676 1210 13 34 56 4.5 20.7 16.7 2.8 6.7 61.0 116.5 120.0 n.a. 30.0 
Saudi Arabia 6771 20 704 27 695 I 153 2 518 2664 20.0 28.1 31.0 18.0 n.a. 47.0 47.0 51.7 n.a. 36.5 
Sudan 120 245 n.a. 7 13 n.a. 15.1 12.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 48.6 68.0 71.0 n.a. 3.5 
Syria 706 4040 2 389 96 459 261 25.3 30.5 30.8 15.1 13.1 177.5 247.5 222.5 102.5 9.8 
Africa 
Ethiopia 84 385 n.a. 3 17 n.a. 19.4 n.a. n.a. 2.9 n.a. 44.8 229.5 230.0 20.0 169.0 
Nigeria I 786 I 702 n.a. 28 22 n.a. 11.8 8.7 n.a. 7.1 n.a. 208.0 146.0 156.0 2.0 -
South Africa I 332 2 556 n.a. 53 89 n.a. 18.5 18.1 n.a. 5.3 n.a. 50.5 86.1 92.7 157.0 145.0 
Zimbabwe 102 444 n.a. 16 6 n.a. 12.3 22.0 n.a. 3.0 n.a. 5.7 13.5 34.0 16.0 40.0 
Asia 
Australia 2 492 3 900 n.a. 184 272 n.a. 8.6 9.7 n.a. 3.2 3.0 69.1 71.0 72.6 63.8 -
China n.a. 56 941 n.a. n.a. 56 n.a. n.a. n.a, n.a. n.a. n.a. 3 250.0 4450.0 4 750.0 n.a. 12.0 
China(Taiwan) I 007 n.a. n.a. 61 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.9 n.a. 494.0 438.2 451.0 1170.0 100.0 
India 2660 4406 s 119 4 7 7 21.1 16.7 16.9 3.0 3.8 956.0 I 104.0 1104.0 240.0 300.0 
Indonesia I 108 2 070 2 387 9 14 5 16.7 12.3 n.a. 3.8 n.a. 266.0 241.8 273.0 n.a. 82.0 
Japan 4 620 8 960 11497 42 75 98 6.6 4.7 5.0 0.9 0.9 236.0 241.0 243.0 41.6 -
Korea, North 878 1300 I 470 54 74 74 n.a. 14.6 14.7 n.a. n.a. 467.0 678.0 782.0 300.0 38.0 
Korea, South 943 3460 4400 28 91 113 29.2 36.0 n.a. 5.1 5.7 625.0 600.6 601.6 1240.0 2 800.0 
Malaysia 385 1465 2 250 31 108 157 17.3 14.3 23.0 4.0 n.a. 61.0 66.0 102.0 51.0 90.0 
New Zealand 243 426 n.a. 79 135 n.a. 4.3 3.9 n.a. 1.8 1.8 12.7 12.6 12.9 9.8 -
Pakistan 725 I 540 n.a. 10 n.a. 17 12.3 n.a. n.a. 7.2 n.a. 392.0 438.6 450.6 513.0 109.1 
Philippines 407 962 863 10 20 17 19.3 13.0 n.a. 2.6 2.0 67.0 112.8 112.8 124.0 110.5 
Singapore 344 574 n.a. 152 239 n.a. 18.1 16.5 n.a. 5.3 6.1 30.0 42.0 42.0 50.0 37.5 
Thailand 542 I 092 I 279 13 23 26 25.7 20.5 18.7 3.7 n.a. 204.0 230.8 238.1 500.0 44.5 
Latin America 
Argentina I 031 3 380 n.a. 41 12.3 n.a. 9.7 15.1 n.a. 0.9 n.a. 133.5 139.5 185.5 250.0 43.0 
Brazil I 283 I 540 n.a. 12 13 n.a. 9.3 6.8 n.a. 1.3 0.7 245.5 272.6 272.6 560.0 185.0 
Colombia 106 31 n.a. 4 12 n.a. n.a. 9.3 n.a. 0.8 n.a. 64.3 65.8 70.0 70.0 50.0 
Cuba n.a. I 100 n.a. n.a. Ill n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.5 117.0 206.0 227.0 130.0 18.0 
Mexico 586 803 I 166 10 12 17 2.4 1.1 n.a. 0.7 n.a. 332.5 357.0 369.5 250.0 -
Peru 383 n.a. n.a. 24 n.a. n.a. 15.3 n.a. n.a. 3.1 n.a. 56.0 95.5 130.0 n.a. 25.0 
Venezuela 494 I 118 I 399 41 53 85 5.4 n.a. n.a. 1.7 2.3 44.0 40.5 40.8 n.a. 20.0 
• Th1s senes rs designed to show natwnaltrcnds only; dilfercnces 1n the scope of the govern· 
ment sector invalidate international comparisons. 
h Based on local currency. GNP estimated where official figures unavailable. 
c Reservists with recent training. 
•See pp. 
/Defence expenditures arc based on the NATO definition. Figures from 1980 provisional only. 
GDP figures used. 
d The difficulty of calculating suitable exchange rates makes convers1on to dollars imprecise. 
Source: IISS Military Balance 1981-82. 
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World military expenditure, in constant price figures 
Figures are in US $ million, at 1978 prices and 1978 exchange rates. 
1971 1972 
NATO 
North A-rica: 
Canada 3 273 3 279 
United States l206SS 12110S 
Europe: 
Belgium 2266 2388 
Denmark 1137 1131 
France 14663 IS 023 
FR Germany 18024 l92SS 
Greece I 044 I 114 
Italy 5457 6027 
Luxembourg 18.8 20.9 
Netherlands 3 452 3 558 
Norway I 045 I 043 
Portugal I 112 I 097 
Turkey" I 655 I 683 
United Kinsdom 13 321 1437S 
Total NATO {excl. United States) 63 196 66715 
Total NATO 187 124 191099 
WTO 
Bulgaria 399 440 
Czechoslovakia I 721 I 739 
German DR 2 745 2864 
Hungary 721 668 
Poland 2 586 2621 
Romania 681 708 
USSR (93 900) [95 400) 
Total WTO (excl. USSR) 8 853 9040 
TotaiWTO [102 753) [104 440) 
Other Europe 
Albania' 142 144 
Austria 472 506 
Finland 381 435 
Ireland 121 144 
Spain I 718 I 868 
Sweden 2 739 2811 
Switzerland I 766 I 799 
Yugoslavia 1477 1666 
Total other Europe 8 814 9 374 
Coaventi0111 
Information not available or not applicable. 
( ) SIPRI estimates, based on uncertain data. 
[] Imputed values, with a high degree of uncertainty. 
Notes 
1973 
3 290 
114976 
2498 
I 074 
IS S13 
20010 
1112 
6018 
22.9 
3 614 
I OS2 
I 014 
1806 
14201 
67 996 
186261 
475 
I 831 
3058 
651 
2807 
719 
(96900) 
9 541 
[106441) 
144 
511 
442 
152 
2042 
2822 
I 743 
I 683 
9537 
1974 191S 1976 1977 
3 SlS 3468 3 702 3 939 
113 666 110 229 104261 108 S31 
2S32 2 7S8 2902 2978 
I 177 I 276 1260 1266 
15 SOS 16194 16898 17 670 
2088S 20791 20641 20S61 
I 06S I 70S 166S 2015 
602S s 601 s S80 s 990 
24.7 26. 28.2 27.6 
3 781 3 96S 3 922 4 373 
1080 1171 1200 I 223 
1215 836 653 616 
I 894 2980 3420 3320 
14501 14494 14 770 14 155 
69685 71 805 72 940 74195 
186 866 185 501 180903 186671 
538 611 664 (597) 
1948 2008 2 115 (2 148) 
3172 3 364 3444 3 560 
712 766 721 750 
2838 3001 3 208 (3 412) 
795 874 951 977 
(98 300) (99 800) [101300) [102 700) 
10003 10624 11103 (11 444) 
[108 303) [110424) [112403) [114 144) 
149 155 191 172 
575 642 657 679 
45S 490 499 462 
167 162 169 174 
2217 2 308 2472 2478 
2844 2925 2919 2932 
I 737 1638 1856 I 753 
2060 2279 2363 {2414) 
10204 10598 11125 (11 064) 
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1978 1979 1980 
4087 3 87S 3 14S 
109 247 109 861 Ill 236 
317S 3 246 3 30S 
I 31S I 322 (I 322) 
18 623 19112 19498 
21417 21 730 22003 
2071 1882 I 673 
6246 6642 6 324 
30.0 30.9 34.7 
4228 4482 4333 
I 307 I 340 I 365 
623 631 674 
2 728 2 368 2211 
14618 15 281 16187 
76 381 78068 78929 
189 715 191 803 193 910 
(624) (666) 00 
(2 105) [2 115) 00 
3 738 4123 4470 
819 780 00 
(3 218) (3 195) 00 
I 070 (I 064) .. 
104 200) [105 700) [107 300) 
(11 574) [11943) [12 250) 
115 774) [117 643) [119 550) 
201 204 00 
741 767 (765) 
485 473 532 
182 200 206 
2461 2 672 2 784 
2980 3067 2908 
I 762 I 843 I 814 
(2 379) [2 363) [2 605) 
(11 192) [11 587) [11 821) 
• Developed market economies include all NATO countries, Other Europe except Albania and Yugoslavia, plus Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Israel and 
South Africa. 
Centrally plat~Md economies include all WTO countries, Albania, North Korea, MoJ1801ia, China and Cuba. 
OPEC countries inc:lude Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Algeria, Gabon, Libya. Nigeria, Ecuador and Venezuela. 
Qatar, although a member of OPEC, is not included. Oman, although it is not a member of OPEC, is included, since its position is essentially similar to that 
of other Arab OPEC countries. 
• At current prices and 1978 exchange-rates. 
• Wholesale price index used as deflator. 
• See section on inflation in appendix 68. 
• Include internal security, etc. 
' Per cent of gross national product. 
• Per cent of gross material product. 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1981. 
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1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Middle East 
Bahrain 31.4 34.9 36.1 46.6 2S.O 32.7 42.7 S0.6 [55.5) .. 
Cyprus 16.8 16.4 IS.2 21.7 23.1 22.S 29.9 23.8 [17.6) .. 
Egypt 2972 2911 5 367 5 927 S 756 S004 S238 [3 322) [2 790) .. 
Iran 1810 2 Sl8 3467 7664 97:ll IOSS7 8 573 9424 47S7 .. 
Iraq• 862 830 I 02S 2016 20SO 2011 2101 1988 2440 .. 
Israel• 2166 2134 3 880 2900 3160 31S9 3079 2676 2 783 2218 
Jordan• 270 292 282 2SO 246 411 329 311 323 .. 
Kuwait• 353 371 396 724 865 I 064 1183 I 076 923 [931) 
Lebanon··· 122 174 191 209 212 174 108 166 200 .. 
Oman" 46.3 72.4 122 342 698 78S 686 767 689 880 
Saudi Arabia 2006 2623 3 348 (4 111) (6267) (8 433) (9146) (11 379) (IS 137) (18 514) 
Syria 370 427 661 624 1116 1110 1111 1165 2018 3186 
United Arab Emirates" .. .. 13.3 20.6 32.0 80.6 611 689 I 033 [1162) 
Yemen, Arab Republic .. 100 94.7 106 118 135 ISO 165 .. .. 
Yemen, Peoples' Democratic S0.4 51.6 46.2 46.6 5l.S 55.1 61.3 78.5 98.1 .. 
Total Middle East 11189 12 569 18 943 2S007 303SO (33 033) (32451) (33 283) [33 445) [37900) 
Soudl Asia 
Afghanistan [33.5) 42.4 46.2 43.5 47.6 49.6 5S.8 59.4 .. .. 
Bangladesh .. .. 46.1 S2.7 68.3 117 125 113 117 121 
India 3021 3 223 2826 2648 2980 3500 3400 3 535 3662 3 60S 
Nepal 9.2 9.0 9.3 9.5 10.8 14.0 14.5 .. .. .. 
Pakistan 874 978 914 912 943 943 937 988 I 001 (I 068) 
Sri Lanka 18.0 16.S 11.8 14.5 1S.2 17.8 (16.1) (19.8) 23.8 30.9 
Total South Asia 3 95S 4269 3 8S3 3 680 4065 4642 4549 (4 731) (4882) (4902) 
Far East 
Brunei 22.2 21.7 23.8 27.8 so.s 80.6 139 131 IS5 .. 
Burma 211 220 200 170 147 149 [167) .. 
Hong Kong 39.S 41.7 32.9 28.7 28.3 Sl.3 77.1 92.9 [101) (102) 
Indonesia .. [I 353) [1268) [1168) [I 621) [I 590) I 813 20SO I 870 1455 
Japan 6298 7093 7486 7 597 7899 7978 8232 8175 92S1 9200 
Korea, North 956 613 608 7S9 909 I 004 (I 034) 1144 12SO I 337 
Korea, South 662 82S 920 I 052 1271 1840 2189 2 721 2661 2990 
Malaysia 395 S1J S40 S61 640 579 687 764 [9S8) 1136 
Mongolia• (S0.3) (S7.1) (63.4) (108) (Ill) (121) (120) (12S) (143) (176) 
Philippines 176 219 307 (3SS) (39S) S44 S95 652 [646) 677 
Singapore" 304 321 269 262 301 368 392 443 SOB .. 
Taiwan 1101 1162 I 2S4 I 069 1199 I 398 166S [2 697) 420S S409 
Thailand SOl SIS 48S 4S7 621 67S 7S7 770 888 (859) 
Total Far East, excl. Kampuchea, 
Laos and Viet Nam 11966 12954 13457 13614 IS 193 16377 17 867 206S8 22 849 24271 
Total Far East 13 267 142S4 14757 14694 16193 [17 427) [190S8) [21916) [24 260) [2S 767) 
Oeeanla 
Australia 2 567 2522 2S97 2820 2911 2912 2920 2901 2910 3046 
Fiji 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.8 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.4 4.4 
New Zealand 270 273 273 28S 290 278 282 298 30S 318 
Total Oceania 2839 2 797 2 871 3 106 3 203 3193 3 204 3 203 3 218 3 369 
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1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Africa 
Algeria 221 (217) (224) 426 371 426 473 465 524 .. 
Ben in• 5.8 5.9 6.1 6.8 7.5 7.8 11.9 (11.9) .. .. 
Burundi 7.0 9.6 10.2 11.9 10.6 12.6 17.3 (21.3) .. .. 
Came~oon 59.2 58.0 59.0 59.4 63.0 66.2 63.6 60.7 61.9 56.8 
Central African Republic 12.8 10.7 12.4 11.7 10.8 10.5 9.3 10.1 12.7 .. 
Chad [30.0] 28.6 25.0 23.3 22.2 31.6 (35.7) (41.3) .. .. 
Congo 31.9 24.7 32.0 40.8 43.0 45.8 43.9 38.1 45.9 .. 
Equatorial Guinea• (3.6) (3.7) (3.8) (3.9) (3.9) .. .. .. .. .. 
Ethiopia 89.3 99.4 97.7 136 213 170 154 251 299 [344] 
Gabon 16.1 17.3 20.3 22.0 24.3 26.9 34.9 (53.9) (59.2) 88.2 
Ghana• 361 299 284 370 350 312 179 133 (145) .. 
Guinea• 21.3 20.9 20.9 20.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Ivory Coast 55.3 (57.2) (59.8) 78.9 70.3 66.7 (65.1) 87.8 79.4 .. 
Kenya 48.9 63.7 71.2 76.5 77.0 110 185 240 242 .. 
Liberia 8.7 7.4 6.0 5.1 5.4 6.2 6.7 [6.9] .. .. 
Libya (476) (533) (637) (I 010) (I 048) (I 603) (I 577) .. .. .. 
Madagascar 26.8 29.1 30.6 34.5 33.1 41.4 50.7 52.2 67.7 .. 
Malawi 2.8 2.9 4.5 5.3 10.3 10.8 15.7 21.1 19.3 .. 
Mali' 19.0 23.4 21.1 23.6 32.3 38.6 37.6 30.9 34.9 .. 
Mauritania 6.1 7.9 9.6 11.2 35.1 . (50.5) (65.6) .. .. .. 
Mauritius 7.9 8.5 9.5 9.9 11.5 (10.7) .. .. .. .. 
Morocco 241 270 311 367 538 755 867 (770) (I 093) .. 
Mozambique" .. .. .. .. 14.0 (41.0) 44.3 (85.1) 87.0 .. 
Niger 8.0 7.5 6.8 9.5 11.1 11.2 .. .. .. .. 
Nigeria I 388 I 618 I 782 1958 2927 2544 2 388 I 794 1 739 1524 
Rwanda 12.4 11.0 17.0 13.6 12.4 14.2 13.7 14.8 15.2 .. 
Senepl 42.7 42.0 37.3 35.1 34.9 41.9 45.1 49.1 50.4 48.4 
Sierra Leone 6.2 6.5 7.4 8.0 7.8 7.2 10.6 [11.4] .. .. 
Somalia 25.9 30.5 31.4 35.5 31.9 31.9 34.9 (66.7) (76.7) 
South Africa 701 710 869 1164 1429 1768 1999 2179 1916 1989 
Sudan 294 259 228 184 152 193 220 (207) [285] .. 
Tanzania• 67.3 79.0 102 134 126 132 164 (265) [247] .. 
Togo 8.6 8.9 10.2 11.5 11.9 17.2 18.3 21.2 19.7 .. 
Tunisia 45.4 51.7 52.7 63.8 86.9 98.0 133 148 139 .. 
Upnda' 447 566 409 315 315 279 199 156 .. .. 
Upper Volta 9.2 9.9 10.0 10.2 22.1 29.1 26.9 23.2 (26.2) .. 
Zaire' 541 SOl 400 635 430 (253) (58.7) (45.5) (121) .. 
Zambia [244] [271] [218] [268] [355) [290) [279] [246) [263) .. 
Zimbabwe 87.2 95.2 123 151 169 216 285 327 390 .. 
Total Africa s 679 6064 6259 7 750 9138 9 796 9 859 (9 577) [10037) [9 859) 
Central America 
Costa Rica• 9.8 9.9 10.9 11.2 13.5 17.7 19.5 22.1 (19.2) [19.2) 
Cuba .. • 367 338 342 357 413 .. 886 992 I 065 [I 026) 
Dominican Republic 64.6 64.6 59.7 68.6 72.1 78.8 78.5 87.1 145 .. 
El Salvador' 24.4 25.1 38.8 42.1 37.8 48.0 56.8 59.0 (58.7) .. 
Guatemala [37.5) 45.4 38.1 41.7 57.7 60.3 83.9 73.2 [64.4] .. 
Haiti 3.7 3.8 3.2 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.5 .. .. .. 
Honduras 18.3 23.5 23.2 21.7 25.8 27.2 26.8 31.4 .. .. 
Jamaica 14.0 14.9 23.1 21.7 24.0 29.1 27.7 .. .. .. 
Mexico 361 401 447 477 520 543 531 536 588 563 
Nicaragua 22.3 28.1 22.7 27.2 32.5 43.5 43.2 .. .. .. 
Panama 21.8 13.9 14.9 15.5 17.7 16.7 .. .. .. .. 
Trinidad and Tobago 7.9 7.4 5.9 6.3 7.4 8.2 8.9 .. .. .. 
Total Central America 953 975 I 030 I 093 I 223 (I 526) I 786 (I 912) (I 969) [2 186) 
South America 
Afaentina' I 020 1021 796 939 (1 200) 1723 1438 1492 I 685 1542 
Bolivia 28.6 39.1 46.7 52.9 72.1 79.0 75.8 80.8 [87.6) .. 
Brazil' 1367 1462 1 737 1764 1758 2100 1986 2041 1744 .. 
Chile" 199 199 318 554 432 430 soo 630 [839) 984 
Colombia 380 200 182 174 193 199 182 168 (184) 229 
Ecuador 71.9 83.8 100 liS 141 129 215 164 168 .. 
Guyana• 13.6 14.4 15.2 21.9 42.0 58.5 35.0 (25.5) .. .. 
Paraguay 30.0 29.4 28.6 26.6 33.3 34.5 37.0 38.8 35.9 .. 
Peru' 300 280 338 359 474 537 780 599 464 469 
Uruguay' 121 109 109 131 123 95 100 132 .. .. 
Venezuela 411 470 452 628 707 482 631 590 568 577 
Total South America 3942 3906 4121 4 765 (5 175) 5 867 5 980 5953 (5 953) [6050) 
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TABLE I 
Military expenditures, GNP, central go,ernment expenditures, public 
health expenditures and public education expenditures, 1969-78, 
by region, organisation and country 
Mil~ry Gross·national Central Public Public M I LEX M I LEX H 
expenditures product government health education GNP CGE GNP 
M I LEX GNP expenditures expenditures expenditures 
CGE H E 
billion dollars billion dollars 
Year current constant current constant billion constant 1977 dollars % % % 1977 1977 
WORLD TOTALS 
1969 23600 38304 3537 5746 1145o4 12006 275o5 607 3305 2 0 1 
1970 247o5 38203 3912 6043 1208o5 139o0 293o0 6o3 31 oS 203 
1971 25908 3810 8 4293 6310 t288o0 154 3 31502 6 o I 29o6 204 
1972 27807 39304 4704 6641 136402 167o6 32300 5o9 ~808 205 
1973 3010 2 40201 5314 7095 1428o3 177o3 35009 5o7 2802 2°5 
1974 339o5 41402 5951 7259 14€Bo2 191 0 5 35905 5o7 28o2 2°G 
1975 38300 4:16oS 6599 7348 170So0 211 0 6 381 0 8 5o8 25o0 2°9 
1976 4 It. 5 4"35 4 7:184 7107 1785o2 22407 40807 5o6 2404 2°9 
1977 439 1 4330 \ 8010 8010 186304 23700 42700 5o5 23o6 3o0 
1978 4790CJ 44G o 7 89~7 8348 199 I oO 253o5 441 0 1 5o4 2204 3o0 
DEVELOPED 
1969 197o3 32004 2892 46gB 940o5 10803 24 I 0 1 Go8 34 0 I 2o3 
1970 20202 31204 3172 4900 98507 12507 25500 604 31.7 2°6 
!971 209 8 30804 3464 5091 1033o3 13907 27207 6 o I 29o8 207 
1972 22400 31602 3783 5340 1083o1 151 0 6 27507 5o9 29o2 208 
1973 238.5 31805 4248 5672 111906 15909 30009 5o6 ~804 208 
1974 26802 32702 4717 5754 1 130o 6 17309 309o6 5o7 28o9 3o0 
1975 29°:3 0 4 .32809 5t12 5759 1 3•j6 0 9 19~0.; 323o5 So7 25o 1 3o:3 
1976 314o0 332o2 5712 6043 i365o2 20406 346_o9 505 2403 3o4 
1977 339o3 339o3 6256 6256 142506 216 o I 36207 5o4 2308 3.5 
1978 37003 34407 6971 6490 152807 231 oO 37402 5o3 2205 3°6 
DEVELOPING 
1969 38o8 63o0 645 1048 205o0 1203 3405 6o0 3007 1.2 
1970 4502 69.9 740 1143 22207 l3o3 3800 6 0 1 31.4 1.2 
1971 5000 7304 829 12!9 25407 14o5 42 0 5· 6o0 2808 1.2 
1972 54o7 77 o2 921 1301 281 0 1 1600 4703 5o9 2705 1 0 2 
1973 6206 8306 1066 1423 30807 1705 50o0 5o9 270 I 1.2 
1974 71.3 8700 1233 1505 33706 17o6 4909 508 2508 1.2 
1975 87o6 97o6 1427 1589 399. I 19o2 5803 6 0 1 2405 1.2 
1976 9706 103o2 1572 1663 420.0 200 1 610 8 6o2 2406 1.2 
1977 99o8 9908 1754 1754 43709 21.0 64o3 507 22o8 1.2 
1978 109.6 10200 1996 1858 46202 22o5 6700 5o5 22 0 1 1 0 2 
BY REGION 
AFRICA 
1969 208 406 86 140 3006 1. 6 503 3o3 1500 1 0 I 
1970 208 403 98 15 I 3204 1 0 6 507 208 1303 1.1 
1971 2o9 402 108 158 3700 1.7 600 206 11.4 1 . 1 
1972 3o2 4o6 114 16 I 39o4 I o 8 602 208 11.7 t 0 I 
1973 3o5 407 126 169 41.2 1.9 702 208 11 0 4 1.1 
1974 4 0 1 5o0 146 179 4504 1.7 Go8 208 11.0 0°9 
1975 50 1 507 168 187 60o0 I 0 9 8 0 I 3°0 905 1.0 
1976 6o4 607 187 198 64o5 2 0 1 806 3o4 . 100 4 1 o I 
1977 6o9 6o9 206 206 66o5 2 2 709 3o3 1004 I . 1 
1-978 1. I 6o6 2;28 212 65o0 2o4 802 3. 1 1002 1 0 t 
APPENDIX IV 
E H+E 
GNP M I LEX 
% % 
408 103 
408 1 13 
5o0 123 
4.9 124 
4o9 t31 
5o0 133 
502 139 
5o3 145 
5o3 151 
5o3 155 
5o I 109 
502 t 2 I 
504 133 
502 135 
5o3 144 
5o4 147 
- ... ~se ... 0 ... 
5o7 166 
5oS 170 
5oe 175 
3o3 74 
3o3 73 
3 5 77 
3oS 82 
305 80 
3o3 77 
3°7 79 
3o7 79 
3o7 85 
3o6 87 
3o8 150 
3o8 169 
308 183 
3o8 173 
403 193 
308 170 
4.3 175 
4.3 159 
308 146 
3.9 160 
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Military Groas national Central Public Public M I LEX M I LEX H E H + E 
expenditures product government health education GNP CGE GNP GNP M I LEX M I LEX GNP expenditures expenditures expenditures 
CGE H E 
billion dollars billion dollars 
Year current constant current constant billion constant 1977 dollars % % % % % 1977 1977 
EAST ASIA 
1969 23.2 37.7 457 743 119.6 4.0 26.8 5. 1 31.5 0.5 3.6 81 
1970 27.6 42.6 539 833 130.7 4.4 30.8 5. 1 32.6 0.5 3.7 82 
1971 30.5 44.8 602 885 147.4 4.9 35. 1 5. 1 30.4 0.6 4.0 89 
1972 32.7 46.2 675 953 164.8 5.4 39.4 4.8 28.0 0.6 4. 1 97 
1973 35.4 47.3 791 1056 166.7 5.7 42.8 4.5 28.4 0.5 4. 1 102 
1974 39.2 47.8 879 1072 169.7 5.6 46.8 4.5 28.2 0.5 4.4 109 
1975 43.4 48.3 997 1111 186.4 5.8 49.9 4.3 25.9 0.5 4.5 115 
1976 47.9 50.7 1101 1165 188.2 6.2 52.4 4.4 26.9 0.5 4.5 us 
1977 50.8 50.8 1241 124 1 203.3 6.5 55.9 4. 1 25.0 0.5 4.5 122 
1978 55.4 51 .6 1439 1340 229.5 6.8 59.6 3.9 22.5 0.5 4.4 128 
EUROPE ALL 
' 1969 113.8 184.8 1638 2661 563.6 64.6 117.6 6.9 32.8 2.4 4.4 98 
1970 122.3 189 .o 1824 2817 602,4 78.4 125.2 6.7 31.4 2.8 4.4 107 
1971 132.8 195. 1 1995 2933 636.2 86. 1 135.2 6.7 30.7 2.9 4.6 113 
1972 144. 1 203.4 215G 3044 661.3 94.2 133.8 6.7 30.8 3. 1 4.4 112 
1973 157.9 210.8 2415 3224 698.0 100.0 145.6 6.5 30.2 3. 1 4.5 116 
1974 179.8 219.3 2729 3329 758.2 109.8 153.8 6.6 :28.9 3.3 4.6 120 
1975 202.0 224.9 3007 3348 833.8 122. 1 164.1 6.7 ~7.0 3.6 4.9 127 
1976 219.9 232.7 3300 3491 874.5 128.2 180.3 6.7 26.6 3.7 = •. --~ 132 
1977 233.6 233.6 3584 3584 9.13 .0 137.9 188.7 6.5 25.6 3.8 5.3 ~39 
1978 256.6 238.9 3976 3701 978.0 151.0 196.9 6.5 24.4 4. 1 5.3 145 
OF WHICH 
NATO EUROPE 
1969 31.4 51.0 814 1322 274.9 31.2 60.7 3.9 18.6 2.4 4.6 180 
1970 33.0 51.0 900 1391 290.6 42.0 66. 1 3.7 17.5 3.0 4 8 212 
1971 36.3 53.4 981 1443 305.5 48.3 73.3 3.7 17.5 3.3 5. 1 227 
1972 39.9 56.3 1065 1503 319.5 54. 1 67.9 3.7 17.6 3.6 4.5 216 
1973 42.9 57.2 1189 1587 336.9 58.2 75.4 3.6 17.0 3.7 4.7 233 
1974 48.8 59.5 1327 1619 364.9 65.2 80.7 3.7 16.3 4.0 5.0 245 
1975 54.0 60.2 1435 1598 407.9 74.6 88.2 3.8 14.8 4.7 5.5 270 
1976 58.2 61.5 1589 1681 416.6 79.0 100.7 3.7 14.8 4.7 6.0 292 
1977 62.7 62.7 1720 1720 433.6 86.6 105.9 3.6 14.5 5.0 6.2 307 
1978 68.9 64. 1 1902 1771 470.6 96.2 110.3 3.6 13.6 5.4 6.2 322 
WARSAW PACT 
1969 77.3 125.5 640 1040 236.9 24.7 42.4 12. 1 53.0 2.4 4. 1 53 
1970 83.7 129.4 717 1 108 256.5 26.6 44.0 11 . 7 50.4 2.4 4.0 54 
1971 90.5 133.0 789 1160 271 .0 27.4 45.9 11.5 49. 1 2.4 4.0 55 
1972 97.8 138.0 846 1194 281.7 28.9 49.1 11.6 49.0 2.4 4. 1 56 
1973 108.1 144.3 952 1272 300.6 30.2 53.3 11.3 48.0 2.4 4.2 57 
1974 123.0 150. 1 1089 1328 325.3 31.5 55.7 11.3 46. 1 2.4 4.2 se 
1975 138.9 154.6 1232 1372 353.1 33.0 58.0 11.3 .S3.8 2.4 4.2 58 
1976 152.3 16 t. 2 1347 1425 379.5 34 3 60.4 11.3 .42. 5 2.4 4.2 58 
1977 161.7 161.7 1470 1470 398.0 35.9 62.6 11.0 40.6 2.4 4.3 60 
1978 177.4 165. 1 1641 1528 420.3 38.5 65.5 10.8 39.3 2.5 4.3 63 
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Military Gross national Central Public Public M I LEX M I LEX H _E_ t!...:!:...! 
expenditures product government health education GNP CGE GNP GNP M I LEX 
M I LEX GNP expenditures expenditures expenditures 
CGE H E 
billion dollars billion dollars 
Year current constant current constant billion constant 1977 dollars % % % % % 1977 1977 
OTHER EUROPE 
1969 5. 1 8.3 183 298 51.8 8.7 14.4 2.8 16.0 2.9 4.8 278 
1970 5.6 8.6 205 317 55.3 9.7 15. t 2.7 15.6 3. 1 4.7 288 
1971 6.0 8.8 224 329 59.8 10.5 15.9 2.7 14.7 3.2 4.8 300 
1972 6.5 9. t 245 346 60. t tt. 3 t(:i.8 2.6 15. t 3.3 4.8 308 
1973 6.9 9.3 273 364 60.6 11.6 16.9 2.5 15.3 3.2 4.6. 306 
1974 8.0 9.7 312 381 68.0 13. 1 17.4 2.5 14.3 3.4 4.6 314 
1975 9.0 10. t 339 378 72.7 14.6 11.9 2.7 13.9 3.9 4.7 321 
1976 9.4 10.0 364 385 78.4 15.0 19.2 2.6 12.8 3.9 5.0 342 
1977 9.2 9.2 392 392 81.3 15.3 20. t 2.3 11.3 3.9 5. 1 384 
1978 10.3 9.6 432 402 87.2 16.3 21.2 2.4 tt .o 4. t 5.3 390 
LATIN AMERICA 
1969 2.8 4.5 159 258 33.4 1.9 7.9 1.7 13.5 0.1 3. 1 217 
1970 3.3 5. 1 179 277 36.0 2. 1 8.6 1.8 14.2 0.8 3. 1 209 
1971 3.7 5.5 202 297 40.2 2.6 9.8 t. 9 13.7 0.9 3.3 225 
1972 3.9 5.5 22'; 317 44.6 2.9 10.5 1.7 "12.3 0.9 3.3 243 
1973 ·4.5 6.0 258 345 49.4 ,_; 11.3 1.7 12. 1 0.8 3.3 231 
1974 5.5 6.8 304 371 58.3 2.8 12. 1 1.8 11.7 0.8 3.3 219 
1975 6.7 7.5 344 384 63.3 3. t 12.8 !.0 11.8 0.8 3.3 212 
1976 5.9 6.3 380 402 67. 1 3.2 12.8 1.6 9.4 0.8 3.2 254 
1971 6.6 6.6 421 421 63.9 3.2 14.3 1.6 10.3 0.8 3.4 2ES 
1978 7.4 6.9 471 439 63.3 3.7 14.8 1.6 10.9 0.8 3.4 268 
!MIDDLE EAST 
1969 6.2 10.0 62 101 35. t 1.1 4.0 9.8 28.5 1.1 3.9 51 
1970 7.5 11.5 70 109 39.2 1.2 4.3 10.5 29.3 1.1 3.9 47 
1971 8.2 12. 1 81 119 47.0 t. 2 5. 1 to. 1 25.7 1 .0 4.3 52 
1972 10.0 14.2 99 140 53. 1 t. 5 6.2 10. t 26.7 t . t 4.4 54 
1973 14.5 19.4 121 162 67.7 3.0 1.0 tt .9 28.7 1.8 4.3 51 
1974 17.4 21.3 147 179 77.5 2.4 6.4 11.9 27.5 1.3 3.6 41 
1975 25.6 28.5 175 195 106.0 2.7 10.7 14.5 26.9 1. 4 5.!5 47 
1976 30.3 32. t 201 212 107.0 3.0 12.2 15. 1 30.0 1.4 5.7 47 
1977 29.4 29.4 220 220 11 t. 8 3. t 12.5 13.3 26.3 1. 4 5.7 53 
1978 32.6 30.3 242 225 124.6 3.4 13.2 13.4 24.3 1.5 5.9 54 
NORTH AMERICA 
1969 83.5 135.6 1024 1663 328.4 44.4 108. I 8.2 41.3 2.7 6.5 112 
1970 80.1 123.7 1077 1664 330.4 48. 1 111.9 7.4 37.4 2.9 6.7 129 
1971 77.2 113.5 1170 1120 340.5 54.2 116.8 6.6 33.3 3. 1 6.8 150 
1972 80.1 t 13.0 1289 1820 360.3 57.9 119.2 6.2 31.4 3.2 6.5 156 
1973 80.9 108 .. 0 1440 1923 364.7 60.3 129.2 5.6 29.6 3. 1 6.7 175 
1974 88.8 108.3 1566 1910 314.8 65. 1 124.4 5.7 34.4 3.4 6.5 175 
1975 94.0 104.7 1699 1892 404.4 71. 1 126. 1 5.5 25.9 3.8 6.7 188 
1976 94.4 99.9 1890 2000 428.4 75.7 132.0 5.0 23.3 3.8 6.6 207 
1977 104.8 104.8 2092 2092 445.8 7,8.0 136.4 5.0 23.5 3.7 6.5 204 
1978 112.8 105.0 2335 2174 464.6 80.0 136.3 4.8 22.6 3.7 6.3 206 
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Military Gross~ national Central Public Public M I LEX M I LEX H E H+E 
expenditures pr duct government health education GNP CGE GNP GNP M I LEX M I LEX GNP expenditures expenditures expenditures 
CGE H E I 
billion dollars billion dollars 
Year current constant current constant billion constant 1977 dollars % % % % % 1977 1977 
OCEAN I A. 
1969 1.9 3. 1 52 85 20. 1 2.2 3.4 3.6 15.4 2.6 4.0 180 
19·70 1.9 2.9 58 91 21.7 2.5 4.0 3.2 13.4 2.7 4.4 224 
1971 1.9 2.8 64 94 23.6 2.7 4.4 3.0 11.9 2.8 4.6 253 
1972 1.9 2.7 69 98 22.8 3.0 4.8 2.7 11.8 3.0 4.9 288 
1973 1.8 2.4 78 104 24.2 3.0 5.2 2.3 9.9 2.9 5.0 ·34 1 
1974 1.9 2.3 87 106 27.7 3.3 6.5 2.2 8.3 3. 1 6. 1 426 
1975 2.4 2.7 97 108 33. 1 3.9 6.8 2.5 8.2 3.6 6.3 396 
1976 2.7 2.9 107 113 33. 1 5.2 7 .o 2.6 8.8 4.6 6.2 420 
1977 2.9 2.9 114 114 34.9 5.0 7.8 2.5 8.3 4.4 6.8 44 1 
1978 3.2 3.0 127 118 35.7 4.9 8.2 2.5 8.4 4. 1 6.9 4~6 
SOUTH ASIA 
1969 1.8 3.0 56 91 14.7 o. 7 2.3 3·.3 20.4 0.8 2.5 100 
1970 2. 1 3.2 63 98 15.8 0.8 2.6 3.2 20.3 0.8 2.6 10G 
1971 2.6 3.8 68 100 16. 1 0.8 2.7 3.8 23.6 0.8 2.7 92 
1972 2.7 3.8 74 104 t7 .9 0.9 2.8 3.6 21.2 0.9 2.7 97 
1973 2.6 3.4 81 109 16.3 0.8 2.6 3. 1 20.9 o. 7 2.4 10() 
1974 2.8 3.5 90 110 16.6 0.8 2.7 3.2 21.1 o. 7 2.4 .100 
1975 3.7 4.2 107 119 20.9 1.0 3.2 3.5 20. 1 0.8 2.7 100 
1976 3.9 4. 1 115 122 22.2 1.1 3.4 3.3 18.5 0.9 2.8 109 
1977 4. 1 4. 1 129 129 24.3 1.2 3.6 3.2 16.9 0.9 2.8 117 
1978 4.8 4.5 146 136 30. 1 1.3 3.9 3.3 15.0 1.0 2.9 115 
BY ORGANIZATION 
NATO. ALL 
1969 114.9 186.6 1838 2986 603.2 75.7 168.8 6.2 30.9 2.5 5.7 131 
1970 113. 1 174.7 1978 3055 620.9 90. 1 178.0 5.7 28. 1 2.9 5.8 153 
1971 113.5 166.9 2152 3164 646.0 102.4 190. 1 5.3 25~8 3.2 6.0 175 
1972 119.9 169.3 2354 3323 679.9 112.0 187. 1 5. 1 24.9 3.4 5.6 176 
1973 123.8 165.2 2629 351 1 701.6 118.5 204.6 4.7 23.5 3.4 5.8 195 
1974 137.6 167.8 2894 3530 679.7 130.3 205. 1 4.8 24.7 3.7 5.8 199 
1915 148. 1 164.9 3135 3490 812.4 145.7 214.3 4.7 20.3 4.2 6. 1 218 
1976 152.6 1.61. 5 3479 3681 845.0 154.7 232.7 4.4 19. 1 4.2 6.3 239 
1977 167.5 167.5 3813 3813 879.5 164.6 242.3 4.4 19.0 4.3 6.4 242 
1978 181.7 169. 1 4238 3945 935.3 t76. 1 246.6 4.3 fB. 1 4.5 6.3 250 
WARSAW PACT 
1969 77.3 125.5 640 1040 236.9 24.7 42.4 12. 1 53.0 2.4 4. 1 53 
1970 83.7 129.4 717 1108 256.5 26.6 44.0 11.7 50.4 2.4 4.0 54 
1971 90.5 133.0 789 1160 271.0 27.4 45.9 11.5 49. 1 2.4 4 .o 55 
1972 97.8 138.0 846 1194 281.7 28.9 49. 1 11.6 49.0 2.4 4' 1 56 
1973 108. 1 144.3 952 1272 300.6 30.2 53.3 11.3 48.0 2.4 4.2 57 
1974 123.0 150. 1 1089 1328 325.3 31.5 55.7 11.3 46. 1 2.4 4.2 sa 
1975 138.9 15"4 .6 '1232 1372 353. 1 33.0 58.0 11 3 43.8 2.4 4.2 58 
1976 152.3 161. 2 1347 1425 379.5 34.3 60.4 11.3 .42.5 2.4 4.2 58 
1977 161. 7 161'. 1 ,1470 1470 398.0 35.9 62.6 11.0 40.6 2.4 4.3 60 
1978 177.4 165. 1 '16'4 t 1528 420.3 38.5 65.5 10.8 39.3 2.5 4.3 63 
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Military Gross national Central Public Public M I LEX M I LEX _H_ _E_ H + E 
expen~itures product government health education GNP CGE GNP GNP M I LEX M I LEX GNP expenditures expenditures expenditures 
CGE H E 
billion dollars billion dollars 
Year current constant current constant billion constant 1977 dollars % % % % % 1977 1977 
OPEC 
1969 6.3 10.3 105 171 45.0 1.9 6.9 6.0 22.9 1.1 4.0 85 
1970 6.8 10.6 122 188 45.8 2.0 7.6 5.6 23. 1 1.1 4.0 90 
1971 7.5 11.0 136 201 58. 1 2.0 8.3 5.5 18.9 1.0 4. 1 93 
1972 9.2 13.0 157 222 65.2 2.3 9.9 5.8 19.9 1.0 4.4 93 
1973 11.3 15.2 188 251 79.5 3.5 11.3 6.1 19. 1 1.4 4.5 97 
1974 14.9 18.2 223 272 94.0 2.6 9.4 6.7 19.4 1.0 3.4 65 
1975 22.4 25.0 265 295 131.4 3.2 15.3 8.5 19.0 1.1 5.2 74 
1976 27.2 28.8 306 323 134.7 3.6 16.9 8.9 21.4 1.1 5.2 71 
1977 26.4 26.4 340 340 140.4 3.5 16.6 7.8 18.8 1.0 4.9 76 
1978 29.9 27.9 378 352 153.6 3.9 1A.O 7.9 18.2 1.1 5. 1 78 
OECD 
1.969 123.3 200.2 2321 3770 722.6 85.4 201.6 5.3 27.7 2.3 5.3 143 
1970 122.2 188.8 2532 3912 748.8 101.2 214. 1 4.8 25.2 2.6 5.5 167 
1971 123.5 181 . 5 2761 4058 784. 1 114.6 230.3 4.5 23. 1 2.8 5.7 190 
1972 130.8 184.6 3035 4285 823.6 125.3 231.2 4.3 22.4 2.9 5.4 ·193 
1973 135.2 180.5 3408 4551 842.7 132.6 252.3 4.0 21.4 2.9 5.5 213 
1974 150.5 183.6 3756 4582 830.0 145.7 258.5 4.0 22.1 3.2 5.6 220 
1975 163.0 181.4 4085 4548 983.0 163.3 270.8 4.0 18.5 3.6 6.0 239 
1976 168.4 178.2 4524 4787 1014.5 173.9 292.6 3.7 '17 .6 3.6 6. 1 261 
1977 183.8 183.8 4960 4960 1059.9 184 .o 306.5 3.7 17.3 3.7 6.2 266 
1978 199.8 186.0 5522 5141 1144.6 196.4 315.3 3.6 16.3 3.8 6. t 275 
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-78. 
130 
APPENDIX V DOCUMENT 909 
APPENDIX V 
Military manoeuvres notified in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980 
under the provisions of the Helsinki final act 
A. A.Uied manoeu11res 
Name Type Period Sponsoring Participating 
country of the of the Area Size forces of the 
manreuvre manreuvre manreuvre 
1975 
A. Major 
mamzuvres 
Fed. Rep. of 
Germany Grosse Ground/air Bavaria 68,000 GE-CA-FR-US 15th-19th 
Rochade September 
United States Certain Trek1 Ground/air NW Bavaria 57,000 GE-CA-FR-US 14th-23rd 
October 
B. Smaller scale 
man(J!uvres 
Turkey Deep Joint Aegean Sea and 18,000 TU-US-UK-GE 12th-28th 
Express Turkish Thrace BE-IT-NL September 
Norway Batten Joint Oestfold (NO) 8,000 NO-UK-DE-NL 3rd-7th 
Bolt 75 October 
Netherlands Pantsersprong Ground/air Western part of 10,000 NL 28th October-
Germany 6th November 
1976 
A. Major 
man(J!uvres 
Fed. Rep. of Grosser Ground/air North-West 50,000 GE-NL-UK-US 6th-10th 
Germany Baer Germany September 
United States Gordian Ground/air Hesse (GE) 34,000 US-GE 7th-11th 
Shield September 
United States Lares Team Ground/air Southern 44,000 US-CA-GE 13th-17th 
Germany September 
B. Smaller scale 
man(J!uvres 
Norway Atlas Express Joint South West 17,000 CA-GE-IT-NL 24th February-
Troms NO-UK-US 23rd March 
Norway Teamwork 76 Joint Trendelag (NO) 13,500 NO-NL-UK-US 10th-24th 
September 
Denmark/GE Bonded Joint Jutland & 11,000 DE-GE-US 11th-21st 
Item Schleswig- October 
Holstein 
United Kingdom Spear-point Ground North-West 18,000 UK-DE-US 2nd-11th 
Germany November 
N.B. "Major manreuvres" are those involving more than 25,000 men. 
1. Within Certain Trek the United States notified Reforger 75, a ground/air manreuvre of 10,000 troops. 
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Name Type Period Invita-Sponsoring Participating tion to 
country of the of the Area Size forces of the obser-manreuvre manreuvre manreuvre vers 
--
1977 
A. Major 
mantZuvres 
United States Carbon Edge Ground/air Germany 58,700 US-BE-CA l3th-23rd Yes 
GE-NL-UK September 
Fed. Rep. of Standhafte Ground/air Germany 38,000 GB-US 12th-15th Yes 
Germany Chatten September 
B. Smaller scale 
mantZuvres 
United States Certain Ground/air Germany 24,000 us 1st-8th May -
Fighter 
Denmark Arrow Express Ground/air Denmark 16,000 BE-CA-DE-GE l9th-23rd Yes 
IT-LU-NL- September 
UK-US 
Belgium Blue Fox Ground Germany 24,500 BE-GB-US l2th-23rd -
September 
Netherlands Interaction Ground/air Germany 12,000 NL 24th September- Yes 
lst October 
Turkey Tayfun 77 Ground /air I Turkey 15,000 TU 13th-14th Yes 
naval October 
--
1978 
A. Major 
mantZuvres 
Fed. Rep. of Blaue Donau Ground/air Numberg 46,000 CA-GE-US 17th-21st Yes 
Germany Regensburg September 
Augsburg 
Uhlm 
United States Certain Ground/air Bad Hessfeld 56,000 BE-GE-LU 18th-28th Yes 
Shield Schweinfurt UK-US September 
Darmstadt 
Monburg 
Limburg 
Netherlands Saxon Drive Ground/air Luneburg 32,500 GE-NL-US 18th-29th Yes 
Wafsburg September 
Hannover 
Bremen 
Fed. Rep. of Bold Guard Ground/air Schleswig- 65,000 DE-GE-UK-US 19th-22nd -
Germany Holstein September 
Baltic 
Command Area 
B. Smaller scale 
mantZuvres 
Arctic Express I Norway Ground/air Troms 15,300 CA-GE-IT-NL 1st-6th Yes 
I 
NO-UK-US March 
Black Bear Ground/air East Agder 8,200 NL-NO-UK-US 22nd-26th -
September 
I 
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Name Type Period Invita-Sponsoring Participating tion to 
country of the of the Area Size forces of the obser-manreuvre manreuvre manreuvre vers 
--
1979 
A. Major 
manfl!uvres 
United States Certain Ground N. Baden 66,000 CA-GE-LU-NL 30th January- Yes 
Sentinel Wtirtenburg UK-US 6th February 
W. Bavaria 
United States Constant Ground Wissen /Sieg 29,000 BE-CA-GE-US 10th-21st Yes 
Enforcer with air Frankenberg September 
support Kassel 
Eschwege - Bad 
Hersfeld 
Giessen 
Diez/Lahn 
Fed. Rep. of Harte Faust Ground Oldenburg 60,000 GE-NL-US-DE 17th-21st Yes 
Germany with air Osnabrtick September 
support MUnster 
Nordhorn 
B. Smaller scale 
manfl!uvres 
Norway Cold Ground/air County of 10,000 CA-NL-NO 17th-22nd -
Winter 79 Troms UK-US March 
Turkey Display Joint Aegean Sea 18,000 IT-TU-UK-US 28th September- -
Determination and Turkish 14th October 
79 Thrace 
France Saone 79 Ground Haute-Marne 16,000 FR 1st-7th Yes 
Haute-Saone October 
Doubs- Jura 
COte d'Or 
United Kingdom Keystone Ground Hameln 18,000 UK 15th-27th -
Hildesheim October 
Salzgitter 
1980 
A. Major 
manfl!uvres 
Fed. Rep. of St. Georg Ground Dillenburg 44,000 GE-US 15th-19th Yes 
Germany with air Eschwege September 
support Bamberg 
Heilbronn 
United States Certain Ground Southwest of 40,000 CA-GE-US 15th-24th Yes 
Ramparts Ntirnberg September 
United Kingdom Spearpoint Ground Osnabrtick 90,000 GE-UK-US 15th-25th Yes 
Minden September 
Nienburg 
Wolfsburg 
Braunhage 
Unna 
B. Smaller scale 
manfl!uvres 
Norway Anorak Joint Troms area 18,200 CA-GE-IT-NL 14th-19th -
Express 80 NO-UK-US March 
Norway Teamwork 80 Joint North Mcpre 16,800 NL-NO-UK-US 18th-24th Yes 
South September 
Trcpnde1ag 
France Marne 80 Ground Aube- Marne 17,000 FR 6th-10th -
with air et Meuse October 
support 
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B. Wlli'SIIW PfU:t colllltries' nuuweurres 
I I 
Name Type Period Invita-Sponsoring Participating tion to 
country of the of the Area Size forces of the obser-
rnanreuvre manreuvre manreuvre vers 
1975 
None 
1976 
A. Major 
man~uvres 
USSR Caucasus Ground/air Kutaisi-Tbilisi About Soviet 25th January- Yes 
Yerevan 25,000 6th February 
USSR Sever Ground/air Leningrad About Soviet 14th-18th Yes 
Military 25,000 June 
District 
Poland Shield 76 Ground/air Bydgoszcz 35,000 POL-USSR 9th-16th Yes 
Szezecin CZ-GDR September 
Wroclaw 
B. Smaller scale 
man~uvres 
Hungary 
- Alert/ Denafolovar About Hungarian 6th April -
tactical (Central Hungary) 10,000 
exercise 
Hungary - Ground/air Tisza /Danube and 15,0001 Hungarian 18th-23rd -
Danatul Soviet October 
1977 
A. Major 
man~uvres 
USSR - Ground/air Kiohinev 25,000 Soviet 31st March- -
Odessa 5th April 
Nikolayev 
USSR Carpathia Ground/air Lutsk, Lvov 27,000 Soviet 11th-16th Yes 
Rovno July 
1978 
A. Major 
man~uvres 
USSR Berezina Ground/air Minsk-Orsha 25,000 Soviet 6th-10th Yes 
Polotsk February 
USSR Tarcza 78 Ground/air GDR 30,000 Soviet 3rd-8th -
July 
USSR Kavraz 11 Ground Kutaisi 25,000 Soviet 5th-20th -
Batumi and September 
Kirovabad (notified 
(Trans- 5th-12th 
Caucasus MD) September) 
1. Including certain staffs and units of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. 
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Name Type Period Invita-Sponsoring Participating tion to 
country of the of the Area Size forces of the obser-
manceuvre manceuvre manreuvre vers 
--
1979 
A. Major 
man(Zuvres 
USSR/ Druzhba Ground/air Western 26,000 Soviet 2nd-7th -
Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia Czechoslovak February 
USSR Ground/air Rovno-Ivano About Soviet 2nd-7th -
Frankovsk 25,000 April 
USSR Neman Ground/air Panevejis 25,000 Soviet 23rd-27th Yes 
Taurage-Aiitus July 
B. Smaller scale 
man(Zuvres 
Hungary Shield 79 Ground Area between less than BU-CZ-HU-RO mid-May -
Lake Balaton 25,000 USSR 
and Tisza River 
--
1980 
A. Major 
manlPuvres 
USSR - Ground/air Stendal 30,000 Soviet 10th-16th -
Magdeburg July 
Cottbus 
Brandenburg 
German Brother- Ground /air I GDR-Baltic 40,000 WP countries First half of -
Democratic hood in Amphibious Sea Coast September 
Republic arms 80 
B. Smaller scale 
manlPuvres 
Hungary Dyna 80 18,000 HU /Soviet 23rd-30th -
August 
135 
DOCUMENT 909 APPENDIX V 
C. Neutral and 11011-llligud IIUUIIIIIPres 
Noti-
fica- Content In vi-
Sponsoring Name Type Partici- Period tion of tation of the of the Area Size pating of the given to country 
manreuvre manreuvre forces manreuvre (No. notifi- obser-
of cation vers 
days) 
1975 
A. Major 
manreuvres 
Switzerland 
-
Ground/air ScbafThausen 40,000 Swiss 10th-18th 31 Detailed Yes 
November 
B. Smaller scale 
manreuvres 
Yugoslavia - Ground SW Macedonia 18,000 Yugoslav 21st-25th 25 Adequate -
October 
1976 
A. Major 
manreuvres 
Yugoslavia Golija 76 Ground/air SW Serbia 24,000 Yugoslav 20th-23rd 34 Adequate Yes 
September 
B. Smaller scale 
manreuvres 
Sweden Poseidon Joint Eastern military 12,000 Swedish 2nd-6th 30 Adequate 
-
district (Gott- October 
land) and adja-
cent air and sea 
areas 
1977 
A. Major 
manreuvres 
None 
B. Smaller scale 
mantEUvres 
Sweden Vonn 77 Ground/air North West 10,000 Swedish 4th-9th 21 Adequate Yes 
Province of March 
Jaemtland 
Spain Podenco Ground/air LaMancha 8,000 Spanish 8th-15th 53 Poor Yes 
(Ciudad Real) October 
Austria Herbstuebung Ground/air Ried Im Inn- 12,000 Austrian 11th-19th 37 Detailed 
-
77 kreis-Mattigho- November 
fenv 
1978 
A. Major 
manreuvres 
None 
B. Smaller scale 
man!Euvres 
Austria - Command/post/ Weinviertel 5,000 Austrian 13th-17th 20 Detailed 
-
communication Lower Austria November 
exercise 
1979 
A. Major 
manreuvres 
Switzerland Knacknuss Ground with NE Switzerland 34,000 Swiss 5th-9th 28 Detailed Yes 
air support Bodensee-Rhine milit. March 
Lake Zurich 13,000 
civ. def. 
4,000 
civil. 
Switzerland Forte Ground with Prealps 27,000 Swiss 1st-6th 33 Detailed Yes 
air support between Lake October 
Leman and 
Lake Quatre-
Cantons 
Austria Area defence Ground Lower Austria 27,500 Austrian 19th-22nd 45 Detailed Yes 
exercise 1979 Piedmont November 
Document 909 
Amendments 1, 2 and 3 
Disarmament 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 31 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
14th June 1982 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " establish preconditions for " 
and insert "promote". 
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "establishment of" insert "a 
substantially-reduced level and". 
3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after "forces" insert "and dismantling 
and scrapping surplus or obsolete weapons". 
Signed: Hardy 
l. See 3rd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendments agreed to). 
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Document 909 
Amendment 4 
Disarmament 
AMENDMENT 41 
tabled by Mr. Beix 
14th June 1982 
4. In the draft recommendation proper, after sub-paragraph l(b) add a sub-paragraph l(c) as 
follows: 
"(c) by guaranteeing respect for the principles set out in the United Nations Charter, and in 
particular the peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 33), the right of security and legiti-
mate defence (Article 51) and the right of peoples to self-determination; ". 
Signed: Beix 
I. See 3rd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendments 5 and 6 
Disarmament 
AMENDMENTS 5 and 61 
tabled by Mr. Vohrer 
15th June 1982 
·. 
5. In paragraph (l) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "is to open" and 
insert " opened ". 
6. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " $ 455 billion" and 
insert " more than $ 500 billion ". 
I. See 3rd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendments agreed to). 
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Document 910 
The Assembly, 
Erolution of the situation in Poland 
RECOMMENDATION 378 
adopted by the Presidential Committee 
on 8th February 19821 
Recalling its Order 53 and Recommendation 370; 
8th February 1982 
Considering that the existence of a military dictatorship in Poland constitutes a flagrant 
violation of the final act of the Helsinki conference ; 
Considering that Poland's serious economic difficulties do not justify the replacement of the 
dialogue between the state authorities and Solidarity by a policy of repression ; 
Considering that the public acts of the Soviet Union reveal interference in the internal affairs of 
Poland and pressure on the Polish Government for the establishment of that dictatorship ; 
Noting that the situation thus created in Poland is such as to cause Article VIII of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty to be applied ; 
Regretting that no member government of WEU has judged it necessary to examine in the 
framework of the Council the implications of this situation for the security of Europe ; 
Believing that as long as repression persists in Poland there can be no question of re-
establishing normal relations with Poland and its allies, starting with the Soviet Union ; 
Firmly recalling that the re-establishment of such normal relations depends on : 
(a) the termination of martial law in Poland ; 
(b) the release of all political prisoners and in particular of Solidarity members; 
(c) the resumption of the dialogue between the government, Solidarity and the Catholic church, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Ensure close exchanges of views between the European and American members of the North 
Atlantic Alliance in order to co-ordinate measures taken and to be taken in respect of both Poland 
and the Soviet Union in accordance with the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 11th 
January 1982 ; 
2. To this end, continue to work out in the most appropriate European framework a joint policy 
towards the Soviet Union and Poland, particularly in economic and financial matters, in both the 
long and short term ; 
3. Further, invite member countries to suspend economic and financial assistance to Poland in 
present circumstances ; 
4. Also invite member countries to pursue and develop their humanitarian assistance to the 
Polish people insofar as it does not strengthen the authorities responsible for the military coup d'etat 
on 13th December 1981 ; 
5. Meet to follow closely the development of the situation in Poland and hold a continuing 
dialogue with the Assembly on this question ; 
6. Conduct talks with the countries of Eastern Europe on the application of the final act of the 
conference on security and co-operation in Europe particularly in connection with serious exami-
nation of events in Poland. 
l. In accordance with the provisions of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. 
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Outline booklet on WEU and its activities 
INFORMATION REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the 
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14th May 1982 
DOCUMENT 911 
Information Report 
(submitted by Mr. lkrcllem, Rapporteur) 
1. Introduction 
I. Strictly speaking, this document is not a 
report. Its aim is to meet the wish expressed 
by the Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments that members of the WEU Assembly, 
particularly those attending its meetings for the 
first time, and all persons interested in the orga-
nisation be provided with documentation about 
Western European Union in as brief, clear and 
precise a manner as possible. Other publica-
tions deal with WEU and its history. Here it is 
simply a matter of guiding a busy reader 
towards understanding the organisation as it 
now operates and the problems facing it. 
Little will therefore be said about the history of 
WEU, thus leaving more room for outstanding 
problems. 
2. As represented by the committee, this is 
merely a first outline to allow members of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments first, 
and then the Assembly as a whole at its June 
1982 session, to make any comments or 
suggestions which may help in drafting the final 
text. 
3. In drafting the present text, your Rappor-
teur has drawn very extensively on Admiral 
Cantu's booklet on "The Agency for the 
Control of Armaments of Western European 
Union" and Mr. Borcier's booklet on "The 
Assembly of Western European Union" and 
made use of the anonymous booklet on " The 
Assembly of Western European Union" issued 
in 1975, merely extending its scope and bring-
ing it up to date. He wishes to thank the 
authors of these three publications, all of which 
were published by WEU. 
11. Modij"U!d Brussels Treaty 
A. Origins 
4. In 1950, the United States asked its Euro-
pean allies for Germany to be associated with 
the Atlantic Alliance. Some of them were not 
then prepared to allow this country to build up 
an independent military force and on 24th 
October 1950, Mr. Pleven, then French Prime 
Minister, proposed that a -European army be 
set up to include all the forces of the European 
member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. 
5. The ensuing negotiations led in May 
1952 to the signing of a treaty by which the six 
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countries which had just set up the European 
Coal and Steel Community (Belgium, France, 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands) would form a Euro-
pean Defence Community. This community 
was to place member countries' integrated 
forces under the guidance of a single European 
authority. However, on 30th August 1954 the 
French Parliament, in a vote on a previous 
question, rejected the proposed European 
Defence Community and another treaty had to 
be prepared. This was the Paris Agreements of 
23rd October 1954 which, on the basis of the 
Brussels Treaty of 17th March 1948, associated 
the Benelux countries, France and the United 
Kingdom together with Germany and Italy, 
which implied substantial changes, in order to 
set up a new European organisation. The 
signatories of the 1954 Paris Agreements clearly 
indicated their aims in the preamble to the 
modified Brussels Treaty: "to reaffirm their faith 
in fundamental human rights ... and in tbe other 
ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United 
Nations... to preserve the principles of demo-
cracy ... to strengthen ... the economic, social and 
cultural ties by which they are already united " 
by co-operating" to create in Western Europe a 
firm basis for European economic recovery ... to 
afford assistance to each other ... in resisting any 
policy of aggression ... to promote the unity and 
to encourage the progressive integration of 
Europe". This was tantamount to saying that 
they considered Europe's unity and security to 
be closely linked, as well as its economy and 
defence, which explains the place they accorded 
in the framework of WEU both to armaments 
co-operation and to the establishment of 
mutual confidence which, at that time, implied 
collective control of levels of forces and arma-
ments. Consequently, while Protocol No. I to 
the Paris Agreements modified the Brussels 
Treaty, Protocols Nos. II, Ill and IV contained 
further provisions relating to the levels of forces 
and armaments of member countries. 
B. The treaty 
6. The cornerstone of the treaty is Article 
V, which lays down that: 
" If any of the high contracting parties 
should be the object of an armed attack 
in Europe, the other high contracting 
parties will, in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, afford the party so 
attacked all the military and other aid 
and assistance in their power." 
It thus defines a defensive alliance far more 
binding than the North Atlantic Treaty or any 
other treaty now in force since it commits the 
forces of all the member countries uncondi-
tionally in the event of an attack on one of 
them. 
7. Article VIII of the treaty sets up a Coun-
cil organised so as to be able to exercise its 
functions continuously and deciding by unani-
mous vote questions for which no other voting 
procedure had been agreed. The Council's aim 
is to strengthen peace and European security 
and also to promote unity and encourage the 
progressive integration of Europe. At the 
request of any of the high contracting parties it 
may be immediately convened to consult " with 
regard to any situation which may constitute a 
threat to peace, in whatever area this threat 
should arise, or a danger to economic stabi-
lity". No limit is placed on the Council's 
responsibilities and the preamble to the treaty 
underlines that its aim is to "preserve the prin-
ciples of democracy, personal freedom and poli-
tical liberty, the constitutional traditions and 
the rule of law " and " to strengthen, with these 
aims in view, the economic, social and cultural 
ties " uniting the signatory countries. In other 
words, nothing is outside the responsibilities of 
WEU. 
8. Article IX sets up "an Assembly compo-
sed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty 
powers to the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe " to which the Council has 
to make an annual report on its activities. 
9. Protocol No. 11 to the Paris Agreements 
makes it incumbent on signatory mainland 
countries not to exceed a certain level of forces 
without the unanimous agreement of their part-
ners and to submit their force levels to the 
Council for approval. The United Kingdom 
for its part is committed to maintain four divi-
sions and the Second Tactical Air Force on the 
mainland of Europe. This undertaking is sub-
ject to verification but there is no check on Bri-
tish forces stationed elsewhere. 
10. Protocol No. Ill bans the production by 
the Federal Republic of certain armaments and 
makes all member countries' heavy weapons 
subject to verification by WEU, for which pur-
pose an Agency for the Control of Armaments 
was set up under Protocol No. IV. 
11. Finally, Article IV of the treaty stipulates 
that the WEU Council is to " rely on the 
appropriate military authorities of NATO for 
information and advice on military matters". 
C. Application of the treaty 
12. While the modified Brussels Treaty gave 
Western European Union extremely vast, not to 
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say unlimited, responsibilities, it also demon-
strated its signatories' concern that the body 
they had set up should not duplicate the work 
of other international organisations. Already, 
following the signing of the North Atlantic 
Treaty on 4th April 1949, the Brussels Treaty 
Organisation had decided in its resolution of 
20th December 1950 to transfer the _exercise of 
Western Union's defence activities to NATO, 
while specifying in paragraph 4 of that resolu-
tion that " these new arrangements will in no 
way affect the obligation assumed towards each 
other by the signatory powers under the Brus-
sels Treaty" nor "affect the right of the West-
em Union Defence Ministers and Chiefs-of-
Staff to meet as they please to consider matters 
ofmutual concern". 
13. Although not fundamentally changing it, 
the Paris Agreements amending the treaty 
described the relationship between WEU and 
NATO. Article IV of the treaty stipulated that 
the signatory countries and any organs estab-
lished by them " shall work in close co-opera-
tion with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-
tion " and recognised " the undesirability of 
duplicating the military staffs of NATO ". 
The statute of the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments specified, for instance, the nature of 
the information on the level of forces of mem-
ber countries that NATO was to submit to it 
each year. Conversely, the exercise of the 
WEU Council's strictly military responsibilities 
was transferred to NATO from the outset. 
14. The same concern to avoid duplication of 
work led the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe, obviously with the approval 
of the WEU Council, to transfer in 1960 the 
exercise of WEU's social and cultural responsi-
bilities under Articles 11 and Ill of the modified 
Brussels Treaty to the Council of Europe with 
the exception of those exercised by the WEU 
Public Administration Committee. This mea-
sure affected the Council's activities but not its 
actual responsibilities, as the Council specified 
in its annual report on its activities in 1959. 
15. The Council's activities in the economic 
field, defined in Articles I and VIII of the 
treaty, have effectively been pursued, particu-
larly since the agreement of 11th July 1963 
organised exchanges of views between the Uni-
ted Kingdom and the then six member coun-
tries of the European Economic Community. 
However, when negotiations began between the 
United Kingdom and the Communities on 14th 
September 1970 the Council decided to halt its 
activities, without however calling in question 
the agreement of 11th July 1963 and the prin-
ciple of consultations. 
16. Finally, the Council's activities in the 
political field proper diminished considerably 
as and when consultations developed between 
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the member countries of the European Commu-
nities in this field. Thus, consultative meetings 
between representatives of member countries 
prior to meetings of many international organi-
sations, including the United Nations General 
Assembly, came to an end as a result of a deci-
sion of the WEU Council of 24th May 1972, 
without however this measure prejudicing the 
future of political consultations in the frame-
workofWEU. 
17. Conversely, in application of Article 
VIII.2 of the treaty, the Council decided on 7th 
May 1955 to set up a Standing Armaments 
Committee to promote the joint production of 
armaments. However, the creation and deve-
lopment of NATO bodies with parallel tasks, 
subsequently Eurogroup and finally the Inde-
pendent European Programme Group preven-
ted the Standing Armaments Committee assum-
ing the importance which the authors of the 
1955 decision undoubtedly expected. 
18. The main reason why the WEU Council 
has found itself gradually deprived of many of 
the activities for which the treaty had made it 
responsible is certainly that all the WEU mem-
ber countries were also members of NATO, the 
Council of Europe and then the enlarged EEC, 
together with other countries. It was therefore 
logical for the exercise of these activities to be 
taken over by the larger organisation, insofar as 
it consented to do so, at the expense of the 
smaller one. 
19. In order to understand the present situa-
tion of WEU, three main factors must therefore 
be noted: 
(i) its Council now exercises only very 
reduced and so to speak residual 
activities ; 
(ii) nevertheless, it retains all the respon-
sibilities conferred on it by the treaty 
and may at any time be called upon 
to resume this exercise ; 
(iii) the Assembly is still responsible for 
the overall application of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty and although the 
Council has relinquished the practi-
cal aspects it must reply to recom-
mendations by the Assembly or 
questions put by its members relat-
ing to the application of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty, even if the 
treaty is applied in other frame-
works. It has always recognised this 
principle and has furnished effective 
replies in many cases. 
Ill. The WEU Council 
20. Article VIII of the modified Brussels 
Treaty setting up the WEU Council merely 
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indicates that " it shall be so organised as to be 
able to exercise its functions continuously ". 
This implies on the one hand that the govern-
ments may be represented at the level and in 
the manner they wish and on the other hand 
that the Council may be composed of perma-
nent representatives. But in any event it is the 
governments of member countries that are 
represented at whatever level the Council may 
meet. 
21. Convenience alone led to a distinction 
between two types of Council meeting: 
22.(i) Ministerial meetings, with the participa-
tion of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of 
member countries or other members of govern-
ments to replace them, are held under the 
chairmanship of each one in turn, generally in 
his capital. Until 1970, these meetings were 
held quarterly, then became more spaced out 
and are now held only once a year. Between 
1963 and 1970, in addition to a day set aside 
for political consultations, a second day was 
reserved for economic consultations. Since 
then, meetings have lasted only one day or even 
half a day. 
23.(iz) Meetings of the Permanent Council at 
the seat of the organisation in London, under 
the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of 
WEU, bring together member countries' ambas-
sadors to the Court of St. James and a senior 
official from the United Kingdom Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. Although the treaty 
draws no distinction between the two types of 
Council meeting, it is evident that the Perma-
nent Council corresponds to Article VIII.3 of 
the treaty which specifies that: 
" At the request of any of the high 
contracting parties the Council shall be 
immediately convened in order to permit 
them to consult with regard to any situa-
tion which may constitute a threat to 
peace, in whatever area this threat should 
arise, or a danger to economic stability. " 
24. In fact, such meetings have never been 
convened, but the Permanent Council meets 
about fifteen times a year, inter alia to carry out 
the Council's statutory tasks: implementation of 
the protocols, adoption of the annual report 
and of replies to recommendations adopted by 
the Assembly and questions put by its mem-
bers, and decisions relating to the activities of 
the ACA or the SAC. It is very exceptional 
for it to tackle foreign policy and defence 
matters of its own accord. 
25. The Council is assisted in this task by a 
Working Group of officials of member coun-
tries' embassies in London and of the Secre-
tariat-General, which is responsible for prepar-
ing its work. Depending on circumstances, a 
first draft reply to Assembly recommendations 
or questions may be prepared in one of the 
member countries or by the Secretariat-General 
for submission to the Working Group prior to 
adoption by the Council. Generally speaking, 
the Working Group meets at least twenty times 
a year. 
26. Furthermore, the Public Administration 
Committee meets twice a year in each of the 
member countries in turn. It organises an 
annual meeting of officials from these countries 
and affords its support to study visits by offi-
cials of one member country to another. This 
is a residual activity since the Council transfer-
red the exercise of its cultural and social res-
ponsibilities to the Council of Europe. 
27. Except in a few cases provided for in 
Article VIII.4 of the modified Brussels Treaty 
and specified in Protocols Nos. 11, Ill and IV 
(which all relate to the level of forces and arma-
ments or their control), the Council always 
takes its decisions unanimously. This provi-
sion, necessary in order to protect the 
sovereignty of states in defence questions, has 
made it very difficult for it to take decisions on 
questions within its responsibility and also on 
the organisation of WEU itself. 
28. The Assembly has often voiced its dissa-
tisfaction at the slender activities of the Council 
and has made many suggestions for strengthen-
ing them. Certain governments have publicly 
considered reactivating it, as instanced by Mr. 
Jobert, then French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, on 21st November 1973, in an address 
to the Assembly about political consultations, 
Mr. van Elslande, Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, on 28th May 1975, when speaking 
about armaments co-operation and Mr. Lemoine, 
Secretary of State to the French Minister of 
Defence, on 1st December 1981. So far, the 
only initiative taken by the Council has been to 
instruct the SAC, on 31st May 1976, to prepare 
a study on the European armaments industries. 
IV. Agency for the Control of Armaments 
29. The treaty provided for the immediate 
creation of an Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments to provide the Council with data allow-
ing it to guarantee that all the member states 
would follow a policy of peace whilst reinfor-
cing their security and encouraging the progres-
sive integration of Europe. In the exercise of 
its institutional tasks, the Agency is in fact 
responsible directly to the Council of WEU. 
30. The Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments of WEU is thus the first example of an 
instrument for the quantitative control of arma-
ments, freely accepted by a group of states with 
equal rights, each one being free to assume 
specific commitments in agreement with its 
partners. 
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31. The Council, at its first meeting on 7th 
May 1955, created the Agency for the Control 
of Armaments in accordance with the provi-
sions of Protocol No. I. This Agency now has 
its headquarters in Paris at 43, avenue du Presi-
dent Wilson. It has a staff of 52, including 22 
managerial staff, heads of service and experts in 
the following divisions: 
- the Directorate of the Agency (Direc-
tor, Deputy Director, Director's Office 
and Documentation Office); 
- Information and Studies Division ; 
- Inspection and Control Division ; 
- Administration and Legal Affairs Divi-
sion. 
32. The Director of the Agency is directly 
responsible to the Council for control activi-
ties. He is also responsible for selecting staff 
who are moreover under the general adminis-
trative supervision of the Secretary-General of 
Western European Union. 
33. The Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments of WEU, whose Charter is covered by 
Protocol No. IV, has been given a twofold 
mission: 
34. (a) Verification that the undertakings of 
the Federal Republic of Germany not to manu-
facture, on its territory, certain categories of 
armaments are observed. The armaments still 
subject to this " non-production " control now 
include: 
- atomic, biological and chemical wea-
pons; 
- long-range missiles and guided missiles 
with certain exceptions ; 
- bomber aircraft for strategic purposes ; 
- parts, devices and products specially 
designed or essential for use in or with 
A, B, C and the abovementioned wea-
pons; 
- installations specially designed for 
producing the armaments that the 
Federal Republic of Germany has 
undertaken not to produce. 
Excluded are any systems or parts thereof, 
apparatus, means of production, product or 
body used for civil purposes or for scientific, 
medical and industrial research in basic and 
applied science. 
35. There is no provision for amend-
ing the undertakings relating to atomic, 
biological and chemical weapons but the 
remainder of the list has been amended on 
several occasions by Council decisions taken by 
a two-thirds majority at the request of 
the Federal Republic of Germany and on the 
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recommendation of the competent Supreme 
Commander of NATO 1• 
36. (b) A general quantitative control of the 
heavier armaments defined by the treaty. 
They include: 
- atomic, biologial and chemical wea-
pons; 
- artillery equipment of more than 90 
mm calibre and the corresponding 
ammunition ; 
- all guided missiles and other self-
propelled missiles of a weight exceed-
ing 15 kg; 
- mines of all types except anti-tank and 
anti-personnel mines ; 
- tanks and other armoured fighting 
vehicles of a weight of more than 10 
tons; 
- submarines ; 
- warships over 1,500 tons displace-
ment; 
- warships powered by means other than 
steam, diesel or petrol engines or gas 
turbines; 
- small craft capable of a speed of over 
30 knots and equipped with offensive 
armament; 
- combat aircraft ; 
- aircraft bombs of more than 1,000 kg ; 
- certain major components of these 
weapons. 
3 7. This applies to all member countries on 
the mainland of Europe. 
38. The mission of controlling levels of 
stocks covers the armaments of the forces of all 
the member countries on the mainland of 
Europe whether these forces are placed under 
NATO command or retained under national 
command. It also covers reserve stocks whe-
ther or not they are intended for one or other of 
these categories of forces. It extends to pro-
duction and imports to the extent required to 
make the control of stocks effective. It takes 
into consideration any external aid received. 
Finally, the Agency is kept informed of any 
exports of material subject to control in the 
context of its task of controlling production. 
39. The Agency reports to the Council 
through a yearly report. It must also report 
l. For instance, the Council resolution of 21st July 1980 
cancelled paragraph V of Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill 
relating to warships, with the exception of smaller ships for 
defence purposes. 
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immediately should there be any manufacture 
of armaments contrary to the undertaking of 
the government concerned or should there be 
any stocks of armaments in excess of quantities 
fixed in accordance with the provisions of the 
treaty. It must also inform the Council of any 
problems of legal interpretation of texts which 
it considers itself unqualified to resolve. 
40. As from 1957 the full process of control 
was applied in depots and in units of forces 
under national command. Control of produc-
tion also began in 1957, but it will continue to 
be on a provisional basis until the convention 
making provision for due process of law to pro-
tect private interests comes into force in accor-
dance with Protocol No. IV. 
41. Such a convention was signed on 14th 
December 1957. It lays down the legal mea-
sures or regulations to be taken by the member 
states to enable the Agency to execute its 
control measures, to protect private interests 
against any damages suffered in the course of an 
inspection and thus to allow recourse to an 
appropriate international court. However, this 
legal instrument has not so far come into force, 
since it has not yet been ratified by France. 
The Agency must therefore obtain the prior 
consent of the firms through the national 
authority concerned. Under this provisional 
procedure, control measures at industrial estab-
lishments are known as " agreed quantitative 
control measures " or " agreed non-production 
control measures ". 
42. An agreement signed on 14th December 
1957 lays down the conditions under which the 
Council determines each year the maximum 
levels of the strength and armaments of forces 
maintained under national command by the 
member states on the mainland of Europe. 
43. So far, the control of atomic and bacte-
riological weapons has not come into force. 
44. All the basic criteria for the verification 
of undertakings not to manufacture certain 
categories of armaments are to be found in the 
treaty or in the decisions of the Council. 
45. For the control of stock levels, maximum 
levels of armaments can be determined only in 
relation to the maximum levels of forces and 
strengths that the states may hold on the 
mainland of Europe. 
46. But the assessment of maximum levels of 
forces and strengths and the resulting determi-
nation of appropriate armament levels are 
worked out differently depending on whether 
the forces are : 
- under NATO authority ; 
- or maintained under national com-
mand. 
47. NATO, in its annual review, must lay 
down force goals to be met or maintained in the 
light of its current or longer-term plans and it is 
on the basis of these goals that the Agency 
determines the necessary levels of armaments 
for the period under consideration, after which 
its mission is to ensure that these levels are not 
exceeded. 
48. For forces maintained under national 
command on the mainland of Europe, the 
maximum strength and armaments have to be 
determined each year on the basis of the provi-
sions of Protocols Nos. 11 and IV set out in the 
agreement of 14th December 1957. 
49. In the case of non-production control, i.e. 
verifying that the undertakings by the Federal 
Republic of Germany not to manufacture cer-
tain armaments are observed, the Agency 
carries out inspections in the establishments 
that could effect the corresponding production. 
These inspections are prepared by studies 
conducted by its experts working from the 
documents at their disposal. After each ins-
pection, with the agreement of the Agency, the 
Council may issue an attestation to the firm 
visited certifying that the commitments under 
Protocol No. Ill are being respected. 
50. • For the control of stock levels, a distinc-
tion must be drawn between: 
51.(i) The study of statistical and budgetary 
documents provided on request by the member 
states and NATO, known as " documentary 
control". 
52. At the end of each year, the Agency 
sends a questionnaire to all the member states 
asking, for each type of armament subject to 
control and held on the mainland of Europe: 
- total quantities of armaments required 
to attain the goals corresponding to the 
appropriate force levels ; 
- the total quantities of armaments held 
on 1st January of the year in question 
together with their distribution in the 
units and depots, making a distinction 
between forces under NATO authority 
and those under national command ; 
- new resources expected in the course of 
the year considered ; 
- quantities expected to be available at 
the end of the year taking account of 
consumption, attrition, obsolescence, 
etc. 
53. Member states' replies to the annual 
questionnaire allow calculations to be made so 
as to be able to compare levels forecast for the 
end of the control year with appropriate 
levels. They pinpoint part-stocks in depots 
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and units. The information they contain on 
industrial armaments production is supplemen-
ted by the list of producer factories with details 
of the quantities produced by each one. 
54. These replies thus serve as a basis for: 
- operations for evaluating the levels ; 
- and field control measures. 
55. As regards documentary control, the 
Agency, through its co-operation with NATO, 
obtains information which must be m harmony 
with the information received from member 
countries. On the basis of this information 
which is processed by the Agency . and then 
discussed with the competent NATO military 
authorities the quantities of armaments required 
for the forces under NATO authority can be 
determined. 
56. The studies of the production program-
mes and budgetary documents of the different 
member countries conducted by the Agency are 
also part of documentary control. A thorough 
study of these documents provides a cross-
check of the information submitted in the 
replies to the annual questionnaire. 
57. All other possible sources of information 
are processed as necessary. The Agency has a 
Documentation Office which assembles all 
information having a bearing on its field of 
action and which sorts, classifies and files any 
such items after submitting them to the experts 
concerned. 
58.(ii) The execution of control measures at the 
units and depots (field control measures) 
which relate to holdings, whether operational or 
reserve, or to production (factories). 
59. It is impossible of course to verify all the 
data obtained from documentary control by 
field visits. The Agency decides each year the 
proportion of the information to be checked on 
the spot and consequently selects the establish-
ments to be visited in a form which may range 
from a simple test check to a full inspection. 
60. Whereas documentary control by the 
Agency extends to the armaments of types sub-
ject to control held by all categories of forces of 
the member states on the mainland of Europe, 
where forces and depots under NATO authority 
are concerned test checks, visits and inspections 
are undertaken by the appropriate authorities of 
NATO, the Agency receiving notification of the 
information they communicate to the Council. 
61. The Agency inspection groups are gene-
rally composed of three experts commissioned 
by the Director of the Agency. These commis-
sions give the inspectors free access to the 
depots and plants designated. They act with 
the co-operation of the national authorities, if 
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the latter so wish, and their powers and obliga-
tions are fixed by a regulation approved by the 
Council. They can question the responsible 
authorities and managements, inspect such 
documents and accounts as may be relevant to 
the control and take, as required, extracts there-
from. They can invoke the assistance of the 
national authorities if this proves necessary for 
the accomplishment of their mission. They 
are bound by security regulations identical to 
those in force at NATO and hold certificates to 
this effect. 
62. Production for the current year in a plant 
is verified by checking information obtained 
from observation of production in hand against 
forecasts established at the beginning of the year 
which may be subject to various and 
sometimes major unexpected changes. The 
inspection group obtains general information 
concerning the production establishment, notes 
the characteristics of the production facilities at 
the assembly stage of the armaments to be 
controlled, examines the relevant production 
plans, etc. Next, it checks that the figures of 
the annual report conform with planned pro-
duction for the current year. 
63. In its appreciation, the inspection group 
must take into account the rate of production at 
the time of the inspection and that expected in 
the near future. The volume of current orders, 
the information obtained from the material 
accounts, a knowledge of stocks of complete 
items and certain assemblies or major compo-
nents, are all useful indications on which to 
form a judgment and to check it against obser-
vations made at the production line or in the 
workshops where the assembly phase of the 
armament to be controlled takes place. The 
average number of field control measures car-
ried out each year is seventy. 
64. However, it should be noted that since 
the production of C weapons has not entered 
the effective production stage, the Council has 
been unable to fix the level of stocks which 
member countries are authorised to hold. 
Where A and B weapons are concerned, it is 
well known that the Agency has not yet carried 
out any controls. Secondly, the fact that 
the convention for due process of law of 14th 
December 1957 has still not come into force 
considerably hampers the Agency's field 
controls. 
65. In spite of these handicaps, following the 
second world war the Agency made a major 
contribution to establishing an element which 
was essential to the restoration of confidence 
between Western European countries without 
which the participation of all in the Atlantic 
Alliance on an equal footing would have been 
inconceivable. There is now some question 
of whether the lists drawn up more than 
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twenty-five years ago are still fully significant 
and whether the restoration of confidence is not 
now a fact. Hence the question has often been 
put in recent years of whether it would not be 
possible to transfer the experience acquired by 
the Agency to measures for controlling arma-
ments beyond the framework of seven-power 
Europe. 
V. Standing Armaments Committee 
66. The Standing Armaments Committee was 
set up by a decision of the WEU Council of 7th 
May 1955 in appliction of Article VIII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. Unlike the Agency, 
it is composed of representatives of the WEU 
member countries who may be either their per-
manent delegates or other senior officials under 
the chairmanship of the representative of each 
country in turn. Its aim is to find "joint solu-
tions which would assist governments of mem-
ber countries in meeting their [military] equip-
ment requirements " by " agreements or arran-
gements on such subjects as the development, 
standardisation, production and procurement of 
armaments " concluded between all or some 
WEU countries and remain open to partici-
pation by other NATO member countries. To 
this end, the SAC is free to set up any sub-
committees and working groups that may be 
required and observers from NATO may be 
associated with them. 
67. The Committee has an international 
secretariat whose head is an Assistant Secretary-
General of WEU and which has a small 
staff. Twice a year, the head of the internatio-
nal secretariat reports to the WEU Council on 
the activities of the SAC. The budget of the 
international secretariat is part of the WEU 
budget. This secretariat also co-operates with 
FINABEL, a body for co-operation between 
military headquarters of member countries in 
the field of armaments. 
68. It is difficult to draw up an objective 
balance sheet of the SAC's activities. On the 
one hand, it must be noted that no actual WEU 
equipment has ever been produced, but it must 
also be borne in mind that the very frequent 
meetings between the armaments directors of 
member countries or their representatives in the 
framework of NATO, the SAC and the IEPG 
have established very fruitful links which have 
led to many bi-, tri- or multilateral productions 
which originated in meetings in the framework 
of the SAC, its sub-committees or working 
groups. Apart from all its own specific tasks, 
what has been the exact role played by the 
SAC in many agreements for the eo-production 
of military equipment concluded between the 
WEU member countries in the last quarter of a 
century? In order to answer this question, an 
in-depth study would be required, based on 
unpublished sources. 
69. However this may be, the question arises 
of possible duplication of work between the 
SAC and other bodies, particularly the IEPG, 
and the governments, like the Assembly, have 
tried to find specific tasks for the SAC, particu-
larly since Mr. Jobert and Mr. van Elslande in 
1973 and 1975 drew attention to this need. 
70. Thus, at its ministerial meeting on 31st 
May 1976 the Council gave the SAC the task of 
preparing an outline study of member coun-
tries' armaments industries. After considering 
this outline, the Council instructed the SAC on 
20th April 1977 to conduct a wide-ranging 
study of the situation of the armaments sector 
of industry in member countries according to 
the principles and methods it laid down. A 
report was submitted to the Council chapter by 
chapter between 1978 and 1982. In May 
1982, the Council transmitted a declassified 
version to the Assembly. 
71. Further, in Recommendation 331 adop-
ted on 19th June 1979, the Assembly asked the 
Council to " consider the possibility of incorpo-
rating appropriate studies proposed from time 
to time by the Assembly among the new tasks 
which the Council is considering entrusting to 
the Standing Armaments Committee". The 
Council's reply was not negative since it Said it 
was prepared to do so. But " they will make 
their decisions on a case by case basis, accord-
ing to the nature of the proposals made and in 
the light of the SAC's other tasks and of the 
resources at its disposal, whilst avoiding any 
duplication of work done by other organisa-
tions". 
72. It should be noted that Mr. Lemoine, 
Secretary of State to the French Minister of 
Defence, suggested in his address to the Assem-
bly on 1st December 1981 that there should be 
far more extensive co-operation between the 
SAC and the Assembly: 
" Without touching the texts, the SAC 
can be placed at the disposal of the 
Assembly subject to the consent of the 
Council of WEU. And rather than need 
to obtain the Council's consent each 
time, could not the SAC be authorised, at 
each session of the Assembly, to give 
help with the various studies decided 
upon? This is just one suggestion, but 
other solutions are possible, of course. If 
the political will exists, I do not think 
anyway that institutional obstacles could 
hinder an expansion of the SAC's role. 
With, as it were, an information and 
research department available to it, the 
Assembly would be in a position to 
initiate more ambitious studies. It could 
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rely on an independent, specifically 
European agency whose work could not 
be suspected of being biased, which is the 
most important thing. I would remind 
you that the SAC is currently composed 
of 28 civil servants of different categories. 
This staff is large enough to carry out 
such tasks on behalf on the Assembly." 
The words used by the Secretary of State show 
that he was thinking of the permanent secreta-
riat and not the SAC itself when making this 
proposal which has so far not been adopted by 
the WEU Council. 
73. In any event, it will be interesting to 
follow further work on the study on the situa-
tion of the armaments sector of member coun-
tries' industry and to discover what type of 
assistance the SAC or its permanent secretariat 
will be authorised to give the Assembly. 
VI. The Assembly 
7 4. The institution of the WEU Assembly in 
19 54 under the modified Brussels Treaty was a 
new expression of the overall trend which had 
earlier led to the formation of the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe and the 
ECSC Assembly. However, since the matters 
for which WEU is responsible relate essentially 
to fields in which member states retain full 
sovereignty, the idea of electing it by direct uni-
versal suffrage has not been envisaged, the 
signatory countries preferring it to be formed of 
members of their parliaments. 
75. It was linked with the wishes of the advo-
cates of the European idea to have the same 
type of democratic representative institutions as 
in the national framework. In accordance with 
the principles of parliamentary democracy, the 
European organisations with political responsi-
bilities should have a representative parliamen-
tary body to balance the governmental repre-
sentatives. 
76. Consequently, the authors of the treaty, 
after defining the Council's competence in Art-
icle VIII, made it binding on the Council, in 
Article IX, to submit an annual report on its 
activities to " an assembly composed of repre-
sentatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Eur-
ope ", i.e. consisting of parliamentarians mem-
bers of the latter assembly. 
77. The WEU Assembly which was thus 
created meets twice a year in plenary session in 
the chamber of the French Economic and 
Social Council, Place d'Iena, Paris. It may, 
however, meet elsewhere, and has held sessions 
in London, Rome, Brussels and Bonn. The 
Assembly's permanent seat is at 43 avenue du 
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President Wilson, Paris ( 16°), in premises 
adjoining the chamber of the Economic and 
Social Council. 
A. Membership, powers tllld statutes 
of the Assem/Jly 
(z) Membership 
78. The WEU Assembly is composed of 
representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to 
the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, i.e. Belgium, France, the Federal Repu-
blic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
79. Further to Article 26 of the Statute of the 
Council of Europe, these countries are entitled 
to the number of representatives given below: 
Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
Federal Republic of Germany . . . . . 18 
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
Luxembourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
80. The Assembly of WEU is consequently 
composed of 89 representatives. A like num-
ber of substitutes is also appointed, all of 
whom, in practice, are members of their natio-
nal parliaments, drawn from government and 
opposition parties, broadly in proportion to 
their strength in parliament. 
81. Substitutes of the representatives may sit, 
speak and vote in the place of representatives 
prevented from attending a sitting of the 
Assembly. 
(iz) Powers 
82. Unlike the WEU Council, which has 
handed the exercise of a number of its responsi-
bilities to other organisations, the Assembly 
defined its powers by stating in Article I of its 
Charter that it may proceed on any matter 
arising out of the modified Brussels Treaty. In 
the political field, the Assembly started a dia-
logue with the Council on European political 
co-operation and parallel with this has always 
resolutely transmitted recommendations to the 
Council on means of ensuring European secu-
rity, feeling its action in this field to be parti-
cularly important since it is the only official 
international parliamentary assembly with 
competence in defence matters. The WEU 
Council has always replied to its recommenda-
tions, which are transmitted to the North 
Atlantic Council whenever appropriate. 
83. Finally, the Assembly has extended its 
discussions to the field of civil and military 
technological and scientific co-operation and it 
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should be noted that the Council has often 
produced very substantial replies to recommen-
dations on these matters. Conversely, the 
Assembly has not dealt with specifically social 
and cultural questions and purely economic 
questions now occupy only a minor place 
among its activities. 
(iii) Statutes 
84. The Assembly's activities are not just an 
echo of those of the WEU Council, and this is 
normal since they reflect the· Assembly's politi-
cal independence which proved possible from 
the very outset with the backing of the Council 
as voiced by the then Chairman-in-Office, Mr. 
Spaak, in his speech to the Assembly at its first 
meeting on 5th July 1955: 
"We [the Council of WEU] have been 
determined to leave you the greatest 
possible freedom, relying upon your 
experience and your wisdom... We 
consider that the organisation and work-
ing methods of the Assembly ... are mat-
ters for its own decision... The Assem-
bly of Western European Union is to be 
independent of all other assemblies, 
and will have its own Clerk. " 
85. Taking advantage of this freedom, the 
Assembly appointed a Committee on Organisa-
tion which drew up a Charter whose terms, 
adopted unanimously, provided it with the 
means of asserting its independence. 
86. The Assembly's independence is first 
expressed at political level in Article I, para-
graph (a), which lays down that: 
" The Assembly carries out the parlia-
mentary function arising from the appli-
cation of the Brussels Treaty. In parti-
cular, the Assembly may proceed on any 
matter arising out of the Brussels Treaty 
and upon any matter submitted to the 
Assembly for an opinion by the 
Council." 
87. The Assembly thus confirmed its right to 
draw up its agenda and applied Article IX of 
the modified Brussels Treaty broadly insofar as 
its deliberative powers embrace not only the 
annual report of the Council but also " any 
matter arising out of the Brussels Treaty". 
88. It should also be recalled that during the 
period when France left its seat on the Council 
vacant (from 14th February 1969 to 15th June 
1970) the French Delegation continued to sit in 
the Assembly. 
89. In pursuit of its duties, the Assembly 
appointed its steering bodies, the Bureau and 
Presidential Committee, and its working bodies, 
the committees, whose discussions are confiden-
tial and whose reports are published after being 
adopted on a vote by roll-call. 
(a) Steering bodies 
90. The Bureau consists of the President and 
six Vice-Presidents elected by the Assembly 
from among its members, one from each of the 
seven member countries. 
91. The Presidential Committee is composed 
of the President of the Assembly, former Presi-
dents members of the Assembly, the six Vice-
Presidents and the Chairmen of Committees. 
It is customary for the President to invite the 
Chairmen of the three political groups to attend 
meetings of the Presidential Committee. 
92. It meets as often as necessary and, subject 
to subsequent ratification by the Assembly, acts 
on behalf of the Assembly in between sessions 
or part-sessions. It decides the dates, draft 
agenda and draft order of business of plenary 
sessions and draws up the draft budget of the 
Assembly in collaboration with the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
(b) Committees 
93. The Assembly appoints five permanent 
committees at the beginning of each ordinary 
session. It may set up special committees or, 
with the approval of the Council, committees of 
investigation in order to obtain full particulars 
regarding a specific aspect of the annual report. 
The committees prepare reports on matters 
referred to them by the Assembly, appointing a 
rapporteur for each subject. Their meetings 
are not public but they may invite guest speak-
ers to address them - usually ministers or senior 
officials. The committees meet most fre-
quently at the seat of the Assembly in Paris, 
but also in other places whenever appropriate. 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments (27 members) 
94. The committee holds some eight or ten 
meetings a year, about six of which are held in 
the period between sessions of the Assembly. 
In addition to the normal activities of other 
committees, the Defence Committee visits 
NATO and national headquarters and military 
installations in the NATO countries and may 
invite senior officers to address it. It holds 
joint meetings with the Council. Also, it gene-
rally invites the chairmen of the parliamentary 
defence committees of the seven member coun-
tries to meet with it once each year, and it 
meets occasionally with the Military Committee 
ofthe North Atlantic Assembly. 
95. The committee examines the parts of the 
annual report of the Council which deal with 
the control of armaments, defence and disarma-
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ment. It frequently studies the state of Euro-
pean security, the organisation of western 
defence, the joint production of armaments, 
disarmament and the limitation and control of 
armaments. Finally, it has organised two sym-
posia on a European armaments policy, one in 
1973 and the other in1979 in conjunction with 
the General Affairs Committee and the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions. 
General Affairs Committee (27 members) 
96. The General Affairs Committee holds 
some eight or ten meetings a year, about six of 
which being held in the period between sessions 
of the Assembly. It also holds joint meetings 
with the Council. 
97. Ministers and other high-ranking officials 
may be invited to address committee meetings. 
98. The Chairman of the committee meets 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council after 
each meeting of the Council at ministerial level. 
99. At each session, the committee reports to 
the Assembly on questions concerning the poli-
tical and economic organisation of Western 
Europe and the main international political 
problems. Each year, it prepares a reply to the 
sections of the annual report of the WEU 
Council dealing with political matters. 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions• (21 members) 
100. The Committee on Scientific, Technolo-
gical and Aerospace Questions holds some eight 
or ten meetings a year, about six of which being 
held in the period between sessions of the 
Assembly, and visits scientific and aerospace 
installations. 
101. Ministers, other high-ranking officials or 
experts may be invited to address committee 
meetings. 
102. It prepares a reply to the chapters of the 
annual report dealing with scientific and tech-
nological co-operation. 
103. Since it was set up, the committee has 
reported to the Assembly on the political, mili-
tary and legal aspects of scientific research, 
space technology, aeronautics, computers and 
oceanography. 
104. In the space field, the committee's aim is 
the establishment of a European NASA ; in the 
aeronautical field, it is endeavouring to pro-
mote close co-operation between European 
1. A Committee on Space Questions was set up on 31st 
May 1965 and on 13th June 1967 became a permanent 
committee with the title" Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions". 
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industries; finally, with regard to the other 
sectors of advanced technology, it advocates a 
European approach to problems. To this end, 
it organised colloquies on a civil and military 
aeronautical policy for Europe in 1973, on a 
European aeronautical policy in 1976 and on 
international aeronautical consortia in 1982. 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration (21 members) 
105. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration meets three or four times each 
year. In collaboration with the Presidential 
Committee, it draws up the draft budget of the 
Assembly, gives its opinion on the budget of the 
Secretariat-General and considers all adminis-
trative questions affecting the organisation. 
I 06. The budget of the Assembly is transmit-
ted to the Council in accordance with an infor-
mal procedure which allows views to be recon-
ciled before the vote on the budget. It is thus 
possible to avoid open encounters with the 
Council which could be settled only by means 
of a joint meeting. 
107. It should be noted that on 13th October 
1956 the Assembly adopted its financial regula-
tions setting out the rules for its financial 
administration. 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges (21 members) 
I 08. The Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges meets each time a question 
concerning the revision or interpretation of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Assembly is submit-
ted to it by the Assembly. Any request addres-
sed to the President by the competent authority 
of a member state for the waiver of the immu-
nity of a representative or substitute is referred 
to it. 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
(14 members) 
109. The Assembly has also set up a Commit-
tee for Relations with Parliaments composed of 
14 members (2 for each member country). 
The secretaries of the national delegations to 
the Assembly are invited to attend its meetings. 
The committee, which usually meets four times 
a year, selects certain texts adopted by the 
Assembly for discussion in national parliaments 
and reports to the Assembly on the action 
taken on these texts. It periodically visits the 
parliaments of the seven member countries and 
is addressed by ministers responsible for rela-
tions with parliament and senior parliamentary 
officials. 
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(c) Political groups 
110. Representatives and substitutes may join 
political groups. There are now four groups: 
the Communist Group, the Federated Group of 
Christian Democrats and European Democrats, 
the Liberal Group and the Socialist Group 1• 
(d) Office of the Clerk 
Ill. The Secretary-General (Clerk) is appoin-
ted by the Assembly on the proposal of the 
Bureau. " He shall provide the Assembly and 
its committees with such secretariat and other 
assistance as they may require. " 
112. The Clerk appoints the staff of the Office 
of the Clerk in consultation with the Bureau. 
(e) Languages of the Assembly 
113. Documents of the Assembly and its 
committees are published in English and 
French. Speeches in the Assembly or in 
committee may be made in the official langua-
ges of the member states. The secretariat 
arranges for simultaneous interpretation of 
speeches in the Assembly in the official langua-
ges of all the member states and at committee 
meetings in French and English. 
B. The Assembly's methods of work 
114. In providing a firm basis for its indepen-
dence, the Assembly has enhanced the interest 
of its dialogue with the Council. Having star-
ted with the report provided for in Article IX of 
the modified Brussels Treaty, this dialogue has 
been developed further through the establish-
ment of public, and subsequently confidential, 
procedure. 
(i) Public procedure 
115. Prior to the spring session, the Council of 
WEU communicates an annual report to the 
Assembly on its activities during the preceding 
year. The Assembly refers this report to the 
appropriate committees for study and they sub-
mit their views to the Assembly in a report. 
116. At the plenary session, the annual report 
is presented orally by the Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council, who generally then makes a state-
ment on his government's policy. He then 
answers oral questions put by the parliamenta-
rians, sometimes as Chairman-in-Office and 
sometimes as Minister for Foreign Affairs of his 
country. 
I. On 1st December 1981, the Communist Group had 12 
members, the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and 
European Democrats 62 members, the Liberal Group 21 
members, the Socialist Group 67 members, and 16 mem-
bers of the Assembly belonged to no group. 
117. After debating the reports submitted by 
the committees in reply to the annual report of 
the Council, the Assembly votes on the draft 
recommendations. It may adopt a motion to 
disagree to the annual report by an absolute 
majority of representatives to the Assembly. 
118. The Assembly also considers in plenary 
session reports from its committees on ques-
tions referred to them. It gives its opinion by 
voting on the substantive texts of these reports 
which are generally in the form of a recommen-
dation to the Council to which the Council 
replies in writing. The Assembly may also 
send resolutions to international organisations, 
governments or the national parliaments. 
119. Its consultative status largely explains the 
methods of work adopted by the WEU Assem-
bly. The Assembly has in fact no real means 
of sanctioning the Council. It has neither a 
permanent majority nor a permanent opposi-
tion and has no legislative powers. The 
Assembly is therefore aware that the impact of 
its recommendations is even greater if they are 
the object of wider agreement. It therefore 
endeavours to adopt its texts unanimously or by 
a large majority. 
120. Such a consensus has been possible on 
certain subjects. In this respect, mention 
should be made of the positions adopted by the 
Assembly in favour of enlarging the Communi-
ties and strengthening European co-operation in 
the fields of foreign policy, defence and advan-
ced technology. 
121. However, the Assembly has not always 
managed to reach as wide agreement as it 
would have wished. Thus, one of the matters 
which has been the subject of the greatest 
controversy is that of Europe's identity in the 
defence field. 
122. With a view to adding substance to its 
debates, the Assembly invites ministers and 
other senior governmental or international offi-
cials or service officers to address it in plenary 
session. Sittings are normally public, but the 
Assembly may exceptionally decide to hold a 
closed sitting. 
123. Representatives may normally put oral 
questions to ministers or other speakers who 
address the Assembly. They may put written 
questions to the Council at any time and a 
written reply will be received. 
124. Article IX of the modified Brussels 
Treaty has thus allowed considerable develop-
ment. However, the fact that the dialogue 
between the Council and the Assembly is held 
in public imposes certain limitations. 
125. First, the annual report does not allow 
the Council to give the Assembly a full picture 
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of its activities because the report is a public 
document and the Council's deliberations are 
confidential. 
126. Again, the Council's replies to recom-
mendations are sometimes not very explicit 
owing to the difficulty of reaching a joint posi-
tion in the Council. In a few instances, though 
rarely, the Council has even had to recall the 
statutory obligation to take decisions unani-
mously and state that it has been unable to 
reach agreement. 
127. In addition, the handling of defence 
matters by the organs of the Atlantic Alliance, 
the transfer of the exercise of WEU's compe-
tence in the cultural and social fields to the 
Council of Europe, the development of the 
European Communities and the establishment 
of political co-operation all combine to impose 
considerable limitations on the questions on 
which the Council can report to the Assembly 
that it has taken action. 
128. However, it must not be thought that 
these obstacles and restrictions make the dia-
logue with the Council devoid of interest or 
bearing. Through its recommendations, the 
Assembly induces the Council to seek and 
define points on which the seven member coun-
tries can agree, and a comparison of the Coun-
cil's replies to Assembly recommendations on 
the same subject over the years shows how 
much progress the European states have been 
able to make towards the definition of a com-
mon policy. Furthermore, the Council has 
agreed to inform the Assembly to the best of its 
ability about any matters relating to its respon-
sibilities, even if they are exercised by other ins-
titutions. 
(ii) Confidential procedure 
129. In view of the shortcomings of public 
procedures for exchanging views, provision has 
been made for confidential exchanges, in order 
to overcome the obstacles constituted by the 
need for the Council's discussions to be secret, 
the transfer of the exercise of much of its 
competence and the unanimity rule. It has 
thus been possible to meet the Assembly's 
requests - while respecting the rules governing 
the competence and methods of work of the 
Council. For instance, information which the 
full Assembly was unable to obtain has been 
given to the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments and the General Affairs 
Committee at joint meetings held in camera 
under the chairmanship of the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council accompanied by members 
of the Council and - in the case of joint meet-
ings between the Council and the Defence 
Committee - with the participation of senior 
NATO officials and officers. 
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130. In order to prepare the joint meetings, 
written questions are communicated to the 
Council beforehand. It should be pointed out 
that matters relating to NATO are generally 
transmitted to that organisation by the WEU 
Council. In this way, members of the Defence 
Committee may often obtain information about 
the activities of the North Atlantic Council 
through the intermediary of the WEU Council. 
It should however be noted that for several 
years the Council has not agreed to hold joint 
meetings but has preferred " informal meet-
ings " for which the questions and answers do 
not have to be prepared or transmitted before-
hand. Meetings of this kind are also held 
between the Council and the Presidential 
Committee as a result of the motion to disap-
prove the annual report of the Council which 
the Assembly adopted in June 1967. This 
motion expressed the Assembly's discontent 
with what it considered to be the quite inade-
quate information which the Council had pro-
vided about its work. As a result, the Council 
sought new procedures for exchanging views 
with the Assembly and proposed an annual 
meeting between the Council at ministerial 
level and the Presidential Committee of the 
Assembly. These meetings are informal, have 
no agenda and thus allow freer discussion. On 
the whole, after the difficult period in 196 7, 
relations between the Council and the Assem-
bly have improved considerably. 
131. At the close of ministerial meetings, the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council may also 
provide the Chairman of the General Affairs 
Committee with confidential information on 
the Council's activities. Insofar as this infor-
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mation may be communicated to members of 
the General Affairs Committee, the parliamen-
tarians who have to follow these specific ques-
tions may thus be kept informed. 
132. Finally, the committees obtain informa-
tion on the policy of a given country in the 
fields of foreign policy, defence or technology 
direct from ministers who are invited to address 
the committees in camera and to answer ques-
tions afterwards. 
133. It is obvious that relations between a 
Council and an Assembly cannot be the same 
in an international organisation as in a state. 
It was therefore felt necessary to provide a 
means of bringing the views of parliamentarians 
to the attention of the national parliaments as 
well as the Council. To this end, members of 
the WEU Assembly do their utmost in their 
own national parliaments to put questions or 
organise debates on matters which have been 
discussed in the WEU Assembly. 
134. The WEU Assembly therefore helps to 
shape a European spirit not only among its 
members but also in the parliaments of the 
seven countries which signed the Paris Agree-
ments. In many of its recommendations it 
shows the need to find a European solution to 
certain problems and encourages parliamenta-
rians to approach their governments to ensure 
that such a solution is found. 
135. Thus, it endeavours to promote the poli-
tical will of governments, parliaments and 
public opinion which is essential for the build-
ing of Europe. 
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Information Report 
(s11bmitted by Mr. Stoffelen, Clulirmtlll and Rapporte11r) 
I. Introduction 
1. The Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments plays a very particular kind of role, 
which is defined in a special rule of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Assembly, Rule 42 his. This 
rule lays down that paragraphs 6 and 7 of Rule 
39 of the Rules of Procedure on candidatures 
for membership of committees and the compo-
sition of their bureaux shall apply to the Com-
mittee for Relations with Parliaments, thus 
implying that the other rules on committees do 
not apply, particularly Rule 42 on reports of 
committees, Rule 41 on procedure in commit-
tees and Rule 40 on the powers of committees. 
2. On the other hand, paragraph 5 of Rule 
42 his allows it to invite to its meetings the 
administrative secretaries of national delega-
tions, i.e. non-parliamentarians, and further-
more its composition (two members per mem-
ber country) takes no account of the weighting 
which exists in the composition of other 
committees, thus implying that it cannot adopt 
recommendations for presentation to the 
Assembly. 
3. Conversely, it~ has three duties under 
Rule 42 his of the Rules of Procedure: 
(i) to select, from the texts adopted by 
the Asse:tnbly, those which, in its 
opinion, should be debated in the 
parliaments ; 
(ii) to make all necessary arrangements 
with a view to calling the parlia-
ments' attention to the work of the 
Assembly and inviting them to 
follow up this work ; 
(iii) to submit to the Assembly, twice 
each year, a report on its activities. 
4. These remarks throw light on the content 
of the present report. It is normal and desir-
able for the Committee for Relations with Par-
liaments to examine and report to the Assembly 
on how it hopes the Assembly's work might be 
brought more closely to the attention of parlia-
ments. It should be added that several times 
and in various ways it has been brought out at 
recent sessions that the Assembly, and particu-
larly the Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments, considered the press's interest in the 
Assembly's work to be an essential factor in its 
effectiveness both as regards public opinion in 
general and also the parliaments of member 
countries. 
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5. That is reason enough to try to reanalyse 
the working methods of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments. After many years 
of activities by the Committee one has to rea-
lise that the public awareness of the· existence of 
Western European Union is still zero. More-
over, it is a fact that even in national parlia-
ments many parliamentarians, if not the majo-
rity, do not know WEU and/or the Assembly. 
The very interesting account by Mrs. Knight in 
her June 1981 report about the impact of our 
work in the Federal Republic illustrated this 
point. Even if we know that improving our 
working methods will not drastically change the 
impact of the activities of WEU and the Assem-
bly we have to do all we can to make the acti-
vities of the Assembly ·as effective as possi-
ble. In the opinion of the Rapporteur the 
committee has to be or become a kind of 
parliamentary pressure group bringing its 
influence to bear on national parliaments and 
public opinion by its own particular means, in 
order to make the Assembly's action better 
known and better understood and to secure 
more effective support for it. 
6. Your Rapporteur has therefore been 
asked by the committee to submit proposals 
designed to increase the interest shown by the 
press, public opinion and parliaments of mem-
ber countries in the WEU Assembly. These 
are not recommendations intended for adoption 
but opinions expressed by the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments, if the latter endor-
ses the views of the Rapporteur. 
7. The report will deal successively with ( 1) 
the activities of the Assembly, especially the 
content and number of reports, (2) relations 
with members of the Council of Ministers, (3) 
relations with national parliaments, (4) relations 
with the press and (5) finally the position and 
responsibilities of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments. 
11. Activities and riJle of the Assembly 
8. Like the WEU Assembly, the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe has a 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
Inherently, the latter has more widespread 
activities than the corresponding WEU commit-
tee since it concerns the parliaments of twenty-
one countries instead of seven, the Council of 
Europe holds four sessions a year instead of 
two, it handles a very wide range of subjects 
and finally has far more parliamentarians and a 
much larger secretariat. It is not therefore 
surprising that it should have acquired far more 
experience than the WEU committee, and your 
Rapporteur feels it would be desirable for the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments of 
the WEU Assembly to establish and maintain 
frequent contacts with its counterpart in the 
Council of Europe and take advantage of the 
latter's experience. 
9. Insofar as he is familiar with this expe-
rience, your Rapporteur has drawn a few 
conclusions relating to the organisation of ses-
sions, sittings and debates in international par-
liamentary assemblies from which he feels the 
WEU Assembly might benefit. 
10. First, the Assembly has to realise that it 
will be much easier to attract the interest of 
members of national parliaments and of journa-
lists if the Assembly debates topical subjects in 
the field of European defence. The Assembly 
of Western European Union is the only parlia-
mentary assembly which is entitled to discuss 
matters of European " foreign " policy and 
European defence. Therefore two conclusions 
can be drawn. For the sake of the credibility 
of the Assembly the committees, when prepar-
ing reports, have to restrict themselves to 
matters strictly connected with the aims and 
content of the Brussels Treaty. The second 
conclusion is that if a report and/or the debate 
on that report does not reveal anything new 
and/or any politically relevant fact we cannot 
expect the press and our colleagues at home to 
be interested. At the same time it is not good 
for the credibility of the Assembly if we do not 
discuss topical subjects. Seen from that point 
of view the Assembly must discuss the twofold 
decision by the North Atlantic Council, the 
peace movement in the European countries, the 
relations between WEU and the United States, 
and so on. 
11. Second, the number of documents sent to 
parliamentarians and press should not be too 
large, otherwise only very limited attention is 
paid to them. Distributing too many docu-
ments is thus a considerable waste of energy 
and resources and the results achieved are just 
the opposite to those expected. 
12. Regarding the Assembly's debates, your 
Rapporteur believes they would undoubtedly 
gain a wider hearing and have a greater impact 
on the parliaments of member countries, thanks 
to the press in particular, if fewer questions 
were debated at each session and if the reports 
dealt with topical matters, which is not the case 
today. 
13. Your Rapporteur realises that each 
committee has a natural inclination to make its 
half-yearly programme of work cover as many 
subjects as possible and, furthermore, that the 
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practice of adopting half-yearly programmes of 
work is encouraged by the fact that the Assem-
bly holds only two sessions a year. But it 
means that committees choose several subjects 
for their work so as to cover any matters which 
may be topical six months later. Should some 
not be covered, they have to add further ques-
tions to their programmes of work in the course 
of the year without, however, interrupting work 
already under way. 
14. Your Rapporteur therefore suggests that 
the number of reports submitted by each 
committee be limited and that one subject be 
left open until shortly before each session in 
order to cover any topical question that arises. 
Another solution might be for each commit-
tee to appoint a Rapporteur who would be 
given a certain possible freedom in the way he 
handles his subject so that his report might be 
adapted to the requirements of the day. 
Ill. Relations between the Assembly and 
members of the Council of Ministers 
15.(i) It should not be forgotten that debates on 
reports are the Assembly's main activity and it 
is to them that the attention of public opinion, 
press and national parliaments should be 
drawn. This does not detract from the fact 
that addresses by ministers during debates are 
most certainly useful and likely to increase the 
interest of debates. However, it happens only 
too often that debates are interrupted by addres-
ses by ministers followed - and this is worth-
while - by questions and answers. Your Rap-
porteur suggests that ministers be invited to 
address the Assembly in the framework of the 
debate on specific reports. They should speak 
on the report and not only answer questions but 
take part in the debate on the report as a 
whole, or at least a substantial part of it. 
There would thus be a true exchange of views 
with a minister or, in any event, with the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council on a topical 
subject of interest to the press and public opi-
nion. The minister might open the debate 
after the Rapporteur has presented the report, 
and wind it up, as is customary in the parlia-
ments of member countries. Your Rapporteur 
cannot over-emphasise the value of this sugges-
tion. 
16. Finally, a member of the committee 
stressed the value for members of the Assembly 
and the press of taking votes immediately after 
debates and not grouping them since it is diffi-
cult for a journalist one day to write about a 
report and the relevant debate and the next day 
or the day after give the result of the vote. If 
he did so, he would be neither read nor under-
stood by the public. It is for the Assembly to 
follow up this sensible remark. 
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17 .(iz) Special attention should be paid to the 
meetings between representatives of the Assem-
bly and of the Council. It is obvious that there 
is a relationship between the importance of a 
meeting (i.e. the subject of the meeting) and 
who is present at the meeting (i.e. ministers or 
ambassadors). The Rapporteur is inclined to 
believe that if there are hardly any subjects of 
importance to deal with it is preferable not to 
organise such a meeting between Assembly and 
Council representatives. On the other hand 
the Assembly is entitled to expect better 
" ministerial " representation of the Council if 
more important subjects are to be discussed. 
IV. Relations between the Assembly 
and national parliaments 
(i) Sel«tion of texts 
18. The primary function of the committee is 
to select texts from among those adopted by the 
Assembly for transmission to national parlia-
ments. In your Rapporteur's opinion the 
committee should limit its selection to those 
texts which contain practical and concise pro-
posals that governments can implement and not 
select any texts drafted in broad terms and deal-
ing only with questions of general principle. 
19. This means in practice that your Rappor-
teur in co-operation with the secretariat must 
submit proposals inviting the committee to 
select usually two texts after each Assembly 
part-session and describing action to be taken 
on these texts by members of the committee. 
Members and delegation secretaries hardly 
comment on these proposals during meetings. 
20. Your Rapporteur feels that it is worth 
considering whether the committee should dis-
cuss selections more intensively, determine 
priorities among texts suggested for selection 
and agree on "campaign tactics" with regard 
to their follow-up at national level. 
21. Discussing such tactics is important, 
since a parliamentary question is not always the 
best way of dealing with a subject. More use 
might be made of direct approaches to govern-
ments. Moreover, in different countries diffe-
rent methods have to be applied. There is 
room for differentiation in proposals for action 
on Assembly texts. 
Proposed action: 
22. Members of the committee could be 
invited: 
(a) to participate more actively in the 
discussion of proposals concerning 
texts with a view to agreeing on more 
differentiated action at national level; 
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(b) to invite to its meetings rapporteurs 
from other committees to enable 
them to give advice about the best 
approach to " selling " the adopted 
texts to national parliaments and to 
the press; 
(c) to discuss whether 
- the number of texts to be selected 
after each part-session should be 
further limited; 
- the material provided by the secre-
tariat is appropriate; 
- further model questions should be 
prepared by the secretariat. 
( ii) Relations with utioiUII delegations 
23. The statistical table appended to each of 
the committee's half-yearly reports is the true 
application of Rule 42 bis of the Rules of Pro-
cedure since it gives detailed information 
on action taken in the parliaments of member 
countries on the work of the Assembly. The 
table in the present report shows that the num-
ber of questions put in national parlia-
ments by members of the Assembly, and often 
by members of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments, rose considerably in 1981, 
thus showing that delegations, thanks to their 
secretariats, paid greater attention than in the 
past to following up the activities of the WEU 
Assembly, each one acting in accordance with 
procedure and methods specific to the parlia-
mentary traditions of the country concerned. 
This is gratifying, and the committee is thus 
able to show that it has very satisfactorily 
accomplished its task. 
24. However, the number of documents rela-
ting to the work of the WEU Assembly distri-
buted in parliaments of member countries is 
not enough to provide adequate information 
about the activities of the Assembly or, a fortio-
ri, to ensure that governments follow them up. 
The inquiry in the Bundestag referred to by 
Mrs. Knight in her June 1981 report showed 
that much could and hence should be done to 
increase the impact of our work in member 
countries, and not only in the Federal Repu-
blic. One step might be to improve the stan-
dard of questions put to governments on the 
activities of WEU so as to obtain more satisfac-
tory answers than in the past. It is for the 
Chairman of the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments to suggest to members of the com-
mittee the text of questions relating to the 
recommendations selected by the committee at 
the close of each session. Here your Rappor-
teur has followed in the wake of his predeces-
sors. However, the ways of putting certain 
questions varies from one country to another. 
For instance, a question on the production of 
certain sophisticated weapons cannot be put in 
the same way in Luxembourg, which produces 
few weapons of this type, as in a country with a 
far more highly-developed industrial range in 
this field. 
25. It is therefore for members of the com-
mittee to adapt the questions they put in the 
light of their countries' specific problems. 
They have moreover always understood this, 
but they might be asked to make a further 
effort not to give up the idea of putting a q~es­
tion to their governments on a recommendation 
adopted by the WEU Assembly m~rely because 
the wording proposed by t~e Chatrma~ of ~he 
committee seems inappropnate to the situatiOn 
in their countries. 
26. Moreover, it is clear that our go~ern­
ments are in no hurry to reply in the natiOnal 
framework to questions on the activities of 
WEU. In earlier years, it would appear that 
the governments, or probably offici~ls respon-
sible for preparing the texts of replies, agreed 
amongst themselves to refuse to a~swer qu~s­
tions dealing with recommendatiOns bemg 
studied by the WEU Council. The first effect 
of this practice was to discourage members of 
the Assembly who would have been prepared to 
put questions to their governments on the 
action they intended to take on the recommen-
dations adopted by the Assembly. It conse-
quently reduced the work of the_ Co_mmi~tee for 
Relations with Parliaments to ml, smce Its task 
is precisely to put questions to each of. the 
member governments on the recommendatiOns 
which have just been transmitted t? the Co:un-
cil, where they are therefore bemg studied. 
The solution then found was to have the ques-
tions proposed by the then Chairman of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments so 
worded as to avoid specific reference to the 
recommendations concerned, thanks to which it 
was possible to obtain answers. Th~ drawback 
was that it was then extremely difficult for 
WEU Assembly and delegation officials to pick 
out from among the mass of documents pub-
lished by each parliament answers in wh~ch 
the name of WEU did not appear. Followmg 
the Assembly's complaints, this practice by 
national administrations now seems to have 
stopped, which is most gratifying. 
27. Certain members of the committee, 
whose views your Rapporteur fully endorses, 
consider each delegation should prepare a 
report on each Assembly session for circulation 
to all members of parliament in the member 
countries at the earliest possible date. Most 
delegations do so, but the practice might be 
generalised. 
159 
DOCUMENT 912 
(iir) Follow-up procedure 
28. The usual method used by members of 
the Assembly in national parliaments or by 
other members of national parliaments is the 
written or oral question asking for their govern-
ments' opinion on an Assembly text. Govern-
ments' answers give the Assembly a more accu-
rate idea of the probable fate of its text. 
29. Members of some delegations prefer to 
approach ministers concerned directly, rather 
than to ask parliamentary questions. 
30. Government replies to such initia~ives are 
often only vague promises or declaratiOns. If 
these replies are not duly followed up the whole 
exercise will be rather ineffective. 
31. In the opinion of the Rapporte~r a 
follow-up procedure should be worked out mter 
alia to consider, for instance once a year, whe-
ther a continuing action could be effective. 
32. Neither of the Assembly's two annual 
part-sessions lasts more than four days. They 
are the only occasions on which all members of 
the Assembly are conven~d. Committee Ifl:eet-
ings are called several times between sessi~ns 
but they are restricted to small groups of parlia-
mentarians. This means that members of the 
Assembly who are at the same time m~mbers of 
their national parliaments, of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. and oft~n of 
other parliamentary, loca_l or n~ternat~o~al 
bodies, have considerable difficulty m retammg 
a continuing view of the work of the WEU 
Assembly. In a way, they rediscover _the 
Assembly and its problems at each sessiOn. 
They adopt recommen~~tions _but . by the time 
they receive the Council s replies, I.e. generally 
five or six months later, they can no longer 
remember the texts of the recommendations 
they adopted and have only a rather vague 
recollection of the reasons why they voted as 
they did. 
33. They therefore often have an inte!ffiittent 
view of the work of the Assembly, which may 
seem disjointed and difficult to follow . cohe-
rently. This must be even more true m the 
case of members of national parliaments who 
are not members of the WEU Assembly or 
journalists having to report on its work. In 
order to remedy this situation, a major effort 
should be made to ensure that matters 
dealt with are followed up after recommenda-
tions are adopted. The Committee for Rela-
tions with Parliaments cannot do this alone and 
each Assembly committee might take responsi-
bility for examining action taken by the Co~n­
cil or by the governments of member countnes 
on the recommendations which it submitted to 
the Assembly. 
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34. Each committee might examine ways and 
means of doing this. An appropriate means 
might be the formation of a sub-committee for 
this purpose. This was the solution adopted 
by the General Affairs Committee for following 
problems raised by a recommendation on deve-
lopments in the Middle East which was adopted 
in June 1981. This experience might be wor-
thy of closer examination. 
35. A member of the Committee for Rela-
tions with Parliaments suggested that a Rappor-
teur be appointed to compare the replies of the 
various governments to the questions put in 
national parliaments. This suggestion might 
be adopted, and the committee's next Rappor-
teur could be asked to carry out this compa-
rison for the recommendations adopted in 
1981, or at least some of them. 
36. Finally, it would be desirable for the next 
Rapporteur of the committee to bring together 
all the committee's earlier decisions in order to 
see what action was taken on them and what 
results were achieved, so as to select those 
which were not satisfactorily applied and thus 
describe the way in which the committee has 
carried out its duties under Rule 42 bis of the 
Rules of Procedure and what it should do to 
improve the way in which it fulfils its role. 
V. Relations with the press 
(I") Information on policy 
37. From this point of view, the WEU 
Assembly has pursued a more reasonable policy 
than the Council of Europe. However, a num-
ber of documents might yet be dispensed 
with. In the report which Mr. Berchem pre-
sented to the Assembly at the December 1981 
session, he gave a table of all the documents 
published by the WEU Assembly. The list 
was impressively long and your Rapporteur 
wonders whether it should not be reduced, on 
the one hand by limiting the number of subjects 
tackled at each session and on the other by abo-
lishing certain periodical publications which he 
does not consider essential, including some 
issued on behalf of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments. For instance, what use do 
members of the Assembly make of the 
" Monthly Information Bulletin " or the 
" Monthly Index of Documents " ? Your Rap-
porteur suggests that a questionnaire be sent to 
members of the Assembly to ascertain whether 
they really wish to receive such documents and 
that, if necessary, the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments and possibly the Presidential 
Committee re-examine the usefulness of publish-
ing them. 
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38. Moreover, certain documents are difficult 
to use because the information given reaches 
members of the Assembly in separate parts. 
Your Rapporteur is thinking of the questions 
put by members of the Assembly to their 
governments in the national parliaments and 
the answers received. Instead of distributing 
both questions and answers separately, they 
might be published collectively prior to each 
Assembly session, which is already done, but in 
future they might be grouped so as to make 
them easier to consult in accordance with a 
procedure which will be described below, the 
aim being to give a far clearer picture of the 
policies of the governments of member coun-
tries on matters dealt with by WEU. 
(if"') Meetings with the press 
39. Your Rapporteur thinks that it might be 
worthwhile from every point of view for the 
Assembly, at a forthcoming session, to organise 
a meeting between some of its members and 
journalists who follow sessions in order to 
obtain their opinions on how its methods of 
work might be adapted. The Presidential 
Committee or the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments might be made responsible for this 
contact which could be a friendly meeting with 
broad terms of reference. 
( iu) Relations with the press in the various countries 
40. Finally, it is quite clear that the whole 
press from all member countries cannot be 
represented at each Assembly session. The 
press from some countries is not represented at 
all. At best, only a few newspapers are able to 
send journalists to Paris for our sessions. This 
is apparently inevitable. However, an effort 
might be made to alleviate this difficulty as far 
as possible. National delegations might orga-
nise meetings and contacts after each session of 
the Assembly so as to report to the parliamen-
tary press of their own countries on what 
happened during the session. 
41. Thanks to the improvement in his bud-
get in 1980, the Assembly's Press Counsellor 
has been able to organise meetings between 
representatives of the press in several member 
countries and representatives of national delega-
tions. These meetings have proved extremely 
worthwhile and our thanks and congratulations 
are justified. It is obviously not possible for 
him to do this regularly after each session, par-
ticularly since information should be given to 
the press immediately after the session. It is 
therefore for the delegations and their secreta-
riats to take such initiatives, and too much 
cannot be done to encourage them in this sense. 
42. Between four and ten weeks after each 
session, the Committee for Relations with Par-
liaments for its part issues a booklet giving a 
summary of debates and addresses by ministers 
together with the texts of recommendations 
adopted. This booklet is prepared by the 
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly under the 
responsibility of the Chairman of the Commit-
tee for Relations with Parliaments and is distri-
buted in the five official languages of member 
countries to all members of the seven parlia-
ments. This is certainly an excellent practice. 
However, your Rapporteur considers that the 
summary of debates takes insufficient account 
of the ideas voiced by the various political 
groups. Only speeches by Rapporteurs and 
committee Chairmen are summarised and the 
amendments tabled are not included. 
43. As Chairman of the committee and 
consequently responsible for the publication of 
this booklet, your Rapporteur is not unaware of 
the difficulties raised by its preparation: the 
bilingual summary records of sittings do not 
allow those drafting the text to have direct 
knowledge of speeches made in German, Italian 
and Dutch. Moreover, since they have to be 
impartial, it is difficult to ask officials to pick 
out the speeches or amendments they consider 
the most important. In future, however, your 
Rapporteur will endeavour to ensure that cer-
tain speeches and amendments, particularly 
those made on behalf of political groups, are 
summarised or, in the case of amendments, 
reproduced in the booklet on the session. 
VI. Position and responsibilities 
of the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments 
44. In the opinion of the Rapporteur it is 
inevitable for the tasks and responsibilities of 
the committee to be extended in two ways: 
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(a) the committee should be renamed the 
Committee on Parliamentary and 
Public Relations ; 
(b) the rules should be changed in order 
to enable the committee to present a 
draft recommendation or order to the 
Assembly. 
VII. Conclusions 
45. As the committee is not empowered to 
adopt a draft recommendation or order, your 
Rapporteur will, as a first step, merely ask the 
committee to approve the ideas set out in this 
document which he has already presented to 
the committee moreover at its meeting on 17th 
November 1981, when they obtained wide 
endorsement. In this document he has added 
to the proposals he made on that occasion the 
suggestions made by several members of the 
committee, with which he personally unreser-
vedly agrees. 
46. If the committee approves, the document 
as a whole might be transmitted, after the 
Assembly has debated it at the June 1982 
session, to the Presidential Committee so that it 
may take the necessary steps to apply those 
parts which concern it. At the same time, the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments, the 
other committees and national delegations 
would be asked to apply those of the sugges-
tions contained in this document which 
concern them, or, should such application 
encounter difficulties, to report to the Commit-
tee for Relations with Parliaments so that it 
may consider how to overcome them. In this 
way, everyone could help to improve the 
impact of the work of the Assembly on press, 
public opinion and parliaments in the member 
countries. 
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Recommendations 
adopted in 
1956 ............. 
I957 ............. 
1958 ............. 
I959 ............. 
I960 ............. 
I961 ............. 
I962 ............. 
1963 ............. 
1964 ............. 
1965 ............. 
1966 ............. 
1967 ............. 
1968 ............. 
1969 ............. 
1970 ............. 
1971 ............. 
1972 ............. 
1973 ............. 
1974 ............. 
1975 ............. 
I976 ............. 
I977 ............. 
I978 ............. 
I979 ............. 
1980 ............. 
I981 ............. 
Total ............ 
Annual average ... 
APPENDIX I 
Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
(Totals by co••try for eod sessio11) 
Member countries 
Federal 
Belgium France Republic Italy ~.,uxembourg !Netherlands of 
Germany 
0 0 3 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 0 5 
2 0 3 0 0 4 
0 0 9 0 0 0 
3 12 2 8 0 3 
0 2 0 3 0 6 
2 4 4 6 2 3 
0 0 13 22 I 2 
4 14 9 11 I 5 
0 11 12 24 0 5 
2 12 12 49 1 4 
I4 9 22 29 2 6 
6 I4 20 22 I 16 
II I5 17 8 0 4 
3 15 15 7 2 3 
0 4 19 9 0 6 
0 6 2 1 0 1 
0 4 2 6 1 0 
0 1 3 13 2 0 
10 28 8 I9 3 11 
16 40 13 14 2 3 
4 I8 4 15 1 1 
17 49 12 2I 4 10 
9 45 12 IO 10 1 
0 32 16 10 12 0 
15 36 12 9 18 0 
I22 373 245 316 65 99 
4.69 I4.35 9.42 I2.15 2.50 3.96 
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United Total Kingdom 
0 3 
2 12 
3 12 
0 9 
1 29 
0 11 
10 3I 
3 41 
2 46 
28 80 
18 98 
16 98 
47 I26 
36 91 
10 55 
10 48 
0 10 
0 13 
0 19 
3 82 
8 96 
14 57 
14 127 
10 97 
8 78 
38 128 
285 I,505 
I0.96 8.29 
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APPENDIX 11 
Table ofinterpentions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1978 
= 0 ~ t ,d 0 e.o "' ·.::: -!!3 .g;.-. o.:: = {3 "0.:::: 8 11) p.;j 6 ] ~.sa 0 
= 
~G) ::s (,) ~e 3 -e -;::: ~ -; .... ~ ·;;; 11) ·~ 8 '60 ~ 11) 0 .g~ "' 8 8.~ 11) ;g 
-ec3 11) ,d 1-< ]t: Vl e ~l ~ - 3 - ] 11) o"' 0 11) ... z 1-<p. g 1-< ]0 ·a ~ ~ ;:J 
312 
-
313 X 2 2 2 6 
314 X 2 2 1 2 3 2 12 
315 2 2 4 
June 316 - 33 
1978 317 2 1 3 318 X 1 3 1 2 7 
319 -
320 -
321 1 1 
322 1 1 
-323 X 6 1 7 
Nov. 324 1 1 
1978 325 7 2 2 1 12 72 326 X 2 4 3 2 11 
327 -
328 X 2 2 4 2 2 4 16 
Other action 4 7 4 4 3 2 24 
329 X 2 2 2 2 2 10 
330 -
June 331 2 2 
1979 332 - 37 333 X 2 2 2 6 
334 -
335 X 2 2 4 6 14 
Resolution 63 2 3 5 
Other action 
336 -
337 X 2 2 2 6 
Dec. 338 X 1 2 2 5 
1979 339 X 2 2 340 - 47 
341 X 2 2 8 12 
342 -
343 -
344 -
Other action 5 3 6 7 1 22 
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et: fJ.. ::> 
345 -
346 -
347 2 2 
348 7 7 
June 349 X 1 2 6 2 2 13 56 
1980 350 2 2 
351 2 2 4 
352 X 2 4 2 8 
353 2 2 4 
354 6 6 
Other action 4 2 2 8 
. 
355 
356 
357 
Dec. 358 X 6 4 2 2 14 
1980 359 X 4 2 4 10 40 360 
361 
362 2 2 
363 2 2 
Other action 10 2 12 
364 X 2 2 2 6 
365 X 2 4 2 8 
366 X 2 4 2 2 10 
June 367 X 2 2 4 69 
1981 368 X 2 1 2 5 
369 X 2 1 10 13 
370 X 2 2 4 
371 X 2 2 2 4 12 
Other action 7 2 9 
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l. Adopted in Committee by l3 votes to l with 0 absten-
tions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett 
(Chairman); MM. De Poi, Urwin (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. 
Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Sch/aman, MM. Be"ier, Bertile, 
Conti Persini, De Bondt (Alternate: Michel), Del/a Briotta, 
van Eekelen (Alternate: Blaauw), Gessner, Hardy (Alternate: 
Hill), Kurt Jung, Lagneau, Lagorce (Alternate: Baumel), 
Lord McNair, MM. Mangelschots, Mommersteeg, Gilnther 
Mill/er, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann (Alternate: 
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Bohm), Thoss (Alternate: Berchem), Valiante, Vecchietti, 
Wilquin. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are prin-
ted in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on tile political actiPitks of the WEU Council-
reply to tile twenty-sennth annual report of tile Council 
The Assembly, 
Noting the satisfactory aspects of the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council; 
Nevertheless deploring the prolongation of the WEU Council's inactivity throughout 1981; 
Drawing attention to the importance of the proposals for reactivating WEU made in 
December 1981 by Mr. Lemoine, French Secretary of State to the Minister of Defence; 
Stressing that these proposals should be explained and if possible further elaborated by the 
French Government and should elicit a response from its six partners; 
Noting that the dangers to peace and security in Europe are now more serious than ever; 
Recalling that WEU is still the only European organisation with effective responsibilities in 
defence questions and, consequently, disarmament, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Make an in-depth examination of the proposals concerning WEU made by the French Govern-
ment with a view to determining the extent of agreement France's partners are able to reach on the 
basis of these proposals; 
2. Extend its consultations to questions raised by the evolution of European public opinion in the 
face of threats to Europe's security; 
3. Inter alia consider the means available to the governments of member countries for countering 
international terrorism with a view to strengthening them through greater co-operation; 
4. Extend its discussions to all threats to the security of Western Europe, wherever they arise; 
5. Prepare the ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council by consultations in the frame-
work ofWEU on European defence and on the development of Soviet-United States conversations on 
the limitation of armaments; 
6. Undertake, at meetings of the Permanent Council, frequent and regular exchanges of views on 
topical questions relating to European defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance; 
7. Examine how the experience acquired by the Agency for the Control of Armaments might be 
used to contribute to the solution of monitoring problems raised at all international conferences on 
disarmament; 
8. Ensure that the possible extension of tasks given to the SAC does not result in that body being 
relieved of its present responsibilities. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Vecchietti, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The annual report of the WEU Council 
for 1981 does not in itself call for any parti-
cular comment. In the main it confirms a 
situation and positions already affirmed by the 
Council in previous years in regard to its own 
activities and relations with the Assembly. It 
shows a desire to meet the Assembly's requests 
provided the policy of governments - or absence 
of policy - towards WEU is not called in 
question. Such a report can hardly be expec-
ted to say more, nor can the government repre-
sentatives on the Permanent Council be expec-
ted to do more as long as the governments 
themselves have not so decided. For that rea-
son your Rapporteur will make only a brief 
examination of the actual text of the report. 
2. Conversely, he considers it essential to 
examine all the problems raised by the Coun-
cil's annual report in the light of certain new 
factors and principally the affirmation, repeated 
by several of the highest authorities in France 
in the last months of 1981 and the first months 
of 1982, of France's will to give new life to 
WEU and to examine French proposals and the 
reactions of France's partners to those propo-
sals. By doing this, he feels he would be better 
fulfilling his task of Rapporteur than if he 
merely made a literal analysis of the Council's 
annual report. 
11. Reactivating WEU 
3. When the Brussels Treaty was modified 
in 1954 to create Western European Union, the 
aim was to allow Germany and Italy to accede 
to the North Atlantic Treaty and to join NATO 
and at the same time to alleviate the disavanta-
ges for the future of Europe of the United King-
dom's refusal to ratify the treaty setting up the 
EDC. At the time, there were considerable 
problems of many kinds. The North Atlantic 
Treaty and NATO provided for Western 
Europe's security, but the modified Brussels 
Treaty also met political and economic require-
ments. 
4. Subsequently, two new factors changed 
this situation: the accession of the United King-
dom to the European Communities and the 
development of political consultations between 
the members of the Communities on the one 
hand, and France's withdrawal from the NATO 
integrated military organisation and the deve-
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lopment of the French nuclear force on the 
other. These two series of events led to WEU 
losing its economic, and to a large extent poli-
tical, importance and to creating the need for 
co-ordination between France and its partners 
in the defence field. While WEU seems fully 
resigned to the first aspect of this trend by 
doing practically nothing in the economic and 
political fields, it cannot be said that it has 
done much to adapt itself to the second ques-
tion, i.e. to find work in the defence field. 
Thus Europeans have not used the instru-
ment at their disposal to examine together the 
requirements of European defence, with the 
result that the United States has had to carry 
too great a military, political and economic 
burden for the defence of Europe. 
5. Since it was France that had created the 
new situation in this field, it was obviously for 
that country to say how far it intended to co-
operate with its partners. This it has done to a 
large extent in regard to its European partners, 
first by making it clearly known - and 
successive governments have left no doubt 
about this - that it would not go back on its 
withdrawal from NATO and would not allow 
its forces to be placed a priori under any inte-
grated command, and second by proposing to 
its allies certain forms of co-operation, either 
on a bilateral basis, in particular for stationing 
its troops in the Federal Republic of Germany 
and for the production of armaments, or on a 
multilateral basis, in the framework of NATO, 
WEU and the IEPG, in certain fields at least. 
6. This is probably how the address by Mr. 
Jobert, then French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the Assembly on 21st November 
1973 should be interpreted. Passages from his 
address may be quoted as follows: 
" 
The road leading to European defence, as 
we well know, is paved with considerable 
difficulties. 
It is all the more important that we Euro-
peans should henceforth undertake an 
intensive effort of thinking and talking. 
If all its members were in agreement, 
WEU could constitute a valid theatre for 
the thinking and talks which I have just 
suggested. 
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The French Government, in proposing 
that the Standing Armaments Committee 
should provide the privileged framework 
for European co-operation in armaments 
manufacture, has already clearly demon-
strated the interest it takes in your 
organisation. I hope that the French 
proposal will make speedy and satis-
factory progress. 
" 
7. The first of these two proposals does not 
seem to have been carried into effect, at least in 
the framework of WEU, since one might consi-
der that the development of political consul-
tations in the European Communities meets 
these proposals to a certain extent. "To a 
certain extent " only, since matters relating to 
Europe's defence are not dealt with there 
although it appears that certain non-military 
aspects of " security " are and will be increa-
singly in future years if the proposals by Mr. 
Genscher and Mr. Colombo are accepted by the 
Ten. 
8. The second proposal was taken up again 
in the Assembly by Mr. van Elslande, then 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 5th 
December 1974 in an address in which he said: 
" ... The industrial problem, and that of 
exports which is closely bound up with 
it, are by far the most vast and most deli-
cate. I believe that WEU could devote 
itself to the study of these questions, to 
which insufficient attention has hitherto 
been paid. WEU includes the chief 
European producers. The first step must 
be a thorough study of the structures of 
the military sectors in the economy of 
each country. We must also ascertain 
what is their relative importance, what 
forms of specialisation are possible and 
what can be done about the pooling and 
financing of research activities. Finally, 
we must determine the best ways towards 
progressive integration, taking account of 
existing financial structures and of 
alliances which may constitute an advan-
tage or a disadvantage, depending on cir-
cumstances ... " 
9. It is common knowledge that this study 
was effectively entrusted to the Standing Arma-
ments Committee and certain chapters have 
been given in to the Council which, in 1981, 
even consented to communicate to the Assem-
bly, as the annual report recalls, a version of 
the economic chapter of the study which had 
obviously been much watered down. How-
ever, seven years after Mr. van Elslande's pro-
posal, this study has not been completed The 
chapters already given to the Council need to 
be brought up to date, as the annual report also 
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indicates. The Assembly has been given only 
parsimonious information about this. Above 
all, no one knows what member countries, res-
ponsible for the slow progress of the SAC's 
work, will do with this study. Only the very 
vaguest of answers have been given to the many 
questions put by members of the Assembly on 
this subject. 
10. It may therefore be said that the attempts 
made by certain countries in 1973-74 to guide 
WEU in a direction corresponding to its true 
vocation have had only very limited results. 
Some have even thought, rightly or wrongly, 
that they could discern behind the concern 
expressed by other governments to " make eco-
nomies ", a desire to reduce both the already 
very small staff of WEU and its activities. 
11. There is thus every reason to welcome 
the fact that the new French Government in 
1981 took up the idea of reactivating WEU. In 
his address on 3rd December 1981, Mr. Le-
moine, French Secretary of State to the Minis-
ter of Defence, underlined the continuity of 
these proposals with those made by Mr. Jobert 
eight years earlier. Although he did not say 
whether these earlier proposals were still the 
same for the present French Government, state-
ments by reliable French authorities indicate 
that this is so. For instance, Mr. Lemoine 
quoted a statement by Mr. Cheysson, French 
Minister for External Relations, in Brussels on 
19th November 1981: 
" ... There can be no question of the Ten 
talking about defence matters, firstly be-
cause one member country - Ireland 
- would not agree and secondly because 
there is Western European Union ... ". 
12. Moreover, after recalling that Mr. Mau-
roy, the French Prime Minister, had, on 19th 
September 1981, recalled France's loyalty to 
the modified Brussels Treaty, a statement which 
was confirmed by Mr. Hernu, Minister of 
Defence, on 16th November 1981, when he 
said that a serious threat to the security of these 
states would gravely affect France's security, 
Mr. Lemoine said: 
" ... A military balance at the lowest pos-
sible level and effective and verifiable 
disarmament are France's goals. And it 
wishes to discuss them within the only 
European organisation which stems from 
a specific treaty still in force and which is 
unchallengeably of topical significance. 
That organisation is Western Euro-
pean Union. France attaches impor-
tance to its existence, to an expanding of 
its activities and more particularly to the 
labours of your Assembly". 
This took up a remark by President Mitterrand 
on 24th September 1981: 
" ... The arms negotiation debate must be 
based on the fundamental notion that 
only a balance of forces can preserve 
peace... Therefore I would like to see 
negotiations begun, but only on a clear 
basis, without either partRer being able to 
speculate on a momentary advantage ... " 
Finally, at the WEU colloquy in London in 
February 1982, Mr. Lemoine recalled France's 
will to revive WEU, while Mr. Hernu said in 
an interview in the Frankfurter Rundschau 
that WEU was the only organisation in which 
Europeans could discuss their common defence 
problems. 
13. This wealth of quotations shows that on 
the French side there is a deliberate will to use 
WEU for its intended purpose. It should be 
noted that this view is shared by a number of 
members of the Assembly. For instance, spea-
king to Mr. De Poi's report just before Mr~ 
Lemoine's address, Mr. Bernini said: 
" ... The real danger is that by seeking, in 
the name of European union, to institu-
tionalise the European Council - which 
is a consultative body with no treaty sta-
tus - and by flanking it with secretariats 
and committees for both defence and eco-
nomic questions or again by giving WEU 
and the Commission of the Economic 
Community the rOle of consultants, and 
in fact mere executives, the ultimate 
result will be to deprive WEU and the 
European Community of their powers 
and help circumvent the existing Euro-
pean treaties - the Rome Treaty setting 
up the European Community and the 
modified Brussels Treaty setting up 
WEU; objectively this would also mean 
the abandonment ofWEU ... " 
This does not mean French statements are 
abundantly clear. Mr. Lemoine's address in 
fact raises certain questions. 
14. The first ambiguity relates to the respec-
tive roles of the Council and of the Assembly of 
WEU. For instance, when he proposes sub-
jects for study by WEU - most interesting and 
important subjects - he is addressing the Assem-
bly and not the Council. It is clear that the 
Assembly would have every interest in taking 
such suggestions fully into account. But 
should a government really turn to the Assem-
bly when it wishes to have a matter examined 
by WEU ? Why does it not go straight to the 
Council, as it is authorised to do under Article 
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty? Several 
of Mr. Lemoine's remarks emphasising the role 
he asks the Assembly to play make one wonder 
whether his proposals also concern the Council. 
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Here it should be recalled that WEU is a whole 
and the Assembly, set up under Article IX of 
the treaty, has no existence outside the organi-
sation as a whole. Without a governmental 
counterpart its work would become academic, 
as Mrs. Knight emphasised when submitting 
the report of the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments in June 1981. 
15. The second ambiguity is linked with the 
first and concerns the Standing Armaments 
Committee. In this connection, Mr. Lemoine 
said on 3rd December: 
" Such studies would require the Assem-
bly to tackle, with the utmost determi-
nation, problems which directly affect the 
security of all countries. 
An independent source of technical infor-
mation would be required for this work. 
Such an instrument is available. All we 
need do is use it. I refer to the Standing 
Armaments Committee. This institution 
may have had some difficulty in finding 
its true role since bodies besides the SAC 
already existed for arms co-operation on 
a bilateral basis - Franco-German for 
example - or on a multilateral basis in 
the shape of the Independent European 
Programme Group. Precedents, although 
infrequent in recent years, have shown 
that the SAC can be placed at the 
disposal of the Assembly subject to the 
consent of the Council of WEU. And 
rather than need to obtain the Council's 
consent each time, could not the SAC be 
authorised, at each session of the Assem-
bly, to give help with the various studies 
decided upon ? This is just one sugges-
tion, but other solutions are possible, of 
course. If the political will exists, I do 
not think anyway that institutional obsta-
cles could hinder an expansion of the 
SAC's role. 
With, as it were, an information and 
research department available to it, the 
Assembly would be in a position to ini-
tiate more ambitious studies. It could 
rely on an independent, specifically 
European agency whose work could not 
be suspected of being biased, which is the 
most important thing. I would remind 
you that the SAC is currently composed 
of 28 civil servants of different categories. 
This staff is large enough to carry out 
such tasks on behalf of the Assembly. " 
16. This statement obviously goes much fur-
ther than what the Council has allowed the 
Assembly so far in response to the latter's re-
quest to be able to make use of the SAC's abili-
ties. The Council's annual report recalls the 
reply to Recommendation 365 which, there is 
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every reason to believe, defines the Council's 
doctrine in the matter as follows: 
" As pointed out to the Assembly in their 
reply to Recommendation 331, the 
Council have no objection to examining, 
on a case-by-case basis, the possibility of 
co-operation between the SAC and the 
Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments. However, they could only 
give their agreement to such co-operation 
for studies relating to subjects within the 
competence of the SAC as defined in the 
decision of 7th May 1955. In this 
connection, the Council regret to have to 
state that the subject proposed in the pre-
sent recommendation does not meet this 
criterion. " 
17. Admittedly, one should probably not 
stop short at the fact that this reply refers only 
to assistance to the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, and it is hard to see 
why it should not apply to other Assembly 
Committees if their request met the criterion 
defined by the Council. Actually, the problem 
is quite different. It lies in the fact that the 
WEU Council decision of 7th May 1955 setting 
up the SAC makes it a purely governmental 
body, as specified in paragraph 2 of the deci-
sion: 
" The Standing Armaments Committee 
shall consist of representatives of the 
member countries of Western European 
Union. In order to ensure continuity 
member countries will maintain perma-
nent delegates at the seat of the Commit-
tee who may also be members of their 
delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation. The governments of the 
member countries may be represented 
at meetings of the Standing Armaments 
Committee, as occasion demands, either 
by officials responsible in their national 
administrations for the questions to be 
discussed, or by their permanent dele-
gates." 
much publicity could be given to such studies. 
Unlike the Office of the Clerk of the Assem-
bly, this intergovernmental committee cannot 
be considered to be independent and conse-
quently it cannot be asked to prepare anything 
other than studies under government responsi-
bility. If, on the other hand, Mr. Lemoine was 
thinking only of the twenty-eight officials of the 
SAC secretariat, it should be recalled that the 
main task of that international secretariat is to 
assist the SAC of which it is the instrument 
above all else. It might certainly be given 
other work but this should not affect its cha-
racter. 
20. Second, would such a measure not imply 
that the governments had in fact given up the 
idea of having the SAC carry out its intended 
tasks and were making it available to the 
Assembly merely to ensure its · survival ? 
Would this be a sound basis for defending 
an institution of this type if its efficiency and 
fundamental aims were in doubt ? Could it at 
one and the same time pursue its work, includ-
ing its study on European armaments indus-
tries, and provide the Assembly with the docu-
mentation it requests without Council super-
vision? 
21. Third, in practice. it appears that the SAC 
itself has had serious difficulties in obtaining 
from the governments the information it needed 
for the study they had asked it to prepare 
although the study was not intended for publi-
cation. Is a better fate to be expected for work 
intended for the Assembly and hence for publi-
cation? 
22. To sum up, Mr. Lemoine's proposal 
must not lead to the SAC being disqualified as 
a governmental body without it becoming - for 
that seems very difficult - an effective instru-
ment for the Assembly's work. But· the Coun-
cil must be asked, while maintaining the SAC's 
normal work, to allow it to provide the Assem-
bly with appropriate documentation for some of 
its requirements or even documentary notes to 
fill out its reports. 
18. Mr. Lemoine's proposal therefore seems 23. These remarks in no way seek to mini-
to raise three questions, one legal, the second mise the French initiative but, on the contrary, 
political and the third practical: try to pinpoint their exact meaning so as to 
encourage the French Government to make its 
19. First, is it conceivable for a body so spe- views clear. It is to be hoped that it will have 
cifically governmental to be annexed in this an opportunity of doing so at the Council's 
way to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly? ministerial meeting on 19th May. Your Rap-
The reply to Recommendation 365 is all porteur believes the Council should be encou-
the Council has granted the Assembly in this raged to shoulder its full commitments under 
field. Mr. Lemoine's suggestion seems rather the modified Brussels Treaty, either by streng-
surprising in .view of the fact that the SAC is thening the SAC to promote European eo-
an organ of the WEU Council. If the seven operation in the production of armaments or, in 
governments agree, it can certainly be asked to the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, by fos-
make studies for the Assembly, but only the tering more active European participation in 
governments can supply the information it the problems of its defence and of the reduction 
would need and they too would decide how and control of armaments. 
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24. This being said, and recognising that it 
was for France to take the necessary initiatives 
so as to show how and to what extent it inten-
ded to co-operate with its European partners 
after its withdrawal from the NATO integrated 
commands, it is to be hoped that France's part-
ners will not hesitate to make known their 
views on these proposals. 
25. In this connection, the Assembly's 
requests have been satisfied to some extent 
either by the Council or by certain member 
countries. This is the case inter alia of the 
reply to Recommendation 365, which states 
that, although the budget situation in the mem-
ber countries at the present time calls for rigo-
rous economies, the working group set up to 
achieve economies also has the task of promo-
ting " greater efficiency in methods of work and 
use of staff in WEU's ministerial bodies, 
without impairing the organisation's ability to 
meet its obligations under the modified Brussels 
Treaty, the Protocols and the Council's decision 
of 7th May 1955 ". 
26. Furthermore, the governments of all 
member countries have in one way or another 
declared that they considered WEU, to use the 
words of Mr. Blaker, United Kingdom Minister 
of State for the Armed Forces, at the December 
1981 session to be " the only European parlia-
mentary institution which is empowered to 
debate defence issues ", although Mrs. That-
cher, United Kingdom Prime Minister, gave a 
fairly non-committal answer to an oral question 
put by our colleague Mr. Urwin on 16th March 
about WEU providing a ready-made forum for 
developing an independent European defence 
policy in that she emphasised the undisputed 
role of NATO in these matters. 
27. For Italy, Mr. Lagorio, Italian Minister of 
Defence, said at the same session in December 
1981: 
" In any case, WEU is the only body 
where security is continuously discussed 
and the only real European point of 
contact for problems of defence and arms 
control. That is why Italy regards WEU 
as an important and indispensable Euro-
pean forum. " 
28. In short, they all said they would conti-
nue to apply the modified Brussels Treaty and 
that they were determined to keep alive the 
organisation which it engendered. As far as 
your Rapporteur is aware, no one has yet adop-
ted a public stance on the French proposals 
other than Mr. van Elslande in his address to 
the Assembly in _1974. It should be recalled 
that France, with all its armed forces and wea-
pons, is committed by Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty to the collective defence of 
Western Europe. It is therefore essential for 
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the intentions behind the French proposals to 
meet with a favourable response so that, the 
dialogue being continued and deepened, all 
these forces, which do not belong to the NATO 
integrated military organisation, may be an 
essential and positive part in the building of a 
European defence policy based on deterrence 
which is more essential than ever at the present 
juncture. This is probably what Chancellor 
Schmidt meant in his discussion with staff of Le 
Monde reported on 24th February 1982: 
" The Germans were prepared for the 
idea of European defence and reactivating 
Western European Union from the begin-
ning of the fifties when WEU became a 
new instrument for the defence and secu-
rity of Western Europe. Germany was 
then ready to enlarge WEU in the frame-
work of the Atlantic Alliance. Today, I 
see no objection of principle on the part 
of Germany but conversely objections on 
the part of France due to its status as a 
nuclear power. I therefore wonder whe-
ther the ideas you mention could become 
official French policy. If so, we would 
be interested. " 
29. The question may obviously arise as to 
how much room remains for significant work 
by the WEU Council between the North Atlan-
tic Council, in which all its members take part, 
and the European Council, in which they also 
all take part. Everything indicates that, 
although small, room exists, since the North 
Atlantic Council is not specifically European 
and, even if the Colombo-Genscher plan pro-
poses that the European Council handle "secu-
rity " matters, it has no specific responsibility 
for matters relating directly to the defence of 
Europe. This was underlined by Mr. Hernu, 
French Minister of Defence, in his 16th 
February 1982 interview in the Frankfurter 
Rundschau. In this connection, reference may 
be made to certain specific fields which should 
provide fuel for the Council's discussions: 
30. First, as suggested by Mr. Hernu in this 
interview and by Mr. Lemoine in the Assembly: 
the questions raised by the development of 
pacifist movements and their consequences for 
Europe's security. Here, it should be empha-
sised that a defence policy based on deterrence 
is credible only if based on the whole of 
society's will to resist and that civism is the 
basis of any defence policy. 
31. Second, the development of terrorism in 
the last decade concerns all our countries and 
the need for a joint European policy in this 
field is being felt everywhere. However, it 
seems difficult to extend consultations on this 
policy to NATO where the presence of Turkey 
on the one hand and the United States and 
Canada on the other would, for widely varying 
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reasons, make it difficult to reach joint conclu-
sions acceptable to the WEU member coun-
tries. The presence of Ireland at the ten-power 
consultations would also raise dillfculties where-
as the framework of the WEU Council would 
seem more appropriate. It is evident that the 
Council's reply to Recommendation 229 which 
attributed to "other European bodies, in parti-
cular... the Council of Europe " responsibility 
for European consultations on this subject, 
meets the legal aspect of the problem but not 
the political or military aspects. 
32. Third, more generally, matters relating to 
the military aspects of Western Europe's secu-
rity outside the NATO area can be handled in 
the framework of WEU whose responsibility in 
this field is set out in Article VIII of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty. In this respect, it should 
be noted that, unlike the North Atlantic Treaty 
which defines an " area " in which casus foede-
ris may apply, the modified Brussels Treaty has 
no limit to its application. 
33. Fourth, following President Mitterrand 
Mr. Lemoine indicated the importance Franc~ 
attached to the link between guaranteed secu-
rity for Europe and the need to pursue disarma-
ment. Unfortunately, from the summary 
record of the London colloquy in February 
1982 it is not possible to see exactly what was 
in Mr. Lemoine's mind when answering ques-
tions put to him about the role of WEU in defi-
ning a policy in conformity with this twofold 
will. It would be desirable for the French 
Government to explain its thoughts on this 
point. Inter alia, the Council should examine 
whether the experience gained by the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments, which makes it 
an instrument whose efficacity is unique in the 
world in its field, could not be used for purpo-
ses less narrow than those assigned to it in the 
protocols to the modified Brussels Treaty, parti-
cularly now that the lists in Annex Ill to Proto-
col No. Ill have been considerably shortened. 
Further easing of controls might be consi-
dered and a possible enlargement of WEU to 
other European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance wishing to join the organisation would 
obviously facilitate such a change of course. 
Conversely, the study of control procedures 
prepared by the Agency might help to solve the 
delicate monitoring problems raised at all inter-
national conferences on disarmament. 
a burden for the ministers who, until the Uni-
ted Kingdom joined the European Communi-
ties, met quarterly. 
35. Sixth, the permanent representatives who 
meet in camera about twice a month might 
make a practice of holding regular exchanges of 
views on all topical matters affecting the 
defence of Europe or European defence. The 
three of the ten nations which are not members 
of WEU might, if they so wished, be kept infor-
med of the gist of these talks, for instance 
through the intermediary of the country chair-
ing the Council. 
36. These suggestions are obviously not 
exhaustive but they show that if the Council is 
still almost inactive it is not because there are 
no areas in which it could act but because the 
governments are not decided to act. 
Ill. Relations between the Council and 
the Assembly 
3 7. Although the Council did not exist as a 
political body in 1981, it must be noted that its 
relations with the Assembly were as good as 
possible, particularly because the Secretary-
General and the officials of the Secretariat-
General, on the one hand, and the ambassadors 
of member countries in London and their staff 
who worked together on behalf of the WEU 
Council, on the other, did their utmost to foster 
these relations. It must be made quite clear 
that the Council's shortcomings cannot be attri-
buted to its members but to the governments 
which did not allow it to play its due role. 
There is every reason to believe that this will 
continue to be the case until the seven govern-
ments agree to define WEU's tasks in the cir-
cumstances of today. Nor can the Assembly 
be satisfied with a situation which fails to 
co~cord wit~ g~vernment statements asserting 
thetr determmat10n to apply the modified Brus-
sels Treaty in full and with the requirements of 
European security. 
38. The number of written questions put by 
members of the Assembly to the Council fell to 
five in 1981. Contrary to what is indicated in 
the Council's report, the meeting between the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the 
Chairman of the Assembly's General Affairs 
34. Fifth, finally, the WEU Council would be Committee was not held in 1981 but this was 
infinitely better placed to promote the interests not at all the fault of the Council. The Assem-
of European security if it met at ministerial bly's lack of enthusiasm with regard to the 
level prior to each of the two annual meetings Council is hardly surprising when one considers 
of the North Atlantic Council in order to pre- the attitude of the Council itself. 
pare these meetings by including European 39. Joint meetings between the Council and 
defe~ce problems in its agenda and really dis- Assembly Committees continued to be informal 
cussmg them. Two ~nual meetings instead of as emphasised in the annual report and were 
the present one meetmg would not be too great grouped, together with the working luncheon of 
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the Council and Presidential Committee, in a 
single day during which the Council moreover 
also held its sole meeting of the year at minis-
terial level. Judging by the ministers present at 
the joint meetings, it may be deduced that seve-
ral member countries were represented at this 
sole meeting neither by their Minister for 
Foreign Affairs nor even by a parliamentary 
secretary of state. 
40. It would be highly desirable for the 
governments of the WEU member countries to 
be represented by full-ranking ministers, inclu-
ding Ministers of Defence, in view of the nature 
of WEU's specific responsibilities. 
41. The subject matter of ministerial addres-
ses to the Assembly and the interest of the ans-
wers ministers give to questions put by parlia-
mentarians encourage the Assembly to call for 
more frequent and greater participation by 
ministers in its work and to express the wish 
that, as far as possible, ministers speak on one 
or other of the reports debated. 
42. However, in view of your Rapporteur's 
remarks about relaunching WEU's activities, it 
is quite clear that there can be a real improve-
ment in relations between the Council and the 
Assembly only if the Council itself is reacti-
vated. None of the minor measures mentioned 
in the annual report can cure the serious 
shortcomings in the governments' work 
although they may sometimes conceal them. 
IV. Political activities of the Council 
43. Chapter 11 of the annual report reached 
the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly after 
Chapter I but on 26th February 1982. In 
other words, the Council has made a parti-
cularly worthy effort to allow the Assembly to 
examine the report in satisfactory conditions. 
It should be added that it is easier to read 
this chapter because certain important docu-
ments mentioned in the report are appended 
as the General Affairs Committee requested in 
its reply to the annual report for 1980. Finally, 
the annual report's systematic description of 
consultations between its members on certain 
major political questions handled mainly in 
frameworks other than WEU meets a request 
often made by the Assembly and corresponds to 
the Council's promises. All this should be 
noted, although it is to be deplored that the 
Council should have taken so little action itself 
on matters which nevertheless relate to Euro-
pean defence, for which it continues, as it has 
often recognised, to be exclusively responsible. 
44. In this respect, its refusal to respond to 
the Assembly's request for Ministers of Defence 
to take part in its meetings has to be recorded. 
173 
DOCUMENT 913 
At least the refusal was not categorical and 
it is to be hoped that, if WEU is to be revived, 
it will carry its own statements into effect: 
" The participation of ministers of 
defence, or their representatives, in Council 
meetings would certainly not be without 
its value. This w<>uld be possible where 
matters which are the direct responsibi-
lity of these ministers were being discus-
sed; where this is not the case, their parti-
cipation in essentially political debates 
would not appear to be strictly neces-
sary." 
It is also recalled that: 
" Article VIII gives the Council adequate 
scope to discuss a wide variety of sub-
jects. The Council continue to be flexi-
ble and have sufficiently wide powers to 
embrace any debate relevant to the appli-
cation of the treaty. " 
One may wonder why, except at its annual 
ministerial meeting, it never does so. It should 
be recalled that there is no text to deprive the 
Permanent Council of this vocation which is 
incumbent upon it just as it is on the Council 
meeting at ministerial level. 
45. Finally, your Rapporteur has to note that 
the proposals he outlined in Chapter 11 of this 
document correspond closely to the remarks 
and aims which the Council sets itself in the 
introduction to Chapter 11 of its annual report 
as regards the control of armaments, the acti-
vities of the SAC and those of the Council 
itself. He can but note that the Council has a 
very desultory approach to the commitments it 
assigns to itself. 
46. These are not new comments. However, 
insofar as the Council describes its duties parti-
cularly pertinently in the present annual report, 
such a considerable difference between announ-
ced intentions and reported facts stands out. 
This is perhaps not a bad omen for a pos-
sible relaunching of its activities since the fact 
is that the seven member countries managed to 
adopt this definition of their intentions unani-
mously. In other words, if the French Govern-
ment explains its proposals it is to be hoped 
that they will be welcomed by its partners and, 
after reading the report, the prospects of relaun-
ching WEU seem particularly auspicious. 
4 7. Turning to political questions themselves, 
it should be pointed out that an unfortunate 
numbering of the headings tends to indicate 
that all these questions come under East- West 
relations or Afghanistan, including matters 
concerning the Gulf or Palestine. If it were 
not just a mistake in the numbering, this would 
be a questionable and dangerous view of 
Middle East problems. 
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48. The Council and the Assembly largely 
share the same views on East-West relations. 
Both consider that the Afghanistan and 
Polish affairs violate human rights and the Hel-
sinki final act. But at the same time the 
annual report indicates that the governments: 
" ... together with- their western partners, 
would continpe the dialogue begun with 
the USSR and its allies and would conti-
nue to work to bring about genuine 
detente, based on stable foundations, 
indivisible and worldwide " 
even if: 
" the improvement in these relations 
which was desired by their governments 
required that the Soviet Union should, by 
taking tangible measures, show restraint 
and responsibility in international affairs. " 
49. This way of thinking coincides remar-
kably with that expressed by the General 
Affairs Committee, inter alia when on 19th 
January 1982 it adopted the report submitted by 
Mr. Michel on the evolution of the situation in 
Poland. Thus, on the one hand, food assis-
tance to Poland, a moratorium on the reimbur-
sement of its debts, support for its efforts at 
economic recovery and, on the other, a remin-
der of the essential principles of detente as laid 
down in Helsinki, suspension of the Madrid 
conference on 18th December and consultations 
between allies, are the two sides of a Western 
European policy on which the governments and 
a majority of the Assembly are unanimous. 
50. Similarly, the full support of the WEU 
member countries for the French proposal for a 
conference on disarmament in Europe demons-
trates that although WEU is a defensive alliance 
it is not concerned with the military effort 
alone but also takes into account the urgent 
need for disarmament to which European 
public opinion showed that it was firmly atta-
ched in 1981. 
51. On the Near and Middle East, although 
the annual report makes little reference to spe-
cifically WEU activities, it makes it abundantly 
clear that there has been a revival of European 
activity in the area and that there is a broad 
consensus between the Western European coun-
tries with regard to Afghanistan, the Iranian-
Iraqi war, relations with the Gulf countries, the 
Palestinian conflict and Egypt. Considerable 
progress has been made as illustrated by the fact 
that the Chairman-in-Office of the European 
Council was twice sent on a collective mission 
and the debates in the United Nations General 
Assembly and in the Security Council and the 
participation of member countries in United 
Nations peacekeeping military operations were 
the subject of consultations between the Ten 
leading to the joint definition of quite specific 
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political aims, particularly at the Venice 
summit meeting, with regard to Palestine. 
52. Although there are many internal and 
external, military and economic threats to 
Europe today which justify scepticism and fear 
for its future, the Council's review of European 
political consultations is certainly far more 
positive than it could have been in previous 
years and this is encouraging. 
53. However, it should be emphasised that 
this review is very incomplete insofar as it 
concerns only a few areas of the world where 
tension is certainly serious but where conver-
gences of views are relatively important. A 
review of intra-European political consultations 
should not however overlook the fact that there 
are other areas where tension is equally serious 
but where, perhaps, it would be more difficult 
to achieve such unanimity, particularly Africa 
and Latin America. It is unbelievable that the 
Council should not feel itself obliged to refer to 
these areas in a report on Europe's activities in 
the external policy field. 
V. Conclusions 
54. Everything indicates therefore that the 
Council's annual report for 1981 is a master-
piece of diplomacy on the part of those who 
wrote and adopted it. The Council has mana-
ged to provide in reasonable time a text which 
conforms remarkably to the wishes expressed by 
the Assembly in recent years and have even 
managed to give it true political content, parti-
cularly in the introduction to Chapter 11 and in 
Part B of that chapter. It should be congra-
tulated. 
55. However this may be, the present annual 
report, like its predecessors, if only by its refe-
rences to what has been done outside WEU, 
mainly underlines the inexistence of the WEU 
Council in 1981. Here your Rapporteur can 
but repeat what has been emphasised so often 
by the Assembly: the constituent party of WEU 
cannot be separated and there can be no effec-
tive Assembly without a valid counterpart in 
the Council. The fact that the Council's report 
is a monument of diplomacy worthy of all-
round admiration does not blind us to the fact 
that this technical success is a thin veil for a de 
facto situation about which the Assembly has 
continuously complained. Once again this 
year it must repeat its displeasure at the Coun-
cil's shortcomings. 
56. However, this displeasure must be tempe-
red by the prospects which the future seems to 
offer with the French proposals expressed twice 
by the Secretary of State, Mr. Lemoine. Clearly 
these proposals need to be explained and 
completed, but they show a noteworthy will to 
reactivate WEU and France's six partners must 
now respond positively. In Chapter 11 of this 
report, your Rapporteur has made a number of 
suggestions which he has incorporated in the 
draft recommendation for submission to the 
General Affairs Committee. He feels the 
Council could subscribe to these proposals 
without encroaching on the rights of other institu-
tions. From the Council's reply to such sug-
gestions it will perhaps be possible to deduce 
what the governments intend to do with WEU 
in coming years. 
57. Your Rapporteur believes that there is 
obviously no question - and everything indi-
cates that the French Government shares that 
opinion - of giving new impetus to the arms 
race by setting up another European military 
bloc alongside NATO. This has never been 
the aim of the modified Brussels Treaty whose 
signatories were determined from the outset to 
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place it in the twofold context of the United 
Nations Charter and of the Atlantic Alli-
ance. On the contrary, the aim is to allow 
Europe to make its voice heard more effectively 
in the two corresponding institutions, on the 
one hand so as to reactivate a disarmament pro-
cess which has been marking time for many 
years because of the overly bipolar view of 
international relations and, on the other, thanks 
to real progress towards effective, controlled 
disarmament, the ultimate aim of which would 
be the progressive dissolution of the two mili-
tary blocs which is necessary if the European 
nations and the rest of the world are to be 
really able to choose, without outside cons-
traints, the course of their national develop-
ment. Insofar as it can further this twofold 
aim, WEU can be seen as a positive step 
towards international peace based on the free-
dom of peoples and not on the ever-threatened 
balance of terror. 
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Amendment 1 
Political acti,ities of the Couneil - reply to the 
twenty-seventh annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Blaauw 
and the Liberal Group 
14th June 1982 
1. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper; add '"and report to the Assem-
bly within a year". 
I. See 1st sitting, 14th June 1982 (amendment amended and agreed to). 
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European-United States co-operation for 
international peace and joint security 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. van Eekelen, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
18th May 1982 
on European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint 
security 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. van Eekelen, Rapporteur 
I. Foreword 
11. Is there a crisis of confidence between Europe and the United States? 
Ill. Economic and monetary problems 
N. Defence and security 
I. The presence of American forces in Europe 
2. The deployment of continental-range missiles 
3. The search for agreement on arms limitation 
4. The breakdown of defence costs 
5. Arms co-operation 
6. Mutual confidence 
V. Relations with the Soviet Union and its allies 
VI. Problems outside Europe 
VII. Conclusions 
1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 absten-
tion. 
2. Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett 
(Chairman); MM. De Poi, Urwin (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. 
Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile, 
Conti Persini, De Bondt (Alternate: Michel), Del/a Briotta, 
van Eekelen (Alternate: Blaauw), Gessner, Hardy (Alternate: 
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Hill), Kurt Jung, Lagneau, Lagorce (Alternate: Baumel), 
Lord McNair, MM. Mangelschots, Mommersteeg, Gilnther 
Mill/er, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann (Alternate: 
Bohm), Thoss (Alternate: Berchem), Valiante, Vecchietti, 
Wilquin. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
DOCUMENT 914 
The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on Europan-United Stlltes co-opemtionfor 
intentlltiolllll J1etU:e tUUl joint set:11rity 
Considering that the cohesion of the free world is an essential condition for the maintenance of 
peace, European security and economic recovery; 
Noting that the European and American partners of the Atlantic Alliance remain fully 
convinced of this fact; 
Noting that western cohesion is being challenged by increased tensions in international rela-
tions and the present serious economic recession; 
Regretting that measures required for collective security are not really understood by the- public 
and therefore do not receive as much support from public opinion as they might; 
Noting that such reactions and challenges, amplified by modem means of communications, 
give rise to mistrust on both sides of the Atlantic; 
Welcoming the initiatives to improve consultations between Europe and North America within 
the framework of existing institutions; 
Considering that events in Afghanistan and Poland require that any measures aimed at improv-
ing relations between members of the Atlantic Alliance and· of the Warsaw Pact should be the subject 
of close collective examination to prevent the impression that faits accomplis are being accepted; 
Welcoming the intensive consultations within NATO on the INF negotiations at Geneva; 
Expressing support for an early beginning of the START negotiations and vigorous pursuit of 
the other disarmament negotiations; 
Considering the need to arrive at a consensus on the military threat posed to the Alliance and 
on the balance of forces; 
Considering further that public support for armament decisions would increase if these measu-
res were presented as a counterweight to Warsaw Pact programmes and allowed for constraints by 
that side; 
Considering that frequent contacts between parliamentarians from European and North Ameri-
can member countries of NATO are essential for a better understanding of public opinion and should 
be organised as effectively as possible, 
RECOMMENDS THA 1 THE COUNCIL 
I. Prepare a comprehensive report on the European defence effort within the framework of 
NATO on sharing the burden of common defence; 
11. Urge member countries 
l. In agreement with the United States and the other members of NATO, to specify the principles 
to which all members of the Atlantic Alliance should conform in their economic relations with 
the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, with particular regard to those items of strategic or 
technological significance whose export is limited, the credit conditions granted and the conclusion of 
long-term contracts; 
2. To make full use of existing machinery for consultations in the political, military and econo-
mic field to allow them to react quickly and in a concordant manner in an emergency or crisis; 
3. To consider ways of improving transatlantic consultation, in particular by informal meetings at 
ministerial and high official levels, thus improving the effectiveness of existing institutions; 
178 
DOCUMENT 914 
4. To ensure that NATO arrives at an early assessment of the balance of forces which can be 
released to the public; 
5. To present new decisions in the armaments field against the background of specific Warsaw 
Pact programmes and capabilities in order to discourage new incentives to the arms race; 
6. To support a policy of vigorous and determined negotiations for a controlled limitation of 
nuclear weapons ensuring a balance of forces as a prerequisite for the security of Europe and of the 
whole western world. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Pan Eekelen, Rapporteur) 
I. Foreword 
1. This report was drafted after a visit by 
the General Affairs Committee to the United 
States from 25th to 31st March 1982 which 
allowed it to obtain ample information from the 
American authorities, particularly at the State 
Department and the Pentagon. It also endea-
voured to ascertain the views of independent 
observers at the Council on Foreign Relations 
in New York and to assess the state of Ameri-
can public opinion by meeting parliamentarians 
and journalists, especially with the assistance of 
the Overseas Press Club in New York. 
2. Furthermore, your Rapporteur and other 
members of the committee took advantage of 
this or other visits to the United States to 
examine these matters in detail. 
3. Your Rapporteur believes he can speak 
on behalf of the whole committee in thanking 
the United States authorities who received it, in 
one capacity or another, and expressed opinions 
which, although not always convergent, were 
always frank and sincere and of considerable 
assistance in preparing the present report. He 
wishes to convey his particular gratitude to the 
staff of the State Department and the United 
States Embassies in Paris, London and The 
Hague who were good enough to organise the 
visit. He prefers not to name them as he 
wishes to thank them all, and he is afraid of 
o~itting some of those helped with this organi-
satwn and kept members of the General Affairs 
Committee informed in one way or another 
although perhaps remaining unknown to him. 
4. This being said, the ideas expressed in 
this report are his own and although your Rap-
porteur hopes they will be endorsed by the 
General Affairs Committee, they commit none 
of those who received it. 
5. The present report is the first one on 
European-American co-operation since the 
General Affairs Committee adopted the report 
by Mr. Schlingemann on a visit to the United 
States in March 1979. Scientific and techno-
logical aspects were discussed in the report by 
Mr. Hill adopted by the Assembly in December 
1981. In addition, attention should be drawn 
to the publication by the Council of Europe of 
the proceedings of its panel on "Relations bet-
ween Western Europe and the United States of 
America", held in Strasbourg in June 1981. 
6. One preliminary observation on the visit 
concerns the difficulty of having adequate 
contact with members of the United States 
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Congress. In view of the multitude of visits by 
European politicians to the United States 
either individually or within the framework of 
international organisations, it seems desirable to 
explore the possibility of achieving some degree 
of co-ordination of these visits in order to 
enhance the effectiveness of transatlantic poli-
tical contacts. 
11. Is there a crisis of confidence 
between Europe and the United States? 
7. Very different judgments may be formed 
of the trend of relations between Europe and 
the United States depending on whether it is 
considered from a long-, medium- or short-term 
stan~point. Similarly, day-to-day information, 
passmg reactions by public opinion, even if 
filtered through parliamentary speeches, press 
articles or public opinion polls, give a very 
jagged impression of these relations: an unbroken 
succession of misunderstandings, clashes and 
crises affecting practically every field, whereas 
contacts with American leaders give a feeling of 
broad continuity and a profound understanding 
of mutual points of view and common interests. 
8. Looking beyond momentary ups and 
downs in relations between Western Europe 
and the United States in the thirty-six years 
which have elapsed since the end of the second 
world war, it is clear that many positive aspects 
can be noted, the appreciation of the need for 
western solidarity has become firmer on both 
sides and the realisation of common aims and 
common problems and the assessment of the 
dangers to international peace and the world's 
economy are very similar on both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
9. Positive examples of allied co.-operation 
are the continued resolve on the double track 
decision of December 1979 regarding interme-
diate-range nuclear forces in Europe, the cohe-
sion shown at the Madrid follow-up conference 
of the CSCE, agreement on the accession of 
Spain to NATO which will strengthen both the 
Alliance and Spanish democracy, the reaction 
to the Polish crisis emanating from the unpre-
cedented extraordinary meeting of the NATO 
Council at ministerial level, European-
American co-operation in Sinai as a welcome 
proof of joint action and shared responsibility 
after past divergencies on Middle Eastern poli-
cies, and the constructive efforts of the Western 
Contact Group on Namibia to solve an almost 
intractable problem. 
10. This does not mean there are no major 
differences over how to handle the challenges 
now facing the world, but the differences are 
not primarily transatlantic. They exist within 
the United States itself, as they do in Europe, 
and this will be shown by the discussions which 
this report will probably stimulate. 
11. Nor does it mean that the divergencies, 
confrontations and clashes which the press, as is 
its task and duty, reports each day are without 
importance or danger. The deployment of 
particularly active Soviet policies throughout 
the world has multiplied the number of crises 
in recent years. The development of Soviet 
nuclear, military and naval power, which has 
attained hitherto unparalleled proportions of a 
particularly and directly threatening nature, 
above all for Western Europe with the deploy-
ment of some 300 SS-20 missiles targeted on 
our part of the continent without there being 
any equivalent weapon to offset them at the 
present time, is causing anxiety or even fear. 
12. Finally, the long and serious economic 
recession throughout the world since October 
1973 has also given rise to often contradictory 
analyses, apprehension and reactions among the 
western countries and hence to clashes between 
the members of the Atlantic Alliance. 
13. These crises, fears and clashes have had 
effect. Their frequency and the number of 
areas concerned often give public opinion, both 
in the United States and in Europe, the impres-
sion that a serious, global crisis is now affecting 
relations between Europe and the United States 
and is liable to lead to a separation which 
would be disastrous for the world economy and 
for joint security. 
14. It will certainly not be your Rapporteur's 
aim to minimise their extent but rather to try to 
ascertain how they are seen in the United States 
and in Europe and to show that they are not 
aspects of a global crisis in transatlantic rela-
tions but merely an accumulation of specific 
problems which governments on both sides are 
trying to solve with a very clear idea in mind of 
the danger of a build-up of tests of strength, 
resentment and misunderstandings. The Gene-
ral Affairs Committee can testify to the conside-
rable efforts made by the United States admi-
nistration to convince Congress and public 
opinion, and by a number of American parlia-
mentarians to convince their electors, not to fall 
back on scepticism, discouragement or resent-
ment towards their European partners. Your 
Rapporteur is convinced that all the Western 
European governments are doing the same with 
regard to the United States in view of their 
understanding of their own nations' feelings. 
15. Your Rapporteur wishes to make a 
modest contribution to this effort to understand 
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and explain the problems and he hopes the 
General Affairs Committee and then the 
Assembly will endorse an approach justified by 
concern for the truth and for the security of the 
free world, the maintenance of international 
peace and the recovery of the western and 
world economies. Confrontation between 
Europe and the United States can contribute 
nothing positive and can but be dangerous. 
But, as a journalist whom the committee met in 
Washington said, the problem is at the level of 
the man in the street. Without wishing to say 
what this man in the street is, your Rapporteur 
believes that all the underlying forces to which 
the democratic regimes address themselves must 
now be warned of the true nature of the threat 
and convinced of the reality of solidarity bet-
ween Europe and the United States. 
16. At present, there appear to be four main 
areas in which there are misunderstandings bet-
ween Europe and the United States: 
(a) European security because of the 
leading role played by the United Sta-
tes in Western Europe's defence and 
because in many fields the western 
side has lost its earlier lead. The 
pursuit of negotiations on the control 
of armaments, particularly strategic 
weapons, between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, is obviously of 
the utmost concern to Western Europe's 
security, as are the deployment of 
new weapons in Europe and the pos-
sible evolution of strategies on both 
sides; 
(b) Euro-American co-operation outside 
Europe since security policy requires 
a minimum of agreement between 
Europe and the United States about 
their respective activities outside 
Europe, first because of the world 
dimension of the Soviet threat in the 
last fifteen years and second because 
of the new shape of the North-South 
confrontation since the end of the 
colonial empires. The development 
of crises in Central America last year 
and the contradictory reactions which 
they aroused, together with the feeble 
western reaction to the invasion of 
Afghanistan and the seizure of Cam-
bodia by Vietnam, a Soviet ally, led 
to misunderstanding and a serious 
lack of trust on all sides; 
(c) relations with the Soviet Union and its· 
allies because, for reasons which vary 
from one country to another, the 
European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance had often attached special 
political and economic importance to 
the idea of detente in East-West rela-
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tions whereas in the United States 
involvement in a process of negotia-
tions made it pay insufficient atten-
tion to checking the military build-up 
of the Soviet Union leading to a pre-
ponderant lead in some sectors and an 
overwhelming one in continental-
range missiles. The massive deploy-
ment of these missiles in Europe, the 
invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet pres-
sure which led to the takeover in 
Poland on 13th December 1981 and 
the increasing number of actions by 
the Soviet Union or its allies in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America led to the 
belief that detente was a lure to allow 
the Soviet Union to pursue with less 
risk a policy of strengthening its 
armaments and of direct or indirect 
intervention. Nevertheless, Europe 
and the United States tried, each on 
its own accord, to preserve the ele-
ments of the policy of detente which 
corresponded to its own interests. 
This could but lead to a series of 
misunderstandings or even clashes 
between the United States and its 
allies; 
(d) finally, economic co-operation be-
cause the crisis the world over since 
the end of 1973 makes it more neces-
sary than ever to co-ordinate remedial 
measures. These relate to the mone-
tary field, the Achilles' heel of the 
free trade system defined in the 
GATT agreements and the Kennedy 
negotiations, particularly since all 
reference of western currencies to an 
objective and unquestionable stand-
ard, like the former gold standard, 
has disappeared; to credit, where the 
utmost uncertainty has prevailed 
since annual inflation rates in most 
western countries reached 10 % or 
even far more around 1980; to inter-
national trade since the rise in unem-
ployment has led many to elude 
GATT rules by various means and, 
finally, to energy since the great "every-
one for himself' in 1973, whose 
devastating effects on western cohe-
sion have just been described by 
Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of 
State, in the second volume of 
his memoirs. 
17. All these factors render more essential 
than ever the need for stronger co-operation as 
everyone now realises. But there seems to be 
no attempt on either side of the Atlantic to 
reach a global definition of it. In his famous 
Philadelphia speech, President Kennedy refer-
red to a western community based on two pil-
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lars, one European, the other American. The 
European pillar has never really been built, 
except in the economic field, thanks to the 
development of the European Communities, 
and to some extent in the field of the ten-power 
political consultations. But the weakness of this 
pillar is perhaps one of the reasons why this 
view of a balanced political and economic edi-
fice has never corresponded to the facts. 
18. The absence of a global definition of co-
operation between Europe and the United Sta-
tes has helped to aggravate a crisis. of confid-
ence. It is difficult to specify when this crisis 
began and to what event it may be attribu-
ted. The French decision to leave the NATO 
integrated military organisation, the Vietnam 
war and the opening of direct negotiations bet-
ween the United States and the Soviet Union 
were obvious contributory factors, but there is 
no doubt that the emergence in the United Sta-
tes of reactions which, if not isolationist, 
around 1970 were and sometimes still are hos-
tile to the maintenance of American forces in 
Europe, and the weaknesses of which Pre-
sident Carter's administration was accused, at 
least during its first three years in office, led 
Europeans to wonder about the permanency of 
American support, particularly the military 
presence in Europe, itself a guarantee in their 
eyes, and probably also in the eyes of the Soviet 
Union, of the credibility of American undertak-
ings with regard to Europe's security. 
19. The Republican administration, now in 
office for a little over a year, has attempted to 
remedy this situation. It has to a certain 
extent succeeded. But the way in which the 
European effort is presented falls well short of 
inspiring in American public opinion the confi-
dence necessary for the development of co-
operation with the United States. 
20. The effect of the demonstrations in many 
European countries at the end of 1981 against 
the deployment of Tomahawk cruise missiles 
and continental-range Pershing 11 missiles in 
Western Europe, accepted by the governments 
which subscribed to the NATO twofold deci-
sion in December 1979, and several attacks on 
Americans assigned to NATO has been to 
make the United States question the determi-
nation of Europeans to ensure their own defence. 
Bitter memories of the Vietnam war, while not 
turning American society away from all exter-
nal commitments, have nevertheless convinced 
the United States that it could not defend a 
population which did not want its assistance. 
Many signs have made it think that this has 
now become the case in Western Europe. 
21. The conclusions which your Rapporteur 
has drawn from his contacts with the American 
authorities are in no way negative. The United 
States administration is very well informed of 
the whys and wherefores of European reactions. 
However, in a democratic society as it exists 
in the United States there is a permanent need 
to make an often reticent Congress and a public 
opinion which is insufficiently informed on 
both sides of the Atlantic share one's views. It 
is for the European partners of the Atlantic 
Alliance to define their own positions clearly, 
as these are after all as respectable and valid as 
those of their American partners, and 
to explain the underlying reasons. At the same 
time the European countries will have to make 
a better presentation of their contributions to 
the common defence effort. 
Ill. Economic and monetary problems 
22. There is no doubt that since 1973 Wes-
tern Europe and the United States have been 
aware of the seriousness of the crisis through 
which the western economy is now passing and 
the need to counter it. On both sides of the 
Atlantic, it is clear that: 
(a) the West's energy supplies are still a 
vital problem, although lower oil 
costs, the development of nuclear 
energy and the discovery of vast new 
resources offer better hopes for the 
next decade, but the problem of 
dependence on the Middle East 
remains; 
(b) an economic revival is essential in 
order to combat growing unemploy-
ment which is now so high that it is 
jeopardising the West's political stabi-
lity and the support of the western 
peoples for the values which the West 
claims to defend. It should be noted 
moreover that the problem is very 
similar on both sides of the Atlantic; 
(c) the continuation of inflation at the 
rate current throughout most of the 
western world between 1975 and 1980 
has become intolerable. There has 
been a marked recovery in 1981 in 
many countries but the annual infla-
tion rate in some European countries 
is still more than 10 %, which makes 
it difficult for them to help to restore 
order in the international monetary 
system. Admittedly, no one is consi-
dering reverting to the gold standard, 
but the re-establishment of world 
monetary order guaranteeing adequate 
stability in relations between the 
various currencies is part of every-
one's programme because the distor-
tion of international trade due to 
variations in exchange rates has gone 
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beyond the level that national econo-
mies can tolerate. However, although 
the essential aims are the same for 
everyone, priorities are not always the 
same, nor are they synchronised. 
23. (l) Since the Republican administration 
took office, the United States seems to have 
been giving priority to the fight against inflation 
and the recovery of the dollar. Thus it has 
allowed or even encouraged the banks to apply 
extremely high interest rates and basic rates 
rose as high as 18 % in the United States in 
autumn 1981 and, although they have varied 
somewhat since then, they are still very 
high. A consequence of this was that econo-
mic recovery was held back and it may now be 
wondered how far the priority given to sta-
bilising the dollar will not lead the United 
States administration, in its concern to reduce 
expenditure all round, to delay the efforts it had 
undertaken to catch up with the Soviet Union 
in the armaments field. 
24. The United States budget for 1983, 
presented by Mr. Reagan to Congress on 8th 
February, makes provision for a deficit of some 
$100,000 million, while continuing to give 
priority to fighting inflation and the recovery of 
the dollar, which is justified in view of the 
recession and provided firms do not borrow for 
the sole purpose of increasing their share of the 
market by absorbing their competitors. But at 
the slightest sign of economic recovery, the 
large slice of savings taken by federal loans is 
liable to lead to another rise in interest rates, 
although the public debt is already over a tril-
lion dollars. American experts did not fail to 
underline an apparent contradiction between 
the expansionist policy of the White House, 
maintaining the promised reduction in direct 
taxes and social expenditure and an increase of 
18 % in military expenditure, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the Federal Reserve System's 
concern for monetary orthodoxy. Mr. Volcker, 
President of the Federal Reserve System, is in 
fact refusing to relax his credit policy until the 
government and Congress start to make effec-
tive reductions in a growing budget deficit. 
25. The debates which have just ended in 
Congress left the government project practically 
intact since budget cuts were kept to a mini-
mum. In the defence field, which is vital for 
Europe, these cuts did not even reach 1 %. In 
other words, interest rates are liable to stay high 
and the dollar will probably continue to be 
most attractive in the world currency market, 
with all the inherent disadvantages for the more 
sensitive European currencies, with dollar 
investments being preferred for a long time to 
come. 
26. As the General Affairs Committee was 
told in Washington, the United States adminis-
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tration does not have an interest rate policy but 
an overall economic, monetary and budgetary 
policy. Whatever the short-term drawbacks for 
European currencies may be, it must be noted 
that if the United States failed to offset a policy 
of high budget deficits by measures of this kind 
it would have to make drastic cuts in a budget 
which had the merit of trying to reduce the 
Soviet Union's comfortable lead in the defence 
field. 
27. (2) On the other hand, some European 
governments, although long divided over the 
priority to be given to fighting the crisis, now 
seem to consider that the fight against unem-
ployment should be given first priority. This 
has led them to adopt a policy diametrically 
opposed to that of the United States since the 
tendency is to facilitate credit at home and 
grant very cheap credit to their foreign custo-
mers so as to stimulate consumption through 
greater budgetary expenditure, a higher stand-
ard of living and social expenditure, and 
exports, even if this means allowing their cur-
rencies to slide. 
28. There are certainly considerable differen-
ces between the European countries, but rising 
unemployment seems to be leading them, one 
after the other in spite of attempts at monetary 
recovery which have sometimes been successful, 
particularly in the United Kingdom in 1981, to 
take decisions which are hardly likely to ensure 
monetary stability. Inter alia, this is the case 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom which 
decided, in mid-January 1982, to lower their 
interest rates in order to stimulate their econo-
mies and fight unemployment. But with the 
strengthening of the dollar such attempts are 
liable to fail. Yet the rising dollar helps Euro-
pean sales abroad and increases exporter's pro-
fits. But the European governments are above 
all afraid that it may also encourage inflation 
imported in the form of a rise in the cost of 
products purchased abroad, even if lower oil 
and raw materials prices due to the generalised 
recession limit this phenomenon considerably, 
at least for the time being. 
29. The instability of exchange rates and of 
American interest rates is therefore considered a 
threat to the Common Market's trade interests 
and an obstacle to the co-ordination of econo-
mic and monetary policies leading to a recovery 
in the growth rate and a victory over infla-
tion. Thus, there have been realignments in 
the central rates of the European monetary sys-
tem within a few months. This instability, 
which has sometimes involved a doubling up of 
interest rates, has inflicted a .. dollar shock" on 
the European economies of a magnitude similar 
to that of the .. oil shocks" of 1974 and 1980, 
and reduced to naught the governments' efforts 
to re-establish their economic growth by pre-
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venting them, for instance, from reducing the 
cost of credit. Thus, at a time when American 
policy is aimed at stabilisation or even a rise in 
the dollar, European policy of stimulating 
employment has the opposite effect, thus 
contributing further to the rising rate of the dol-
lar and a drop in the exchange rates of Euro-
pean currencies, weakening European positions 
in the world. One consequence of this policy 
is to increase Europe's energy problems since 
the price of oil is fixed in dollars. 
30. However, this American policy cannot be 
considered from a solely European point of 
view or even from a solely western point of 
view. Its effects have also reduced the means 
of action on the world market of gold-
producing countries, particularly the Soviet 
Union, which has thus been forced to draw 
heavily on its gold reserves to buy dollars at a 
time when rising interest rates on the American 
market have lowered the price of gold from 
about $ 800 an ounce in 1980 to about $ 350 at 
the beginning of 1982, in order to obtain the 
foreign currency needed for its purchases of 
grain or to help its satellites to meet their 
overwhelming commitments to their western 
creditors. It is therefore understandable that a 
policy of loans or cheap credit extended by the 
United States' European partners to the Soviet 
Union and its allies is rather irritating for the 
United States, which had hoped that its firm 
monetary policy, at the cost of major sacrifices 
on its part, would have had more effect on the 
Soviet Union and induced it to change the 
course of its external policy and military effort 
if it had not received indirect assistance from 
European members of NATO. 
31. In such matters, no one can say who is 
right or who is wrong, but it may be noted that 
different policies, pursued without sufficient 
consultation among the western partners, have 
weakened the hoped-for political effects of the 
American measures, slowed down the revival of 
western economic activity and provoked unne-
cessary resentment between the transatlantic 
partners. 
32. (3) Although the crisis has led to a drop in 
energy consumption in most western countries, 
there is still a danger of the stabilisation of oil 
prices resulting from the reduction of consump-
tion, the development of new oil resources, par-
ticularly in Mexico, Gabon, Cameroon and 
Nigeria, and natural gas in the North Sea being 
jeopardised by the rise in the dollar. Econo-
mic recovery would be difficult because it 
would be followed immediately by a rise in 
energy prices which would endanger it. 
33. The United States, which has domestic 
resources for most of its energy requirements 
and can, if necessary, increase its oil production 
at short notice, therefore tends to attach less 
importance to the question of energy supplies, 
whereas certain European countries, having 
only very limited resources on their own terri-
tory, felt they had to make major sacrifices in 
order to ensure their energy supplies. This is 
the case in particular for Belgium, France, the 
Federal Republic ofGermany and Italy. 
34. The fact that these countries, and France 
in particular, have made a considerable effort to 
develop the production of other sources of 
energy, including nuclear energy, presents few 
disadvantages of an international nature. 
However, it should be recalled that there are 
still sizeable world oil reserves: while prices 
have dropped in spite of the almost total inter-
ruption of Iranian deliveries and a more than 
two-thirds cut in Iraqi supplies because of the 
war between the two countries, and also in spite 
of the cuts in output decided upon by OPEC, it 
is unlikely that prices will rise very much in the 
next few years even in the event of economic 
recovery. 
35. It is not therefore surprising that the 
United States was disturbed about the signing of 
contracts between Belgium, France, the Federal 
Republic and Italy and the Soviet Union for 
deliveries of natural gas. Indeed the United 
States authorities consider these contracts 
involve a number of risks which they did not 
fail to emphasise: 
36. (i) Although in most cases the countries 
concerned are not considering procuring more 
than 5 % of their energy requirements in this 
way, their decision involves long-term measures 
to convert part of their industry to this form of 
energy, as well as large-scale investment for its 
transport and distribution. They are thus pro-
viding the Soviet Union with the possibility of 
cutting off their supplies overnight on one pre-
text or another and consequently exercising 
economic and possibly political pressure on 
them which is liable to endanger Atlantic cohe-
sion. 
37. (ii) These drawbacks were said to b.e even 
greater since the oil pipeline to be built should 
come into service in 1986 for a period of 
twenty-five years. The United States fears that 
such contracts make the signatctry countries 
unduly dependent on the Soviet Union and it 
suspects Europeans of giving economic advan-
tage precedence over their foreign policies 
towards the Soviet Union. 
38. (iii)The contracts they have signed not only 
allow the Soviet Union to acquire equipment 
for research on and the exploitation and trans-
port of natural gas which is the result of 
advanced technology without anything valid in 
exchange but also provide it foreign exchange 
which frees resources for military use. 
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39. (iv) These investments beneficial to the 
Soviet Union are generally granted at interest 
rates far lower than current market rates and 
even less than the erosion of western curren-
cies. This allows the Soviet Union to obtain 
modern equipment very cheaply. 
40. (v) The interests at stake are so great that 
the contracting parties cannot be expected to 
participate in any policy of economic sanctions 
against the Soviet Union or its allies. It was 
moreover hardly a month after the Polish 
takeover that France, which had not hesitated 
to denounce Soviet responsibility, signed its 
contract. 
41. (vi) In view of the vast reserves of natural 
gas recently discovered in the British, Danish, 
Dutch and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea, 
this investment diverts the capital of signatory 
countries from truly western resources where it 
could have been used for offshore natural gas 
prospecting, drilling, transport and distribution. 
Present estimates are that this offshore natu-
ral gas would cover more than thirty years' 
consumption for the whole of Western Europe 
if it made these admittedly heavy investments. 
The United States for its part says it is pre-
pared to supply Europe with the gas it might 
require during the period 1982-85 when invest-
ment would not yet be profitable. 
42. These various factors illustrate the sur-
prise and displeasure of the United States at the 
reluctance of the countries owning these resour-
ces to exploit them and at the haste of others to 
conclude contracts with the Soviet Union 
which they consider both politically dangerous 
and economically unhealthy. 
43. (4) To these differences should be added 
trade difficulties in a period when the crisis is 
making all countries try to protect their domes-
tic markets and develop external trade at heavy 
cost. Monetary disparities already help to dis-
tort the rules of free competition. Protectionist 
practices, often covert so as not to seem to 
violate GATT rules, exist and are increasing on 
both sides of the Atlantic, and mutual accusa-
tions, founded or not, are multiplying. 
44. Thus, although the United States' overall 
position towards Europe is positive, the EEC's 
external trade deficit with the United States 
being $ 13,000 million, the European Commu-
nity is often held responsible for the trade diffi-
culties and discriminatory practices of which 
the United States feels it is the victim. It 
considers Europe, and to a far greater extent 
Japan, are becoming a threat to American 
industry, agriculture and commerce. 
45. One of the more serious issues is that of 
European agricultural products and foodstuffs 
said to benefit from subsidies and public assis-
tance. It is the Community agricultural policy 
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that is thus called in question, Europe having in 
fact become a major exporter of grain, sugar, 
dairy products and probably soon Mediterra-
nean products on the international market, 
hence the American request for a GATT tribu-
nal to be set up to condemn the policy of Com-
munity subsidies for flour, sugar, poultry and 
pasta. It should be noted that opinions on the 
subject differ somewhat depending on whether 
the EEC is considered as a state-type entity or 
as a sort of cartel of states. 
46. The second subject of discord is the iron 
and steel industry: faced with a sudden surge of 
European and above all Japanese steel exports 
to the United States because of competitive 
prices due to the rise in the value of the dollar, 
the American iron and steel industry has com-
plained about dumping and the subsidies gran-
ted to the iron and steel industry in eleven 
countries, mostly European. The European 
Commission has responded by pointing to the 
low volume of steel exports in 1980, which are 
now taken as a reference point, and to the large 
demand for steel tubes which cannot be met 
entirely by American industry. The dialogue 
on these points has not been favourably 
concluded and should be pursued. 
47. Finally, the United States criticises the 
EEC countries for their policy of export credits 
at rates which they consider too low and conse-
quently liable to jeopardise free competition. 
The United States is urging the OECD coun-
tries to raise the cost of credit when exporting 
to third-world and Warsaw Pact countries: diffi-
cult negotiations are soon to open in the OECD 
between the signatories of the arrangement for 
granting credit for exports. In the first case, 
only economic reasons are advanced, whereas 
the EEC considers that credit granted to third-
world countries forms part of their policy of 
development assistance. The search for means 
of avoiding a trade war between the two sides of 
the Atlantic is now at the hub of increasingly 
frequent talks between Americans and Euro-
peans. These difficulties undoubtedly stem 
from a more general opposition: the EEC and 
the United States do not share the same diplo-
matic and strategic view of international rela-
tions. Priorities are not the same, particularly 
with regard to the North-South dialogue. 
48. Can it be claimed that the same is true in 
East-West relations? Trade with the Soviet 
Union and its allies is thus a particularly deli-
cate aspect of the Euro-American dispute. In 
this case, in fact, there are many connections 
between truly political concerns and those 
relating to the economy. 
49. Consequently, while American public 
opinion was annoyed that Europe would not 
take sanctions, except in March 1982 to reduce 
by 25 % Community imports of fifty-eight libe-
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ralised Soviet products, i.e. a reduction of 
1.34 % in the total volume of EEC imports, 
after the takeover in Poland on 13th December 
1981, European public opinion on the contrary 
did not take President Reagan 's decisions very 
seriously when on 29th December he announced 
sanctions against the Soviet Union by post-
poning the signature of long-term contracts for 
so-called strategic goods, but in no way inter-
rupting deliveries to the Soviet Union under 
earlier contracts. Neither effective economically 
nor clear politically, such practices have cast 
doubt on the credibility of a policy of sanc-
tions. Moreover, the European governments 
were apparently not consulted or informed by 
Washington, which presented them with a fait 
accompli. However, the situation subsequently 
improved on the occasion of the special meet-
ing of the North Atlantic Council in January 
1982, although no clear-cut economic measures 
were adopted with regard to the Soviet Union. 
50. In these various fields, it is evident that it 
is essential to co-ordinate decisions taken or to 
be taken on either side of the Atlantic. With 
OECD, GATT, Cocom and meetings between 
governors of central banks, all the requisite 
machinery for consultations exists and is appa-
rently used. But in the last resort it is often 
considerations of particular short-term interests 
or even internal policy that seem to decide the 
governments. No international institution can 
solve this problem as long as there is no firm 
and lasting desire on all sides to do so. Yet 
everything indicates that the economic crisis 
has curbed any inclination on the part of the 
Western European and United States Govern-
ments to take effective account of the interests 
of their western partners. But now is the time 
when co-ordination of measures taken or, above 
all, yet to be taken is more than ever necessary 
to maintain the economic cohesion of the West 
which alone can allow the crisis to be over-
come, or at any rate its effects to be attenuated, 
and to avoid the crisis leading to a dangerous 
political and military weakening of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
IV. Defence and security 
51. The United States had to intervene in the 
two world wars because it realised that its own 
security might be jeopardised by events outside 
the western hemisphere. Looking back, it may 
be regretted that in 1918 it did not draw the 
consequences of the obligations stemming 
nolens volens from its position of the world's 
leading economic and hence political power 
and that a strong isolationist trend based on 
memories of the past rather than current rea-
lities prevented it from occupying its due place 
in the then collective security system. At least 
the second world war and the development of 
nuclear strength, the conquest of space and 
mastery of modem technology can leave it no 
illusions. Although a remnant of isolationism 
sometimes breaks the surface of the collective 
American attitude, it is no longer a rational 
choice and has been deliberately rejected by all 
those who have exercised responsibilities in 
the United States since the end of the war. 
52. Moreover, the people of the United 
States have little doubt about the existence of 
Soviet imperialism which threatens the inter-
national balance, world peace and the security 
of the United States although at times they may 
have wondered whether the measures taken by 
successive United States Governments to coun-
ter this threat were really adequate at the time. 
53. On these two points, therefore, there has, 
since 194 7 at any event, been a deep-rooted 
convergence of views among the very great 
majority of Western Europeans and Americans 
and almost all their political leaders. This is a 
fundamental factor on which joint security is 
based, particularly as the American leaders, and 
apparently the great majority of public opinion, 
are convinced that safeguarding the indepen-
dence and freedom of Western Europe is essen-
tial for the security of the United States itself, 
perhaps less for strategic reasons than for eco-
nomic, political and cultural reasons. This is 
why the United States has made and is continu-
ing a considerable effort, accompanied by major 
sacrifices, to ensure the security of Western 
Europe at the same time as its own. 
54. This underlying fact must never be for-
gotten when tackling the problems now facing 
co-operation between Europe and the United 
States in the fields of European defence and 
security. There are five closely-linked but 
nevertheless separate fields: the maintenance of 
an American military force in Europe, the 
deployment of continental-range missiles on 
European territory, the search for agreement 
with the Soviet Union on the limitation of 
conventional and nuclear armaments in 
Europe, the reciprocal confidence of Americans 
in the determination of Europeans to defend 
their freedom and of Europeans in that of the 
Americans not to sacrifice Europe's security to 
that of their own territory, and finally sharing 
the burdens imposed by joint defence. A sixth 
point deals with arms co-operation. 
1. The presence of American forces in Europe 
55. Europe's defence is mainly ensured by 
American strategic nuclear armaments. These 
are comparable to Soviet strategic nuclear 
armaments and ensure that the United States 
has a second strike capability in the event of 
the Soviet Union trying to destroy its nuclear 
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means. Its main strength is constituted by 36 
submarines carrying 576 missiles, most of them 
with multiple warheads, about 316 long-range 
nuclear-capable bombers and 1 ,052 interconti-
nental missiles, most of which also have mul-
tiple warheads 1• 
56. This is a considerable force. Neverthe-
less, it is faced by a Soviet force of 84 submari-
nes carrying 950 nuclear missiles, 150 long-
range, nuclear-capable bombers and about 
1,398 surface-to-surface intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles, most of them with multiple nuclear 
warheads. In other words, American strategic 
nuclear strength is not greater than that of the 
Soviet Union and the new administration has 
started to modernise it, particularly by starting 
work on 8 nuclear submarines of a new type 
each carrying 24 Trident missiles. 
57. Its aim being to deter a potential adver-
sary, the slight numerical inferiority of the 
American strategic force is of no consequence 
insofar as it is depluyed so as to be able to 
inflict serious damage in response to a first 
strike by the Soviet Union, as is now the case. 
These are the terms of its protective role for 
Europe since the Soviet Union cannot risk a 
nuclear war which would devastate its entire 
territory. The latter's policy is therefore to 
dissociate this highly deterrent force from the 
defence of Europe, which American diplomacy 
has never accepted. 
58. The guarantee given both to the Euro-
peans and to the Soviet Union that this strate-
gic nuclear force is really intended for the 
defence of Europe is the presence of far from 
negligible American forces in Europe: 219,729 
men in the army and 54,000 in the air force. 
They have short-range tactical missiles with 
nuclear warheads. In addition, equipment is 
being stored for substantial reinforcements. 
59. However, some segments of American 
public opinion and Congress are now asking for 
a substantial reduction in these forces and they 
have many arguments in favour of such a 
reduction: 
(i) Europeans should be urged to make 
a greater effort to increase their 
contribution to their own security; 
(ii) it should allow significant savings to 
be made and improve the American 
balance of payments, which might 
foster lower interest rates in the 
United States; 
(iii) since such forces would obviously 
not be capable of winning against a 
1. All figures in this chapter are taken from "The milit-
ary balance 1981-82" published by the International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies in 1981. 
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massive Soviet offensive, they would 
be hostages and a smaller force 
would reduce the number of hostages 
without diminishing the deterrent 
effect of the American presence in 
Europe; 
(iv) a reduction might be offset by plan-
ning for reinforcements to be 
brought in quickly from the United 
States in the event of emergency. 
60. At present everything indicates that the 
United States administration does not share this 
view and it has said so strongly, most recently 
through the person of Mr. Eagleburger, Under-
Secretary of State, speaking to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee. His main argu-
ments were: 
(a) far from encouraging Europeans to 
make an additional effort, a large-
scale withdrawal of American forces 
would discourage them and make 
them seek a semblance of security by 
other means; 
(b) the savings made would be slight in 
view of the large contribution made 
by the countries where forces are sta-
tioned - mainly the Federal Republic 
- to their cost, and the balance of 
payments between the United States 
and Western Europe is clearly to the 
advantage of the United States; 
(c) the Soviet Union might also interpret 
withdrawal as a demonstration of a 
weakening American determination to 
defend Europe and consequently these 
forces would be more like hostages 
and less deterrent. 
61. It is obviously in Europe's interests for 
these forces to be kept at their present level, 
and it therefore has every advantage in demons-
trating as clearly as possible its own deter-
mination to take part in the defence of its terri-
tory in order to strengthen the impact of the 
arguments of those who stress the deterrent and 
non-hostage nature of the American force in 
Europe, which introduces the question of shar-
ing the financial burden of joint defence. 
62. In this connection mention should also 
be made of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. 
The allied participants have agreed not to 
undertake unilateral reductions prior to a posi-
tive outcome of these talks. 
2. The deployment of continental-range missiles 
63. In Western Europe, the presence of Ame-
rican forces and their retaliatory capability in 
the event of conventional or limited nuclear 
attack are an essential part of Europe's secur-
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ity. Anything that disconnected, i.e. separated, 
Europe's security from that of the United Sta-
tes would allow a potential enemy to speculate 
on the possibility of waging and winning a war 
limited to European territory and would destroy 
the deterrent effect of United States strategic 
nuclear weapons. 
64. The fact that the Soviet Union deployed 
first SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and then since 1977 
SS-20 missiles with multiple nuclear warheads 
capable of reaching, from Soviet territory, 
almost any point in Western Europe has been a 
matter of particular concern to the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance who have 
since lost no opportunity of drawing the atten-
tion of the American authorities to the fact that 
they had no weapons in Europe capable of 
countering the SS-20. This meant that the 
Soviet Union could hope that the United States 
would not endanger the security of its own ter-
ritory by using strategic nuclear weapons to 
counter an offensive limited to European terri-
tory. 
65. In December 1979, the North Atlantic 
Council decided to take up the challenge by 
installing on the territory of the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance missiles capa-
ble of balancing the strength the SS-20 gave the 
Soviet Union: Pershing 11 continental-range 
ballistic missiles and Tomahawk cruise missi-
les. However, at the same time the North 
Atlantic Council decided to ask the Soviet 
Union to stop deploying the SS-20, in which 
case the Americans would not deploy the 
Pershing 11 and Tomahawk. 
66. If Europe's means of defence, which have 
been inadequate and which it was hoped would 
be improved in 1983 with the deployment of 
the Pershing 11 and Tomahawk, remain 
unchanged, one may wonder whether American 
public opinion would agree to maintain Ameri-
can forces on European territory as hostages of 
the Soviet Union. If these forces, which pro-
vide the link with the American strategic deter-
rent, were withdrawn from Europe, Western 
Europe's security would no longer be guaran-
teed. 
67. Since then, the Soviet Union has used all 
the means at its disposal to confirm the situa-
tion it had thus created, on the one hand by 
speeding up deployment of the SS-20, of which 
there are now more than 300 in Eastern Eur-
ope, on the other by fostering through active 
propaganda all movements of public opinion in 
Western Europe against the deployment by the 
United States of weapons capable of retaliating 
against the SS-20 and, finally, by calling for the 
ratification of the SALT 11 treaty, suspended by 
President Carter following the invasion of 
Afghanistan. It now seems that in spite of the 
Polish crisis the United States is prepared to 
resume these negotiations. The negotiations 
on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) 
started in Geneva in December 1981 and were 
suspended for two months in March 1982. In 
fact, the negotiations are still in a preliminary 
stage and statements by both sides are obviously 
aimed at defining maximum positions in order 
to tackle the serious talks from a position of 
strength. 
68. The Soviets asked for inclusion in the 
negotiations of the French and British nuclear 
forces which these countries regard as strategic 
weapons. The eighteen French missiles on the 
Plateau d'Albion are in fact the only western 
continental-range missiles deployed in Europe. 
France, which considers its deterrent force to 
be both a national and minimum one and 
whose missiles are in the process of being 
modernised, was not at all prepared to enter 
into such negotiations and the United States did 
nothing to persuade it to do so. Moreover, the 
Soviet Union wished the negotiations also to 
cover the NATO forward-based systems which 
consist mainly of aircraft, most of which are 
dual-capable. Mr. Brezhnev at various times 
proposed a moratorium on the deployment of 
INF. The latest version was his proposal of 
16th March to freeze the number of INF in the 
European part of his country, which would 
perpetuate, until the conclusion of a hypothe-
tical Soviet-American agreement, the Soviet 
Union's present near-monopoly in this field. 
69. On the American side, it must be noted 
that the administration showed no weakness. 
President Reagan envisaged renouncing the 
deployment of intermediate-range missiles in 
Europe only in the framework of the zero 
option, i.e. the total dismantling of all conti-
nental missiles in Eastern Europe, whether 
SS-20s, SS-4s or SS-5s. He announced that he 
would not be satisfied with a mere transfer of 
these missiles eastwards in view of the ease with 
which the Soviet Union could move them a few 
hundred kilometres to the west and the difficul-
ties and delays in bringing modem missiles 
from the United States to Europe. Everything 
indicates that such firmness is essential if the 
Geneva negotiations are to achieve anything 
other than the renunciation by the West of a 
capability similar to the Soviet missiles. There 
is no reason to think that the United States 
administration would be prepared to change its 
opinion on this point. 
70. Some of these Soviet proposals have been 
given credence in Western Europe. A series of 
demonstrations against the deployment of Ame-
rican missiles in Europe were held in autumn 
1981, culminating in most European capitals in 
November. They were led in certain countries 
by the local communist parties and in others 
they were dominated by political or religious 
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associations which cannot be suspected of com-
plicity with the Soviet Union but which were 
driven by a real aversion to nuclear weapons. 
They question the notion of deterrence by 
horrible weapons often insufficiently explained 
and the large amounts of money spent on 
them. Whatever the reasons, these demonstra-
tions, which were often massive and widely 
reported in the press, were interpreted in the 
United States as being hostile to NATO and the 
United States and provided encouragement for 
supporters of the withdrawal of American 
forces from Europe and opponents of the 
deployment of intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons. There were still very vivid memories 
of this in the United States in spring 1982, as 
members of the General Affairs Committee who 
were there can testify. 
71. It is encouraging that many of those who 
demonstrated against nuclear weapons also 
rejected the Soviet moratorium proposal as a 
propaganda move. These groups also expressed 
doubts, however, about the negotiability of Pre-
sident Reagan's zero option. 
3. The search for agreement on arms limitation 
72. It is easy to be ironical about the number 
of negotiations now being conducted actively 
on arms limitation. Apart from the INF nego-
tiations in Geneva to which your Rapporteur 
referred above, mention may be made of: the 
MBFR talks which have been pursued in Vien-
na for many years without reaching agreement 
even on the data of existing forces on both 
sides; the CSCE which has stopped at confiden-
ce-building measures designed only to streng-
then detente, whose very foundations have been 
undermined by Soviet initiatives in Afghanistan 
and Poland and non-respect by the Soviet 
Union and its allies of its principles; SALT 11 
on intercontinental-range nuclear missiles, 
which agreement is effectively applied, although 
the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet 
Union led the United States to postpone its 
ratification; the conference of the United 
Nations Disarmament Committee, which for 
years has kept to vague generalities, and the 
special sessions of the United Nations General 
Assembly, the next of which is to be held in 
June 1982. 
73. Irony would be unacceptable and it is 
precisely because the United States takes these 
negotiations seriously that it has not allowed it-
self to make concessions which might have pro-
duced results which although spectacular would 
have been dangerous for the Alliance. Empha-
sis should be placed on the prominence given 
to these negotiations in consultations in the fra-
mework of NATO and the respect shown by 
the Americans for the views expressed by their 
allies. 
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74. In none of these cases has the United Sta-
tes administration considered or a fortiori 
accepted concessions which might have o~ered 
it immediate advantages but at the cost of disso-
ciating Europe's defence from that of the Uni-
ted States. The continuity of American views 
and actions here is particularly remarkable 
since internal forces have often urged it to seek 
rapid and spectacular conclusions from which 
the administration in office might have derived 
immediate political advantages. Suspicion 
which has sometimes been voiced in Europe in 
this connection has proved groundless and it is 
only fair to underline this, while the Americans 
on the contrary have sometimes, particularly in 
the case of the CSCE, followed their European 
allies in spite of serious hesitation on their part 
because they did not wish to give the impres-
sion that they were refusing forms of detente in 
which Europe seemed to believe although they 
themselves had little confidence in them. Sub-
sequent events proved that these apprehensions 
were at least partly justified. 
4. The breakdown of defence costs 
75. The problem of sharing the cost of defen-
ding Europe between the European and Ameri-
can partners of the Atlantic Alliance has been a 
particularly delicate aspect of relations between 
Europe and the United States for a long 
time. It is quite clear that after the second 
world war the United States bore the main bur-
den, whereas Europe's return to prosperity cal-
led for a fairer division. It is equally under-
standable that in a time of economic and finan-
cial difficulties this question of cost-sharing 
should become particularly acute. 
76. The problem is even more complex since 
the United States assumes commitments through-
out the world and certain European countries 
have military commitments outside Europe, 
which is not the case of others, whereas the 
Atlantic Alliance covers only a limited geogra-
phical area. To what extent is it then legitimate 
to place military expenditure in Europe and in 
the rest of the world on the same footing ? 
77. Second, the larger industrialised coun-
tries, starting with the United States, invest 
almost entirely, or at any rate to a very great 
extent, in their national industries, which impo-
ses no burden on their external balance of pay-
ments, while others have to purchase abroad a 
fairly large, and sometimes considerable, part of 
the equipment and weapons required for their 
forces. For this, they generally turn to their 
allies who are better placed and who hence 
derive commercial benefits from the purchases 
of their partners. 
78. Third, in future the North American 
allies are likely to devote more resources to 
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civil defence and air defence in view of the 
growing threat from Soviet air forces and cruise 
missiles. 
79. Fourth, comparisons vary considerably 
according to the facts on which they are based: 
in absolute figures 1, as a proportion of gross 
domestic product, as a proportion of the increase 
in GDP or in terms of per capita gross domestic 
product. Further account has to be taken of 
reference years and the continuity or discon-
tinuity of the proportions established. It has 
thus been possible to make the comparisons 
in the table hereafter. 
80. Simplified to a maximum for ease of refe-
rence, the table shows that between 1971 and 
1979 the United States' share in the military 
expenditure of the countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance fell sharply whereas the military effort 
of Japan, which is not a member of the Alliance, 
rose, without, however, in proportion to its 
population and wealth approaching that of the 
members of the Atlantic Alliance. This partly 
explains the strength of Japan, which bears less 
of a military burden, in international competi-
tion. Again a comparison with the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact member countries 
would show that the financial and human bur-
dens they bear are in all respects far heavier 
than those of the countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance. Finally, your Rapporteur has not 
analysed the figures for the European member 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance: they would 
show major disparities and diverging trends. 
These two factors are not directly concerned 
with his subject. 
81. But he considers it essential to recall that 
in view of the increase in Soviet weapons all 
the members of the North Atlantic Council 
accepted, in 1977, the principle of an annual 
increase of 3% in constant terms in their mili-
tary expenditure up to 1984, and this under-
taking was renewed in 1979. Yet this promise 
has been followed up in only a few member 
countries of the Alliance while others, because 
of their economic and financial difficulties, 
have on the contrary continued to allow their 
military expenditure to slide. One of the merits 
of the present United States administration is 
clearly to have reversed the tendency which 
had persisted until 1979 and to have energeti-
cally and successfully in a reticent Congress, 
defended a budget aimed at improving the 
defence effort. 
82. Without wishing to criticise the policy of 
one or other European country, your Rappor-
1. Figures in this paragraph are taken from the United 
States Department of Defence pu~lication " Report O!l 
allied commitments to defence spendmg- A report to Um-
ted States Congress" by Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of 
Defence, March 1981. 
- ------- -------------------------
1971 
Other 
United members 
States of the Atlantic 
Alliance 
I. GDP (in 1979 constant dol-
lars) (000 million) .......... 1,821 2,166 
2. Population (millions) ....... 207.1 330 
3. Per capita GDP ($) ......... 8,793 6,553 
4. Total defence expenditure 
(1979 constant dollars) (000 
million) ................... 140.11 82.35 
5. Total defence expenditure 
as% ofGDP .............. 7.1 3.6 
6. Total active duty manpower 
(thousands) ................ 3,831.7 4,258.5 
7. Total active duty manpower 
as % of population ......... 1.85 1.29 
8. Per capita defence expendi-
ture (in 1979 constant dollars) 677 250 
teur underlines the magnitude of the American 
effort and the firm language used by the United 
States Government in face of public opinion 
and Congress, which were strongly tempted to 
attribute responsibility for the Alliance lagging 
behind to the inadequate part played by their 
European allies. However this may be, a 
European effort and respect for the under-
takings entered into in 1977 would be of great 
assistance to this administration in pursuing a 
policy which would perhaps associate Western 
Europe's security more closely than ever with 
that of the United States. 
5. Arms co-operation 
83. The present American administration has 
shown its willingness to pursue vigorously the 
ongoing attempts to improve the two-way traf-
fic of transatlantic arms co-operation. It puts 
more emphasis, however, on industrial co-
operation, such as the teaming up of industries 
in the production of components, than on other 
means of a division of labour. This approach 
might produce practical results as it is likely 
to be patterned according to existing skills and 
capabilities in the various countries. Yet, your 
Rapporteur feels from past experience that the 
two-way street cannot flourish without conti-
nued government support in persuading indus-
try to give up part of their activities in return 
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1979 
Other 
United members Japan Total States of the Japan Total Atlantic 
Alliance 
648 4,631 2,355 2,778 -l,Oll 6,144 
105.7 642.7 220.58 347.71 115.8 684.1 
6,132 7,209 10,678 7,989 8,636 8,982 
5.60 228.05 118.38 97.03 9.56 224.96 
0.9 5 5.2 3.4 1 3.7 
258.9 8,349.1 3,024 4,062.9 264 7,350.8 
0.24 1.3 1.37 1.17 0.23 1.07 
53 355 537 279 83 329 
for the benefits of shared research and develop-
ment and larger scope for series production. 
Emphasis on industrial arrangements should 
therefore be no substitute for governmental 
activity. The same applies to overcoming 
Congressional pressures against procurement of 
European equipment. 
6. Mutual confidence 
84. The analyses which make up the present 
chapter show clearly that Europeans have no 
reason to doubt the determination of the United 
States Government to maintain forces in 
Europe, to negotiate a reduction in these forces 
or the limitation of their nuclear armaments 
only in order to attain a lower level of balance 
ensuring Western Europe's security and to do 
nothing which would separate Europe's defence 
from that of the United States or make less 
improbable a limited armed conflict in Europe 
in order to ensure theoretically much greater, 
but in fact illusory, security for American 
territory. 
85. The main obstacle to this policy is the 
limited confidence which American public opi-
nion, shocked by the Vietnam war and by set-
backs in Iran and elsewhere, now has in the 
determination of Europeans to ensure their own 
defence. Apparent or real opposition to a 
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number of affairs outside Europe have been a 
contributory factor, as well as the demonstra-
tions against the deployment of intermediate-
range nuclear weapons in November 1981 
whose magnitude seems to have struck Ameri-
ican public opinion, some countries' failure 
to implement the North Atlantic Council's 
1977 decision to increase military budgets, 
or others' trade policy towards the Soviet 
Union and its allies. 
86. The necessary effort to re-establish a situ-
ation, which admittedly is not seriously jeo-
pardised for the moment but which might be if 
present misunderstandings increase or worsen, 
must therefore be made in both Europe and the 
United States. Your Rapporteur does not there-
fore feel he should conclude his remarks 
about his talks in New York and Washington 
on a note of alarm but on a serious warn-
ing that can be fully effective in the United Sta-
tes itself only if it is first heeded in Europe. 
87. Conversely, European sensitivities should 
also be spared. American defence policy 
seems to centre on two points: the survivability 
of the retaliatory strategic forces and the provi-
sion of an incentive to the Soviet Union to 
engage in substantial reductions by means of a 
determined American armament effort. The 
second of these objectives is most liable to 
arouse European apprehension. Therefore it 
would be desirable for new defence spending to 
be linked to specific programmes and capabi-
lities of the Warsaw Pact in order to avoid 
stimulating a new spiral in the arms race. In 
addition, it would be desirable to draw up an 
agreed document on the present and future 
balance of forces which could be released to 
the public. 
V. Relations with the Soviet Union 
and its allies 
88. For reasons of society, history, civilisa-
tion, political habits and economic tradition 
and structure, the nature of the Soviet challenge 
is not understood in the same way in Europe as 
in America. Nor do the European countries 
themselves all share the same approach. The 
presence of communist ministers in the French 
Government and the existence of a powerful 
communist party in Italy are often interpreted 
in America as a sign of strong Soviet influence 
in these two countries, although here too there 
is a great difference between the administration, 
more sensitive inter alia to the reality of these 
countries' contributions to the Alliance's mili-
tary effort, and public opinion, which is often 
inadequately informed. 
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89. Furthermore, the evolution of East-West 
relations in the last ten years, often covered by 
the vague word detente, has not always been 
understood in the same way in the United Sta-
tes and in certain European countries. For 
many Europeans detente was a new-style rela-
tionship between Eastern and Western Europe 
thanks to which trade could be increased to the 
benefit of the economies of all concerned and 
exchanges of persons and ideas could be develo-
ped leading to a more liberal trend in Soviet 
society and a relaxation of the Soviet grip on 
the people's democracies. Sacrifices were 
made by European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance, including the Federal Republic, parti-
cularly concerned by such a trend because of its 
responsibilities towards the whole German 
nation. It is not therefore surprising that the 
European members of the Atlantic Alliance 
should have set great store by the application of 
the Helsinki final act and the pursuit of the 
economic, cultural and above all human aspects 
of detente. 
90. There were certainly fewer illusions on 
the American side about what it was possible to 
expect of the Soviet Union and its allies, and 
the United States followed rather than preceded 
its allies in Helsinki. But detente had other 
advantages for the United States: mainly it allo-
wed a direct dialogue to be started with the 
Soviet Union at political level to avoid any 
crisis in international relations becoming too 
serious and leading to a direct confrontation 
between the two great powers and, at military 
level, to achieve a limitation of armaments, 
particularly nuclear armaments, with a view to 
maintaining security based on mutual deterrence 
and at the same time limiting the expenditure 
involved in increasing and improving nuclear 
weapons. It is certain that some results have 
been achieved in these two respects. All are 
not satisfactory as may be seen from the present 
imbalance in continental-range missiles or the 
outbreak of disputes over their interests outside 
Europe, but although the conference to verify 
the application of the Helsinki final act held in 
Belgrade was a failure and the , one held in 
Madrid, after dragging on for more than a year 
without achieving anything, was adjourned in 
April 1982 until some vague date in the 
autumn, the negotiations between the two great 
powers on the limitation of nuclear armaments 
seem about to be resumed in summer 1982. 
91. These general considerations seem largely 
to explain the misunderstandings which have 
emerged over certain matters in the last two 
years. 
92. Different assessments have emerged 
mainly on two occasions: the invasion of 
Afghanistan at the end of 1979, and the Polish 
coup d'etat on 13th December 1981. Each 
time Europeans had the feeling that the United 
States had been too slow in marking its deter-
mination to oppose the Soviet initiatives and 
then, afterwards, without consulting its allies, it 
had reacted with more vigour than they thought 
necessary in face of a fait accompli at the risk 
of jeopardising the advantages they hoped to 
draw from detente. The Americans for their 
part thought European reactions showed great 
weakness, but the Polish affair hardly delayed 
the opening of the Geneva negotiations on 
theatre nuclear weapons. 
93. (l) Afghanistan has been occupied since 
29th December 1979 by Soviet troops who are 
fighting a resistance movement which includes 
practically the whole population. Clearly it 
may be thought that this operation is a failure 
for the Soviet Union since it is caught up in a 
struggle seemingly without solution. However, 
the struggle remains within tolerable limits for 
the Soviet Union since, with 90,000 men, it is 
managing one way or another to remain in 
Afghanistan. 
94. On the other hand, its position there 
considerably weakens the West's allies in the 
Middle East, particularly Pakistan. It also gives 
the Soviet Union a position of force within 
reach of the Gulf where it exercises an indirect 
threat at a time when the war between Iran and 
Iraq is making the area particularly vulnerable. 
Finally, the fact that, in the end, the West was 
incapable of reacting constitutes a considerable 
success for the Soviet Union and severely wea-
kens the impact of statements that the United 
States and a fortiori Europeans may make about 
this area. 
95. Immediately after the invasion of Afgha-
nistan, the United States Government neverthe-
less decided to build up a large armed force 
capable of intervening at very short notice to 
ensure the security of western interests in the 
Gulf area and Europe was asked to take part in 
this force. The Europeans did not commit 
themselves, although certain countries conside-
rably increased their naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean, whereas the United States consi-
dered, not without reason, that it was Europe's 
oil supplies rather than the United States' that 
came from the Gulf area. At present, the 
build-up of the United States rapid deployment 
force is being pursued at what seems to be a 
satisfactory rate, and it is widely considered by 
American public opinion as one of the very 
unfairly-shared burdens shouldered mainly by 
the United States for the benefit of mainly 
European interests. 
96. (ii) Poland: The main difficulty raised by 
the Polish problem in relations between Europe 
and the United States stems from the policy of 
sanctions referred to by President Reagan in his 
speech on 29th December and which the Uni-
ted States is considering strengthening, having 
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noted that the dictatorship established in 
Poland on 13th December has remained inflexi-
ble. The Ten envisaged no sanctions in their 
decision of 4th January, although they firmly 
condemned the indirect intervention of the 
Soviet Union in Poland. At the most, the Ten 
announced that they would concert with the 
United States to avoid anything liable to jeopar-
dise its action. In other words, they would not 
take part in the sanctions. In February, how-
ever, the Ten decided to reduce Community 
imports of Soviet goods by 1.34 %, a barely 
symbolic figure. 
97. Similarly, at the special NATO meeting, 
economic measures were agreed upon such as 
freezing any further official credits to Poland 
for the purchase of goods other than food pro-
ducts and the suspension of negotiations inten-
ded to change the dates on which Poland's 
external debt fell due in 1981. Finally, since 
February there has been a succession of Euro-
pean and American missions in the United Sta-
tes and in Europe to reach joint decisions, par-
ticularly on meaningful reductions in the cre-
dits granted to the Soviet Union. The difficul-
ties encountered by Europeans and Americans 
in reaching agreement on such matters have 
been noted above. 
98. In fact, in both Europe and America, 
relatively firm statements conceal a practice of 
mentioning sanctions but doing nothing that 
might affect each one's specific interests. 
99. Although consultations had been held 
with increasing frequency for more than a year, 
decisions were taken unilaterally by the United 
States, and Europe used this as a pretext for not 
being associated with them. The apparent 
result is to have doomed in advance any 
attempt to take concerted and consequently 
effective action in response to the coup on 13th 
December. 
* 
* * 
100. Relations with the United States and its 
allies are still fundamental for the security of 
Europe and the West as a whole, and NATO is 
the natural forum for these consultations. It is 
very important for both the United States and 
the ten countries of the European Community 
to enter these consultations with a willingness 
in principle to adjust prepared positions after 
receiving the reactions from their other part-
ners. Otherwise consultations have no mean-
ing. For strategic commodities there is, of 
course, Cocom which keeps an up-to-date list 
of products which the West undertakes not to 
deliver to the eastern countries. There are 
probably more deep-rooted reasons for the 
" transatlantic misunderstandings " with which 
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the Alliance must continue to operate with lit-
tle hope of overcoming them once and for all. 
101. What is important, therefore, is to avoid 
a proliferation of unilateral measures which so 
to speak take the other allies by surprise, which 
was the very reason for the more regrettable 
misunderstandings and tension in recent years. 
Your Rapporteur is in no way suggesting the 
creation of new institutions. Those which 
exist are quite ample. But he believes they 
should be used more systematically than in the 
past so as to avoid unilateral positions being 
announced to public opinion which may give 
the impression that there are serious differences 
between the members of the Atlantic Alliance. 
It would therefore be most useful to explore 
the suggestions made by Ministers Genscher 
and Colombo to provide for more informal 
contacts between the Ten and United States 
representatives. This could be done at both 
the ministerial level and at the level of the Poli-
tical Committee of European political co-
operation with the aim of discussing general 
policy objectives thus promoting better under-
standing. New institutional links should be 
avoided. 
VI. Problems outsitk Europe 
102. The Atlantic Alliance covers a specific 
area and the member countries are not bound 
to consult each other about matters outside that 
area. However, since the Suez affair in 1956 
members know that they cannot risk embarking 
upon operations abroad without a minimum of 
prior agreement. Further proof of this was the 
Vietnam war, during which Europe moved pro-
gressively away from the cause upheld by the 
United States. Consultations between the 
member countries of the European Community 
have since developed conside~bly and in many 
cases the representative of the country exerci-
sing the chairmanship has been able to speak 
for all the EEC countries in the United 
Nations. Furthermore, the reciprocal exchange 
of information between European and· Ameri-
can members of the Atlantic Alliance has been 
developed, particularly in the framework of 
bilateral talks. However, exchanges of views 
have not been sufficiently numerous or rapid to 
avoid unilateral action by one or another lea-
ding to misunderstandings or crises in relations 
between Europe and the United States. Often 
the Ten have not been able to express a unani-
mous view. It may be noted however that ten-
sion has not been so widespread as in the past. 
103. The principal difficulties now facing the 
West are in two areas: 
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(a) The Middle East 
104. The Middle East is a particularly sensi-
tive area for the whole of the western world, 
particularly Europe, because most of Europe's 
oil supplies come from the Gulf. There is 
great political instability in this area relatively 
close to the Soviet Union which in recent years 
has been active on the diplomatic scene. The 
invasion of Afghanistan, too, brought the Soviet 
army much closer to the mouth of the Gulf and 
the sources of oil consumed in Europe, thus 
giving the area even greater importance. 
105. This instability and the threats to the 
region represented by the presence of Soviet 
forces in Afghanistan, the build-up of the Soviet 
navy and the establishment of naval posts of 
supply in the Indian Ocean where Soviet air-
craft carriers often cruise, or even ships with a 
landing force capability, have led to a build-up 
in United States naval strength, too, and also in 
that of certain Western European countries, 
including France. The United States appa-
rently welcomes unreservedly this European 
participation in the security of the area. But 
the main step taken by the Americans has been 
the creation of a rapid deployment force on 
American territory including forces of all arms, 
well-trained and capable of intervening at very 
short notice if necessary. 
106. (i) Israel and the problem of the Palesti-
nians is a particularly sensitive subject. The 
efforts announced by Europeans and Americans 
to restore fair and lasting peace suffer from 
their evidently different approaches. The 1978 
Camp David agreements between Egypt and 
Israel were negotiated and signed under the sole 
aegis of the United States and Europe was reser-
ved in its endorsement of them. The Ameri-
can veto on sanctions against Israel following its 
annexation of the Golan Heights, although the 
United States condemned Israel's decision, 
contrasts, in appearance at least, with the posi-
tions adopted by the Ten at the Venice meeting 
to recognise Palestinian right to self-deter-
mination and the right of the Palestinian Libe-
ration Organisation to take part in negotia-
tions. Such divergencies are detrimental to the 
West's credibility in the area. Both European 
and American positions recognise the need to 
restore peace on the basis of recognition of 
Israel's right to exist and the right of Palesti-
nians to self-determination. In the past, many 
Europeans and the Americans did not have the 
same order of priorities, but recently their views 
have grown closer together. The policies of 
the Begin Government tend to erode support 
for Israel. On the other hand, acute diver-
gencies among the Arab countries make specta-
cular initiatives seem inopportune. 
107. Insofar as the United States seems to 
have little faith in global negotiations and 
agreement, at least in the near future, it is 
trying to work on Israel to ensure respect for 
the Camp David agreements and moderation in 
any operations on the West Bank and in South 
Lebanon and on those Arab countries over 
which it can hope to exercise some influence to 
make them accept a specific settlement for each 
problem. It is afraid of European initiatives 
which, designed to treat the Palestinian pro-
blem as a whole, would in fact make a solution 
more difficult. Conversely, the United States 
unreservedly welcomes the participation of 
several European countries in the United 
Nations force in South Lebanon and even more 
in the one in the Sinal which is to guarantee 
respect for the territorial clauses of the Camp 
David agreements. It is an important new 
development that European countries are will-
ing to share part of the responsibility for main-
taining stability in the area. 
I 08. (ii) The assassination of President Sadat 
showed that Egypt, linchpin of a policy aimed 
at restoring peace in the Middle East, was 
threatened, although the new Egyptian Govern-
ment seems to be continuing the policy begun 
by President Sadat. It cannot ignore attempts 
at subversion by Libya which considers itself 
practically at war with the United States since 
the United States air force shot down two 
Libyan aircraft which attacked its planes in 
1981 during United States manoeuvres to 
demonstrate opposition to Libya's unilateral 
decision to extend its territorial waters. The 
United States has accused Libya of being 
responsible for numerous attacks, particularly 
against American diplomats in Europe, and has 
severed diplomatic relations. The Europeans 
have not followed suit. In view of the tradi-
tional relations which some of them have with 
Libya, the evolution of intra-African relations 
in which Libya played, still plays or may one 
day play a role, particularly over Chad, Tunisia 
and even the Western Sahara, and certain 
pacifying gestures made by Libya recently, the 
European countries the most concerned are 
reluctant to envisage a break with Libya, whe-
ther or not they are convinced of Libya's 
responsibility in certain terrorist attacks. 
109. (iii) Saudi Arabia is another pillar of wes-
tern security in the Middle East and it too 
seems threatened. The military assistance 
granted to it by the United States is strongly 
contested by the Israelis and the Saudi Arabian 
Government for its part cannot envisage pur-
suing a policy leaning too strongly towards the 
West as long as the Palestinian question has not 
been settled. In recent years, it has made a 
major contribution to preventing the price of 
oil rising even higher, although this factor is 
now less decisive since the drop in the price of 
oil is largely due to worldwide over-production 
in view of slackening demand. 
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110. (iv) The war between Iraq and Iran is the 
fourth sector of uncertainty in the Middle East. 
So far, there have been no clear signs of 
Soviet intervention and the western countries, 
anxious not to allow the war to spread, have 
remained completely neutral. No one seems to 
have the wherewithal to convince the Iranian 
Government to accept the Iraqi Government's 
overtures. 
111. (v) Similarly, recent events in Syria, with 
the uprising of certains factions of the popula-
tion, have aroused no noticeable divergencies 
between the European and American partners 
and they all seem to be looking for a way to 
achieve Syrian disengagement in Lebanon and 
the restoration of the latter's sovereignty, thus 
implicating Syria, the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation and Israel. In spite of Soviet sup-
port for the Syrian Baath regime, there seems to 
have been general agreement that abstention 
was the only reasonable policy. 
112. At the present time, therefore, there seem 
to be no deep-rooted differences between Ame-
rican policy and the policies of the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance in the Near 
and Middle East. The principal difference 
seems to relate to the place which should be 
granted to the PLO in an agreement which the 
Europeans more than the Americans consider 
should be of a global nature if it is to last. How-
ever, to maintain this situation, exchanges of 
views on this area must be pursued in order to 
avoid remaining differences of opinion degene-
rating into confrontations. 
(b) Latin America 
113. The economic difficulties which have ari-
sen throughout the world have hit Latin Amer-
ica particularly hard and revolutionary move-
ments have sprung up almost everywhere, 
endangering the weaker regimes, as in Uruguay. 
Authoritarian governments have taken over 
in some of them, such as Chile and Argentina, 
whereas revolutionary movements seem to be 
making considerable headway in the smaller 
Central American countries able to receive 
Soviet assistance relayed by Cuba. 
114. The United States is certainly extremely 
sensitive about events on the American conti-
nent where, since the declaration of the Monroe 
Doctrine in 1823, it has been relentlessly oppo-
sed to interference on that continent from any 
foreign power. This applies in particular to 
Central America, where the United States has 
·considerable economic, political and strategic 
interests. This has led the United States to 
grant political support or even military assis-
tance to regimes which it considered capable of 
maintaining order and stability, sometimes at 
the expense of the freedom of the people and 
even the most fundamental human rights. 
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115. This is another question on which Euro-
pean public opinion may express its disagree-
ment with American policy and European 
governments make known their objections. 
The first has not been lacking in recent months 
and some governments have gone even further, 
particularly the French Government which, in 
January 1982, announced its decision to supply 
the Government of Nicaragua, which itself sup-
ported an uprising by part of the population of 
El Salvador against its government, with arms 
to the admittedly limited value of $ 25 million. 
This decision certainly sparked off unfavoura-
ble reactions from the United States Govern-
ment which itself provided the El Salvador 
Government with a few military advisers, but 
above all it caused a storm in American public 
opinion which saw the government of a friendly 
allied country deliberately taking what it consi-
dered to be the side of Fidel Castro and the 
Soviet Union. The fact that President Mitter-
rand's visit to the United States in March 1982 
led France to postpone the date of deliveries of 
arms to Nicaragua only partially solved a pro-
blem which was above all one which brought 
European intervention in Central American 
affairs where, in any event, it could not hope 
for very great results. 
116. This in no way means that the United 
States has been insensitive to the reactions of its 
European allies, but the proximity of the threat 
it feels prevents it from acting in accordance 
with the same criteria as certain Europeans who 
are tempted to consider that the underlying 
cause of the trouble in Central and Latin Ame-
rica stems not from Soviet intervention through 
an intermediary country but from deep-rooted 
economic and social injustice and readily 
believe that an internal political change would 
be likely to solve the problem. 
117. For the United States, on the contrary, 
events in the area are vital and it must first 
safeguard its national security, which does not 
necessarily preclude support for defenders of 
freedom and, if need be, social change allied 
with economic development. But it is not 
always easy to find a way to safeguard security 
and democracy, often endangered by economic 
difficulties, social inequality and anarchy. 
This twofold concern explains its economic and 
military support for El Salvador and the forma-
tion of the Central American Democratic 
Community on 19th January 1982 with Costa 
Rica, Honduras and El Salvador. There is a 
plan for $ 350,000 million of economic assis-
tance to this community and $ 182,000 million 
of military assistance. 
118. It was found possible to hold elections in 
relatively satisfactory conditions, in spite of the 
activities of armed rebels, in the country where 
there is the most disturbance, El Salvador, on 
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28th March 1982. The results showed the size 
of the forces most favourable to the restoration 
of democracy, economic recovery and social 
justice, to which the United States has decided 
to give its support. The elections to the consti-
tuent assembly allowed more than a million 
and a half electors to vote, probably represen-
ting about 70 % of citizens of electoral age, in 
spite of the rebels' attempts to impose a boy-
cott, thus far exceeding all hopes. 40 % of the 
votes were for the Christian Democrats of Mr. 
Napoleon Duarte, who can hardly be left out of 
the government since presumably the United 
States will provide the financial assistance 
necessary only if he is included. 
119. The situation was not the same in Guate-
mala, where the elections on 7th March 1982 
"seem to have been held in highly questionable 
conditions, which led to another military 
putsch which, on 23rd March, brought to power 
a team of officers apparently more determined 
than their predecessors to launch a real appeal 
to the electorate to restore a constitutional 
regime and encourage the economic and social 
transformations the country needs. After some 
hesitation, the United States seems prepared to 
grant assistance to this new team which appears 
to represent the country's best chance of avoi-
ding dictatorship and civil war. 
120. The time seems particularly unsuitable 
for Europe to become involved in Central Ame-
rican affairs at a time when the United States 
for its part seems about to find local political 
forces which have sufficient popular support 
and have the aim of making the economic and 
social transformations necessary for providing 
democracy with sound foundations, while 
excluding Soviet and Cuban influence. It is 
not sure that they will succeed, but it is cer-
tainly not for Europe to make them fail. 
Europe seems well aware of this since on 30th 
March 1982 the European Council, at the close 
of its Brussels meeting, stressed its concern 
about developments in Central America, 
emphasising that they stemmed from serious 
economic problems and social inequality aggra-
vated by the world economic situation, and 
declared itself ready to associate itself with the 
Nassau group of countries (Canada, Colombia, 
Mexico, United States and Venezuela) in their 
policy of development assistance for Central 
America. 
121. It should be added that in the dispute 
between the United Kingdom and Argentina 
over the Falkland Islands, like the United King-
dom's European partners, the United States, 
often accused of providing undue support for 
authoritarian Latin American regimes, has 
sought to secure a solution of this crisis through 
mediation and strenuous negotiation. It is 
assumed that if these efforts fail the United Sta-
tes will support the United Nations resolution 
and, therefore, the British position, for, if it 
does not, relationships within NATO will be 
imperilled. In general, countries in both Wes-
tern Europe and North America should in their 
policies stress the inhabitants' right to self-
determination. 
* 
* * 
122. But co-operation between Europe and the 
United States cannot be limited, in the third 
world, to trying to halt Soviet expansion. It is 
also essential to co-operate in the North-
South dialogue which Europe is trying to deve-
lop with a view to meeting the economic chal-
lenge of underdevelopment. Generally spea-
king, Europeans are more receptive to the idea 
that North-South economic interdependence 
must be organised so as to improve forecasts of 
trade patterns and to stabilise the international 
economic environment. They are in fact often 
inclined to think that one of the main problems 
in international relations is the instability of the 
third world and North-South relations, hence 
their desire to increase assistance and revive the 
North-South dialogue in order to encourage the 
resumption of international trade. The Ameri-
cans, on the contrary, often give priority to the 
importance of East-West relations and see no 
reason to interfere with free trade. Inter alia, 
they have reduced their contribution to the 
budget of the World Bank and the International 
Development Agency. 
VII. Conclusions 
123. The main question now raised by rela-
tions between Western Europe and the United 
States is to what extent the picture of a western 
world based on two equal pillars once evoked 
by President Kennedy still meets the wishes of 
both Europe and the United States. The ques-
tion is a legitimate one in that on the European 
side institutional unity has made but little pro-
gress and has produced unified views on no 
more than a few mainly economic matters, and 
on the American side the priority once given to 
the dialogue with Western Europe, although 
still strongly asserted by the administration, 
sometimes seems to fade away when confronted 
with other necessities at the level of public opi-
nion. 
124. Yet the Committee's recent contacts in 
the United States allow it to state that at pre-
sent there is no crisis in relations between 
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Europe and the United States. But there are 
many problems - and your Rapporteur has 
tried to describe and analyse the main ones -
which, taken together and dramatised when 
blown up by public opinion, are liable to stir 
up serious misunderstandings and even sharp 
opposition which might be catastrophic for the 
joint security of the western world, i.e. for 
world peace and for the economic recovery 
which is being sought on both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
125. Close consultations between allies seem 
more necessary than ever if such a development 
is to be avoided. They are certainly held and, 
from OECD to NATO including the IMF and 
the World Bank, there is no lack of appropriate 
institutional frameworks. Suggested improve-
ments therefore concern two aspects in parti-
cular: 
126. First, consultations should be permanent 
and automatic. This is far more a question of 
practice than an institutional problem and bila-
teral talks can help just as much as internatio-
nal institutions. It is above all a matter of pre-
venting decisions being taken which might take 
other partners by surprise and cause unneces-
sary frustration and premature reactions. 
12 7. Second, the fact that we are dealing with 
democracies where the decisions of the execu-
tive depend closely on the representatives of 
public opinion. As an American Congressman 
the Committee met pointed out, it is for these 
representatives to keep in touch with public 
opinion and to inform and guide it. Parlia-
mentarians on both sides of the Atlantic should 
do some soul-searching to determine how far 
they fulfil the role that is theirs for the benefit 
of the Atlantic community as a whole and 
hence of their own electorates which, whatever 
the specific concerns of individual western 
nations, can hope to safeguard their freedom 
and prosperity only in the framework of 
western security and general economic reco-
very. 
128. The western summit meetings to be held 
in Versailles and Bonn in June 1982 should 
provide an opportunity for reasserting these 
principles by North America, Europe and 
Japan. But it is in everyday practice rather 
than at large international meetings that trans-
atlantic relations should be improved. Although 
it is true that its global responsibilities, 
particularly in the field of security, underscore 
the leading role which the United States can be 
expected to play, many worldwide problems 
cannot be solved satisfactorily except in close 
co-operation with Western Europe. 
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Amendment 1 
European-United States co-operation for international 
peace and joint security 
AMENDMENT tt 
tabled by Mr. Hardy ud others 
14th June 1982 
1. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from " weapons " to the end. 
Signed: Hardy, Miller, Urwin, Sto.ffelen 
I. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendments 2 and 3 
European-United States co-operation for international 
peace and joint security 
AMENDMENTS 2 and 31 
tabled by Mr. van Eekelen 
14th June 1982 
2. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows: 
" Welcoming the outcome of the meetings of heads of state or government at Versailles and 
Bonn which reaffirmed the solidarity and cohesion of the free world in maintaining peace and 
international security as well as in promoting economic co-operation based on respect of the 
principles of GATT, ". 
3. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4 and insert a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"4. To ensure that NATO governments continue to base their public assessments of the 
balance of forces on a common document along the lines of their recent publications; ". 
Signed: ·van Eeke/en 
1. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (amendments agreed to). 
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Amendment4 
European-United States co-operation for international 
peaee and joint security 
AMENDMENT 41 
tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Mr. Urwin 
16th June 1982 
4. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " regretting " 
and insert " noting ". 
Signed: Baarve/d-Schlaman, Urwin 
I. See 6th sitting, I 7th June I982 (amendment negatived). 
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Evolution of the situation in Poland 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. Michel, Rapporteur 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the erolution of the situation in Polluul 
The Assembly, 
Recalling its Order 53, Recommendations 370 and 378 and the statement by its Presidential 
Committee of 8th January 1982; 
Considering that the measures taken by the Polish Government, particularly on the occasion of 
1st May 1982, to alleviate the state of siege fall far short of meeting the three conditions set by the 
North Atlantic Council on 11th January 1982 for re-establishing normal relations with Poland; 
Regretting that the economic measures agreed by the North Atlantic Council to back up these 
conditions have not been applied more strictly; 
Welcoming the fact that participants in the Madrid conference have refused to pursue their 
work in the circumstances created by the crackdown on 13th December 1981; 
Noting that events in Poland on 1st, 2nd and 3rd May and recourse to further measures of 
constraint show that the Polish Government has found no means other than force to impose a policy 
rejected by the great majority of the population, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that consultations between the European and American members of the Atlantic 
Alliance are pursued and strengthened with a view to co-ordinating the measures taken and to be 
taken in respect of both Poland and the Soviet Union in order to convince them to meet the condi-
tions set by the North Atlantic Council for re-establishing normal relations with Poland, i.e.: 
(a) the de facto and de jure abolition of the regime imposed by martial law in Poland; 
(b) liberation of all political prisoners; 
(c) resumption of the dialogue between the government, free trade-unionism as formerly 
embodied by Solidarity and the Catholic church; 
2. Assert that if these conditions are not fulfilled the resumption of the Madrid conference on the 
application of the final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe would be 
seriously imperilled. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submined by Mr. Michel, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
I. When it adopted Order 53 on 3rd Dec-
ember 1980, the WEU Assembly decided to 
instruct its General Affairs Committee "to fol-
low developments in Poland and to report to it 
on this question at the next part-session ". At 
the same time it requested its President " to 
convene an extraordinary session forthwith 
should the independence and sovereignty of 
Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign 
intervention". The General Affairs Commit-
tee then asked Mr. Hanin to present .at the June 
1981 session a report on developments in 
Poland and, after a substantial number of 
amendments, the Assembly adopted the recom-
mendation presented by the Rapporteur on 
behalf of the committee. 
2. It may be wondered whether the events 
in Poland since 13th December 1981 called for 
a speedy reaction from the WEU Assembly or 
not. Although the case of armed foreign inter-
vention could not be invoked and consequently 
the second part of Order 53 was not applicable, 
there could be no doubt about the first part 
since the presentation of Mr. Hanin's report in 
June 1981 in no way terminated the mandate of 
the General Affairs Committee to follow deve-
lopments in Poland. Moreover, this mandate 
was renewed by the Presidential Committee on 
8th January 1982. 
3. The General Affairs Committee adopted 
a preliminary report submitted by your Rap-
porteur on 19th January 1982 and the Pres~­
dential Committee, under the procedure provi-
ded for in Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Assembly in turn adopted the 
corresponding recommendation in London on 
8th February (Recommendation 378). How-
ever it was clear that it would be difficult to mer~ly ask the Assembly, at its June 19_82 s~s­
sion to ratify a text adopted by the Presidential Co~mittee on 8th February. This text would 
have to be brought up to date to take account 
of subsequent events and of the reply of t~e 
Council to the statement adopted by the Presi-
dential Committee on 8th January. 
4. There is obviously no question of going 
back over the aspects of the problem already 
handled by Mr. Hanin in Document 870. The 
aim is to examine the evolution of the situation 
in Poland since the summer of 1981 and its 
implications for Europe. Indeed, while events 
in Poland since 13th December 1981 have been 
the subject of many declarations and positions 
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adopted by several European parliamentary or 
intergovernmental institutions, the present 
document will endeavour to situate these events 
in the framework of WEU's specific compe-
tences. 
5. Had it been a strictly internal Polish 
matter WEU would have had little to say. 
The in'fringement of human rights, political and 
trades union freedoms within a country which 
is not a member of WEU does not concern an 
organisation whose responsibilities are prima-
rily directed towards collective defence and 
security. It would be more a matter for the 
Council of Europe or the United Nations and 
the International Labour Organisation. How-
ever, insofar as an internal situation in a coun-
try which is not a member of WEU may create 
a " situation which may constitute a threat to 
peace in whatever area this threat should arise, 
or a danger to economic stability ", Article VIII 
of the modified Brussels Treaty authorises the 
WEU Council and hence the Assembly to exa-
mine the matter. There is no denying that this 
is the case for the situation in Poland. 
6. A fortiori, insofar as there is outside inter-
vention in Poland, WEU is concerned. Yet 
while it is clear that there has been no armed 
intervention, it is no less evident that events in 
Poland since 13th December seem to be the 
result of the steady pressure the Soviet Union 
has exercised on the Polish authorities. In fact, 
this is hardly challenged by those who advise 
the governments of Western Europe to abstain 
from any reaction to events in Poland since 
their aim is to maintain peace, which clearly 
shows that they consider that the situation in 
Poland has not remained a purely internal mat-
ter but places at stake what they consider to be 
the essential interests of the Soviet Union. 
7. Further, if it is considered that the cohe-
sion of Western Europe is an important factor 
of its security and that any reactions by Euro-
pean countries tow~rds th~ Poli~h affair _migh~, 
if they diverged, Jeopardise this cohesiOn, It 
may be seen that from this point of view too 
the security of Western Europe is affected, 
which also justifies the inclusion of the Polish 
question in the agenda of our Assembly. 
11. Events in Poland 
1. Evolution of the internal situation 
from June to Deeember 1981 
8. Three main factors have influenced inter-
nal developments. First, Poland's growing eco-
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nomic difficulties. Its debts in the West have 
risen considerably, now amounting to some 
$ 27,000 million, and Poland has had to ask for 
a deferment in the payment of its short-term 
debts to western banks, which had been granted 
to a very large extent before the crackdown on 
13th December 1981. In addition, the food 
position deteriorated significantly making it 
necessary to introduce strict rationing in 
December 1981 and shortages extended to most 
basic consumer items. Finally, output was gra-
vely jeopardised by the sharp deterioration in 
social reactions and the multiplication of dis-
putes between the state and Polish workers. It 
is difficult to say which came first, the econo-
mic crisis or the political crisis, but the correla-
tion between the two is obvious. For the 
Poles, economic difficulties have confirmed the 
bankruptcy of the regime. But at the same 
time they have provided the government with 
an excellent pretext for gaining acceptance of 
strict measures which have been presented as 
being essential for the necessary economic reco-
very of the country. 
9. This must be stated clearly. It is evident 
that a meaningful economic recovery was essen-
tial and that this was not facilitated by the 
situation in Poland before 13th December. 
Some of the claims made by the unions affi-
liated to Solidarjty were hardly compatible with 
this requirement. However, insofar as a dia-
logue was still possible and had been effectively 
started between Solidarity and the government 
authorities, it was possible to appeal to the very 
real patriotism of the Polish people to ask ·it to 
make the sacrifices necessary for maintaining 
the country's economic independence and res-
toring credit. By electing to use force, the 
Polish Government has certainly not chosen the 
best course to secure the effort and sacrifice 
necessary. On the contrary, there is every 
indication that the atmosphere created by the 
crackdown on 13th December makes it impos-
sible for the government to appeal to Polish 
national cohesion and patriotism and it has 
thus placed itself in a position which will pre-
vent it from achieving the necessary recovery. 
10. The second factor is the remarkable deve-
lopment of Solidarity which managed in 1981 
to represent practically the whole Polish 
nation. It extended to both farm workers and 
students and the state had recognised its repre-
sentative nature. However, its extension made 
it more difficult to retain cohesion. 
11. Solidarity held its first congress in 
Gdansk from 5th to 1Oth September and then 
from 29th September to 7th October 1981. A 
wide range of trends emerged at this Congress 
and on 29th September a majority voted to 
penalise the leaders of the union accused of 
accepting a compromise regarding the self-
management of firms without consulting union 
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members. Nevertheless, on 7th October Mr. 
Lech Walesa was elected President of the union 
with 55% of the votes which showed that those 
most in favour of caution and moderation 
remained in the majority in Solidarity and it 
was thus possible to continue a dialogue with 
the state authorities. 
12. Among the decisions reached at this 
congress, emphasis should be laid on the 
request for a referendum on the self-manage-
ment of firms and the adoption of a message to 
the workers of eastern countries expressing Soli-
darity's support for those who were working for 
trades union freedom and asking them to call 
for free elections. Finally, the Solidarity 
congress adopted a programme for the radical 
transformation of political and economic life in 
Poland, turning resolutely towards democracy. 
13. Subjects of discord within Solidarity were 
more a question of timing imposed by the 
country's economic and social position than of 
aims pursued. Whereas Mr. Walesa had a 
majority in favour of advancing progressively in 
order to avoid perturbing the economy by a 
growing number of strikes, a large minority 
called for the immediate exploitation of the 
advantages gained. These divergences led to 
uncertainty in Solidarity's action. For inst-
ance, on 28th October the union called for a 
one-hour warning strike which was followed 
throughout the country but, on the 29th, it 
asked its members to stop all strike action 
immediately. 
14. Several times proposals were made by 
certain leaders of the Polish United Workers' 
Party (PUWP), as by Mr. Stefan Olszowski on 
22nd September in favbur of the formation of a 
national front combining the party, the Catho-
lic church and Solidarity. On 4th November, 
General Jaruzelski received together Mr. 
Walesa and the Primate of Poland, Monsignor 
Glemp, to propose the formation of a Council 
of national agreement between the government, 
the church and Solidarity. Negotiations to this 
effect were opened on 17th November. This 
demonstrates that the possibilities of dialogue 
between the state and Solidarity were far from 
exhausted on 13th December and on that date 
the Polish Government was following a course 
which could allow the whole Polish nation to 
take part in the necessary effort of economic 
recovery provided, on its part, it was prepared 
to make meaningful concessions where free-
doms were concerned. It might be wondered 
however whether outside considerations did not 
prevent it from making such concessions. 
15. For a long time, thanks inter alia to 
Cardinal Wyszinski, Primate of Poland since 
1949, the Catholic church had remained the 
only social organisation independent of the 
communist party. Until the creation of Solida-
rity, it considered it was the sole defender of the 
identity and sovereignty of the Polish people, 
its freedom and human rights. 
16. As from 1980, the Polish church upheld 
the claims of Solidarity which corresponded to 
these values: it could not remain outside the 
new movement. In 1981, particularly after 
Lech Walesa had been received by the Pope in 
Rome on 15th January, the Polish episcopate 
abandoned its traditional discretion and 
demonstrated its support for Solidarity more 
clearly. During the crisis, it tried to protect 
Solidarity, moderate its claims so as not to 
make them incompatible with state require-
ments and to serve as a mediator between the 
trade union and the public authorities. 
17. Lech Walesa remained in close touch 
with Cardinal Wyszinski and always followed 
closely his advice about the need for modera-
tion, particularly in the Bydgoszc affair in 
March 1981. He maintained this privileged 
relationship with Archbishop Glemp, the suc-
cessor to the Primate of Poland who died on 
28th May. Moreover, he had both socialist 
and catholic advisers, such as Professor Gere-
mek and Mr. Kurowski, the economist, who 
had a strong influence in Solidarity. The 
Catholic church was thus able to remind Soli-
darity of the need to avoid going too far or 
making exaggerated demands so as not to 
endanger the internal stability and sovereignty 
of Poland vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. On the 
other hand, in February 1981, it confirmed its 
moral support for the peasant union whose 
legality the Supreme Court had just denied, and 
it upheld Solidarity's claims against censorship 
and for the freedom of the press and radio. It 
took a public stand at the side of Solidarity 
when Archbishop Glemp celebrated a solemn 
mass before all the delegates to the trade 
union's first national congress in September. 
18. The Catholic church's relations with the 
government were more delicate. On the one 
hand, the church had remained in contact with 
the authorities: for instance, the joint church-
state committee met on 23rd March. But seve-
ral times the church also warned the authorities 
of the dangers of an authoritarian policy. 
Thus, in February 1981 Cardinal Wyszinski 
declared that: 
" the use of force, pressure, threats or 
irritating propaganda does not lead to 
domestic peace but, on the contrary, to 
further tension and protest. " 
In November, the Catholic church remained 
silent about the question of a national coalition 
and, on 8th December, Archbishop Glemp war-
ned members of the Sejm about the serious 
consequences of passing a law giving the gov-
ernment exceptional powers. 
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19. The third factor was the crisis in the 
Polish Communist Party (the PUWP). At a 
meeting of the Central Committee on 9th and 
1Oth June, Mr. Kania had managed to avert the 
request of a minority which wished to renew 
the leadership of the party. He then stated 
that there was no valid alternative to the line of 
socialist renewal. The party held an extra-
ordinary congress from 14th to 20th July during 
which the some 2,000 delegates, for the first 
time elected by militants, voted - for the first 
time too by secret ballot- to re-elect Mr. Sta-
nislas Kania as First Secretary of the party. 
Finally, on 25th September the Sejm. adopte.d a 
bill on self-management. After votmg agamst 
the government bill, the members adopted an 
amended text which had the prior agreement of 
the leaders of Solidarity. 
20. Everything then indicated that the socia-
list renewal announced by Mr. Kania was win-
ning the day but on 18th October Mr. Kania 
was placed in a minority in the Central Com-
mittee and obliged to resign from his duties as 
First Secretary. The Prime Minister, General 
Jaruzelski, took over. Today, it appears clear 
that General Jaruzelski already then had the 
firm intention of using every means at his dis-
posal to terminate the policy of compromise 
and democratisation thitherto followed by Mr. 
Kania. Already on 28th November, he had 
asked the Sejm to vote a law giving the govern-
ment full powers, inter alia allowing it to sus-
pend the right to strike. On 7th December, the 
Sejm, whose members had received a warning 
letter from the Polish Primate, Archbishop 
Glemp, rejected the government's proposal, and 
this created a situation which, to say the least, 
was unusual in a country of Eastern Europe. 
This did not prevent the police from inter-
vening on 2nd December to evacuate the fire-
men's cadet school in Warsaw which had been 
occupied since 18th November by striking 
cadets and since the National Committee of 
Solidarity, at its meeting in Gdansk on 12th 
December, had decided to organise a national 
referendum on the exercise and methods of 
power, the government retaliated by imposing 
martial law on 13th December and setting up a 
Military Council of National Salvation under 
General Jaruzelski composed exclusively of 
officers. Many Solidarity leaders and intellec-
tuals were arrested on that day. 
21. It therefore seems that the main purpose 
of the government takeover on 13th December 
was not to correct a jeopardised economic 
situation but to solve a political crisis by resto-
ring the absolute authority of the state and of 
the party over the country. The dismissal of 
Mr. Kania on 18th October had left the leader-
ship of the Polish Communist Party in the 
hands of a team determined to employ every 
means to achieve this aim. 
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2. Tu December 1981 crisis 
22. The deployment of strength which was to 
allow the government to quell all opposition 
started in the evening of 12th December 
1981. During the night, the headquarters of 
Solidarity were occupied by the police and 
some union leaders were arrested. In a broad-
cast on Sunday morning, 13th December, Gen-
eral Jaruzelski proclaimed martial law and 
announced the arrest of extremist leaders of 
Solidarity, who were to be judged in a military 
court, and of several dozen people responsible 
for errors committed in the seventies, including 
the former First Secretary of the party, Edward 
Gierek. 
23. The same day, the new Military Council 
of National Salvation decreed the suspension of 
union activities. A single radio and television 
programme was instituted and all regional sta-
tions were closed. This programme was direc-
ted by people in military uniform appointed by 
the authorities. All other journalists were sent 
on leave. Polish air space was closed to inter-
national traffic and all flights by LOT were 
cancelled and very strict measures taken to halt 
movement in the country. All the leaders of 
Solidarity were arrested. A curfew was impo-
sed from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. and all connections 
with the outside world were cut off. Use of the 
telephone was tightly controlled and limited. 
Public meetings, entertainment and strikes were 
banned. All civil servants were placed under 
the orders of the army. All weapons had to be 
handed into the authorities and it was forbidden 
to leave national territory. All persons over 17 
years of age could be detained for the duration 
of martial law by simple decision of the militia 
and visits to frontier areas were made subject to 
authorisation. Teaching establishments were 
closed and the press was banned except for the 
official organs of the Communist Party. Many 
sectors of the economy including transport, 
communications and energy sources were pla-
ced under military control and the death sen-
tence was proclaimed for all who refused to 
serve under the regulations covering civil 
defence and militarised service. The meeting 
of the Sejm to be held on 15th December was 
adjourned. 
several other places, including the naval 
shipyard in Gdansk, the Nowa Huta factory 
and several mines in the Katowice area. It 
took several days and the intervention of large 
numbers of armed forces backed by armour to 
winkle out the strikers from the premises they 
were occupying. According to the govern-
ment, the cost of this action was 7 deaths, 404 
wounded and 3,500 arrests. In fact, the 
number of victims was probably far greater 
although accurate figures cannot be given. 
25. As a result, active resistance practically 
stopped in the last days of December 1981 and 
in the first days of January the resumption 
was announced of a number of activities and 
the limited relaxation of certain measures such 
as the curfew. Thus the use of force by Gene-
ral Jaruzelski and the Polish army succeeded, 
thanks to its surprise effect, in reducing to 
silence and disorganising Solidarity without 
having to call for the direct intervention of the 
Soviet Union, and established a dictatorship in 
Poland which is still in place and which there is 
no reason to think will be terminated in the 
near future. 
3. The question of Soviet intert~ention 
26. The Soviet Union has never made any 
secret of the fact that it was not prepared to 
accept the evolution of Poland towards a plura-
list regime, be it political or unionist, and it has 
exerted steady pressure on the Polish authori-
ties for them to use every means at their dispo-
sal to repress the movement started by Solida-
rity in 1980, without hesitating to wield the 
threat of direct intervention should the Polish 
authorities not achieve this result. Obviously 
we can only know about the pressure that has 
been made public but there are enough pointers 
to be able to deduce what more discreet inter-
vention there has been, particularly if account 
is taken of the memories of Hungary in 1956 
and Czechoslovakia in 1968 in the minds of the 
Soviet and Polish authorities. 
27. As early as 4th March 1981, Soviet and 
Polish leaders met after the 26th Congress of 
the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet lea-
ders then insisted that the course of events be 
24. In spite of the censorship, some informa- reversed in Poland. Soviet warnings have been 
tion reached the West about the crackdown on multiplied since June. For instance, on 5th 
13th December. Solidarity seems to have been June, after the release of the last persons impri-
caught napping. The arrest of its leaders and soned in Poland because of their opinions, the 
the impossibility of communicating from one Central Committee of the Soviet Communist 
town to another prevented it from organising a Party called upon the leaders of the Polish 
response. But there were spontaneous manifes- Communist Party to wage eff~tive war against 
tations, particularly in a large number of facto- counter revolution. Mr. Gromyko, Soviet 
ries which were occupied by striking workers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, went to Warsaw 
as for instance the tractor factory in Ursus in from 3rd to 5th July and reaffirmed that Poland 
the Warsaw area where the Solidarity office was, is and will be a lasting link in the socialist 
launched an appeal for a general strike, and community. On 14th August, Mr. Kania and 
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General Jaruzelski went to Crimea at the invi-
tation of Mr. Brezhnev and on the 15th sub-
scribed to a communique denouncing the 
various destructive actions of forces hostile to 
socialism in Poland, underlining that the USSR 
was surveying the situation attentively and very 
seriously. 
28. The Solidarity Congress in September 
was sharply condemned by Tass which descri-
bed it as an anti-socialist and anti-Soviet orgy 
and on 1Oth September Moscow called upon 
Warsaw to take immediately energetic and radi-
cal measures against anti-Soviet manifestations. 
Finally, on 11th December Tass accused Soli-
darity of preparing to overthrow the govern-
ment. Conversely, from the moment General 
Jaruzelski had accomplished his coup d'etat on 
13th December he had the steady support of 
Moscow, which was confirmed inter alia 
during his visit to Moscow on 2nd and 3rd 
March 1982. As from 13th December, Mos-
cow had made it known that it considered this 
to be an internal Polish matter and the Soviet 
press has steadfastly accused the United States 
and its western allies of encouraging Solidarity 
to rebel against the authorities and of interven-
ing in Poland's internal affairs. 
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zelski and whether it corresponds to deep-
rooted convictions or his concern to avoid for 
his country - and at the same time for Europe 
and the world - Soviet military intervention, it 
is far less difficult to note that this policy has 
been imposed by the Soviet Union which, 
beyond doubt, is truly behind the seizure of 
power . on 13th December and subsequent 
events. To close one's eyes to this on the 
grounds that it is an internal Polish matter is 
tantamount to taking shelter behind a legal 
position which may perhaps be comfortable but 
which in no way corresponds to reality. This 
is why the Polish question is of interest to all 
Europeans and concerns WEU. 
4. EJiolution of the situation sillce 13th December 1981 
32. Four months after the establishment of 
the state of emergency on 13th December, the 
situation in Poland has changed little. The 
" state of war " was confirmed by the Sejm on 
25th January and although certain restrictions 
on the freedom of the population have been 
eased and the number of political prisoners 
dropped from 6,000 to 3,000 between January 
and April, the government is mainly supported 
by the military and police system it has set 
up. It has no social foundation and Polish 
society is proving increasingly hostile: practi-
cally no intellectuals or artists support the 
regime, the television is boycotted, and resist-
ance, although passive, is increasingly visible in 
spite of the apparent " normalisation ". Out-
ward signs are the spread of clandestine masses, 
strikes and symbolic gestures such as the pre-
sence of factory delegations at the christening of 
Walesa's new-born child in Gdansk on 20th 
March. 
29. Admittedly there is nothing to indicate 
that the Soviets envisaged immediate military 
intervention in the 13th December takeover. 
No special movement by Soviet troops was 
monitored by the United States which, for its 
part, felt no need to place United States forces 
in Europe in a state of alert. Yet Soviet inter-
vention in Polish matters has been evident 
throughout the crisis. It is more than probable 
that Soviet pressure and the threat of direct 
military intervention convinced General Jaru-
zelski to effect a coup d'etat on 13th Decem-
ber. The presence of Soviet elements in 
Poland has since been reported on several occa- 33. The military authorities are increasing 
sions although it cannot be claimed that there their efforts to give the impression that the 
has been large-scale intervention. country has returned to work again in an 
atmosphere of calm. But they are systemati-
30. In the present state of knowledge of the cally continuing repression, particularly by 
situation in Poland obviously nothing can be asking for " declarations of loyalty " from civil 
said about the exchanges between General Jaru- servants, workers, journalists, artists and tea-
zelski and the Soviet leaders, but the facts chers, by militia operations to enforce martial 
themselves show that very strong pressure has law, by imprisonments and condemnations -
been brought to bear, leading, inter alia, to the for instance, 150 members of Solidarity have 
elimination of Mr. Kania and the concentration been condemned for having organised strikes or 
of power in the hands of General Jaruzelski other protest movements since 13th December 
who seems to have been more receptive to - and by encouraging opponents of the regime 
Soviet pressure than the other leaders of the to emigrate. Finally, after the establishment of 
Polish party. This intervention was emphasi- military control over key sectors of industry, 
sed by the United States President, Mr. Reagan, agriculture in turn has been placed under army 
in his speech on 29th December and by the control. However, it very quickly became 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the European apparent to the authorities that they could not 
Community countries when they met in Brus- use the full force of the army to eradicate 
sels on 4th January 1982. pockets of active resistance: this was done in 
. . . . . January by militia shock troops, for instance 
31. Whtle It IS therefore difficult to give an during the violent demonstrations in Gdansk on 
opinion on the policy pursued by General Jaru- 30th January. 
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34. General Jaruzelski defined the three main 
aims of his policy in his speech in the Sejm on 
25th January as: 
(z) re-establishment of state authority; 
(iz) development and enhancement of 
democracy on the basis of national 
understanding in which connection 
he considered contacts with the 
church but not with Solidarity; 
(iiz) revival of the national economy. 
At the same time, he announced that the state 
of war would be terminated as soon as possible 
but that any action by anti-state forces would 
harden the position. There could be no ques-
tion of reverting to the pre-August 1980 posi-
tion or to the pre-13th December" anarchical" 
situation but General Jaruzelski promised to 
return to a " front of national understanding " 
without Solidarity but with civil committees of 
national salvation which have been set up 
everywhere and which include members of the 
three legal parties. As the days pass, this 
" understanding " draws closer to the Polish 
United Workers' Party, under the control of the 
army, satellite groups and unrepresentative civil 
committees, whereas Solidarity no longer has 
any legal existence and " social committees " 
set up in firms are visibly intended to take its 
place. Its President, Lech Walesa, and his col-
leagues are still in captivity. 
35. The Polish Communist Party, after losing 
members and suffering divisions, is now being 
built up again and is moving out from under 
the wing of WRON (the Military Council of 
National Salvation) to assume a leading role on 
the lines of the Soviet model. At the seventh 
plenum of the party central committee on 24th 
and 25th February, it made its first task the sta-
bilisation of its membership after 600,000 had 
left it. At the same time, it carried out an 
internal purge, from the bottom to the top. Its 
statutes, made more democratic at the last 
congress, were suspended to make it easier to 
regain control. A timetable and a long-term 
programme of action adopted by the political 
bureau in March confirm that the leading role 
is now in the hands of the headquarters. How-
ever, all the WRON leaders are members of the 
Polish United Workers' Party and loyal to the 
interests of the "socialist camp". Neverthe-
less, there still seems to be some dissension in 
the junta between those in favour of repression 
and who have the support of Moscow, General 
Jaruzelski and his supporters who are believed 
to adopt a " centrist " position and the " mode-
ment. 21 newspapers, more than 705 journa-
lists and the journalists' association have had to 
stop work. 
36. The " democratic process " referred to by 
General Jaruzelski in his programme speech is 
thus aimed only at re-establishing the suprem-
acy of the Communist Party and Poland's 
membership of the Warsaw Pact. The govern-
ment is consequently isolated from society with 
which it no longer has any means of organising 
a dialogue. 
37. To revive the national economy, there 
has been talk of reintroducing certains forms of 
market economy, as Hungary has done in the 
last ten years. On 26th February, the Sejm 
adopted the principle of economic reform based 
on independence for firms, self-financing, finan-
cial profitability and self-management. But the 
consequences were a sharp rise in prices, which 
increased three- or fourfold at one fell swoop 
on 15th January following the freeing of prices 
decided upon on 3rd January, and the 71% 
devaluation of the zloty. Although the aim of 
these measures was to eliminate the black mar-
ket, it should be recalled that price increases 
were the cause of rioting in both 1970 and 
1976. Moreover, the control assumed by the 
army over all sectors of the economy, including 
agriculture as from April, and the absence of 
freedom of expression contradict this policy and 
demonstrate that the first aim of the takeover 
was not economic reform but political control. 
In a way this was moreover what Mr. Obo-
dowski, Polish Minister for Economic Affairs, 
admitted in his first interview in the western 
press on 25th March: " Martial law cannot 
reform the economy. Nor does it solve politi-
cal problems. However, all these questions 
can be solved in an atmosphere where law and 
order prevail as a result of the introduction of 
martial law. " 
38. In fact, since the beginning of January 
the economic situation has worsened: imports 
from the West fell by 50% in February and 
exports by 10 %. In spite of increasing coal 
output and better discipline, the shortage of raw 
materials and spare parts is causing conside-
rable difficulties; Polish industry is running at 
half-capacity, factories are closing down or 
slowing down output and the GNP, which fell 
by 25 % in 1980, is expected, according to offi-
cial estimates, to fall by between 15 and 20 % 
in 1982. It is not known how far estimates 
take account of the generalised passive resis-
tance which the authorities call laziness and 
which is still to be found. 
rates", who are in favour of major reforms. 39. Polish leaders see their position further 
Dissension is mainly over information and pro- weakened by the Polish debt to western coun-
paganda. The isolation in which the govern- tries. They have asked for moratoria not only 
ment is trying to keep Poland helps to streng- on the capital which is due to be reimbursed 
then the people's hostility towards the govern- but also on the interest. In the negotiations on 
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this subject, they have not failed to point out 
that western economic pressure could but 
strengthen Poland's dependence on the Soviet 
Union and lead to social unrest which might 
delay the end of the state of war. In this way 
they probably hope to soften the western atti-
tude for, in spite of its present development, 
trade with Comecon cannot entirely replace 
what the Polish economy derives from co-
operation with the West. Since 6th January, 
Poland has been increasing its trade and finan-
cial agreements with the Soviet Union and 
Comecon and one might say that the Polish 
economy is being reintegrated into the Soviet 
orbit since the assistance granted is condi-
tional. But to a considerable extent Polish 
industry depends inherently on imports of 
equipment from the West, and the slow-down 
of external trade is further aggravating econo-
mic paralysis, unemployment and the disastrous . 
fall in the standard of living. 
40. Mr. Rakowski, Deputy Prime Minister, 
said on 20th January that Poland would have to 
face at least five difficult years in order to 
straighten out its economy and, in April, Gene-
ral Jaruzelski announced that economic auste-
rity measures would last until 1990 at least. 
41. Everything shows that the measures taken 
in Poland since January 1982 were not designed 
primarily to effect an economic recovery but 
rather to restore political order and put an end 
to contestation, considered too dangerous. The 
official line of preventive action to avoid civil 
war already proves to what extent economic 
recovery is secondary. For many Poles, in 
fact, 13th December was not the culminating 
point of the open conflict between the authori-
ties and the trade union but the moment chosen 
by the authorities to end the free trade union 
experiment and the democratisation which it 
has always refused. 
42. On the other hand, following the crack-
down on 13th December, the Polish episcopate 
quickly reacted, declaring on 15th December 
that it was convinced the nation would not take 
a step backwards and that it could not give up 
the democratic renewal announced to the coun-
try. Its action has since been concentrated on 
the following aims: 
- an end to the state of siege which it has 
called an infringement on freedom; 
- more humane conditions of detention 
for those in prison and their early libe-
ration; 
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instrument for mediation: religious services 
were the only public gatherings allowed. How-
ever, priests were arrested and all were sub-
jected to restrictions on their movements. This 
is because, since 13th December, the church 
has been the only obstacle to normalisation, 
and although the Primate has not preached 
active resistance or called for a radical condem-
nation of the takeover which some had expec-
ted, there was no question of co-operation with 
the state as long as a state of war lasted. 
44. The church was probably above all 
anxious to prevent blood being shed, but it had 
to bear in mind that resistance could lead to 
violence, and it therefore sought political 
detente, an amnesty, a revival of Solidarity. 
For this, it was prepared to start talks. On 9th 
January, Archbishop Glemp met General Jaru-
zelski. The joint church-state committee met 
on 18th January. But at the end of January 
the Polish episcopate showed its disillusion-
ment; its protests were not preventing the 
government from continuing to make arrests or 
having the " declaration of loyalty " signed 
against which it had been protesting since 
December. 
45. The attitude of Pope John Paul 11, whom 
Archbishop Glemp visited at the beginning of 
February, came up to the expectations of at 
least part of the clergy and the episcopate who 
no longer had any hopes about the govern-
ment's good will. For John Paul 11, in fact, 
there was no question of relinquishing any of 
the conquests of the last sixteen months. 
46. The first meeting of the plenary confe-
rence of the Polish episcopate on 2nd March 
and the sermon given by the Primate on 7th 
March showed that the Polish church endorsed 
the position adopted by the Pope: " tell the 
truth " and stop compromising. Henceforth, 
the church is a possible but uncompromising 
interlocutor for the government. The military 
and political authorities still have to accept 
such mediation, i.e. go back on the measures 
taken on 13th December, for the very purpose 
of avoiding negotiations with Solidarity. There 
is thus no reason to hope that mediation by the 
Catholic church is foreseeable in the coming 
months. 
4 7. At the time of writing, it is still possible 
to wonder about the reasons, scope and conse-
quences of the measures announced by the 
Polish Government on 1st May. These 
include freeing a further contingent of political 
prisoners to reduce the number from about 
- restoration of statutory activities for 3,000 to some 2,000, ending the curfew, re-
trade unions, particularly Solidarity, establishing long-distance telephone calls, lifting 
essential for a balanced social life. the requirement for prior permission to hold 
. . meetings of authorised associations and relaxing 
43. In fact, at the begmmng of January the some foreign trade restrictions. An indication 
Catholic church seemed to be the only possible that the state of war is not at an end is that 
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these steps towards relative liberalisation were 
announced as tentative and liable to be revoked 
if need be, even by regional or local authori-
ties. These· are slender concessions indeed 
after almost five months of iron rule. 
48. Nevertheless, they show a tendency on 
the part of the Polish authorities to move 
towards relaxing the state of war while at the 
same time appealing to the good will of the 
Poles. The government may have the impres-
sion that it is being partly successful, particu-
larly since the announcement on 28th April 
that Mr. Kerlaj, President of Rural Solidarity, 
endorsed the regime - freely or by force - and 
that other leaders might thus be encouraged to 
do so. But the announcement by the under-
ground press that Solidarity had been reorga-
nised in secret by some of the trade union's 
regional presidents who had eluded the police 
since 13th December indicates that Solidarity 
and the Polish people will not rally to the 
regime so easily. · It also appears that, however 
limited, the sanctions applied by the West and 
in particular Poland's difficulty in arranging to 
repay its external debt encouraged the govern-
ment to adopt a more liberal approach in the 
hope of bending the West's relatively firm 
stand. Finally, the government hoped to take 
the sting out of a possible boycott of the official 
demonstrations on 1st May and more particu-
larly the demonstration prepared by the clan-
destine leaders of Solidarity for 13th May. 
49. In any event, measures for relaxing the 
state of war announced for 1st May are not 
likely to change opinions about developments 
in Poland since 13th December. Normalisa-
tion is the same as was imposed in Czecho-
slovakia after the fall of Dubcek. Its imposi-
tion will have to be prolonged and with parti-
cular severity since the government stands 
alone in a society which rejects it and the 
inflexible deployment or even use of force 
remain its only means of achieving its ends. 
50. The demonstrations which took place in 
almost all the main Polish towns on 1st, 2nd 
and 3rd May confirmed this view in three 
essential respects. It was evident, in spite of all 
the means available to it, that the government 
was unable to mobilise the people but Solida-
rity, although threatened, succeeded and this 
clearly showed the failure of the regime set up 
on 13th December. Finally, the precariousness 
of the relaxations in the state of siege allowed 
for 1st May has been proved since the previous, 
or more severe, conditions have been reintro-
duced in all these towns. Hence there is 
clearly little chance of certain forms of freedom 
being effectively restored if the government fails 
to reach agreement with the truly representative 
factions of the Polish people, Solidarity and the 
Catholic church. 
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5. The Soviet attitude since 13tll December 
51. The military takeover on 13th December 
was considered by the Soviet Union as a step 
towards regaining the unity of the socialist com-
munity. However, the official position was ex-
pressed only in an article published in Pravda 
on 1Oth January by a member of the Central 
Committee. The Polish crisis was analysed as 
follows: " The Polish crisis is mainly the result 
of concerted and systematic activities by reac-
tionary forces inside and outside the country 
seeking to undermine the institutional bases of 
the Polish state and its social regime". No 
further mention was made of errors attributable 
to the Polish Party and Government. Full res-
ponsibility for the crisis was placed on " the 
enemies of socialism". Inside the country, 
"Solidarity extremists had already, under the 
authority of Washington and other NATO capi-
tals, shared out portfolios in the government 
which was to take over in Warsaw after the 
overthrow of the present regime". Outside the 
country, the United States wished to make 
Poland a " hotbed of destabilisation " and 
seemed determined to " pursue an undeclared 
war against this socialist country ". The take-
over had therefore averted such a situation, 
which corresponds to the explanation given by 
the Polish Government. 
52. Contacts between Poland and the Soviet 
Union were resumed in January at every level. 
The Ministers of Trade and Foreign Affairs 
and a member of the secretariat of the PUWP 
each went in turn to Moscow during the first 
week of January in order to normalise relations 
and obtain additional economic assistance. On 
6th January, a protocol on trade and payments 
for 1982 was signed. It included privileged 
conditions for paying the difference in the cost 
of reciprocal deliveries. In 1981, the Soviet 
Union supplied Poland with 60 % of its raw 
materials imports and 90 % of its energy and 
food imports to enable the Polish Government 
to keep its head above water, while Polish deli-
veries fell by 50 %. The same was true of cre-
dits. It seems clear that the Soviet Union will 
have to pay a high economic price for restoring 
order in Poland, and the Polish crisis may have 
serious drawbacks for the Soviet bloc, quite 
apart from the effects of western reactions. 
Poland is the Soviet Union's second trading 
partner and it is understandable that Mr. Brezh-
nev's confidence and Moscow's political and 
economic support for the Polish Government 
are still tinged with doubt. 
53. Moreover, the Soviet press soon showed a 
degree of impatience with the tolerance of 
Polish leaders for Walesa and Solidarity and 
with open-ended normalisation. In February, 
it re-emphasised the evolution of the situation 
in Poland and expressed two main concerns: 
anti-socialist opposition hardly seems to have 
abated, witness the incidents in Gdansk, 
Poznan and Warsaw; the PUWP was weakened 
during the period leading up to 13th December 
and is far from having recovered its lost 
positions. In fact, the Soviets have difficulty in 
hiding their concern about the relaxation of 
emergency measures too soon. In the absence 
of a political solution, they have had to 
acknowledge that for the time being only the 
army is capable of maintaining order in Poland 
and putting the country's economy back on the 
rails. General Jaruzelski's visit to Moscow on 
2nd and 3rd March showed that he remained 
loyal although his government had visibly not 
managed to eradicate the counter-revolution. 
However, there are signs of suspicion about the 
military power and the desire for the PUWP to 
resume its leading role. Moscow openly 
supports the most uncompromising trend 
among the Polish leaders. Thus, in recent 
weeks the Soviet Union has been visited by Mr. 
Kociolek, First Secretary of the PUWP, Mr. 
Orzechowski and Mr. Siwak, who are among 
the most hostile to any form of opening and 
liberalisation. The Soviet press never men-
tions the promises of " renewal " which even 
General Jaruzelski has made, nor the possible 
reconstitution of trade unions. The Soviets 
therefore seem to expect General Jaruzelski to 
restore order in the most orthodox manner 
while respecting their wishes unconditionally. 
54. In the meantime, the Soviet Union has 
promised to increase the value and quality of its 
economic assistance to Poland. After lending 
$ 3,700 million in January, it is reported that 
$ 1, 700 million were lent in March following 
General Jaruzelski's visit so that Poland might 
pay the interest owed to European banks. In 
exchange, Poland is to reorganise its economy 
in order to rebalance its trade. 
55. Where the western countries are concer-
ned, the Soviet Union adopts different positions 
according to whether it is dealing with the Uni-
ted States or with Europe. It reacted to the 
various western statements by a violent attack 
on the United States and an attempt to deter 
Europeans from taking economic retaliatory 
measures, while endeavouring to divide them. 
For instance, Moscow had a moderate reac-
tion to the ten-power declaration on 4th Janu-
ary. Pravda protested at the Ten's threats and 
warnings, reproached them for deliberately dra-
matising the international situation, but men-
tioned their " attachment to maintaining co-
operation, even economic, with the socialist 
states". 
56. The Soviets used sharper language about 
the United States. In January, Pravda accused 
the United States of blackmailing the European 
Governments by threatening to abandon the 
Geneva negotiations on the limitation of inter-
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mediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. 
The Soviets did not fail to emphasise that the 
most severe sanction taken by Washington, 
which concerned the Siberian oil pipeline, in 
the long run affected Europe more than the 
Soviet Union. But the NATO declaration of 
11th January showed that there was still 
agreement in the West; it was therefore consi-
dered to be an " unacceptable interference in 
Polish affairs" running counter to all the prin-
ciples of international relations. Accusing the 
United States of violating the Helsinki agree-
ments by " supporting the plot by counter-
revolutionary forces to overthrow the author-
ities in Poland ", Pravda made little mention of 
sanctions, or stressed that their effects were 
quite negligible, particularly if they were not 
followed by the Europeans. 
57. It seems that the Soviet Union's main 
aim was to minimise the political impact of 
American sanctions by making sure of western 
food assistance in Poland and forestalling 
Poland's failure to pay its debts to the West, 
since Poland's bankruptcy would endanger the 
credit of the whole Soviet bloc and Moscow's 
ability to borrow on western markets. At the 
same time it emphasised that the Europeans 
were liable to lose positions in Soviet external 
trade which might be difficult to recover. But 
the Soviet Union for its part has serious reasons 
for wishing to maintain these trade links at a 
time when it is experiencing growing economic 
difficulties. In other words, a meaningful 
concerted policy of western sanctions is not 
necessarily condemned to remain without effect 
on Moscow, nor on Warsaw. 
Ill. Western reactions 
1. The westem position in 1981 
58. The seizure of power on 13th December 
occurred at a time when the members of the 
Atlantic Alliance had had ample opportunity to 
consult with each other on the measures to be 
taken in the event of Soviet intervention in 
Poland. They had done so moreover in the 
North Atlantic Council and in the course of 
political consultations between members of the 
European Community. Not very satisfactory 
results had been achieved however in the 
course of these consultations because of difficul-
ties in relations between these countries and 
differences over problems concerning their joint 
defence. Public opinion had just become 
aware of the overwhelming superiority of the 
USSR in continental-range missiles in addition 
to its clear lead in conventional armaments and 
the consequential threat to Western Europe. 
Although the American administration seemed 
prepared to make the necessary effort to deploy 
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continental-range nuclear weapons in Europe in 
the relatively near future, European opinion 
proved to be sharply divided over the expedi-
ency of such action. Relations between 
Europe and the United States suffered a serious 
setback from this in spite of the apparent una-
nimity achieved at the NATO ministerial 
meeting in December 1979 on the deployment 
of these weapons. 
59. Neither the Soviet invasion of Afghanis-
tan nor Soviet threats to Poland prevented the 
development of campaigns against the deploy-
ment of NA TO's new weapons in many coun-
tries of Western Europe although it was com-
mon knowledge that the West's inferiority in 
the field of defence considerably weakened any 
protests it might voice against Soviet expansio-
nism. Yet it cannot be said that western reac-
tions have had no effect on Soviet policy. 
However weak they may have been, the measu-
res taken, particularly by the United States, 
after the intervention in Afghanistan and the 
warnings given in 1981 regarding Poland have 
probably helped to persuade the Soviet Union 
to play for time in the Polish crisis and to avoid 
direct military action. It may therefore be 
thought that if the West had been more firm 
and more united its deterrence would have been 
far more effective. In the end, the widespread 
pacifist demonstrations in Europe at the end of 
1981 and the negative reactions they aroused in 
the United States helped to convince the Soviet 
leaders that the international situation in 
December 1981 was not too unfavourable to a 
show of force in Poland. 
2. Tile United Statu position 
60. The deterioration of co-operation bet-
ween the United States and some of its Euro-
pean allies certainly explains to a very large 
extent the divergences that quickly appeared 
over the way to respond to the demonstration 
of force in Poland on 13th December. Admit-
tedly, immediate reactions were fairly conver-
gent. There was near unanimity on both sides 
of the Atlantic in condemning the methods 
used by General Jaruzelski. However, from 
the moment there was question first of denoun-
cing the responsibility of the Soviet Union in 
Polish affairs and then of defining a joint policy 
for the West to meet the new situation, very 
serious differences came to the fore. 
61. The United States reacted very quickly to 
the introduction of military rule in Poland and 
on several occasions President Reagan strongly 
repression in Poland, the United States Presi-
dent announced that his country was taking the 
following steps: 
(l) requirement of licences for the 
export of an expanded list of oil and 
gas equipment to the Soviet Union 
and suspension of all such licences 
for a wide range of material inclu-
ding pipelayers; 
(iz) suspension of the issuance or rene-
wal of export licences to the Soviet 
Union for computers, electronics 
and other high technology items; 
(iil) suspension of all service to the Uni-
ted States of the Soviet airline Aero-
flot; 
(iv) closure of the Soviet purchasing 
commission in the United States; 
(v) postponement of negotiations on a 
new long-term agreement for the 
sale of American grain to the Soviet 
Union; 
(v1) suspension of negotiations on a new 
United States-Soviet maritime agree-
ment and a new regime of port 
access controls for all Soviet ships 
wh.en the current agreement expires 
on 31st December; 
(viz) non-renewal of United States-Soviet 
exchange agreements soon to expire, 
including those on energy, science 
and technology. 
The United States President added that his 
country would make a complete review of all 
other United States-Soviet exchange agreements 
and should other measures prove necessary he 
was prepared to take them. American deci-
sions would be determined by Soviet actions. 
62. In the same statement, President Reagan 
nevertheless said the United States wished to 
maintain " a constructive and mutually benefi-
cial relationship with the Soviet Union and ... a 
high level dialogue. But we are prepared to 
proceed in whatever direction the Soviet Union 
decides upon - towards greater mutual restraint 
and co-operation, or further down a harsh and 
less rewarding path". Finally, President Rea-
gan at the same time said that the Secretary of 
State, Alexander Haig, had been in contact with 
the United States allies about the measures 
being taken to explain why such action was 
essential at .the present time. 
condemned the repression exercised by the 63. It is not unimportant to note that these 
Polish Government. Speaking in Los Angeles measures were planned far more as means of 
on 29th December, he spelt out a number of pressure on the Polish and Soviet Governments 
sanctions. Referring to the heavy and direct than as reprisals as such since on the one hand 
responsibility of the Soviet Union for the the United States Governm~nt announced it~ 
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intention to relax them or tighten them depen-
ding on the evolution of the situation and, on 
the other hand, they in no way affected the ins-
truments of the political dialogue between the 
two superpowers. Destined to demonstrate the 
determination of the United States, they left it 
the possibility of giving the Polish people the 
benefit of this firmness by not burning bridges 
for the pursuit of the follow-up conference in 
Madrid on the application of the Helsinki final 
act, nor for the SALT negotiations. 
64. By their very nature, these measures can 
be effective only if the United States' European 
allies adopt similar ones, or at least do not 
thwart them, and thus demonstrate that they 
share the United States' determination and do 
not wish the Soviet Union to evade the effects 
of the American decisions by turning to Euro-
pean suppliers. Here it may be wondered whe-
ther the consultations between the United 
States and its allies were as far-reaching as Pre-
sident Reagan gave to understand. 
65. Admittedly, the Polish question was on 
the agenda of the NATO ministerial meeting in 
June 1981 and of all the meetings between 
members of the Atlantic Alliance throughout 
the year, but the announcement of these measu-
res seems to have preceded any true consulta-
tion of the United States' European allies. 
However, these decisions were announced on 
the eve of the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council at the level of ambassadors which had 
been convened mainly to examine the situation 
in Poland and at which the American represen-
tative presented and commented on the deci-
sions by President Reagan stopping short, 
however, of formally asking the European 
members of the Alliance to endorse them. 
However this may be, and in view of the state-
ments by President Reagan between 13th and 
29th December, it cannot be claimed that this 
was a unilateral step about which the United 
States' partners knew nothing until the last 
moment. 
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Chancellor Schmidt to Mr. Brezhnev and the 
answer he had received, and to describe the 
discussions Vice-Chancellor Genscher had held 
in Bonn on 30th December with Mr. Rakowski, 
the Polish Deputy Prime Minister. At this 
meeting, Mr. Genscher was said to have asked 
the Polish Government to take three specific 
steps: end martial law, release those interned 
since 13th December and re-establish the dia-
logue between the government, the Catholic 
church and Solidarity. All the western coun-
tries seem to agree on this expression of their 
requirements with regard to the Polish Govern-
ment, as is testified by the declaration adopted 
by the Ten on 4th January 1982. 
68. The joint declaration adopted on 4th 
January by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of 
the ten member countries of the European 
Community is appended to the present docu-
ment. They were outspoken in their disappro-
val of the Polish Government's action and 
launched a pressing appeal to restore the dialo-
gue between the state, the church and Solidar-
ity. However, they were far more cautious in 
their attitude towards the Soviet Union since 
they merely " note with concern and disappro-
val the serious external pressure and the cam-
paign directed by the USSR and other Eastern 
European countries against the efforts for rene-
wal in Poland ", which is a particularly restric-
tive way of describing Soviet responsibility in 
this matter. Regarding retaliatory measures, 
the Ten merely " take note of the economic 
measures taken by the United States Govern-
ment " and show no sign of adopting parallel 
measures. Finally, they decided to propose an 
early resumption of the Madrid meeting to dis-
cuss developments in Poland. All in all, the 
statement adopted at the ten-power meeting 
stops well short of the positions adopted by 
President Reagan and there is no question of 
retaliatory measures against the Soviet Union. 
However moderate the declaration may have 
been, the Greek Government disavowed its 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who had 
endorsed the ten-power declaration. 
3. European reactions 69. At the very time the Brussels meeting 
was being held, General Jaruzelski was giving 
66. For their part, the countries of Western the ten ambassadors whom he had convened a 
Europe have shown little unity and in general negative answer to these requests. This was 
have been far less firm than the United States the first time however that a head of govern-
in their reactions to the repressive moves on ment of a country of Eastern Europe had thus 
13th December. Although all expressed disap- recognised ten-power Europe as a political 
proval ofthe Polish Government's policy, seve- entity. However, General Jaruzelski's condi-
ral voiced their disapproval so as not to involve tions for releasing some of those detained were 
the Soviet Union and no true retaliatory mea- that they should abstain from any political 
sures have been decided upon by the European action, the others being certain of lengthy 
members of the Atlantic Alliance. detention or exile, and there was no question of 
the government holding conversations with the 
67. The NATO Council meeting on 31st former leaders of Solidarity. 
December allowed the representative of the 
Federal Republic of Germany to inform his 70. On 5th January, Chancellor Schmidt 
colleagues of the content of the message from went to the United States where he had a leng-
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thy discussion with President Reagan, in the 
course of which he undertook, on behalf of the 
Ten, to take no measures liable to detract from 
the effects of the measures decided upon by the 
Americans but there was no question of them 
taking similar measures, which strictly limited 
the scope of this undertaking. Finally, France 
and Greece are reported to have been against 
sending Mr. Leo Tindemans, new President of 
the Council of the Community and Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Warsaw and 
Moscow to inform the Polish and Soviet 
Governments of the joint positions adopted by 
the Ten. It is believed that some members of 
the European Community wished to denounce 
the Soviet intervention in Poland and draw the 
practical consequences thereof, but their views 
failed to gain acceptance at the meeting in 
Brussels. 
71. Europe's inability to define a policy in 
the Polish question, in spite of the ample time 
the Europeans had to work out a joint reaction, 
is most disturbing because it helps to isolate 
Europe from the United States. When Afgha-
nistan was invaded, the Europeans had no hesi-
tation in accusing the United States of being too 
weak, but its weakness was largely due to the 
element of surprise which left it no time to 
consult its allies beforehand or to build up its 
forces in the Middle East. 
72. This was not so_ for Poland and there 
would have been ample grounds to be gratified 
had Europe not been struck by unbelievable 
paralysis with the result that the Americans 
may be justified in wondering how far Europe 
is composed of allies it can trust. In this 
respect, the ministerial meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council on 11th January 1982 did not 
dispel all ambiguity about the way in w:Pich the 
European members of the Atlantic Alliance 
intend to be associated with the measures taken 
by the United States which, they admit, are 
justified. 
73. Further, if Europe one day intends to 
change the major division imposed on it by the 
Soviet takeover of the countries occupied by the 
Red Army at the end of the war, it will 
obviously not succeed by closing its eyes to a 
Soviet policy of using force to maintain 
its domination. The solution is to be found in 
an evolution such as Solidarity thought it could 
start in Poland, which may open the door for a 
future reunification of Europe, otherwise this 
may occur under the pressure and domination 
of the Soviet Union. 
occasion of a confrontation between the United 
States and its European allies and a joint decla-
ration was drawn up which, although couched 
in moderate terms, was at least more specific 
about sanctions than the ten-power declaration, 
at any rate about the list of measures conside-
red, because less was said about their imple-
mentation. This time, Greece refused to 
endorse the sections of the declaration which 
appeared to be a global condemnation of 
Poland and the Soviet Union. However this 
may be, the United States could consider that 
its allies had undertaken to act - in the long 
run at least - and progressively to set up machi-
nery for sanctions against Warsaw and Moscow 
should the situation not improve in Poland or, 
a fortiori, grow worse. For instance, the allies 
decided to suspend all trade credit for Poland, 
except for food products, and to hold negotia-
tions on the repayment dates of the Polish 
public debt due in 1982. Finally, they 
declared that they were prepared to continue 
and increase humanitarian assistance to the 
Polish people. The EEC for its part decided 
on 23rd February to grant emergency assistance 
of 8 million European currency units. On 
14th January, the western countries in effect 
suspended until further notice their negotiations 
with Poland on rescheduling payments due in 
1982, i.e. $ 3,500 million. However, the agree-
ment on consolidating amounts due in 1981 
was not called in question. The western coun-
tries, including the United States, have in fact 
been cautious and have not started procedure 
for declaring that Poland had broken off pay-
ments. But the western banks agreed to 
reschedule the Polish 1981 debt, i.e. $ 2,400 
million, only if Poland settled arrears of interest 
due on the part of its debt which was not 
guaranteed by western governments. This 
matter was settled on 6th April and the reim-
bursement of the debt rescheduled, reimburse-
ment of the capital being set to start 
on 1st January 1986. This agreement should 
allow them to consider possible requests for 
further loans to Poland. 
75. The European Community is obviously 
determined to apply the decisions taken on 
11th January where Poland and the Soviet 
Union are concerned, but to interpret them res-
trictively. Thus, on 25th January it was deci-
ded at the meeting of the ten Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs to halt supplies of cut-price 
food products to Poland: the DM 84 million 
thus saved will be used to finance the direct dis-
tribution of foodstuffs to the Polish people 
through the intermediary of international orga-
nisations such as the International Red Cross. 
4. Western positions sinu the NATO meeti11g 
o11 lltA ltiiUiary 1982 16. Similarly, it decided to impose trade 
sanctions on the Soviet Union between 16th 
74. The ministerial meeting of the North March and 31st December 1982: these sanc-
Atlantic Council on 11th January 1982 was the tions involve restrictions on imports of a list of 
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fifty-eight products. The volume of imports 
concerned is about 1.34 % of its total imports 
from the Soviet Union whereas in February the 
Commission had proposed a 3.5% reduction. 
Furthermore, the NATO declaration speci-
fied that each of the allies would act according 
to its own circumstances and legislation when 
taking any measures against the Soviet Union. 
In February, only a few European countries 
decided to follow the NATO advice. These 
measures were little more than gestures, more 
symbolic than constraining. For instance, the 
United Kingdom on 5th February and the 
Federal Republic on the 17th decided to restrict 
movements of Soviet diplomats on their terri-
tory. These decisions by Western European 
countries took account of the fact that, far from 
improving as promised, the situation in Poland 
was growing even worse and the British 
Government considered the West should keep 
more constraining measures in reserve, " real 
sanctions ", in case new developments further 
aggravated the Polish crisis. This attitude was 
welcome in Washington because the United 
States had, until then, had every reason to fear 
that its relatively firm decisions were not being 
followed, in spite of the NATO declaration. 
77. The United States tried to persuade its 
European partners to take more effective mea-
sures against the Soviet Union, including the 
cancellation of the agreements for building the 
gas pipeline intended to supply Europe with 
Siberian gas, the abolition of low interest credits 
for Soviet imports and additions to the list of 
products which may not be exported to the 
Soviet Union. A delegation led by Mr. Buck-
ley visited various European capitals for this 
purpose, apparently without much success. 
The Europeans in fact noted that the United 
States was not restricting its exports of grain to 
the Soviet Union, although they accounted for 
more than 70 % of American sales to that coun-
try. The United States Government had at 
that juncture precluded any further embargo on 
grain sales, thus considerably weakening its 
arguments in European eyes. 
78. However, since January the United States 
Government has shown its determination to 
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two countries. But President Reagan did not 
wish to link the arms limitation negotiations 
with the evolution of the situation in Poland. 
The talks on the limitation of continental-
range missiles are therefore to resume on 20th 
May and those on strategic weapons in August. 
79. The Madrid conference, which had 
achieved no significant results in 1981, was 
resumed on 9th February. It allowed the 
Western European countries to stress that 
events in Poland since 13th December were so 
many violations of the Helsinki final act and to 
denounce violations of human rights. The 
Americans had made it understood that they 
would refuse to discuss any- other matter 
covered by the CSCE as long as the situation in 
Poland did not take a positive turn. Thus, 
they refused to take part in committee work, 
attending only plenary sessions in order to be 
able to denounce the state of war in Poland. 
The decision on 12th March to suspend the 
Madrid conference until 9th November was in 
fact a compromise which met the wishes of the 
Soviet Union, which did not want the confe-
rence to end with recognition of another failure 
or to be centred on the Polish question, and 
also the wishes of the West, which could not 
agree to the conference being continued without 
taking account of events in Poland. 
IV. What Europe can do 
80. While it is clear that the West is deter-
mined not to use force to check the repressive 
steps that were taken in Poland on 13th 
December, that it has never thought of doing so 
nor allowed the Poles to believe that it would 
do so, it nevertheless has considerable means of 
exerting pressure on the Soviet Union and the 
Polish Government which may have an impor-
tant effect as the recent past has proved. 
Admittedly, a break in relations of all kinds 
with the USSR and its allies is probably not 
desirable insofar as such relations allow western 
positions, and the possible consequences of a 
policy that might not take account of them, to 
be made known. 
tackle the question of Poland in all its talks 81. However, the pursuit of the Madrid 
with the Soviet Union, inter alia at the meeting Conference which was suspended in February 
between Mr. Haig and Mr. Gromyko in Geneva and is to be resumed in November 1982, raises 
on 24th January and at the CSCE conference in a special problem. In their declaration on 4th 
Madrid. Although he did not cancel his meet- January, the Ten had called for the support of 
ing with Mr. Gromyko at which they were to neutral countries for the Polish question to be 
fix the date for resuming the SALT negotia- placed on the agenda of that meeting. The 
tions, Mr. Haig in fact shortened it and insisted Soviet Union and its allies were not prepared to 
that the Polish question be tackled. Thus he open a debate which could but strongly chat-
met the wishes of the· Europeans who were lenge the events of 13th December and the 
insisting on the East-West dialogue being conti- measures since taken by the Polish Govern-
nued, and also of certain American Republi- ment. It was therefore out of the question for 
cans such as Mr. Kissinger who were calling for the West to agree to take part in a meeting 
the suspension of all negotiations between the which no longer made sense. As Mr. Hanin 
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had recalled in his June 1981 report, the final 
act of the Helsinki Conference banned any 
recourse to the threat or use of force, any inter-
vention by a foreign power in the internal 
affairs of a signatory state and committed all 
participants to respect human rights within 
their frontiers (Preamble, Article 11, VI and 
VII). It is clear that these provisions have been 
transgressed. It was therefore not possible to 
consider continuing a conference to follow up 
the application of the final act of Helsinki with 
powers that refused to agree to examine a case 
of flagrant violation of this international agree-
ment and it was natural for the western 
governments to make the inscription in the 
agenda of the Madrid Conference of the exami-
nation of the situation in Poland a sine qua non 
of their participation in that conference. 
There is no reason why their attitude should 
change in November if there is no significant 
change in the situation in Poland. 
82. In economic matters, the measures taken 
by the United States Government hardly affect 
the immediate interests of the United States or 
its trade with the Soviet Union in the near 
future. However, they have definite advanta-
ges because of their variety, moderation and the 
way in which the United States intends to 
shape their application according to the deve-
lopment of the situation in Poland. The fact 
that the United States has already undertaken 
to apply them leaves room for regret that Eur-
ope was not consulted sufficiently before the 
United States decision, but it would also be 
desirable for Europe to apply them since other-
wise these measures would be deprived of much 
of their effectiveness. Indeed, it is clear that 
the Soviet Union and its allies, starting with 
Poland, need to maintain and develop their 
relations with the West and they are prepared 
to make certain concessions to this end. 
Hence, if the West manages to define a joint 
policy in this connection, it will have a means 
of pressure whose importance must certainly 
not be exaggerated, but nor must it be mini-
mised. The North Atlantic Council declaration 
of 11th January at least had the merit of setting 
out minimum conditions which Poland should 
meet in order to resume "constructive political 
and economic relations with the West". It was 
urged "to end the state of martial law, to 
release those arrested and to restore immedi-
ately a dialogue with the church and Solida-
rity". Although the application of martial law 
was relaxed slightly for I st May and although 
many political prisoners have been freed since 
January, these conditions are still fully valid if 
normal relations are to be resumed with the 
Soviet Union and Poland. 
interests of the Polish state and the aims of the 
Soviet Union._ In the first case, the humanita-
rian steps started l'Jefore 13th December, includ-
ing the distribution of food or day-to-day 
consumer items to the Polish population, 
should in no way be called in question insofar 
as one may be certain that the items collected 
in the West are effectively distributed in Poland 
by independent organisations such as the Inter-
national Red Cross. In the second case, mea-
sures of economic and financial assistance had 
been taken or planned, inter alia to facilitate 
the reimbursement of the Polish debt, before 
the takeover on 13th December. But in pre-
sent circumstances it is difficult to see why 
exceptional measures should be maintained to 
assist the Polish Government. That govern-
ment and those who have brought pressure to 
bear on it must shoulder their responsibilities in 
the situation they have created. It is admit-
tedly not a question of forcing the Polish state 
into bankruptcy, which would be disastrous for 
everyone and detrimental to international 
order, nor of placing it entirely in the hands of 
the possible Soviet lender who would see this as 
a further opportunity of tightening the grip on 
Poland. Negotiations for rescheduling repay-
ments of the Polish debt were probably neces-
sary, but such measures must not be taken as 
assistance to the Polish Government until it has 
fulfilled the three conditions laid down by the 
North Atlantic Council on 1 rth January. 
84. Finally, where the Soviet Union is 
concerned the General Affairs Committee noted 
during its recent visit to the United States that 
the latter's government took a very serious view 
of the fact that its European partners had conti-
nued to conclude long-term agreements with 
the Soviet Union which might make them 
unduly dependent on it, to grant privileged 
terms of credit and to supply items which might 
be used for military purposes. The committee 
also saw that American complaints were not 
directly linked with the Polish affair but rather 
the process of detente begun in Helsinki. The 
United States' European partners do not neces-
sarily share this point of view but if they wish 
to be better understood by the Americans they 
must be more specific than before, in the fra-
mework of the Ten for instance, about tangible, 
effective means of pressure and the precise 
conditions in which such _measures might be 
terminated. Only a readiness to suspend the 
application of current contracts, to refuse privi-
leged credit terms and the supply of material 
usable for military purposes can allow 
Europe to agree with the United States on 
fixing the conditions for terminating such mea-
sures. This would help to improve relations 
between Europe and the United States and 
83. A distinction should be drawn however strengthen western pressure on behalf of the 
between the concerns of the Polish people, the Polish people. 
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85. Finally, the Polish affair should remind 
Europeans that since the end of the second 
world war Soviet policy in Europe has not 
changed a great deal, which means that it is 
above all in the field of defence and security 
that Europe must try to terminate as quickly as 
possible the position of inferiority in which it 
found itself in December 1981. This means 
that the countries of Western Europe must 
make a greater military effort and accept the 
deployment on their territory of missiles capa-
ble of deterring the Soviet V nion from attempt-
ing any form of attack. Failing this determina-
tion, the credibility of even joint statements 
about Poland would be considerably weakened. 
86. The West's inferiority in the field of 
armaments, the signs of its weakening determi-
nation to ensure its defence and to provide itself 
with the wherewithal to do so, deprive even the 
strongest statements by Western European 
governments of much of their weight, whereas 
those by President Reagan obtain a special 
hearing in view of the recovery he has effected 
in the United States defence effort. There 
must be equivalence of words, decisions and 
means if the policy of brutal repression applied 
in Poland since 13th December is to be swayed. 
87. That is an aspect of the problem that 
concerns WEU more particularly and which the 
member countries of that organisation do not 
seem to have fully realised. At the last session 
of our Assembly, the Secretary of State to the 
French Minister of Defence emphasised the 
importance he attached to our organisation and 
gave useful and considered advice on the direc-
tion to be given to its parliamentary work. It 
is however surprising that no government felt 
the need to invoke Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and ask for the WEU Council 
to be convened immediately after the events on 
13th December 1981, which undoubtedly 
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endangered the peace and economic stability of 
Europe. 
88. It is not possible for Europe to remain 
indifferent to events in Poland since 13th 
December and a deep-rooted movement of soli-
darity towards the Polish people has been felt 
throughout our countries, as instanced by the 
multiple appeals to muster humanitarian assis-
tance for the Polish people. There is even less 
reason to halt this assistance since the material 
situation of the Polish people has been deterio-
rating ever since. But solidarity would have no 
meaning if it were not carried over into the 
political field, not in the sense of retaliation 
against anyone, but to help Poland maintain its 
independence and the Polish people to retain 
the rights they had gained during the 1980-81 
crisis. Poland's serious economic difficulties 
must not be taken as a pretext for restoring by 
force a dictatorship whose aims are in no way 
economic but solely political and which is not 
in a position to appeal to the nation to accept 
the sacrifices necessary for the country's econo-
mic recovery. 
89. This means that Europe does not have to 
consider the present situation as an irreversible 
established fact which might possibly be penali-
sed by retaliatory measures of shorter or longer 
duration, but on the contrary as a point in time 
when it is still possible to act to bring about a 
relaxation of martial law and to provoke or to 
encourage a return to the policy of dialogue 
pursued by the Polish Government up to 13th 
December. Europe must therefore try to act 
effectively and this can be done only through 
close co-ordination of the measures the United 
States and the countries of Western Europe take 
in regard to the Soviet V nion and Poland in the 
economic and political fields, particularly with 
regard to the resumption of the Madrid confe-
rence, and in the defence field. 
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Statement by President Reagan 
on the decisions taken against the Soviet Union 
following events in Poland, 
Los Angeles, 29th December 1981 
The Soviet Union bears a heavy and direct 
responsibility for the repression in Poland. 
For many months the Soviets publicly and 
privately demanded such a crackdown. They 
brought major pressures to bear through now-
public letters to the Polish leadership, military 
manoeuvres, and other forms of intimidation. 
They now openly endorse the suppression 
which has ensued. 
Last week I announced that I had sent a 
letter to President' Brezhnev urging him to per-
mit the restoration of basic human rights in 
Poland as provided for in the Helsinki final 
act. I also informed him that, if the repression 
continued, the United States would have no 
choice but to take further concrete political and 
economic measures affecting our relationship. 
The repression in Poland continues, and 
President Brezhnev has responded in a manner 
which makes it clear the Soviet Union does not 
understand the seriousness of our concern, and 
its obligations under both the Helsinki final act 
and the United Nations Charter. I have, 
therefore, decided to take the following imme-
diate measures with regard to the Soviet Union: 
- All Aeroflot service to the United States 
will be suspended. 
- The Soviet purchasing commission is 
being closed. · 
- The issuance or renewal of licences for 
the export to the USSR of electronic equip-
ment, computers and other high-technology 
materials is being suspended. 
- Negotiations on a new long-term grains 
agreement are being postponed. 
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- Negotiations on a new United States-
Soviet maritime agreement are being suspended, 
and a new regime of port-access controls will be 
put into effect for all Soviet ships when the cur-
rent agreement expires on 31st December. 
- Licences will be required for export to 
the Soviet Union for an expanded list of oil and 
gas equipment. Issuance of such licences will 
be suspended. This includes pipelayers. 
- United States-Soviet exchange agree-
ments coming up for renewal in the near future, 
including the agreements on energy and science 
and technology, will not be renewed. There 
will be a complete review of all other United 
States-Soviet exchange agreements. 
The United States wants a constructive and 
mutually beneficial relationship with the Soviet 
Union. We intend to maintain a high-level 
dialogue. But we are prepared to proceed in 
whatever direction the Soviet Union decides 
upon towards greater mutual restraint and co-
operation, or further down a harsh and less 
rewarding path. We will watch events in 
Poland closely in coming days and weeks. 
Further steps may be necessary and I will be 
prepared to take them. American decisions 
will be determined by Soviet actions. 
Secretary Haig has been in communication 
with our friends and allies about the measures 
we are taking and explained why we believe 
such steps are essential at this time .. 
Once again I call upon the Soviet Union to 
recognise the clear desire of the overwhelming 
majority of the Polish people for a process of 
national reconciliation, renewal and reform. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Declaration adopted by the ten Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs of the European Community, 
Brussels, 4th January 1982 
l. The Ten utterly disapproves of the deve-
lopment of the situation in Poland. 
2. They have noted the declarations of the 
Polish leadership of its intention to maintain 
national independence and to re-establish in the 
near future liberty and the process of reform, as 
well as resuming the dialogue with the various 
elements of the Polish nation. Unhappily the 
Ten must note today that, contrary to these 
declarations, what has taken place has not been 
dialogue but repression, bringing in its train 
violations of the most elementary human and 
citizens' rights, contrary to the Helsinki final 
act, the United Nations Charter, and the uni-
versal declaration of human rights. 
3. The Ten, therefore, appeal urgently to 
the Polish authorities to end as soon as possible 
the state of martial law, to release those arrested 
and to restore a general dialogue with the 
church and Solidarity. 
4. The significance of these grave events 
extends beyond Poland itself. The inability of 
the system in Eastern Europe to accept the 
modifications necessary to meet the legitimate 
aspirations of the people is such as to endanger 
public confidence in the possibility of co-
operative links with the East, and thus seriously 
to affect international relations: In this context 
the Ten note with concern and disapproval the 
serious external pressure and the campaign 
directed by the USSR and other Eastern Euro-
pean countries against the efforts for renewal in 
Poland. 
5. This already grave situation would be 
further aggravated if it led to an open interven-
tion by the Warsaw Pact. For this reason the 
Ten wish to issue a solemn warning against any 
such intervention. 
6. The Ten are totally in sympathy with the 
Polish people and are willing to continue the 
direct humanitarian aid to them. 
219 
7. The Ten have taken note of the econo-
mic measures taken by the United States 
Government with regard to the USSR. The 
Ten will undertake in this context close and 
positive consultations with the United States 
Government and with the governments of other 
western states in order to define what decisions 
will best serve their common objectives, and to 
avoid any step which could compromise their 
respective actions. 
8. Developments in Poland constitute a 
grave violation of the principles of the Helsinki 
final act. The Ten, therefore, consider that the 
Madrid conference should discuss them as soon 
as possible at ministerial level. The Ten will 
make approaches to the neutral and non-
aligned states to propose an early resumption of 
the Madrid meeting. 
9. The Ten will work in the United Nations 
and its specialised agencies for a denunciation 
of violations of human rights and acts of violence. 
10. Other measures will be considered as the 
situation in Poland develops, in particular mea-
sures concerning credit and economic assistance 
to Poland, and measures concerning the Com-
munity's commercial policy with regard to the 
USSR. In addition, the Ten will examine the 
question of further food aid to Poland. 
11. The Ten have called on the Polish autho-
rities, both nationally and through the presid-
ency, to lift the abnormal and unacceptable res-
trictions which have been placed on the work 
of embassies, representatives of the media, air 
services and other communications in Poland. 
12. The Ten will study what can be done to 
alleviate the situation of Poles outside Poland 
who do not wish to return to their country 
under present circumstances. 
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Specitd ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council, 
11th January 1982 
Declaration on events in Poland 
1. The allied governments condemn the 
imposition of martial law in Poland and 
denounce the massive violation of human rights 
and the suppression of fundamental civil liber-
ties in contravention of the United Nations 
Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights and the final act of Helsinki. 
2. The process of renewal and reform which 
began in Poland in August 1980 was watched 
with sympathy and hope by all who believe in 
freedom and self-determination; it resulted from 
a genuine effort by the overwhelming majority 
of the Polish people to achieve a more open 
society in accordance with the principles of the 
fmal act of Helsinki. 
3. The imposition of martial law, the use of 
force against Polish workers, with the thousands 
of internments, the harsh prison sentences and 
the deaths that followed, have deprived the 
Polish people of their rights and freedoms, in 
particular in the field of trade unions. These 
acts threaten to destroy the basis for reconcilia-
tion and compromise which are necessary to 
progress and stability in Poland. They are in 
clear violation of Polish commitments under 
the Helsinki final act, particularly the principle 
relating to respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms. Developments in Poland 
demonstrate once again the rigidity of the War-
saw Pact regimes with respect to those changes 
necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations of 
their peoples 1• This endangers public confi-
dence in co-operation between East and West 
and seriously affects international relations. 
4. The allies deplore the sustained cam-
paign mounted by the Soviet Union against 
efforts by the Polish people for national 
renewal and reform, and its active support for 
the subsequent systematic suppression of those 
efforts in Poland. These acts cannot be recon-
ciled with the Soviet Union's international 
undertakings, and in particular with the princi-
ples of the final act of Helsinki, especially those 
dealing with sovereignty, non-intervention, 
threat of force, and self-determination. The 
Soviet Union has no right to determine the 
political and social development of Poland. 
5. The allies call upon the Polish leadership 
to live up to its declared intention to re-
1. The Greek Delegation has reserved its position on this 
sentence. 
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establish civil liberties and the process of 
reform. They urge the Polish authorities to 
end the state of martial law, to release those 
arrested, and to restore immediately a dialogue 
with the church and Solidarity. Only with 
reconciliation and genuine negotiation can the 
basic rights of the Polish people and workers be 
protected, and the economic and social progress 
of the country be secured. Poland could then 
expect to enjoy fully the benefits of stability in 
Europe and of constructive political and econo-
mic relations with the West. 
6. The allies call upon the Soviet Union to 
respect Poland's fundamental right to solve its 
own problems free from foreign interference 
and to respect the clear desire of the overwhel-
ming majority of the Polish people for national 
renewal and reform. Soviet pressure, direct or 
indirect, aimed at frustrating that desire, must 
cease. The allies also warn that if an outside 
armed intervention were to take place it would 
have the most profound consequences for inter-
national relations. 
7. In their communique of 11th December 
1981, NATO Ministers reaffirmed their com-
mitment to work for a climate of confidence 
and mutual restraint in East-West relations; 
what has since happened in Poland has great 
significance for the development of security and 
co-operation in Europe. The persistence of 
repression in Poland is eroding the political 
foundation for progress on the full agenda of 
issues which divide East and West. 
8. The allies remain committed to the poli-
cies of effective deterrence and the pursuit of 
arms control and in particular have welcomed 
the initiatives contained in President Reagan's 
18th November speech. The Soviet Union 
will bear full responsibility if its actions with 
regard to Poland and its failure to live up to 
existing international obligations damage the 
arms control process. A return to the process 
of real reforms and dialogue in Poland would 
help create the atmosphere of mutual confi-
dence and restraint required for progress in 
negotiations in the field of arms control and 
limitations including the Geneva talks on inter-
mediate-range nuclear forces due to resume on 
12th January. 
9. In view of the grave developments in 
Poland, which constitute a serious violation of 
the Helsinki final act, the allies agreed that the 
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Madrid conference should deal with the situa-
tion as soon as possible at the level of Foreign 
Ministers. : 
10; The allies will also intensify their efforts 
to bring to the attention of world public opi-
nion and international organisations, including 
the United Nations and its specialised agencies 
such as the International Labour Organisation, 
the violation of human rights and acts of vio-
lence in Poland. 
11. Each ally will, in accordance with its 
own situation and legislation, identify appro-
priate national possibilities for action in the fol-
lowing fields: 
(a) further restrictions on the movements 
of Soviet and Polish diplomats, and 
other restrictions on Soviet and Polish 
diplomatic missions and organisa-
tions; 
(b) reduction of scientific and technical 
activities or non-renewal of exchange 
agreements. 
Meanwhile the allies emphasise: 
- their determination to do what lies in 
their power to ensure that the truth 
about events in Poland continues to 
reach the Polish people despite the 
obstacles created by the authorities in 
Warsaw and Moscow in direct contra-
vention of their obligations under the 
Helsinki final act; 
- their resolve that the quality of their 
relations with the military regime in 
Poland should reflect the abnormal 
nature of the present situation and 
their refusal to accept it as perma-
nent; 
- their willingness to contribute, with 
other governments, to the solution of 
the problem of Polish citizens now 
abroad and unable or unwilling to 
return to their own country 1• 
12. The allies recognise the importance of 
economic measures to persuade the Polish 
authorities and the Soviet Union of the serious-
ness of western concern over developments in 
l. The Greek Delegation has reserved its position on this 
paragraph. 
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Poland, and stress the significance of the mea-
sures already announced by President Reagan 1• 
13. Regarding economic relations with 
Poland, the allies: 
- noted that future commercial credits 
for goods other than foods will be 
placed in abeyance; 
- noted that the question of holding 
negotiations about the payments due in 
1982 on Poland's official debts should, 
for the time being, be held in suspense; 
- affirmed their willingness to continue 
and increase humanitarian aid to the 
Polish people for distribution and 
monitoring by non-governmental orga-
nisations to ensure that it reaches the 
people for whom it is intended; 
- noted that those allies which sell food 
to Poland will seek the clearest possible 
Polish commitments with regard to the 
use of the food 1• 
14. In the current situation in Poland, econo-
mic relations with Poland and the Soviet Union 
are bound to be affected. Soviet actions to-
wards Poland make it necessary for the allies to 
examine the course of future economic and 
commercial relations with the Soviet Union. 
Recognising that each of the allies will act in 
accordance with its own situation and laws, 
they will examine measures which could 
involve arrangements regarding imports from 
the Soviet Union, maritime agreements, air 
services agreements, the size of Soviet commer-
cial representation and the conditions surround-
ing export credits 1• 
15. The allies will maintain close consulta-
tions on the implementation of their resolve not 
to undermine the effect of each other's mea-
sures. 
16. In addition to agreeing to consult on 
steps to be taken in the near future, the allies 
will also reflect on longer-term East-West eco-
nomic relations, particularly energy, agricultu-
ral commodities and other goods, and the ex-
port of technology, in light of the changed 
situation and of the need to protect their com-
petitive position in the field of military and 
technological capabilities 1• 
l. The Greek Delegation has reserved its position on 
these paragraphs. 
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Statement by the Presidential Committee 
of the WEU Assembly, Paris, 
8th January 1982 
1. The Presidential Committee had been 
convened as a matter of urgency to assess the 
situation in Poland in the light of the Assem-
bly's Order 53 passed on 3rd December 1980 
and its Resolution 370 adopted on 18th June 
1981. 
2. It noted with satisfaction the reply of the 
Council to Written Question 228 put to the 
Council on 15th December 1981 by the Presi-
dent of the Assembly in which the Council sta-
tes that it shared the President's and the Assem-
bly's grave concern at events in Poland. 
3. The Presidential Committee was pleased 
to note the fact that member countries and their 
allies have effectively pursued their consul-
tations on the serious situation created by the 
introduction of martial law and repressive 
measures in Poland on 13th December 1981 
and welcome and endorse the joint declaration 
of the Ten on 4th January 1981. It also 
expressed its hope that the meeting at ministe-
rial level of the Council of NATO due to take 
place on 11th January will take further positive 
steps to achieve agreement on a joint position. 
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4. The Committee invites the Council to 
examine the consequences of events which have 
taken place in Poland from the point of view of 
the security of Europe as well as the measures 
to be taken to meet that challenge, while 
wishing that everything possible should be done 
to alleviate the sufferings of the Polish people 
and if possible to create conditions in which 
they can make further progress towards the 
achievement of improvement in their economic 
and political circumstances. This would involve, 
in the opinion of the Committee, as a matter 
of urgency, the restoration of trade union 
rights and the process of economic and political 
reforms, the end of martial law, the liberation 
of political prisoners and the resumption 
of the dialogue between the representatives 
of Solidarity, the church and the state author-
ities. 
5. The Committee expressed the wish that 
the Council should do all it can to keep the 
Assembly informed of its decisions and of deve-
lopments in its consultations. ; 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to the statement by the Presidential Committee 
on 8th January 1982 
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The Council have taken careful note of the statement on the situation in Poland sent to them on 
8th January 1982 by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly. 
They welcome the Committee's support of the position expressed by the Foreign Ministers of the 
member states of the European Community in their declaration of 4th January 1982 in Brussels. 
The Council wish to draw the Assembly's attention to the declaration which the North Atlantic 
Council, meeting in extraordinary ministerial session, published in Brussels on 11th January 
1982. As indicated in that declaration member governments condemn the imposition of martial law 
in Poland and denounce the massive violation of human rights and the suppression of fundamental 
civil liberties in contravention of the United Nations Charter, the universal declaration on human 
rights and the final act of Helsinki. They urge the Polish authorities to live up to their declared 
intention to end the state of martial law, to release those arrested, and to restore immediately a 
dialogue with the church and Solidarity. They call upon the Soviet Union to respect Poland's 
fundamental right to solve its own problems free from foreign interference. 
The member countries of WEU have since remained in close contact with their European and 
Atlantic partners. They have continued to consult with them on developments in the Polish situa-
tion and on the measures to be taken in consequence, which have been examined by the North 
Atlantic Council on 23rd January and by the Foreign Ministers of the member states of the European 
Community on 25th January in Brussels. These subjects will also, as previously announced, be 
reviewed at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 3rd February. 
Member countries of WEU together with other western countries have discussed amongst them-
selves Polish and Soviet violations of the Helsinki final act and intend raising the subject at the 
resumption of the CSCE meeting in Madrid on 9th February. 
The member countries of WEU will continue to play an active part in the current consultations 
and the Council will not fail to inform the Assembly of further developments. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd February 1982. 
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APPENDIX VI 
RECOMMENDATION 378 
on the evolution of the situation in Poland 
adopted by the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly, 
London, 8th February 1982 
The Assembly, 
Recalling its Order 53 and Recommendation 370; 
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Considering that the existence of a military dictatorship in Poland constitutes a flagrant viola-
tion of the final act of the Helsinki conference; 
Considering that Poland's serious economic difficulties do not justify the replacement of the 
dialogue between the state authorities and Solidarity by a policy of repression; 
Considering that the public acts of the Soviet Union reveal interference in the internal affairs of 
Poland and pressure on the Polish Government for the establishment of that dictatorship; 
Noting that the situation thus created in Poland is such as to cause Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty to be applied; 
Regretting that no member government of WEU has judged it necessary to examine in the 
framework of the Council the implications of this situation for the security of Europe; 
Believing that as long as repression persists in Poland there can be no question of re-
establishing normal relations with Poland and its allies, starting with the Soviet Union; 
Firmly recalling that the re-establishment of such normal relations depends on: 
(a) the termination of martial law in Poland; 
(b) the release of all political prisoners and in particular of Solidarity members; 
(c) the resumption of the dialogue between the government, Solidarity and the Catholic 
Church, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure close exchanges of views between the European and American members of the North 
Atlantic Alliance in order to co-ordinate measures taken and to be taken in respect of both Poland 
and the Soviet Union in accordance with the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 11th Janu-
ary 1982; 
2. To this end, continue to work out in the most appropriate European framework a joint policy 
towards the Soviet Union and Poland, particularly in economic and financial matters, in both the 
long and short term; 
3. Further, invite member countries to suspend economic and financial assistance to Poland in 
present circumstances; 
4. Also invite member countries to pursue and develop their humanitarian assistance to the 
Polish people insofar as it does not strengthen the authorities responsible for the military coup d'etat 
on 13th December 1981; 
5. Meet to follow closely the development of the situation in Poland and hold a continuing 
dialogue with the Assembly on this question; 
6. Conduct talks with the countries of Eastern Europe on the application of the final act of the 
conference on security and co-operation in Europe particularly in connection with serious examina-
tion of events in Poland. 
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APPENDIX VII 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 378 
1. In their reply to Recommendation 378 the Council would like to draw the attention of the 
Assembly to the continuing and intensive consultations which took place within NATO, in the 
European Council and between members of WEU. 
The NATO meeting of 11th January resulted, as the Assembly is aware, in broad agreement on 
an attitude to be adopted towards Poland and the Soviet Union. 
In their reply on 3rd February to the statement by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly 
on 8th January 1982, the Council already stated that the member countries of WEU have remained 
in close contact with their European and Atlantic partners. 
The European Council renewed its call to the Polish authorities to end with the minimum 
delay the state of martial law, release those arrested and restore a genuine dialogue with the Church 
and Solidarity. 
A further exchange of views with the transatlantic partners regarding the western position is en-
sured through consultations in the NATO Council. 
2. Joint policies in the economic field towards the Soviet Union have been worked out in the 
framework of the EEC as is shown e.g. by its decision to restrict imports from the Soviet Union. Wes-
tern countries have decided with regard to Poland that the question of the rescheduling of Poland's 
1982 official debts should for the time being be held in suspense. They also took restrictive mea-
sures concerning officially backed credits, including the decision not to make any new credits avail-
able to Poland at the present time. For the longer term it should be noted that during discussions of 
the European Council on 29th and 30th March 1982, the heads of state and of government discussed 
the basis on which East-West economic and commercial relations had been conducted. The heads of 
state and of government agreed that these questions, including the important and related question of 
credit policy, should be the subject of careful study by the European Community and by their own 
and other governments, both nationally and internationally and in close consultation with other 
members of the OECD. Thus the EEC introduced a proposal in this organisation to upgrade the 
Soviet Union from the intermediate to the relatively r:.:;h category for export credits. 
3. Member countries of WEU as well as other NATO countries have suspended economic and 
financial assistance to Poland on the understanding that no basis for the re-establishment of normal 
relations and consequently for continuation of such assistance exists as long as no positive develop-
ment takes place in Poland to end martial law, release those in detention and restore a genuine dia-
logue with the Church and Solidarity. 
4. In their communique on 4th January, Foreign Ministers of the Ten declared their total sympa-
thy with the Polish people and their readiness to continue their direct humanitarian aid to them. 
The NATO Foreign Ministers affirmed during their 11th January meeting their willingness to 
continue and increase humanitarian aid to the Polish people for distribution and monitoring by non-
governmental organisations to ensure that it reaches the people for whom it is intended. Further-
more, EEC Ministers concluded on 27th January that the funds which were released by their deci-
sions should be used to finance humanitarian assistance in the form of gifts. 
It should be noted that both the EEC and NATO countries specifically stipulated that such aid 
should be channelled only through non-governmental organisations and be conditional on it reaching 
the Polish people. 
5. WEU member countries have met regularly and are continuing to do so, either through the 
medium of the WEU Council or in other multilateral fora, to discuss the situation in Poland. The 
Council will not fail to inform the Assembly of further developments. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th May 1982. 
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6. WEU member countries were represented at ministerial level at the resumption of the CSCE 
meeting in Madrid in February of this year. Regrettably the violations of the principles of the Hel-
sinki final act, of which the repression in Poland constitutes a particularly grave element, had not 
only prevented the Madrid meeting from achieving positive results, but also put at risk the entire 
CSCE process. WEU member countries as well as other member countries of the EEC, which 
· remain committed to the continuation of the CSCE process, have expressed the hope that, when the 
Madrid meeting resumes in November, the prevailing circumstances would be more conducive to the 
achievement of a positive outcome. 
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Amendments 1, 2 and 3 
Evolution of the situation in Poland 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 31 
tabled by Mr. Pignion 
15th June 1982 
l. After the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
" Recalling the decisions taken in the framework of European political co-operation; ". 
2. In paragraph l of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "in respect of both Poland and 
the Soviet Union in order to convince them to meet the conditions set by the North Atlantic Coun-
cil " and insert " in respect of both the Polish and the Soviet Governments in order to convince them 
to meet the conditions set by the North Atlantic Council and the European organisations". 
3. After paragraph l of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows: 
" Continue for its part to consider regularly the application of European measures and possibly 
envisage further measures designed to attain the aims set out in the previous paragraph; ". 
Signed: Pignion 
l. See 5th sitting, 16th June 1982 (amendments l and 2 agreed to; amendment 3 amended and agreed to). 
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International aeroiUIUtical consortia -
guidelines drawn from the colloquy 
on 9th and lOth February 1982 
REPORT' 
. submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Scienti.frc, Technological and Aerospace Questions2 
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
18th May 1982 
on international aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn from the colloquy 
on 9th and lOth February 1982 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. The political principles of collaboration 
Ill. The viewpoint of government officials on collaboration 
- United States-European collaboration 
- The Italian viewpoint 
- The mechanisms of collaboration 
- The perspective of the smaller nations 
- The difficulties and problems of co-operation 
IV. The industrial dimension to collaboration 
- The collaborative experience so far 
- Cost control in international aerospace consortia 
- Project preparation phase 
- Project implementation stage 
- Financial advantages of the concerted approach 
- Examples of cost control from the Tornado programme 
- A cost-efficiency analysis of Tornado 
- Co-operation in military aeroengine manufacture 
- Helicopter collaboration 
- Co-opei'3tion in missiles and spacecraft 
V. Conclusion 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Val/eix (Chairman); 
MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts 
(Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Sch/aman), Adriaensens, Amadei 
(Alternate: Cavaliere), Antoni (Alternate: Martino), Barthe, 
Fiandrotti, Forma, Fortier (Alternate: Bassinet), Fourre, 
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Garrett (Alternate: Lord Northfield), Hawkins (Alternate: 
Sir Russe/1 Fairgrieve), McGuire (Alternate: Morris), Man-
ning, Prussen, Spies von Biil/esheim, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, 
MM. Topmann, Worre/1. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed 
in italics. 
The Assembly, 
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on internatiotudurotu~~~ticfll consortia - guidelines drtlwn 
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(z) Conscious of the political will it has consistently demonstrated through the organisation in the 
last ten years of no less than five symposia so as to promote improved co-operation and collaboration 
in the conception, design, development, production and procurement of high technology defence 
equipment, especially missiles and aircraft: 
(ii) Reaffirming its belief that the ensuing military benefits of such collaboration, namely enhanced 
co-operation, interoperability and where possible standardisation in equipment of the armed services 
of the western Alliance, would to a large extent offset the advantage of commonality of armaments 
currently enjoyed by the forces of the Warsaw Pact; 
(iii) Aware that the military aircraft, space and guided missile sectors of European industry play an 
increasingly important social and economic role in many regions of Europe in maintaining employ-
ment and in stimulating new technological developments, especially in times of recession; 
. ,.. 
(iv) Recalling that the incentive for international collaboration in t~ aeronautical industry must be 
not just the economic and political advantages for governments, or the military benefits for armed 
forces but the commercial interests and industrial development of participating aerospace companies; 
(v) Convinced that existing institutions such as the Conference of National Armaments Directors 
(CNAD) of NATO, the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) of Western European Union and the 
Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) should be made to operate effectively and their 
work harmonised, particularly as many of the same people are involved; 
(vi) Recognising that aeronautical collaboration has taken place within a variety of industrial orga-
nisational structures from simple prime and sub-contractor relationships through joint companies to 
complete industrial consortia and that the organisational requirements for one particular aerospace 
project do not necessarily lend themselves to another; 
(vii) Considering that families of aircraft and of military aerospace equipment represent a cost-
effective return on investment, not least for the smaller countries of Europe, and that to this end 
existing consortia such as Airbus Industrie and Panavia offer the basis for further projects; 
(viii) Appreciating that the fiscal, legal, and financial environment within -.vhich transnational 
consortia have to operate impose impediments to aeronautical collaboration in Europe not shared by 
competitor aerospace companies in the United States and that the objective for Western Europe 
should be to provide itself with a comparable industrial aeronautical capability; 
(ix) Convinced that the pursuit of a genuinely balanced North Atlantic market for high technology 
defence equipment with the United States of America demands not only enhanced collaboration 
among the member states, but also a change in American policy towards a satisfactory opening for 
European production, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Strengthen the effectiveness of the Standing Armaments Committee as an agency for the pro-
motion of co-operation, interoperability and where possible standardisation in defence equipment of 
the WEU countries by increasing the SAC's establishment of expert staff and enhancing the level of 
political support accorded to its work by the governments of the member nations of WEU; 
2. Persuade the governments represented in WEU to reinforce the vital function of the Indepen-
dent European Programme Group in harmonising national operational requirements and re-
equipment timescales on a European scale by assigning the chairmanship of the IEPG to a defence 
minister on a rotational basis and by regular progress reports by the IEPG to the Assembly of WEU; 
3. Seek to make the most effective use of the Conference of National Armaments Directors 
(CNAD) since a concomitant to the mutual defence commitments of the Atlantic Alliance must be a 
common approach not just to strategy but to materiel procurement and logistics; 
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4. Reinforce political will within the WEU nations at the highest governmental level to pursue a 
collaborative approach to the re-equipment requirements of the European armed forces of the Atlan-
tic Alliance by placing policies for the achievement of a balanced and equitable European and Atlan-
tic-wide market for armaments firmly on the agenda for heads of government meetings and for the 
more regular and routine meetings of Alliance defence and foreign ministers; 
5. Urge defence ministry staffs of the WEU countries to bear in mind, in addition to the operatio-
nal requirements of their individual national armed forces, criteria such as overseas marketability of 
defence equipment, the need to control costs by avoiding a-higher degree of technical sophistication 
than that required to achieve substantial superiority over any likely threat, and the benefits, both 
industrial and military, of securing other Alliance nations to share in the production and procure-
ment of the high technology defence equipment; 
6. Promote the earliest possible involvement of industrial interests including existing European 
consortia in the conception-:-and definition of future aerospace projects either nationally or through 
the European Defence Industrial Group (EDIG) or preferably both so as to achieve a market and 
commercial orientation of such projects from the design stage, the first and foremost of which should 
be a new European combat aircraft; 
7. Press the national governments within WEU to pursue industrial policies towards the aeronau-
tical sector more favourable to the development of an independent European capability in aerospace 
than to the costly maintenance oJ purely national aerospace capabilities and to ensure to this end that 
a collaborative strategy within Europe be maintained involving the fullest utilisation of existing 
consortia for the design, development and production of new aeronautical projects; 
8. Invite the member governments of WEU to reaffirm to the European Communities the need 
for carefully-considered proposals to be put to the Council of the EEC for the establishment of a har-
monised framework of company law and of harmonised tax systems so as to facilitate the operation of 
transnational consortia within the EEC; 
9. Emphasise strongly to member governments of WEU the importance of applying the family of 
aircraft concept in the European framework whenever excessive competition is liable to weaken 
Europe's industrial potential; 
10. Impress upon the governments of the member nations the need to make clear to the Govern-
ment of the United States that the evolution of a balanced and equitable Atlantic-wide market in 
military aerospace products is a paramount political necessity, which will also require the support of 
Congress for the lifting of restrictions on European imports such as the Speciality Metals Amend-
ment. 
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ExplantJtory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur) 
I. llttroduction 
I. In its reply to Recommendation 362 on 
international industrial consortia and collabora-
tive arrangements for the production of high 
technology military equipment, the Council 
observed that "the development of co-operative 
armaments programmes is, moreover, a long 
and arduous task requiring, in the countries 
concerned, consensus with regard to industrial, 
economic, military and political interests. Co-
operation in the matter of armaments is more 
readily achieved by pragmatic and patient 
endeavour than by declarations of principle, 
whose limitations have been shown by past 
experience". 
2. It has been with the objective of promot-
ing European consensus and the reconciliation 
of national industrial, military and political 
interests within the WEU member states in the 
pursuit of improving interoperability and stan-
dardisation of defence equipment within the 
western Alliance that the Assembly of Western 
European Union and its two committees most 
concerned, namely on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions, have sponsored no 
less than five specialist symposia in the last 
nine years culminating in the colloquy at Lan-
caster House, London, on international aero-
nautical consortia from 9th to lOth February 
1982. 
3. Whereas the first colloquy in Paris in 
1973 was very much concerned with the Ame-
rican challenge to the independence and even 
survival of the European high technology def-
ence equipment industry for which the pres-
cription was essentially collaboration or extinc-
tion, collaboration has now become a fact of 
life for the aerospace companies of Europe. 
"Co-operate or die", in the words of Mr. 
Lemoine, French Minister of State for Defence, 
is a principle which has beenfully recognised by 
the European aeronautical industry for a long 
time, and a whole .catalogue of famous collabo-
rative projects now in service like the Alpha-Jet, 
Jaguar, Puma, Lynx, Gazelle, Hot, Roland; 
Milan, F-16 and Tornado offers tangible testi-
mony to the effective translation of that princi-
ple into practice. 
-'-
4. As a result there are companies, consortia 
and industrial groupings in the European aero-
nautical sector fully able to compete in terms of 
performance and cost with their American 
counterparts. This process has been much 
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aided by the conscious decisions of successive 
United States administrations, and particularly 
that of former President Carter, to promote a 
transatlantic dialogue over the procurement 
within the western Alliance of sophisticated 
military equipment. The two-way street has 
passed from a declaration of principle favoured 
by forward-thinking academics, like Thomas 
Callaghan of Georgetown University, and cam-
paigning politicians to a practical reality. Of 
course, the dominance of the United States 
aerospace industry persists as does the imba-
lance of trade in aerospace products, particu-
larly in the civil sector, although even this, fol-
lowing the success of Airbus Industrie's A-300 
European Airbus, is diminishing. 
5. The argument has therefore shifted dra-
matically over the course of the last decade. 
The merits of European collaboration no 
longer have to be argued. The awesome costs 
of developing and producing modem aero-
planes, missiles and spacecraft have long since 
been evidently beyond the capabilities of all 
but the three or four richest European nations. 
Even they have appreciated that in most ins-
tances, unless a large export market can be 
assured to amortise development costs, there is 
no alternative to the industrial benefits of 
shared development expenditures, long produc-
tion runs and technology transfer inherent in 
collaborative programmes. For the smaller 
European nations the collaborative imperative 
is even more stark, since without collaboration 
their aerospace-related industries could not 
survive. 
6. What remains to be studied are the 
mechanics of co-operation. A whole genera-
tion has elapsed since the inception of the first 
European collaborative projects such as the 
Concorde, Transall and Atlantic. Ad hoc co-
operation has been replaced by the consortium 
approach to collaboration and by families of 
armaments and United States-European colla-
boration. The arrangements utilised for the 
joint development and production of various 
European aerospace projects have already been 
described in Document 863, the report on 
international industrial consortia and collabora-
tive arrangements for the production of high 
technology military equipment dated 1st 
December 1980. The Lancaster House collo-
quy, by bringing together ministers, civil ser-
vants, serving officers of the armed forces, 
industrialists and politicians involved or inter-
ested in the procurement process, provided an 
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almost unique opportunity to assess on a Euro-
pean scale the progress and the impediments 
which attend aerospace collaboration today, 
and to draw appropriate conclusions. 
7. The broad themes of the recommenda-
tion to Document 863 were endorsed by the 
colloquy, such as the more effective utilisation 
of existing institutional frameworks for collabo-
ration rather than the establishment of new 
bureaucratic structures, the importance of a 
commercial orientation to collaboration from 
its inception and an approach to partnership 
with United States aerospace companies which, 
whilst not protectionist, recognises the impor-
tance of retaining multiple independent design 
and development capabilities within Europe. 
ll. The political principles of collaboration 
8. The colloquy was privileged to be 
accorded important contributions by three 
Ministers of State, Mr. Hurd, of the British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. 
Lemoine, of the French Ministry of Defence, 
and Viscount Trenchard, of the British Ministry 
of Defence, as well as opening speeches by the 
President of the Assembly of WEU, a former 
British Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Mul-
ley, and by the Chairman of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions ofWEU, Mr. Valleix. 
9. Whereas the 1973 WEU colloquy took 
place with the American technological and pro-
ductive challenge to the European aerospace 
industry very much in mind, the 1982 Lancas-
ter House colloquy of WEU was held in the 
recent aftermath of the imposition of martial 
law in Poland and with the memory of the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan still very 
much alive. The political and military argu-
ments in favour of enhanced collaboration for 
the production of high technology defence 
equipment are therefore even more telling, 
especially since the economic recession has 
made budgetary constraints upon equipment 
programmes particularly severe because at the 
same time, according to Lord Trenchard, the 
cost of an aircraft and its weapons is escalating 
at 5 % per annum more than the rate of infla-
tion. 
with estimates in the United States Department 
of Defence's publication entitled "Soviet Mili-
tary Power" which adduces to the Soviet Union 
an average of 12% to 14% of its gross national 
product to defence spending, excluding the 
space and science expenditures which are, of 
course, also of profound military signifi-
cance. In the words of Secretary of Defence 
Caspar Weinberger's preface to this booklet 
"the growth of the Soviet armed forces is made 
possible by the USSR's military production 
base which continues to grow at the expense of 
all other components of the Soviet economy. 
There are 135 major military industrial 
plants now operating in the Soviet Union with 
over 40 million square metres in floor space, a 
34% increase since 1970". 
11. Since, to quote Mr. Valleix again, "the 
challenge of the Soviet Union is today the main 
concern of Europeans, and not without reason" 
it is crucial that the most efficient use be made 
of the western democracies' politically limited 
financial resources for defence. The role of 
aerospace collaboration in this respect was well 
summarised by Mr. Lemoine at the colloquy 
when he said that: " These high aeronautical 
development costs in relative terms (they have 
also been increasing by leaps and bounds in 
absolute terms over the last few years due to 
new technology) are making it less and less pos-
sible or realistic to go it ·alone and more and 
more vital to engage in international co-
.operation through adequate consortia... It was 
not by chance that the first generation of inter-
national co-operation schemes launched fifteen 
to twenty years ago involved almost exclusively 
the aeronautical and missile industries. But 
what was then merely a trend has now become 
an absolute necessity." 
12. Even the United States is no longer able 
to "go it alone" in the development and pro-
duction of all the high technology weaponry its 
armed forces need to meet the Soviet challenge. 
From the European perspective Lord Tren-
chard was right to warn that "unless Europe 
can maintain leading positions in a large 
portion of the defence industries the two-way 
street between the United States and Europe 
will not work well, and if the two-way street 
does not work well wider aspects of the defence 
of the West and of agreement between the 
United States and her NATO partners and the 
10. The scale of the Soviet challenge was free world will be harder to achieve". From 
well described by Mr. Valleix who reminded the American perspective the situation was 
the colloquy that the Soviets "have built up an starkly stated in T.A. Callaghan's West Point 
arsenal far greater than they need to defend paper of June 1981 entitled "The Structural 
their national territory and extending well Disarmament of the West. Our Most Critical 
beyond a persevering determination to catch up Defence Industrial Challenge". In it the 
with western technology. On average, Soviet famous author of the Callaghan report to the 
expenditure is increased by 5 % per year in State Department of 1974 advocating the two-
constant terms, representing 11 % to 13 % of way street forcefully describes the position 
the gross national product." This corresponds faced by Europeans and Americans alike: "If 
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we accept the fact that we are dependent mili-
tarily upon our allies for our own military 
security, then we must also accept the need for 
defence industrial interdependence. If we per-
sist in pursuing an autarchic defence industrial 
policy - refusing to be dependent upon any ally 
for weapon development, production or support 
- then we shall become increasingly vulnerable 
militarily, because (z) we will have set ourselves 
a task our defence industrial base cannot per-
form; (iz) our allies' military capabilities, readi-
ness and war reserves will continue to decline, 
and (iiz) we (like our allies) will find it impossi-
ble to climb out from the quicksand of structu-
ral disarmament." 
13. The possibility of the "structural disar-
mament of the West" in face of the Soviet chal-
lenge is inherent in the relative price effect 
whereby the cost of sophisticated weaponry 
escalates more than the rate of inflation, and 
considerably more than the 3 % increase in 
defence expenditure in real terms to which the 
NATO member countries are committed to 
aim. In the words of Lord Trenchard, 
"without constantly increasing defence budgets 
in real terms we are all faced with a steady 
reduction in the numbers of aircraft, ships and 
tanks that we can afford". As the Warsaw 
Pact is deploying new equipment of ever greater 
sophistication in ever growing numbers, this is 
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demands military flexibility in having for politi-
cal and economic reasons to impose upon the 
national military staffs compromises in opera-
tional requirements. This should be achie-
vable since, in the words of Mr. Lemoine, "we 
are contemplating a common potential theatre 
of operations where possible personal differen-
ces of concept must be reconciled if we are to 
go ahead with the co-operation we must indis-
pensably engage in to keep within our defence 
budgets... The other compromise - the indus-
trial one - is much more difficult to achieve 
because it implies mutual sacrifices. In parti-
cular, France feels a sense of solidarity with so-
called less industrialised countries that are insis-
tently asking the big European nations for 
a minimum degree of technology transfers to 
assist their infant industries and bolster their 
decision-making autonomy and independence, 
which they want just as we do. In short, we 
must not deny to them that two-way traffic 
which we Europeans were not able to obtain 
from the United States; on the contrary, we 
must endeavour to establish it between big and 
less-industrialised countries within Europe." 
In other words there is a need for an 
intra-European two-way street between the 
large and small countries of Europe just as 
much as there is for a transatlantic two-way 
street between North America and Europe. 
a state of affairs to which the heads of govern- 16. Cost control is an essential interest for all 
ment of the western Alliance, as stated in the Alliance nations in the procurement of defence 
draft recommendation, must address themselves equipment. In the judgment of Lord Tren-
as a matter of urgency. chard it can best be achieved if each country, 
14. The potential of defence equipment bur- and indeed to a large extent each company 
den-sharing inherent in an equitable two-way within each country, selects areas where it has a 
street and Alliance-wide collaboration in the lead technology and develops them. Each 
field of aerospace weaponry was analysed by nation should avoid spending money on the 
Mr. T.A. Callaghan Jnr. in his contribution to industries where it is competitively weak and 
the Europe-America Letter of March 1982 should in turn seek co-operation in those areas 
which summarises admirably some of the basic with other countries. In Lord Trenchard's 
political arguments inherent in the Lancaster view the savings inherent in productive specia-
House colloquy discussions. "The defence of lisation outweigh the consequent loss of compe-
the West could be immeasurably strengthened titive stimulus to efficiency. "I believe", he 
and the danger of continental and interconti- argued, "that we shall only make international 
nental nuclear war greatly reduced", Mr. Calla- collaboration work better if we exercise a grea-
ghan argues, "if the allied heads of government ter degree of self-discipline in selecting a smal-
were to agree at the Bonn summit to pool their ler number of areas in each country where we 
efforts and resources, and to create a credible, will apply our inevitably limited research and 
collective conventional force for the defence of development resources ... " 
Europe. This would require agreement also on b 
a collective defence-industrial effort within 17. The politics of collaboration cannot e 
complete without a political appraisal of the 
Europe, and between Europe and North Amer- institutional framework within which collabora-
ica. With half again as many people, and 
more than twice the GNP of the Warsaw Pact, tive projects are undertaken. Lord Trenchard 
echoed the sentiments of the draft recommen-
a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional balance dation to this report and of the previous report 
could be achieved without economic strain - if on international industrial consortia of Decem-
the financial burdens, and the economic bene- her 1980 when he emphasised that "there is 
fits Gobs and technological pride and progress) more hope that the discipline of the profit and 
were equitably and efficiently shared." loss account will drive industrial companies 
15. Burden-sharing in co-operative weapon into more and more international collaboration 
production and in aerospace collaboration on an industrial basis than that major new ini-
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tiatives on a government-to-government basis 
on their own will be successful". Nevertheless, 
governments have a role to play as we have 
seen over the failure to sell Tornado to other 
than the armed services of the three manufac-
turing partner nations, Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom. Lord Trenchard was right to 
observe laconically that "the problems of sales 
to third parties with all the security and foreign 
policy problems they sometimes produce need 
much more consideration at the formative stage 
of a collaboration". Furthermore, although it 
is right to put more faith in commercial incen-
tives to collaboration than in governmental or 
institutional pressures, these official frameworks / 
for collaboration do merit serious political 
attention. Mr. Lemoine was to be applauded 
therefore for reminding the colloquy "that 
France's aeronautical economic policy consists 
of promoting European co-operation both in all 
official frameworks and by encouraging the 
work of the European Defence Industrial Group 
of European industrialists (EDIG) - the unof-
ficial industrial opposite number of the Inde-
pendent European Programme Group - as well 
as by urging French industry to participate in 
international consortia". 
the chairmanship of the IEPG be assigned on a 
rotational basis to a defence minister, a view 
echoed by Mr. Hoist in his evidence to the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments in Paris on 17th November 1981 when 
he said that "a meeting of state secretaries 
constitutes the highest body of the IEPG. It 
provides political guidance to the ·work of the 
organisation and is convened at least once a 
year in the country which has the chair... the 
position of state secretary does not exist in 
many of the member countries. They have in 
many instances been represented instead by 
senior civil servants. However, this state of 
affairs has made it more difficult to generate 
political impetus and momentum in the organi-
sation. It is possible that the annual meeting 
should be specifically designated a ministerial 
session in order to ensure such impetus." In-
deed it should, but the outcome of the work 
will still depend on the political will of the 
national governments represented. 
Ill. The viewpoint of government officials on 
collaboration 
18. Finally it is clear that the work of WEU 19. A number of distinguished civil servants 
in promoting collaboration has had some politi- and serving officers participated in the col-
cat success but further progress is essential. loquy and papers were read by Mr. Barnes, 
First, the Council has finally agreed that Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser (Projects) at the 
National Armaments Directors should as a rule British Ministry of Defence, by General Bar-
give preference to future collaborative equip- bato, Director-General Armaments (Aerospace) 
ment selected in the framework of the Indepen- at the Italian Ministry of Defence, by lngenieur 
dent European Programme Group rather than General Cauchie, Director for International 
competing non-European equipment. Second- Affairs at the French Ministry of Defence, by 
ly, the determination of the General Rappor- Lieutenant-Colonel De Winne, Assistant to the 
teur to see a more effective role for both the National Armaments Director at the Belgian 
IEPG and also for the SAC of WEU was Ministry of Defence, and by Dr. Schomerus, 
echoed at the colloquy by Mr. Hurd, although Ministerialdirigent, Federal German Ministry 
the example he gave of the European combat for Economic Affairs. In addition there were a 
aircraft remains tragically nugatory owing to a number of interventions by prominent officials 
lack of funding and political will on the part of from the floor, notably by Mr. Plantey, Head of 
the potential partner nations. "In 1981 ", Mr. the international secretariat of the Standing 
Hurd reminded the colloquy, "the Assembly Armaments Committee of WEU, an expanded 
passed Recommendation 368 which asked version of whose observations has been added 
WEU member governments to harmonise spe- to the record of the colloquy as an appendix. 
cifications so that development of a new com-
bat aircraft would proceed and to demonstrate, 
in the framework of the Standing Armaments United States-European collaboration 
Committee and of the Independent European ~ 
Programme Group, their interest in its develop- 20. Mr. Barnes' paper on the possibilities of ~ 
ment. The Council in reply told the Assembly joint co-operation between the United States .-_ 
that the next generation of combat aircraft was and Europe was invaluable. He recalled the 
being actively discussed by the French, German fact that, of the total expenditure on defence 
and British Governments. Interest shown by equipment by all members of the Alliance, the 
various European governments was such that a European share is just under 40 % and that the 
project group had been set up within the IEPG vast majority of the remainder is spent in the 
to facilitate concerted action and exchanges of United States, whereas in other NATO expen-
information." Abortive examples of this kind ditures the European share is no less than over 
heighten disenchantment with the work of the 66 %. Of the world armaments market about a 
IEPG and increase the importance of the draft third is held by the United States, a third held 
recommendation to this report demanding that by the USSR and a third by the European 
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nations. Inasmuch as European collaboration 
has contributed to these achievements it should 
be extended particularly in the fields of guided 
weapons and space technology in which pro-
gress towards effective collaboration had been 
slower than with aircraft. 
21. Mr. Barnes reminded the colloquy that 
"the prospect of collaboration with the United 
States cannot be set aside for two reasons. The 
first is the sheer size of the potential markets 
which can be opened up, both within the Uni-
ted States itself and within its overseas custo-
mers. The second is that the cost of the re-
search, development and evaluation which pre-
cedes production is reaching proportions which 
even the United States finds hard to afford -
especially if the production run is effectively 
limited to its own offtake and if other overseas 
markets (excluding the North Atlantic Alliance) 
are small." 
22. There is nothing new in collaboration 
between the United States and individual Euro-
pean countries. Anglo-American co-operation 
in World War 11 initiated the process, then 
came the licence production by the Glenn Mar-
tin company of the B-57 version of the English 
Electric Canberra for the United States air 
force, followed by the V/STOL development 
based on the Kestrel and Harrier, leading first 
to the A VS-A and subsequently to the 
A VS-B. The General Electric-SNECMA 
CFM-56 powerplant is another example of suc-
ce~sful United States-European collaboration 
and it should not be forgotten that European 
countries have contributed very usefully to the 
Shuttle and the related Spacelab programme. 
Eloquent testimony to the quality of the Euro-
pean contribution to the Shuttle and Spacelab 
programme was given during the visit made by 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions of WEU to the Kennedy 
Space Centre in July 19Sl. 
23. An important initiative was launched by 
the administration of President Carter whereby 
Dr. Perry, the Under-Secretary for Research 
and Engineering in the Department of Defence, 
sought to extend the principle of transatlantic 
collaboration by allowing more than one coun-
try to participate, thereby furthering the cause 
of interoperability within NATO. 
24. The idea he promoted, the family of wea-
pons concept, had its origin in the Anglo-
French helicopter package of the late 
1960s. In the case of a two-system family of 
weapons the United States would develop one 
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to-air guided missiles, where the United States 
is developing a medium-range weapon 
(AMRAAM) and the Federal German Republic 
and the United Kingdom are in the early stages 
of a project for a short-range missile 
(ASRAAM). There is another family poten-
tially in prospect in the field of anti-tank gui-
ded weapons (A TGW) but this is not yet 
certain. Present plans would be for a European 
consortium to develop and produce a medium-
to long-range A TGW and for the Americans to 
develop and produce a short- to medium-range 
ATGW. 
25. A feature of the family of weapons 
concept if it comes to fruition is the right of 
each side to establish second sources for pro-
duction under licence rather than just to buy off 
the shelf what has been produced on the other 
side of the Atlantic. Similarly, it may be easier 
for European firms to act as sub-contractors to 
a main contractor in the United States. 
26. Dual production and sub-contracting do 
not depend exclusively on the family of wea-
pons concept. The F-16 aircraft programme is 
an example where production takes place both 
in Europe and the United States, the develop-
ment and initial production having been under-
taken in the United States. The AIM 9L Side-
winder air-to-air guided weapon is another 
example, as is the NATO Sea Sparrow. For 
the future another programme which is likely to 
have an element of European manufacture is 
the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS). 
27. The principal prerequisites for worth-
while transatlantic industrial collaboration are 
in Mr. Barnes' view those listed below and in 
the view of the Rapporteur they are essentially 
the same as for effective European collabora-
tion: 
(i) the armed forces have to agree on 
the type of equipment needed and on 
when it has to enter service; 
(iz) the industries of the participating 
countries have to see mutual com-
mercial advantage in collaboration; 
(iii) there has to be agreement between 
the respective governments on such 
issues as funding, research and deve-
lopment levies, technological and 
design property rights, financial and 
economic guidelines and the condi-
tions to be met for sales to other 
countries. 
weapon and Europe the other, with the assu- 2S. Whereas the experience of collaboration 
rance~that the other partner in each case would in Europe has been to reinforce the stabi-
adopt the product for his own armed forces and lity and security of aerospace programmes 
would refrain from applying government funds - Concorde and Tornado are the two most 
for a rival system. The sole example of such a obvious examples - political and in particular 
family of weapons to date is in the field of air- parliamentary pressures on transatlantic colla-
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boration, together with the partisan lobbying of 
legislators by parochial interest groups in the 
United States have had an adverse effect. 
When it comes to defence appropriations 
Congressional opinion understandably tends to 
be more favourable to the all-American product 
than to its United States-European collaborative 
or purely European counterparts. Damaging 
initiatives like the speciality metals amendment 
are a typical manifestation of this protectionist 
type of Congressional behaviour, which is per-
fectly understandable in the American political 
context. Likewise, the paucity of funding for 
the British Aerospace Hawk trainer to meet the 
United States navy's VTXTS trainer require-
ment is regrettable but comprehensible. A 
clear exception is provided by European equip-
ment which performs in a way no American 
equipment can match. So the swing-wing Tor-
nado failed to be selected as an enhanced tacti-
cal fighter (ETF) for the United States air force, 
but the AV8-B Super Harrier V/STOL aircraft 
was the enthusiastically expressed selection of 
the United States marine corps. To its credit 
the United States administration takes a more 
enlightened attitude towards the two-way street 
but its determination to assist requires constant 
political reinforcement at top governmental 
level by European nations. 
The Italian viewpoint 
29. Uniquely among the participants General 
Barbato saw the steady trend in the Italian 
aeronautical industry towards the fulfilment of 
multinational operational requirements on the 
basis of European collaboration and even of 
international integration, as "part of the more 
general political and cultural context moving 
towards the constitution of a united Europe, 
integrated in its varied national components, 
but also obeying undoubtedly precise technical, 
economic and industrial demands", which are: 
(z) the reduction of the development 
costs borne by a single country; 
(ii) technology transfer; 
(iiz) enhanced export potential. 
30. General Barbato recalled that Italy had 
been participating in international programmes 
and particularly European programmes in the 
military field for the last twenty years. He 
listed the activities concerned as follows: 
- licence production of the F-104G Star-
fighter aircraft; 
- the servicing and refurbishing of the 
Nike missile; 
- the development and production of the 
Panavia Tornado aircraft; 
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- the joint development and production 
between Aeritalia and Embraer of 
Brazil of the AM-X light attack-
reconnaissance aircraft to replace the 
F-104G and Fiat G-91 from 1987 with 
the 70 % Italian and 30 % Brazilian 
funding corresponding to the two 
nations' respective requirements for the 
aircraft; 
- the definition and feasibility studies on 
the EH-101 anti-submarine helicopter 
between Agusta and Westland of the 
United Kingdom for a possible replace-
ment of the SH-30 and Sea King heli-
copters currently in service with the 
Italian navy and Royal Navy respect-
ively. 
Other projects such as the Aeritalia G-222 
medium-range transport aircraft, the SIAI Mar-
chetti SM-260M basic trainer, the Aermacchi 
MB-339 jet trainer, the Agusta A-109 and 
A-129 helicopters and the Spada/Aspide sur-
face-to-air guided missile system have been car-
ried out on a national basis since they are fully 
within Italian industrial and financial resources. 
31. For the future international collabora-
tion, particularly European collaboration, 
represents in General Barbato's view the future 
for Italy in the military aeronautical field; cer-
tainly for all major programmes. In this res-
pect an air defence aircraft would be required 
to replace the F-104S interceptors by the end of 
the century. General Nencha admitted that 
the timescale of the Italian requirement for a 
new fighter was different from that of the other 
interested countries since the Italian air force 
believed it should retain its present equipment 
until 1995. General Barbato admitted that the 
size of the new programme "makes a national 
self-contained development practically impos-
sible considering the financial resources that 
Italy would be able to devote to it. The pur-
suit of European collaboration with the 
assumption of the (existing) possibility of 
agreeing common or at least similar require-
ments with the partners and taking into account 
the other European countries' need for a new 
fighter aircraft is particularly important". 
Should this attempt fail, production under 
licence would represent the only possible solu-
tion (obviously excluding direct procurement 
abroad) since the operational requirement 
would remain on a national basis. However, 
General Barbato expressed his disapproval of 
such a possibility since it "would interrupt 
Italy's fruitful European integration process 
being carried out today in the military 
aeronautical area and would slow down the 
progress of national industry. It would also be 
detrimental to potential European partners 
because of the reduced number of new fighter 
aircraft to be produced and [because of these 
partners] having to forego both the Italian 
financial contribution and the Italian industry's 
technological and productive contribution." It 
is difficult to emphasise strongly enough the 
wisdom of General Barbato's remarks about a 
new combat aircraft for Italy which apply 
equally forcefully and relevantly to Italy's 
potential British, French and German partners. 
The mechanisms of collaboration 
32. Ingenieur-General Cauchie listed the cri-
teria by which countries choose international 
co-operation for carrying out armaments pro-
grammes. They are as follows: 
(i) the cost of developing the equipment 
concerned must be high; 
(ii) it must be a specific item and the 
dependence of the co-operating part-
ners must not have unacceptable re-
percussions on other major national 
programmes; 
(iii) co-operation must allow the capabi-
lity of each partner country to be in-
creased or at least maintained; 
(iv) the requirements of each partner 
must not involve constraints on the 
independence of the other partners, 
for instance where exports are 
concerned; 
(v) there must be agreement on simple 
and efficient management. 
The first precondition is self-evidently met in 
the case of advanced aerospace programmes. 
The second, third and fourth criteria involve 
the definition of specifications, work-sharing 
and accommodating the divergent interests of 
the partners which all necessitate political will 
to overcome the inherent problems. Finally, 
the meeting of the fifth condition by means of 
satisfying the needs and demands of govern-
ment, industry and the military customers is the 
essential prerequisite for successful collabo-
ration. 
33. Prime contractorship by an existing com-
pany with the administrative organisation of 
one of the two countries acting as executive 
agency is the simplest and most direct form of 
collaboration which has worked well as in the 
cases of the Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet 
Aviation/British Aerospace Jaguar offensive 
support aircraft and the Aerospatiale/Westland 
Lynx and Gazelle helicopters. For the Jaguar 
the United Kingdom was responsible for the 
Adour engine with the executive agency and 
the industrial prime contractor company Rolls-
Royce/Turbomeca coming under British law, 
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while the airframe was produced under the gui-
dance of a French executive agency and with a 
French registered prime contractor, SEPECA T. 
Perhaps the best system of all was to have 
two complementary programmes as with the 
Gazelle and the Lynx helicopters for which the 
executive agency and prime contractor were 
French in the first case and British in the 
second. It is clear that a partnership of more 
than two countries makes the effective man-
agement of such a system difficult. 
34. Another method of collaboration is to 
establish special bodies for the purpose. Under 
the guidance of a policy steering committee of 
equal members which unanimously decides the 
guiding principles of collaboration, the partici-
pating governments may decide to establish a 
programmes office from their national Defence 
Ministries to manage the programme. This 
body may or may not have legal status. If not, 
as in the case of the Franco-German program-
mes office for missiles, notice and administra-
tive implementation of the necessary contracts 
are ensured by the Defence Ministry of the 
national host country acting as contracting 
agency on the instructions of the programmes 
office. Conversely, in the case of Tornado it is 
an official agency, NAMMA, which acts as exe-
cutive agency and which has been given the 
legal status of NATO for that purpose. 
35. Parallel with this state organisation the 
industrial companies concerned form a consor-
tium governed by the laws of the country in 
which it is located. In the case of, Franco-
German missiles the consortium is Eurbmissile, 
grouping together the appropriate divisions of 
SNIAS and MBB under the aegis of an econo-
mic interest group (GIE) under French law, a 
method which allows companies to combine 
their efforts to attain a joint aim while retaining 
their independence and without the constitution 
of capital. In the case of the Tornado pro-
gramme a limited liability company, Panavia 
GmbH, was established under German com-
mercial law grouping together the British Air-
craft Corporation, Messerschmitt-BOlkow-
Blohm and Aeritalia. 
36. The advantage of the first type of organi-
sation is simple and efficient programme mana-
gement equivalent in efficiency to a purely 
national programme. The advantage of the 
second system is that it permits greater account 
to be taken of the interests of all the partici-
pants. Nevertheless, equitable work-shfiring at 
both the development and production stages is 
difficult to achieve whether it is done on a divi-
sion of man-hours basis or by an apportion-
ment of workload on a financial basis. 1 In the 
first case differences in productivity ~etween 
participating countries are the problem. In the 
second case the difficulty lies in flu~tuating 
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exchange rates. Whichever basic method is 
adopted, and in spite of the meticulous applica-
tion of compensating formulae, perfect fairness 
in work-sharing is never attainable. However, 
over the duration of a programme the g~ns and 
losses probably cancel each other outi and if 
personal dedication to the common objective 
inspires the programme it should transdmd the 
arguments and tribulations of working t~ether. 
37. One further difficulty, as Mr. Ptantey 
observed, is inherent in the operation qf inter-
national consortia, namely that they funttion in 
a transnational economic, fiscal and con ractual 
environment but are subject to the j ridical 
regulations and administrative methods of their 
host country. The harmonisation of European 
company law has not kept pace with progress 
in the field of international aeronautica1 colla-
boration. In this respect Mr. Valleix believed 
that the European Communities ,and WEU 
should initiate a dialogue on the rationalisation 
of the legal framework required on an EEC 
basis to facilitate the work of international 
European consortia. 
The perspective of the smaller nations 
38. Lieutenant-Colonel De Winne of the Bel-
gian Ministry of Defence expressed views typi-
cal of the smaller countries of the Alliance 
when he stressed that " the emphasis is more 
and more on the economic effects of armaments 
expenditure. Henceforth the national defence 
investment budget will not only have to be used 
to ensure procurement of the best possible 
equipment, [but also] the most suitable [weap-
ons] for fulfilling its tasks and at the lowest 
price. It will furthermore and increasingly 
have to gain economic returns from expenditure 
by safeguarding the technological basis of natio-
nal industry and avoiding the export of hours of 
work." 
39. The principal weapon systems procured 
by Belgium are in fact developed and produced 
abroad like the Sea King helicopter or produ-
ced under licence nationally or in co-operation 
with allies like the F-16. Belgian aeronautical 
firms mainly produce component parts develo-
ped abroad. By participating in NATO, Bel-
gium undertook to fulfil certain tasks in the 
overall framework of NATO strategy and 
consequently to equip itself with appropriate 
weapons in accordance with the principles of 
complementarity and interoperability. The 
main objective is to make the NATO Alliance's 
joint interests coincide with Belgium's own 
national interests. To this end the Conference 
of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is 
responsible for the overall management of work 
carried out in the principal armament groups 
covering land, sea and air systems plu$ such 
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aspects as research, communications, electro-
nics and liaison with industry. 
40. Since military requirements stem 1 from 
two main sources, the evolution of the ~hreat 
and technical progress, Belgium suffers I from 
distinct disadvantages like other smaller ~oun­
tries of the Alliance. It does not haVe the 
capability to assess the totality of the thre~.t and 
has to rely on intelligence supplied bw the 
larger countries through the Alliance af. and 
when they see fit. Furthermore, the adv need 
technology required to meet a sophist cated 
new military threat is beyond the meaps of 
smaller countries like Belgium. Even im less 
sophisticated areas within Belgium's industrial 
and technical capabilities such as in command 
and control systems there is a strong possibility 
that larger countries will impose their national 
equipment as a NATO standard in order to 
promote the global interests of their major 
manufacturers. 
The difficulties and problems of co-operation 
41. Dr. Schomerus of the Federal German 
Ministry for Economic Affairs insisted that it 
was important for the difficulties and problems 
involved in co-operative projects to be talked 
over in a prudent and objective way for a num-
ber of reasons. First, problems are everyday 
occurrences in co-operative projects. Second-
ly, experience has taught that they can be mas-
tered. Thirdly, they must also be mastered in 
the future because Europe has no alternative to 
co-operation. There is no problem that should 
justify abandoning European co-operation. 
Fourthly, there is no reason to belittle the 
shortcomings inherent in co-operation. If the 
concrete difficulties are studied carefully there 
should be no question of jumping to false 
conclusions. 
42. Some of the problems can be simply 
listed: 
(z) effective collaboration is predicated 
on achieving consensus between the 
partners on the specifications of co-
operative projects and the operatio-
nal requirements to be met by them. 
Many complicating factors necessa-
rily enter into the process of achiev-
ing consensus such as the distribu-
tion of roles within the Alliance, and 
differences in existing equipment 
stocks, their capabilities and replace-
ment timescales; 
(iz) collaborative projects are funded not 
only by the industrial participants 
but by the partner governments. 
Different national financial, budget-
ary and parliamentary appropriation 
considerations inevitably have to be 
reconciled. Differences of national 
economic and industrial policy pre-
sent problems also. For example, 
the West ·German Government, un-
like those of the United States and 
other European countries, is willing 
to provide export credits only at the 
market rate. On the industrial 
plane nationalised companies in a 
collaborative arrangement may have 
access to capital resources and enjoy 
a degree of insulation from the com-
mercial disciplines expected for a 
private sector partner company; 
(iiz) political differences towards the 
exploitation of export markets can 
cause serious tensions between colla-
borative partners unless identified 
and clearly accepted at the outset of 
a co-operative project; 
(iv) the maintenance of an existing 
consortium in times of budgetary 
constraint may pose particular pro-
blems as the manufacturing phase of 
the project for which it was created is 
run down. Consortia ought to envi-
sage a continuing role for themselves: 
build up their own capital and be 
ready to finance private venture pro-
jects either themselves or with fun-
ding from their parent companies 
before specific requests for proposals 
(RFPs) on behalf of national Minis-
tries of Defence are issued. Further-
more, national Ministries of Defence 
must issue RFPs to existing consortia 
and not just to national companies; 
(v) the challenge of cost control is one of 
the most important facing European 
partners in collaborative projects 
which has not been adequately recog-
nised in the law. European colla-
boration has broadly been successful 
in the aerospace sector but co-
operative projects must be competi-
tive not just technically but commer-
cially also. This is the lesson of the 
Tornado experience from which 
determination should be heightened 
to extend the Airbus Industrie family 
of aircraft and to build a new Euro-
pean combat aircraft. 
IV. The industrial dimension to collaboration 
The collaborative experience so far 
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the viewpoint of his company, which has an 
unrivalled background in both co-operation 
with the United States since the 1950s and the 
development by the Glenn Martin Company of 
the Canberra bomber, and also .of co-operation 
within Europe from the 1960s onwards over 
such projects as the Concorde, Jaguar, Tornado 
and Airbus. 
44. In the sixteen years since the start of the 
Jaguar project there has been little need to alter 
the basic industrial arrangements. The man-
agement organisation was kept simple. The 
French registered management company placed 
contracts for the airframe while at the same 
time having essentially no full-time central 
staff. This solution to collaboration between 
two partners would certainly still suggest itself 
in similar circumstances in the future. 
45. The Tornado programme presented diffe-
rent challenges not merely because the aircraft 
was to be built and procured by three countries, 
but because it was necessary to share design 
leadership effectively and to move closer to 
full weapon system prime contractorship. In 
this respect the Panavia consortium is not only 
the central source of contracts for Aeritalia, 
MBB and BAe, but has gone on from responsi-
bility for design and series production of the 
lDS Tornado to extensive responsibilities for 
spares and support and for purchasing the pro-
duction Turbo-Union RB-199 engines. This 
arrangement demonstrated its flexibility by 
additionally undertaking from 1977 the deve-
lopment and production of the air defence 
variant of the Tornado for the Royal Air Force, 
with a Panavia project directorate based at 
Warton. 
46. The Panavia ground rules for co-
operation were laid down in 1969 when the 
partners agreed " to endeavour to work in asso-
ciation and in complete harmony, making the 
best use of their respective means and experien-
ces". The terms of agreement were clearly 
drawn up with great foresight, since despite 
many changes in circumstances they have 
remained essentially unaltered, and have mean-
ingfully guided the successful day-to-day in-
dustrial co-operation on Tornado for the ·last 
thirteen years. There is· little doubt that in 
similar circumstances in the future, the Panavia 
solution would offer a proven means of mana-
ging a major multipartner weapon programme. 
47. On the technical side of collaboration it 
is obviously simplest to eo-locate an integrated 
engineering team for the limited period of the 
few weeks required for design definition. 
Alternatively, where design leadership is shared, 
an effective method is to allocate to partners 
43. Dr. Hall of British Aerospace gave a clear areas of systems design responsibility 
and direct exposition of the practical industrial (SDRs). The nominated partner holds lead 
experience and lessons of collaboration from responsibility for that area, which might for 
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example be wings, avionics or propulsion, and 
has to generate specification documents, ensure 
engineering integrity and represent the consor-
tium to the customer and suppliers. Authori-
tative joint technical reviews ensure the integra-
tion of the allocated area into the design as a 
whole. 
48. Another unglamorous but essential tool 
for collaboration is a common set of engineer-
ing standards for drawings, small parts, mate-
rials and processes, which ensure consistency 
throughout the project no matter where a com-
ponent of the weapon system is designed or 
manufactured. The Panavia standards which 
are essentially metric are being considered by 
other authorities for further applications outside 
the Tornado programme. Through its Tor-
nado experience British Aerospace is now 
·conversant with the United States military spe-
cifications requirements which, with the appro-
priate NATO standardisation agreements (ST A-
NAGs), are incorporated into the Panavia stan-
dards. From its Jaguar experience British 
Aerospace is thoroughly familiar with the 
French system of air reglements also. 
49. A further tool of international industrial 
co-operation is the process of controlling the 
procurement of equipment which can make up 
a third or more of the value of the aircraft. 
Contrary to traditional practice for British mili-
tary aircraft of having a large amount of 
government-furnished equipment, the lDS ver-
sion of the Tornado has almost all its equip-
ment purchased by industry, by Panavia. To 
ensure effective financial control a comprehen-
sive procurement system has been established, 
dealing with the many difficulties of purchasing 
across national boundaries. An associated 
mechanism is the arrangement whereby, 
although all contracts are placed in the name of 
Panavia, the purchasing staff of the partner 
companies undertake the normal buying func-
tion by means of an agency agreement. 
50. As the Tornado comes into service with 
four allied flying services and as the benefits of 
joint training at the Trinational Tornado Trai-
ning Establishment (TTTE) at RAF Cottesmore 
become increasingly appreciated, the improved 
commonality of spares and support will encou-
rage the extension of such standardisation not 
just to future projects but to the area of aircraft 
external stores and armament, without which 
complete weapon system standardisation cannot 
be achieved and without which the essential 
military goal of total interoperability cannot be 
realised. 
Cost control in international aerospace 
consortia 
ex-Finance Director and latterly as Managing 
Director of Panavia to present a highly detailed 
and most carefully researched paper addressed 
to the problems of cost control of sophisticated 
weapon systems whose escalating costs are be-
coming a limiting factor in defence policy, even 
for the governments of rich nations who are be-
ginning to question whether they can continue 
to afford to procure the most sophisticated wea-
pons to meet their defence requirements. 
52. A major defence programme can be divi-
ded into two main phases: project preparation 
including the concept definition phase, identi-
fying requirements, potential solutions, specifi-
cations and cost estimates, and the project 
implementation phase with its requirement to 
control costs within the budgetary and funding 
limits laid down. 
Project preparation phase 
53. The essential mission requirements must 
be analysed and a careful cost-effectiveness 
study of the alternative solutions undertaken. 
The requirements and specifications derived 
from these must be kept as simple as possible to 
achieve the vital mission objectives. Even at 
its inception the programme must be viewed in 
its overall perspective and savings in develop-
ment and unit production costs should not be 
made at the expense of greater penalties in life 
cycle costs. In addition there is the need to 
seek international partners with whom to share 
the development costs and with whom to 
achieve economical production runs. 
54. An important feature is the early defini-
tion of the main principles of co-operation and 
their clear expression in a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU). Again the Tornado 
programme provides an excellent example with 
the MOUs on both the governmental and 
industrial sides forming a solid basis of agree-
ment which remains valid for running the pro-
gramme today. An international aerospace 
programme if it is to be successful further 
requires that the governments concerned exer-
cise flexibility in aligning their requirements 
and timescales. This is essential if they are to 
provide industry with a unified specification. 
Otherwise industry is obliged to reconcile by 
technical innovation, at far greater cost, differ-
ing operational requirements. This factor has 
been one of the most successful aspects of the 
Tornado programme. By contrast, the failure 
to reconcile operational requirements and time-
scales has been one of the most depressing 
features of the tragic obstacles which still pre-
vent the launching of a new European combat 
aircraft project. 
51. Mr. Klapperich of Panavia drew on his 55. So far the major factors influencing pro-
deep experience of the Tornado programme as gramme cost have been governmental, but as 
240 
the project enters the definition phase these 
become a joint responsibility between govern-
ment and industry. Government must be flex-
ible to take advantage of minor specification 
changes which can yield major cost savings. In 
establishing programme monitoring and control 
systems, governments must take heed from the 
top-heavy bureaucratic example of NAMMA 
and resist the temptation to duplicate manage-
ment and control functions which industry 
must in any case operate to control the pro-
gramme. A far more efficient approach is for 
government and industry to agree clear pro-
gramme goals and objectives and for govern-
ment to exercise control by commercial means 
through the strict application of incentive and 
penalty contracts. 
Project implementation stage 
56. At the conclusion of the project prepara-
tion phase a weapons system is well defined in 
terms of design and proposed programme. 
Most of the decisions which will ultimately 
affect the overall cost of the programme have 
been made. The remaining cost control func-
tions are normal to manufacturing industry and 
consist of controlling work in progress within 
the funding limits laid down. In addition, cost 
consciousness should be instilled at all levels of 
engineering. At the design stage the use of 
exotic or rare materials can be avoided and 
modern automatic production processes should 
be utilised to minimise the impact of increases 
in labour and material costs. Above all, the 
chief complainant about cost escalation in aero-
space projects - the government - is actually 
often the worst culprit in precipitating cost 
increases by insisting upon expensive specifica-
tion and programme changes. For maximum 
economy, deviations from the predetermined 
programme must be kept to an absolute 
minimum. 
Financial advantages of the concerted approach 
57. The financial advantages of sharing deve-
lopment costs are self-evident, but the benefits 
of concerting the functions of manufacture and 
supply between partners ensures that because of 
the enlarged production run the average aircraft 
price for each of the -participating governments 
is well below that which they could have obtai-
ned from an individual national programme. 
Taking a typical national programme of 300 
aircraft, an international programme with two 
further partners would ·save each nation more 
than 50 % on development and about 20 % on 
production as compared with a purely national 
programme. 
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Examples of cost control from the Tornado pro-
gramme 
58. The factors which have acted in favour of 
cost stability on Tornado are the following: 
(z) early agreement by the participating 
governments and armed services on 
the performance and design require-
ments which have remained rela-
tively unaltered; 
(ii) the single source principle whereby 
airframe, equipment and engine 
manufacturers were selected early on 
for the duration of the programme. 
As a result Panavia obtained as 
early as 1970 firm option prices for 
all high value equipment items, 
which constitute about 40 % of the 
quoted production price; 
(iiz) a clearly-defined and budgeted 
breakdown of the work to be done in 
each programme phase. The achie-
vement associated cost and pro-
gramme control was monitored in 
terms of the agreed milestones which 
also formed the basis of reporting to 
the customer and of annual overall 
programme cost reviews; 
(iv) the establishment as early as possible 
of firm, fixed price contracts for 
equipment and · supplies. These 
principles were already generally in 
force during development and were 
applied even more vigorously in the 
production phase; 
(v) detailed matters such as strict confi-
guration control and standardisation 
of technical and commercial docu-
mentation received careful attention 
throughout the programme. 
A cost-efficiency analysis of Tornado 
59. The ratio between development, pro-
duction, and the support of a weapon system 
during its lifetime is generally of the order of 1: 
3: 7. Intensive trials of a weapon system at the 
development stage, even if apparently costly, 
will therefore be amply rewarded by dispropor-
tionately large savings in cost in the produc-
tion stage and more especially in the in-service 
support stage. This has led to the very impor-
tant move away from target procurement cost 
as the design objective to the far more signifi-
cant objective of low life cycle cost. 
60. The goal of low life cycle cost was pur-
sued from very early in the Tornado program-
me which envisaged on condition maintenance 
procedures and considerable reliance upon au-
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tomatic test equipment. As a result the relia-
bility and maintainability record of the aero-
plane has proved even better than planned. In 
addition, a high degree of commonality between 
the partner nations' versions of the lDS and the 
air defence variant, together with common tech-
nical documentation, crew training and centra-
lised cost control have all contributed to impro-
ved standardisation and interoperability within 
NATO and greatly reduced support costs. 
61. In order to monitor development costs of 
the Tornado checkpoints were agreed between 
the customer governments and Panavia and 
funding limitations contractually settled accor-
dingly. Panavia contained in real cost terms 
the cost of the first flight of the first prototype 
in 1974 within the limits predicted in 
1971. Likewise, a financial limitation was 
established for the overall development pro-
gramme with a given number of flight test 
hours. Panavia contained the real cost of this 
programme by the planned end date of May 
1978 within the cost predicted in 1971. 
62. As far as the price of the production air-
craft is concerned, the German Tornado Project 
Director stated in December 1980 that the 
aeroplane's cost remained stable in real cost 
terms (that is excluding the effects on inflation 
and exchange rate fluctuations) from 1970 till 
1980 when a 17 % upward adjustment in basic 
price had to be made largely to meet additional 
performance requirements. The same evidence 
of basic cost stability is illustrated by the fact 
that Panavia in 1976 was able to grant the 
customer binding option prices (i.e. maximum 
prices) for the total quantity of production aero-
planes and subsequently to maintain the quota-
tion for each batch of aircraft within or below 
the relevant share of that overall maximum 
price. At present 648 out of the total of 805 
aeroplanes are covered by this arrangement. It 
is doubtful whether the cost escalation of 
comparable American programmes such as the 
Grumman F-14 Tomcat or the McDonnell 
Douglas F-18 Hornet has been any less. 
Above all, the experience of the trinational 
crews who operate Tornado confirms that it 
represents a worthy testimonial to the merits of 
European collaboration and deserves to be pre-
cursor of other such international collaborative 
projects. 
Co-operation in military aeroengine manu-
facture 
in commercial aeroengines. In the commercial 
sector to ensure a profit between 2,500 to 3,000 
engines must be sold and therefore installed on 
several different types of aircraft. 
64. The Tyne and Larzac consortia were the 
collaborative enterprises in the military field in 
which SNECMA has been principally involved 
with four other partners: with Rolls-Royce in 
the United Kingdom for the Tyne; with Turbo-
meca in France and MTU and KHD in the 
Federal Republic of Germany for the Larzac. 
There are two Larzac assembly lines: one in 
France and one in Germany. So far 850 Lar-
zac engines which power the Franco-German 
Alpha-Jet light trainer and attack aircraft have 
been delivered on schedule and at quoted pri-
ces. Joint development is now in hand of the 
improved Larzac 04 X with prime contractor-
ship resting in the Turbomeca/SNECMA 
team. 
65. Mr. Pequignot was sceptical of the bene-
fits of collaboration in military aeroengines. 
He believed it increased development costs and 
that with multiple assembly lines production 
and final assembly tooling were also more 
costly. Furthermore, each manufacturer had to 
ensure for himself at least one major prime 
contractorship for each generation of power-
plant or risk losing his independent design and 
development capability. 
66. Mr. Malroux, Vice-President of SNECMA, 
cited the CFM-56 as an example of com-
mercial success which owed its origins to the 
requirements of the market and not to the exe-
cution of an intergovernmental agreement as 
was the case with Concorde. The CFM-56, 
which was originally launched as a commercial 
programme, now had an important additional 
military application in re-engining Boeing 
KC-135 tankers. 1,800 units to date have been 
sold and the programme is well on its way to a 
break-even point of 2,500 engine sales. 
67. In the view of Mr. Malroux the essential 
factor for the success of the CFM-56 project is 
that it has been the product not of a consortium 
but, on the contrary, of "bilateral and voluntary 
co-operation between two engine companies 
which have convinced themselves that their 
long-term interests and their respective strate-
gies coincide on a given market, and this with-
out sacrificing any part of their independence, 
creativity potential and ability to sell and 
manufacture separately". 
68. The selling price of the CFM-56 does not 
63. Mr. Pequignot, Assistant Director- arise from an aggregate of the respective costs of 
General for Programmes of SNECMA, observed partners enjoying a de facto monopoly situation 
that there is no co-operative engine programme but from the competition of the market place. 
outside the framework of a co-operative aircraft The 50 : 50 division of production responsibi-
programme. Co-operation in the military lity was not arrived at on the basis of costs, as 
aeroengine field is radically different from that for Concorde, but on the basis of the tasks to be 
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discharged and, correspondingly, the financial 
proceeds. 
69. Programme management and contracts 
with customers are carried out by a joint com-
pany, CFM International, which is not an enti-
ty external to the two parent companies but an 
operation in which the operating services and 
management organisation of both SNECMA 
and General Electric are closely associated. 
H e/icopter collaboration 
-70. Dr. Jones, Technical Director of West-
land Helicopters, stated that so far internatio-
nal collaboration in the helicopter field had 
been successful. The licence construction of 
primarily Sikorsky and Bell designs from the 
United States gave way for Aerospatiale. and 
Westland Helicopters to the Anglo-French 
family of helicopters - the Lynx, Puma and 
Gazelle. This in turn was to be followed by 
the products of the quadripartite helicopter 
agreement of the late 1970s between France, 
the Federal German Republic, Italy and the 
United Kingdom whereby their respective 
Ministers of Defence undertook to meet their 
armed forces' future helicopter requirements 
among themselves. 
71. Italy and the United Kingdom have simi-
lar requirements for a new anti-submarine heli-
copter for the 1990s. Project definition took 
place up to March 1982 under two govern-
ment-to-government memoranda of understan-
ding. To hold and manage the contract Agusta 
and Westland Helicopters formed a joint com-
pany, European Helicopter Industries Limite<J., 
registered in London. The helicopter is known 
as the EH-101 but the future of the helicopter 
is in doubt since the joint naval orders anticipa-
ted for the EH-101 are considerably below 
the level necessary to amortise investment in 
the project. However, the combined market 
potential for this class of helicopter, both civil 
and military, is up to ten times the combined 
defence requirements of the United Kingdom 
and Italian Governments. Investigations are 
proceeding into the possibility of launching the 
EH-101 as a joint venture combining private 
industrial risk capital with an element of 
government-sponsored military funding. 
Co-operation in missiles and spacecraft 
72. Mr. Dousset, the Assistant Director-
General of SNIAS, opened his remarks by 
reminding the colloquy of the difficulties as 
well as the often quoted advantages of collabo-
ration. In the missile and space field a diffi-
culty is that the European industry is dispersed. 
There are almost twenty principal missile cons-
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tructors and even more leading firms engaged in 
space activities. In spite of the fact that most 
of them are jealous of their technical compe-
tence and have their own products, effective co-
operation has taken place particularly in anti-
tank guided missiles. The first generation of 
these, such as the SS-11, Swingfire and Vigilant, 
were purely national programmes. Of the 
second generation, the Euromissile, Hot and 
Milan Franco-German missiles dominated the 
market, particularly as British Aerospace Dyna-
mics Group built the Milan under licence. For 
the third generation, the Euromissile Dynamics 
Group consortium had been formed between 
the two original Euromissile partners, SNIAS 
and MBB, plus British Aerospace Dynamics 
Group to develop a single family of successors 
to Milan, Hot and Swingfire and to furnish the 
European portion of any transatlantic anti-tank 
guided weapon co-operation. Furthermore, the 
governments created a single management 
agency for this third generation A TGW colla-
boration entitled the Franco-German Pro-
gramme Office (BPF A). 
73. In surface-to-air guided weapons progress 
towards collaboration has been very limited 
with the exception of the Franco-German 
Roland system produced by Euromissile. 
Competitive national systems like Rapier and 
Crotale have been strongly placed in this 
market. 
74. In the anti-ship missile sector there has 
been no co-operation beyond the Anglo-French 
agreement for British licence production of 
Exocet and the Franco-Italian alliance between 
Oto Melara and Matra to produce Otomat. 
75. In airborne guided weaponry BAe and 
Matra co-operated to produce Martel. How-
ever, of the next generation of air-to-surface 
guided weapons, the BAe Sea Eagle is a purely 
national programme. In air-to-air guided wea-
pons the AIM 9L Sidewinder is being built 
under licence in the Federal German Republic, 
Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom. 
Beyond that particular programme there is the 
prospect of the United States-European 
AMRAAM-ASRAAM air-to-air guided family 
of weapons eo-production. 
76. In space, European co-operation in the 
1970s was a model of flexibility and success. 
The European Space Agency (ESA) was the 
umbrella organisation for most European space 
developments but it has never precluded the 
separate activities either of national space agen-
cies like the French Centre National d'Etudes 
Spatia/es (CNES) or of individual aerospace 
companies. As a result, a degree of effective 
European specialisation in the space field has 
grown up, albeit within a highly collaborative 
framework. Thus France, under the sponsor-
ship of CNES and with the principal participa-
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tion of the SNIAS, SEP and Matra industrial 
companies, has concentrated largely on the 
Ariane launcher programme. The Federal 
German Republic with MBB-Emo has been 
more involved in Spacelab, whereas Italy with 
Aeritalia and Telespazio and the United King-
dom with British Aerospace and Marconi Space 
Systems have concentrated on communication 
satellites. 
77. Nevertheless, there are serious drawbacks 
to the organisation of Europe's space efforts. 
As the ESA charter specifically precludes mili-
tary space developments, Europe lags woefully 
behind the other two superpowers in this vital 
strategic field of high technology. There is also 
unnecessary duplication. The Franco-German 
television satellite and the European L-Sat are 
clear examples of conflicting programmes, as is 
the development by CNES of the Spot earth 
resources surveillance satellite which duplicates 
part at least of ESA's potential activity in the 
remote sensing field, leaving it to concentrate 
primarily on an oceanic surveillance satel-
lite. As to the consortia like MESH, STAR 
and COSMOS, their longevity testifies to the 
logic of the consortium approach to internatio-
nal high technology developments as in the 
space field. 
78. Finally, Mr. Dousset summarised the key 
prerequisites to success in forming international 
consortia as follows: 
- they must first meet the interests of 
manufacturers; 
- greater coherence in the laws and regu-
lations under which international 
consortia have to operate must be evol-
ved; 
- common or at least compatible techni-
cal standards must be ensured. The 
work of the Association of European 
Aerospace Manufacturers (AECMA) in 
this regard has been admirable; 
- operational requirements, re-equipment 
timescales and programme specifica-
tions must be harmonised; 
· - the law of juste retour is too inflexible 
to form the basis of equitable work-
sharing, which can only be established 
by a process of give and take, prefera-
bly over a family of joint projects; 
- consortia should be formed to last so 
that companies' experience of working 
together can be built upon and not 
wasted; 
- the prime contractor must be the firm 
which is the best placed industrially 
and which has the . greatest interest in 
the programme; 
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- there must be a single marketing orga-
nisation to create a community of inte-
rests between consortium companies 
and to discourage the development of 
competitor programmes by any of the 
partners. 
V. Conclusion 
79. The Lancaster House colloquy validated 
and endorsed the recommendations both of 
Document 863, the report on international 
aeronautical consortia of December 1980, and 
the findings of previous WEU colloquies. 
Sound military, economic and industrial logic 
must now impel the European nations of the 
western Alliance not only to reinforce collabo-
ration among themselves but also, having 
forged a stronger, more advanced and more uni-
fied industrial and technological base in West-
em Europe, to extend further collaboration 
with Western Europe's Alliance partners in 
North America. Such transatlantic partnership 
is increasingly one of equals and is in the 
interests of the nations of Europe and North 
America alike. The alternative would be to 
succumb to collective weakness in face of the 
undoubted Soviet challenge and to expose the 
western democracies to indubitable and unjusti-
fiable danger. 
80. Inspiration for the principle of aerospace 
collaboration is continued in the masterly syn-
thesis of the General Rapporteur of the 1976 
WEU aeronautical colloquy at Toulouse. His 
guiding concepts, so widely quoted by Mr. Val-
leix at Lancaster House, are well worthy of 
repetition. Their validity is undiminished by 
the passage of time. They are: 
- first, that there will be no aviation 
market for Europe unless it can assert a 
European political purpose; 
- second, that the European market will 
not find strength in resorting to protec-
tionism; 
- third, that progress should be made 
pragmatically, step by step, through 
better co-ordination and resorting to 
solutions of the Airbus Industrie type; 
- fourth, that programmes should be 
judiciously selected and involve whole 
families of aircraft; 
- fifth, that co-operation should be esta-
blished with the United States on a 
basis of equality and reciprocity and 
not on a basis of offset production; ' 
- sixth, that the European market alone 
is inadequate, at any rate to justify civil 
aircraft production, and that European 
industries should therefore break into 
the American market and win their 
place on the rest of the world market. 
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81. As a clear message full of conviction 
and confidence to conclude these guidelines 
from the Lancaster House colloquy, Mr. Ver-
gnaud's masterly precepts from the Toulouse 
colloquy of six years ago cannot be surpassed 
and should stand as the final word upon our 
deliberations in Lancaster House on 9th and 
lOth February 1982. 
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(i) Considering the need to ensure a better place for Europe in industrial and trade competition 
with the United States and Japan; 
(ii) Considering how fast technology evolves and the difficulty member countries experience in 
keeping abreast with progress in the various fields of advanced technology; 
(iii) Considering the need to develop and produce high technology weapons capable of ensuring a 
balance of forces with the Warsaw Pact; 
(iv) Considering the budgetary difficulties of member states and the problems they consequently 
have to face because of the sharp rise in the cost of research and development of modem weapons; 
(v) Considering that greater harmonisation of the research and development efforts of the member 
countries, in spite of disparities in the relevant budgets, and more intensive European co-operation 
would allow these difficulties to be overcome more easily; 
(vi) Noting the part of the Council's twenty-seventh annual report on scientific, technological and 
aerospace questions and the indications it gives on energy and security on the one hand and space 
activities on the other; 
(vii) Considering the reply of the Council to Recommendations 331 and 365 and the statements by 
Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, to the Assembly on 3rd Decem-
ber 1981, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Invite the Standing Armaments Committee and its international secretariat, in fields within 
their competence, to assist the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in 
preparing the second part of its report on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high 
technology fields; 
2. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to draw up a list of military research and 
development programmes which, because of their cost, technical complexity or special interest, might 
be worthwhile matters for European or international co-operation; 
3. Study the possibility of increasing the security and energy interdependence of member 
countries; 
4. Invite the governments of member countries : 
(a) to decide on a choice of projects for European co-operation in fields such as micro-
electronics, biotechnology and maritime, nuclear and space technology; 
(b) to implement these projects with the greatest flexibility and also perseverance in bi- or 
multilateral frameworks; 
(c) to make provision for training the corresponding experts; 
(d) to promote exchanges of research workers between European countries, thus enabling the 
setting up of European teams ; 
(e) finally, to ensure the financing of these projects. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submined by Mr. Fituulroni, Rqporteur) 
I. Introductory remarks 
1. At the committee meeting on 18th 
March 1982, your Rapporteur submitted a wor-
king paper and explained that in view of the 
complexity of the subject and the interviews yet 
to be arranged with the competent authorities, 
he preferred to present the report in two parts, 
a general part and one going into more detail 
on the harmonisation of research with particu-
lar regard to the military applications of high 
technology. 
2. As stated by Dr. David Beckler, the 
Director for Science, Technology and Industry 
of the OECD, international co-operation on 
and/or co-ordination of research in high tech-
nology fields which have military applications 
is an exceedingly complex topic, conceptually 
and technically. Implementation of such co-
operation and/or co-ordination encounters 
many obstacles and difficulties. These include 
the international sharing of information classi-
fied at national level, co-operation with univer-
sity research, the wish of private bodies and 
firms to take part and commercial interests. 
Mention should also be made of the foreseeable 
complexity of the institutional structures which 
would be needed to implement a programme 
covering several areas of research with a large 
number of possible military applications. 
3. Your Rapporteur will first consider the 
general civil organisations and fields where har-
monisation is tried or applied. 
4. Much multilateral work is done in the 
scientific and technological fields in the United 
Nations and in many regional organisations. 
In 1979, the United Nations Conference on 
Science and Technology recommended setting 
up an intergovernmental committee on science 
and technology for development, a United 
Nations centre and an interim fund of $ 250 
million. 
5. A United Nations conference on the 
exploration and peaceful use of outer space 
(Unispace 82) will be held from 9th to 21st 
August 1982 to discuss the application of space 
science and technology for solving the problems 
of developing countries. Your Rapporteur 
examines this in Chapter VII. 
6. The United Nations Committee on the 
peaceful uses of outer space is a major element 
in international space relations. 
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7. In the United Nations framework there 
are UNESCO, the World Health Organisation, 
the World Meteorological Service, the Intergo-
vernmental Oceanographic Commission, the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation, the United 
Nations Environment Programme and its earth 
watch project, and many others. 
8. Your Rapporteur does not wish to dis-
cuss them all but only those directly related to 
Western European activities. As all internatio-
nal activities in research and development origi-
nate in the national framework, he will first 
give a short general outline of such activities in 
the member countries. 
9. Since the 1960s, scientific research and 
development in all member countries of Wes-
tern European Union has evolved along more 
or less the same lines. The scientific and tech-
nological budgets in our countries grew very 
rapidly. In the 1970s, new problems arose be-
cause of the scarcity and rising cost of energy 
resources and minerals and environmental 
problems. The economic recession, unemploy-
ment and other social questions required ever-
increasing budgets which in turn demanded 
other savings. 
10. The structure of technological policies in 
WEU member countries follows one of two 
general models. In the British system, decen-
tralisation is the rule and in the continental 
countries, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands, concerted action is more gene-
rally applied. In the latter context a minister 
is responsible for the co-ordination of all or 
most of the government's scientific and techno-
logical policies, i.e. he is responsible for balan-
cing the scientific and technological efforts un-
dertaken in the different .fields of governmental 
civil activities. 
11. In the United Kingdom research and 
development activities are discussed and deci-
ded upon in the separate departments. The 
basis is a customer-contractor principle accor-
ding to which the departments, being the custo-
mers, conclude agreements with the contractors 
to provide the necessary research and develop-
ment on a contract basis. An important role 
within the department is played by the chief 
scientists and their staffs. Some departments, 
for example the Department of Industry and 
especially the Defence Department, also have 
their own laboratories and research establish-
ments. 
12. The Department of Education and Science 
provides the budgets for the universities. 
There exist several research councils such as 
the Medical Research Council, the National 
Environment, the Agricultural, the Social 
Science Research and other general councils, 
such as the Science Research Council. Some 
co-ordination is achieved by the Advisory 
Board for the Research Councils. The money 
for these councils too is provided by the 
Department of Education and Science. On the 
military side there are many centres, units and 
establishments for research and development 
such as the Royal Aircraft Establishments, the 
Propellants, Explosives and Rocket Motor 
Establishment, the Admiralty Surface Weapons 
Establishment, the Royal Signals and Radar 
Establishment and the Telecommunications 
Laboratories. 
13. In Belgium the Minister in charge of 
Scientific Policy is the co-ordinator of all 
governmental scientific and technological poli-
cies. He has a relatively small budget for 
national programmes and the development of 
" centres of excellence " in several disciplines. 
He is also in charge of the Belgian space 
efforts. Research programmes start mostly at 
the request of the ministerial departments and 
often are carried out in universities and scienti-
fic establishments. There are also the national 
fund for scientific research and funds for specia-
lised activities such as medicine, agriculture, 
etc. For aerospace matters, there is the Belgian 
civil and military aviation research group. 
Most of the military research is done at FN 
Hers tal. 
14. In the Federal Republic of Germany the 
Federal Ministry for Research and Technology 
has a task of co-ordination and initiates govern-
ment-sponsored research activities. For these 
activities the Ministry has a fairly large budget 
which is mainly used to finance and manage 
important industrial projects and the principal 
establishments for nuclear, aeronautical and 
space research. Apart from extending and 
raising the level of scientific knowledge, an 
important aspect of the Federal Government's 
research and technological policy is to maintain 
and increase the efficiency and competitiveness 
of the Federal economy. 
15. Research and development in the univer-
sities is primarily the responsibility of the 
Uinder which are also responsible for 50 % of 
the funding of the German scientific research 
establishment. The other half is financed by 
the Federal Government which is also politi-
cally responsible for the activities of the Max 
Planck Institute and the Fraumhofer Institute. 
The latter is mainly concerned with techno-
logical developments and, to a lesser extent, 
with basic science. 
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16. The Federal Government takes account 
of the wide-ranging aspects of foreign policy in 
the development and execution of its research 
and technology policies. It considers interna-
tional co-operation is essential for financial and 
economic reasons and also in questions of deve-
lopment aid. 
17. As more than two million people will be 
seeking employment in Germany in the 1980s 
without there being any reduction in the older 
working population, two million more jobs will 
have to be created and this can be done only by 
establishing advanced technology industries. 
Special attention is therefore being paid to 
microelectronics, software technology, commu-
nications techniques and information techno-
logy. 
18. Another important field of research and 
development is oceanography and oceanogra-
phic technology. Deep-sea drilling techniques 
are being promoted in industry and in the uni-
versities. 
19. About one-tenth of the total research and 
development expenditure of the Federal Gov-
ernment is earmarked for defence purposes, 
i.e. development of the Tornado, Alpha-Jet, 
artillery rocket systems, AWACS and sea mines 
in shallow waters. 
20. In France, a Minister of State is in charge 
of scientific research and technological develop-
ment. The expanded Ministry manages its 
own budget, which has been greatly increased 
(30 %) this year. It now has a budget of 
$ 2,800 million. Planning, which has gained 
new impetus, gives particular prominence to 
activities linked with research and technology. 
A bill has been tabled in parliament contai-
ning guidelines and programmes for France's 
research and technological development. 
21. Considerable sums of money are alloca-
ted to the various research establishments and 
institutes which include the Atomic Energy 
Commissariat, which handles both civil and 
military work, aerospace research and develop-
ment establishments, the National Centre for 
Scientific Research (CNRS) and the National 
Institute for Health and Medical Research 
(INSERM) whose activities are more specific-
ally civil. 
22. The National Centre for Scientific 
Research also distributes large sums and assists 
research and development in the universities. 
23. In France, with effect from 1985 the total 
amount spent on research should be 2.5 o/o of 
the gross domestic product as compared with 
1.8 % at present. 36 % of total allocations for 
research and development are and will be ear-
marked for military research. A special effort 
is being made in certain sectors of scientific and 
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technological innovation: energy, biotechno-
logy, electronics and the technological develop-
ment of industrial materials. The number of 
research workers in the public sector is growing 
at a rate of 4 to 5 % per year. 
24. During the Committee's visit to Italy in 
March 1981, the then Minister for the Co-
ordination of Scientific Research and Techno-
logy indicated that a large part of his Ministry's 
budget was earmarked for industrial innovation 
and therefore industrial applications rather than 
fundamental research. The latter is carried out 
mainly in universities and co-ordinated by the 
National Research Council. A major contribu-
tion to Italian research and technology is made 
privately by industrial companies. The Minis-
try for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research 
and Technology tries to co-ordinate private 
and public research and development efforts. 
Apart from civil research, the Ministry also 
promotes military research activities. In many 
sectors such as the aeronautical sector the two 
types of research are closely related. An exam-
ple is the development of the AMX interceptor, 
the Italian air force's future tactical fighter. 
Civil and military research are also closely rela-
ted in optics, electronics, radar systems and in 
fields such as lasers and microelectronics. Fur-
ther developments in telecommunications are of 
great interest, especially through satellites. 
25. In the Netherlands, the separate post of 
Minister for Science Policy was abolished in 
May 1981 when a new government took office. 
All authority vested in this minister was 
transferred to the Minister of Education and 
Science who is now also responsible for the co-
ordination of science policy. The departmen-
tal unit for science policy is maintained as a 
separate entity. Within parliament the Commis-
sion for Science Policy has been maintained. 
In order to improve the use of technology 
for industrial renovation a project group is to 
be set up, as a result of recent discussions 
between the Minister responsible for science 
policy and the Minister for Economic Affairs, 
to put forward within a year proposals for a 
technology policy. The Minister of Education 
and Science will also remain in charge of a 
certain number of establishments such as 
TNO. A bill on the reorganisation of this 
establishment is being considered by the Coun-
cil of Ministers and will be submitted 
to parliament in the course of 1982. 
26. Apart from conventional technology, spe-
cial attention is being given to new develop-
ments such as electronic data-processing and 
biotechnology. Three microelectronics centres 
have been set up in close co-operation with 
industrial and technological policy in the fra-
mework of the Communities in order to meet 
the challenges of the United States and Japan. 
27. As the government is very reticent about 
nuclear energy, only small sums of money are 
being allocated to research and development on 
fast breeders for example. More funds are ear-
marked for new energy technologies. In 1981 
the total government budget for science and 
technology was some Fl. 3,215 million, of 
which F1. 1,450 million was earmarked for 
research and development at university level. 
Only some Fl. 83 million was assigned to 
research and development for defence pur-
poses. Industry's research and development 
expenses amounted to F1. 3,360 million. 
Defence outlays 
28. As the major military power in the 
Atlantic area the United States devotes 15 % of 
the total federal budget to defence. To main-
tain its technological challenge in all areas, it 
spends about 13 % of defence funds on research 
and development, which is nearly half of all 
federal research and development. The defence 
budget now is . $ 180 billion. At the other 
extreme is Japan which for historical reasons 
has maintained a low defence establishment 
since the end of the second world war. In 
1981 defence expenditure was $ 11.5 billion, 
and only 1 % of this was for research and 
development. 
29. There are major differences between the 
WEU countries in research and development 
spending for defence purposes. Belgium 
spends only 0.5 % of its budget on defence 
research and development, the Netherlands 
4.5 %, Italy 3 %, Germany 10 %, France 36 o/o 
and the United Kingdom 54 o/o. Recent trends 
for research and development spending indicate 
that it is falling in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, rising in France and levelling off in the 
United Kingdom. 
30. The following three countries spend 
broadly the same amounts on deferice: France 
$ 26 billion, the Federal Republic $ 25 billion 
and the United Kingdom $ 28.66 billion. In 
Germany, 5 o/o of the total defence budget is 
spent on research and development. Both 
France and the· United Kingdom devote 10 o/o 
or more of defence outlay to research and deve-
lopment. 
11. Scientific research and derelopment 
and the European Community 
the three technological universities and 31. Until 1974 the three communities- eco-
TNO. As in the case of Italy, the Netherlands nomic, coal and steel and Euratom- had only 
Government is interested in an integrated sectorial research and development programmes 
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for nuclear energy, coal, steel and agricul-
ture. In 1974 the Council of Ministers decided 
that the scope of Community activities should 
be extended to the entire scientific and techni-
cal field with a view to promoting industrial 
and agricultural competitiveness, improving 
living and working conditions, and reducing 
energy dependence. The Council of Ministers 
excluded from the general programme all 
research and development involving military or 
industrial secrecy. On this basis the Commis-
sion then worked out and implemented a range 
of sectorial research and development program-
mes. 
32. In 1981 it proposed that all these pro-
grammes should be integrated in an overall 
strategy aimed at: 
(z) promoting the scientific and techni-
cal potential of the Community; 
(iz) improving the competitiveness of 
Community agriculture and the self-
sufficiency of Europe; 
(iiz) contributing to the development of 
the third world ; 
(iv) making research priorities more 
relevant to the present and future 
needs of industry and making access 
to research results easier for enter-
prises; 
(v) making the necessary technology 
available to essential industries in 
good time; 
(vl) concentrating efforts on new tech-
nologies such as biotechnology, 
information-processing technologies 
and communications; 
(viz) facilitating the achievement of 
objectives of common interest; 
(viii) having the Community intervene 
when for reasons of scale national 
resources cannot cater for major 
technological programmes and 
where smaller member states might 
otherwise be at a disadvantage or a 
regional imbalance arise. 
33. To this end, it was proposed to incorpo-
rate existing programmes relating to energy, raw 
materials, etc., in an outline programme speci-
fying what action should be taken or considered 
in the light of the choices made by the Commu-
nity. Furthermore, programmes policy would 
be enhanced by action to stimulate scientific 
efficiency and the development of specific pro-
jects. 
34. These general principles were discussed 
in the scientific and technical research commit-
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tee (CREST) and the consultative committee on 
industrial research and development (CORDI). 
35. All scientific and technical activities must 
be carried out or developed on the basis of the 
three treaties, whether it be a matter of the acti-
vities of the research centres at lspra, Petten, 
Karlsruhe and Geel, shared-cost action, also 
called indirect action, concerted action or 
action by COST (European co-operation in 
scientific and technical research1). Other forms 
of intervention are used for agriculture under 
Article 41 of the EEC treaty, computer science, 
textiles, demonstration projects and scientific 
and technical questions under the ECSC treaty. 
Finally, new means are being considered for 
stimulating the efficiency of the EEC's scientific 
and technical potential. 
36. I_n science and technology the Commu-
nity IS mainly concerned with applied 
research. Its activities are classified under 
three different headings: direct action, indirect 
action, and concerted action2• 
37. Direct action means the Community's 
own research activities carried out by its own 
research workers in the abovementioned four 
facilities with more than 2,000 employees. 
38. Indirect action covers projects for 
research carried out under contract by public 
bodies or industrial firms in the member states. 
Generally speaking, half the funds are provided 
by the Community, the other half from national 
sources. Research under contract is an impor-
tant means of co-ordination and allows use to 
be made of the research teams and laboratories 
of the member states. 
39. Concerted action covers programmes 
drawn up by common agreement. The various 
parts are financed entirely by the member states 
and are carried out under their responsibility. 
The Commission co-ordinates the work and 
the exchanges of information. 
40. For Community programmes the Com-
mission is assisted by advisory committees on 
programme management and by concerted 
action committees composed of experts from 
member states appointed by their respective 
governments. 
41. Your Rapporteur believes that co-
ordination should be achieved through the 
Community on the basis of comparisons bet-
ween national and Community policies in order 
1. The committee also has non-EEC member countries 
such as Austria, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and Yugoslavia. COST is a co-operation 
scheme distinct from the Communities although its secret-
ariat is largely provided by the secretariat of the Council of 
Ministers of the Community and by the Commission. 
2. See Appendix I. 
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to examine the desirable orientations of scienti-
fic and technical activity, taking into account 
existing strengths and weaknesses. The combi-
ned objectives of the member states should be 
clearly defined. This should be done in the 
long-term Community outline programme to be 
drawn up by the Commission. Once this has 
been done, the choices between national, inter-
national and Community level action should be 
considerably easier. 
42. The Community outline programme 
should be reconsidered periodically in order to 
make the necessary adjustments. This should 
facilitate the decision-makill8 process, especi-
ally with regard to human and financial resour-
ces, the budget and annual allocations for 
science and technology at Community level. 
Generally speaking, the planning of the scien-
tific and technological activities of the Commu-
nity should take into account the need for 
greater mobility among the scientific commun-
ity and make Europe's productive capability 
permanently adapted to the changing circum-
stances of competition. 
Ill. Trends in budget appropriations 
43. Over the period 1970-80, budget appro-
priations in the Community as a whole recor-
ded an average annual growth rate of about 
12% in nominal value and 0.5% in real terms. 
The increase in real terms occurred mainly 
after 1978. However, this increase in govern-
ment research financing in real terms for the 
Community as a whole conceals two different 
trends in individual countries. There was 
higher growth than the average Community rate 
in the Federal Republic of Germany (2.9 %), 
Ireland (6.2 %) and the Netherlands 
( 1.2 % ). There was a decline in Belgium 
(- 2.9 %), France (- 0.1 %), Italy (- 1.4 %) and 
the United Kingdom (-0.7 %). Since 1980, 
with the exception of Belgium, the latter (i.e. 
France, Italy and the United Kingdom) have 
increased their research and development 
budgets. 
44. Government financing of civil research 
and development accounts for about three-
quarters of national science and technology 
budgets. For the individual member states, 
civil budgets are 48% in the United Kingdom, 
66 % in France, 90% in the Federal Republic 
of Germany and exceed 95% in the other WEU 
countries. 
45. For joint action at the level of the Euro-
pean Economic Community, the most impor-
tant civil research objective is energy. Up to 
72 % of the overall Community's 1980 research 
and development budget of more than 300 mil-
lion accounting units was for energy research 
with particular regard to thermonuclear fusion 
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for civil purposes. The United Kingdom and 
France do not allow this research to be 
extended to the defence field. 
46. On 8th March 1982, the Council of 
Ministers responsible for research and techno-
logy in the Communities adopted a new five-
year thermonuclear fusion programme for the 
years 1982-86 with a total budget of 620 mil-
lion accounting units. hi addition to the ten 
Community members, Sweden and Switzerland 
are associated with the European effort. This 
will allow Europe to maintain a sound position 
on thermonuclear fusion vis-a-vis the United 
States, Japan and the USSR. 
4 7. In order to avoid duplicating research in 
this field, the possibility has been left open for 
co-operation with the United States and Japan 
and even, in the framework of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, with the 
Soviet Union. 
48. The objective of the Community budget 
is to build an experimental thermonuclear reac-
tor before the year 2000. The joint European 
Torus (JET) now being built at Culham in the 
United Kingdom will take half of this bud-
get. The other half, some 300 million accoun-
ting units, is to be spent on fusion research 
in national laboratories and on studying deve-
lopment of the next European Torus (NET) 
should Europe have to go it alone after all. 
49. The Council of Ministers has also discus-
sed the joint strategy proposed by the Commis-
sion. Thus, it adopted the principle and 
method of preparing the general outline pro-
gramme and took options for Community 
research and development activity in the eigh-
ties. 
50. 16.1 % of the Community's research bud-
get for 1982 is earmarked for industrial techno-
logical research, 4.2 % for environmental 
research, 0. 7 % for raw materials, 0.8 % for 
agriculture, 64.9 % for energy and the rest, 
13.3 %, for miscellaneous purposes. 
51. It is still difficult to judge whether the 
new guidelines proposed by the Commission 
will ultimately be accepted by the member 
governments. Even if the Community strategy 
is adopted, its financing might be difficult to 
arrange as long as the budgetary problems of 
the Community, especially the British contribu-
tion, have not been settled. Furthermore a 
decision to increase the Community resources 
might be required. 
52. On the other hand, the member states are 
well aware of the dangers of Japanese and Ame-
rican competition. If no action is taken this 
challenge could not be met and the outcome for 
Europe's world economic and industrial situa-
tion would be serious. 
53. All countries are preparing innovation 
plans for their industries, especially a technolo-
gical revolution in new sectors of high techno-
logy. In an interview in "30 days of Europe" 
in January 1982 the President of the Commis-
sion, Mr. Thorn, stated that Europe should take 
the initiative in new sectors of high technology 
not in a national, but in a Community frame-
work. 
54. Although Western Europe spends about 
the same amount of money (about 40,000 mil-
lion accounting units) on research and develop-
ment as the United States and more than dou-
ble the amount for Japan (about 15,000 million 
accounting units) which has nearly the same 
number of scientists and engineers as Western 
Europe (370,000 versus 363,000), its technolo-
gical results are often not comparable to 
Japan's. What is now happening in Japan was 
predicted some seven or eight years ago and the 
efficiency of its industry has led to Japanese 
superiority in several important fields. The 
role of government should also be recognised; 
through its economic and tax policies and 
through government-sponsored research and 
development and technology transfer, it has 
provided significant assistance. 
55. Since the end of World War 11 the Japa-
nese Government has formulated a series of 
long-range economic plans designed to accele-
rate economic growth. The seven-year plan 
covering the period 1979-85 has now reached 
the half-way point. The plan projects total 
anticipated growth over the period and ancil-
lary plans are then developed to facilitate the 
achievement of the overall target, including the 
necessary restructuring of industry. For exam-
ple, at the present time twelve industries 1 are 
considered to have high growth potential. 
56. Government-sponsored research and 
development is designed to help high growth 
industry to expand. At the same time govern-
ment financial assistance is provided to help in 
the transfer of labour and capital out of the 
"troubled industries" through retraining pro-
grammes, compensation for scrapping equip-
ment, partial payment of salaries while indus-
tries are entering new fields, etc. The projects 
largely relate to the development of new tech-
nologies in the electronics and machinery 
industries. For instance, the government wishes 
to give Japan world leadership in computer 
technology by 1990. 
57. In Europe the governments and industrial 
authorities have often been unable to meet the 
scientific and technological challenges with 
which our society is confronted. The evolu-
tion of the organisation of public research and 
development, especially at university level, is 
1. See Appendix 11. 
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much too slow; there is a considerable disper-
sion of effort, each country pursuing the same 
research and development activities. More-
over, conditions do not allow early returns on 
the results of basic or applied research. Fin-
ally, there is an inadequate relationship bet-
ween public research, industry and commerce. 
58. Government financing for international 
co-operation has a number of special features 
worthy of examination. Appropriations for 
research and development in the Community 
account for about 1.5% of total government 
research and development financing in the 
member states. In the period 1970-80 the 
average annual growth was 5.3 % in real terms; 
this percentage is considerably higher than the 
corresponding figure for government research 
and development spending in the Community. 
Research projects financed by the Commis-
sion were 2 % down on 1978 in current value. 
This decrease is mainly due to indirect action 
projects since it was often difficult to obtain 
decisions in the Council of Ministers on new 
projects in time. The reduction mainly affec-
ted energy projects. 
59. Apart from 'co-operation within the Com-
munity there is also multilateral co-operation in 
four priority fields of research: defence, space, 
. general promotion of knowledge and industrial 
technology. These fields absorbed some 85% 
of all government funds for multilateral co-
operation in 1980. Space occupies a privileged 
position in total budgetary appropriations allo-
cated by member states to this research sector 
and in total funds allocated to multilateral co-
operation concluded through the European 
Space Agency. 
60. In certain member states appropriations 
for research and development co-operation in 
the defence sector cannot be singled out from 
the total amounts allocated to defence. Fur-
thermore, the nature of co-operation in this 
research sector differs according to the size of 
the member states concerned. In general, 
smaller states practise multilateral co-operation 
whereas larger member states prefer bilateral 
agreements. 
61. The reasons for the small percentages of 
total government research and development 
financing, either in a Community or in a multi-
lateral framework, reside in the nature of co-
operation. First, Community research and 
development was originally conducted only in 
certain sectors in accordance with the trea-
ties. Second, Community research or multi-
lateral co-operation are only complementary to 
national research and development. Third, co-
operation often concerns projects which are too 
big or too costly to be financed by any one 
country. Fourth, the mobility of scientists and 
specialists can also be promoted through semi-
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nars and other complementary activities. It is 
clear that different countries have different 
priorities and it is the task of the Commission 
to select the common goals. 
IV. Industrial innovation 
62. In all industrialised western countries 
committees have been formed and studies made 
on how to prepare for the changes and chal-
lenges expected in the 1980s and 1990s. Gov-
ernments are strongly aware that they should 
work actively towards a restructuring of their 
industrial and technological potential. Tech-
nological innovation is one of the major thera-
peutic agents for current economic ills and one 
of its most important beneficial effects is to 
achieve and maintain a high level of internatio-
nal competitiveness for a nation's goods. 
63. Not all economists are convinced how-
ever that innovation is the main part of the 
story of economic growth. Many believe that 
its most important source in the post-war 
period was capital formation, accounting for 
approximately 40% of actual growth. But 
productivity change due to innovation might be 
the second main source of growth and it can 
account for 30-35 % of present growth. 
certain industries might lead to unfair competi-
tion and protectionist measures for the home 
market. Innovation policies might well there-
fore lead to the erection of non-tariff barriers if 
national innovation policies are not harmon-
ised. 
67. Your Rapporteur is aware that many 
other aspects could be dealt with in this section 
on industrial innovation but the main point he 
wishes to bring out is the danger that innova-
tion policy might become an obstacle to harmo-
nisation. 
V. Harmonisation within the OECD 
68. On 19th and 20th March 1981 the 
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technolo-
gical Policy met at ministerial level under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Aigrain, then French 
Secretary of State for Research and Develop-
ment, and Mr. van Trier, then Dutch Minister 
for Science Policy. The theme of the meeting 
was science, technology and innovation for the 
1980s - Prospectives on the national and inter-
national level. Three subjects were discussed: 
innovation policy, future consequences of 
science and technology and international colla-
64. Within the Communities the innovation boration. The meeting ended with a minister-
policy undertaken by national governments ial declaration on future policy for science and 
might become a source of friction however. In technology which represented a commonly-
comparing national budgets with the Commun- agreed set of principles and orientations for the 
ity budget it is obvious that the member science and technology policies of OECD mem-
governments play an important role in the ber countries. · It was recognised that all mem-
process of innovation. The industrialists' poli- ber countries were faced with common challen-
cies are a crucial factor in innovation. For ges such as the slow-down in economic growth, 
instance, in West Germany the government has high levels of unemployment, low rates of pro-
long been aware of the crucial importance of ductivity increase, persistent inflation, structu-
technical change for industrial performance and ral imbalances in the economy, increased 
for many years this has been an integral energy prices and environmental problems. 
component of Federal government policy. Science, technology and innovation had a vital 
There is therefore a close relationship in West role to play in the resolution of these difficul-
Germany between government, industry and ties and in responding to the needs and aspira-
university. Government innovation policy has tions of society. Many forms of international 
largely been limited to the development and co-operation could promote progress in science 
successful use of the infrastructure essential for and technology. Finally, a number of recom-
providing the conditions under which innov- mendations were made on the future role of the 
ation can flourish in both large and small firms. OECD in science and technology policy. 
65. In France, the programme-law places 69. During the meeting it was made clear 
emphasis on the idea of long-term growth that the industrial countries should take the 
programmes, concentrating the means available change and challenge of the 1980s seriously and 
in public research bodies, university laborat- work actively to develop their technological 
ories, national firms, research centres and potential. This would take time but the 1980s 
private firms for the attainment of major should be considered as a transition period lea-
objectives. Furthermore, the resources made ding to the 1990s when the rewards of meeting 
available for basic research are to be increased this challenge would be reaped. 
at a rate of 13 % per year. 70. The overall priorities of the member 
66. If these different policies are followed, countries were identified by the OECD in the 
they might well become an obstacle to achiev- following figures which represent an average of 
ing a Community policy for research and deve- member governments' research and develop-
lopment. The special assistance given to ment expenditure: defence and aerospace 43 %; 
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energy and infrastructure 19 %; industry and 
agriculture 13 %; health and welfare 10 %; 
advancement of knowledge 15 %. However, 
the priorities vary considerably between coun-
tries. Thus, although the governments of 
France, Germany, Japan and the United King-
dom all spend the same total amount on 
research and development, expenditure is 
allocated quite differently. France and the 
United Kingdom specialise in defence and aero-
space; Japan in industry and agriculture; and 
Germany in energy, infrastructure, health and 
welfare. 
71. Defence and aerospace represent about 
two-thirds of specific government research and 
development funding in the United Ki.ngdom, 
about one-half in France, one-quarter m Ger-
many and less than one-sixth in Japan. In 
France and the United Kingdom the defence 
departments also act as procu~ment agencies 
for civilian space and aeronautics research and 
development contracts with industry. Some 
government laboratorie~ underta~e bot.h types 
of work. For instance, m the Umted Kingdom, 
defence aviation establishments work on aero-
space research and development for both mili-
tary and civilian purposes. 
72. On space research and development the 
United States spends the most in both absolute 
and relative terms. Of the other four coun-
tries France, Germany and Japan spent about 
the ~ame in both absolute and relative terms 
and the United Kingdom slightly less. 
73. On energy the Federal Republic, followed 
by the United States and France, spends the 
most since energy has become the number one 
objective of government researc.h and ~evelop­
ment funding. For the Umted Kingdom, 
which has both coal and oil resources, the per-
centage remained about the same during the 
1970s. Of all research and development expen-
diture on energy, about 80 % is still earmar-
ked for nuclear research and related projects. 
74. All OECD countries face common pro-
blems of inflation, high energy costs, increasing 
social demands and unemployment. Within 
the OECD Committee for Scientific and Tech-
nological Policy member .countri~s exchan~e 
views on ways to promote mnovatton for thetr 
mutual benefit and to make structure adjust-
ments to meet increased technological competi-
tion. The committee has completed several 
long-term studies of East-West technology 
transfer and of North-South technology trans-
fer. It pays particular attention to the effects 
of such transfers on the structure and economy 
of OECD member countries. 
75. On 1st April 1982 the OECD Council 
decided to set up a Committee on information, 
computers and communications policy to exa-
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mine the social and economic impact of data 
flows and the spread of information techno-
logy. This is a sign of the increasing imp'!r-
tance given to this area by the OECD an? tts 
member countries. The OECD thus remams a 
focal point for international discussions on 
these subjects. 
76. As the OECD brings together the Euro-
pean, North American and ~acific centres . of 
western strength it offers a umque opportum~y 
for information exchange and consensus buil-
ding among countries with a great commonality 
of interests. 
77. There are however other instances where 
the incentive for co-operation is largely politi-
cal or military, such as within the NATO f~­
mework. One lesson learnt from the past ts 
that there is a need for a pragmatic approach 
and that an institutional approach might not be 
the appropriate solutio.n for cert~n situa-
tions. A second lesson ts that there ts a need 
for continuity over a period of years. 
78. The OECD has drawn some lessons 1 
from co-operation developments over the past 
ten years and identified a number of elem~n~s 
influencing the success of co-operattve activi-
ties. Some are of a general nature and others 
more specifically related to research or to tech-
nological development. 
79. The general conditions have been descri-
bed as follows: (i) a political context of intergo-
vernmental co-operation activities is esse~ti~l 
because of its political implications; (il) a stmt-
larity between partners is important as there 
should not be too pronounced differences in 
their scientific and technical development; (iil) 
the aims of the joint action should be clearly 
defined at the outset and should also be fairly 
ambitious as they are justified precisely because 
not feasible on a national basis; (iv) it is neces-
sary to recognise the importance of ~avin~ a 
general mechanism of contacts and ~tscu~st~n 
for launching defining and mountmg JOmt 
research centr~s; (v) the definition of an institu-
tional framework demands a detailed budgetary 
analysis· (vz) as the most flexible arrangements 
are ofte~ the best any mechanism which allows 
direct co-operati~n between nation~l research 
establishments is preferable to settmg .up. an 
international organisation; whatever the mstttu-
tional approach, the decision-making body 
should be allowed the utmost initiative; (viz) a 
balance should be established between-equity.-
returns in relation to investment - and effici-
ency - entrusting work to the most competent; 
(viii) appropriate provision should be made ~or 
management, accountability and responsibility 
in halting or redirecting work. 
1. Science and technology policy for the 1980s, page 152 
et seq. 
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80. The special conditions for co-operation 
in science should contain the following 
elements: (z) a balance must be struck between 
national and international programmes which 
should be complementary; (iz) the international 
research programme should provide extra 
training for national experts; (iiz) the institu-
tional structure should be kept flexible, free 
from internal red tape and provide a maximum 
delegation of responsibilities; (iv) to achieve 
financial stability, approval of budgets extend-
ing over a number of years is essential. 
81. Specific conditions have to be fulfilled to 
achieve success in high technology co-operative 
activities: (z) thorough market research is 
needed before a project is undertaken; (iz) a 
single centre of industrial decision requires 
either a joint enterprise or acceptance of a 
prime contractor and subcontractors; (iiz) the 
number of participants should be limited as 
otherwise it would be difficult to arrive at a 
sound decision-making process; (iv) a joint 
development in high technology calls for inte-
grated international participation from drawing 
board to execution; (v) operational responsibi-
lity should be left to industry without interven-
tion by civil servants who should define and 
finance the programme and eventually evaluate 
the results achieved. 
82. Several examples have shown that there 
are no clear-cut divisions between scientific 
and technological co-operation. Atomic energy 
in Western Europe for instance started off as 
scientific co-operation in the 1950s1 but has 
now become an industrial activity within the 
framework of the national state. Co-operation 
is still predominant in areas such as nuclear 
waste disposal or radiation protection. A 
similar development took place with regard to 
satellites which have now become a more 
commercial activity. On the other hand, 
scientific collaboration in fusion research is still 
the order of the day because commercial 
exploitation of fusion power is still many years 
away. 
83. The OECD has some twenty years' 
experience as a forum for exchanging thoughts 
on governmental policies, and especially in this 
context, in the scientific and technolo-
gical fields. 
84. One of the prime aims of the science and 
technology policy of its member countries 
today is to strengthen their international indus-
trial competitive position. There are, however, 
many areas in which extended international co-
operation in science and technology could 
l. The wartime participation of European teams in the 
Manhattan atomic bomb project is a very good case of 
transatlantic co-operation in the scientific and technological 
field. 
prove mutually beneficial. At the ministerial 
meeting in March 1982, a number of sugges-
tions were made on possible areas of 
increased co-operation; they are: (z) the promo-
tion of mobility of scientists and engineers 
between member countries; (iz) very large-scale 
scientific and technological undertakings need-
ing very expensive equipment; (iiz) " generic " 
technologies which affect a wide range of indus-
trial sectors such as corrosion prevention and 
control, welding and joining and radiation 
processing - these are areas of funda-
mental scientific research leading to expensive 
technological problems; (iv) technologies for the 
public service sector such as refuse disposal 
arrangements, sewage-processing facilities, 
resource recycling programmes, etc.; (v) 
research to improve the scientific basis of 
national regulations concerning health, safety 
and the environment; (vz) evaluation of the 
possible repercussions of new technologies on 
the economy, the environment and society, 
especially those which affect several countries; 
(viz) satisfying the needs of developing countries 
and establishing North-South scientific and 
technological relationships. 
85. The above examples are not an exhaus-
tive list of possible areas for co-operation on 
which interested countries might eventually 
make specific proposals after having judged 
their merits and the costs of co-operation. 
110 member countries to the fact that possibi-
lities for developing atomic weapons exist in 
this or that country. 
88. The Agency has some 120 inspectors to 
control its 800 establishments all over the 
world. It has set up a Senior Advisory Group 
for Safeguards Implementation which gives 
directives to the inspectors in order to protect 
producers of nuclear power plants against the 
leakage of their industrial or commercial 
secrets. The Agency has a board of governors 
consisting of representatives of 34 countries, 
half from the developed northern part of the 
world and half from the developing countries of 
the southern hemisphere. 
89. The third world countries have stressed 
time and again that Article IV on the promo-
tion of international co-operation in the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy has been largely 
ignored. However, the northern countries are 
not inclined to expand the activities of the 
!AEA very far. Moreover, many of its repre-
sentatives are against the growth of internatio-
nal organisations. 
90. The Agency has set up a Committee on 
Assurances of Supply whose task is to bring 
countries supplying nuclear technology -
Canada, France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United 
States - closer to the needs of the developing 
countries wishing to establish nuclear power 
plants. Discussions are being held to improve 
the predictability of supplies and avoid them 
being interrupted. 
91. The IAEA is also attempting to establish 
a scheme for international plutonium storage 
and the management of spent fuel. 
VII. Reply to the annual report of the Council 
Energy and security 
92. The committee appreciates the Council 
taking such interest in the committee's reports 
and recommendations on energy and security, 
the European combat aircraft and other aero-
nautical developments and the future of Eur-
opean space activities. Nevertheless, the com-
mittee is not entirely satisfied with some of the 
Council's replies which, although factually 
correct, do not indicate the reasons why, for 
instance, a common energy policy still cannot 
be developed - what practical constraints 
prevent the attainment of such a policy which 
has been proclaimed ever since the first energy 
crisis in 1973. Energy policy guidelines for the 
decade up to 1990 have been agreed but the 
reply does not indicate what they are and how 
stringent they should be. 
93. Addressing the European Parliament on 
24th March 1982, Mr. Tindemans, Chairman-
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in-Office of the Council of Ministers, said: " It 
is in the energy sector that a return to nation-
alism is probably the most threatening. " 
94. The Assembly recommended that the 
western world determine an acceptable thres-
hold of safety and security for its imports of 
energy or rare raw materials from eastern bloc 
countries. This is a most important issue for 
the European governments which may well be a 
source of differences between Europe and the 
United States. The Council merely stated that 
the question should be examined carefully 
and that diversification of sources of supply 
would be desirable. 
95. In Siberia, the Soviet Union has one of 
the biggest gas reserves in the world and wishes 
to use this to best avail. Its gas exports produce 
the hard currency necessary to buy technolo-
gically-advanced equipment and essential food-
stuffs. Contracts have been concluded with 
five Western European countries to construct a 
double pipeline from the Siberian gasfields inter 
alia to Germany, France and Italy. The 
contract covers a period of 20-22 years, and gas 
will be delivered within 6-10 years. In econo-
mic terms, there are positive arguments to 
accept such a barter deal: gas against pipelines. 
It is advantageous for the Western European 
countries and the Soviet Union. It helps to 
diversify the energy supplies of the countries 
concerned and produces hard currency for the 
Soviet Union. If Western Europe failed to 
conclude or terminated the contracts, its 
exports to the Soviet Union would fall as the 
Soviet Government would have less money to 
pay for them. Third, the export of Soviet gas 
would expand world supplies of gas and would 
thus ease the pressure on gas prices. 
96. A geopolitical argument is that opening 
up Siberia and its gasfields will provide the 
Soviet Union with many new minerals and 
energy resources, thus reducing the Soviet 
Union's need to turn to other countries for its 
energy supplies. 
97. There are also strategic arguments for the 
export of Soviet gas. As mentioned by the 
Council, it is a means of diversifying Western 
Europe's sources of supply, making Europe less 
dependent on supplies from the Middle East. 
The manufacturing of pipelines is of great 
importance for the European steel industry 
which is now in a difficult period. To import 
gas also avoids Western European stocks being 
depleted. 
98. The United States Government has 
invoked two strategic arguments against this 
reasoning, namely that the western-financed 
pipeline system provides the Soviet Union with 
an important strategic asset which, in case of 
crisis or war, it can use for its own purposes. 
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Second, if the Soviet Union had to build this 
pipeline alone it would be unable to use much 
of its steel production for defence purposes, for 
instance. The United States Government has 
also emphasised that Western European coun-
tries should avoid economic dependence on the 
Soviet Union. In 1986, the earliest date for the 
finished pipeline, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and France would depend on Soviet 
exports for 30 % of their gas consumption. For 
the Federal Republic, this would represent 
about 5 % of its total energy consumption. 
99. The American Government has also 
pointed out that in the British, Dutch and 
especially Norwegian sectors of the North Sea 
there are still unexploited gasfields. New tech-
niques for drilling up to a depth of some 10 km 
might open up many of the deeper gas reserves 
and thus make the need for Soviet gas even 
more questionable. 
100. Your Rapporteur thinks that these consi-
derations should play an important role in 
defining European policy on energy and 
security. 
101. Referring to the Council's same reply on 
energy and security your Rapporteur would 
mention the dangers of a growing use of fast-
breeder reactors as the international nuclear 
fuel cycle evaluation study has shown that it 
might be well nigh impossible to preserve a 
firebreak between nuclear power technology 
and nuclear weapon capability. This statement 
was made by the United States Government in 
the discussion of this study and has not been 
challenged by other nuclear weapon states. 
The concern for the future - in case of 
processing spent fuel elements followed by the 
storage of separated plutonium - should be to 
adopt the best technical safeguards and institu-
tional measures to increase the protection of 
such material against diversion, which may be 
done covertly or overtly by national govern-
ments as well as by criminal elements. 
European aeronautics 
102. Your Rapporteur does not wish to 
discuss this subject in much detail as Mr. 
Wilkinson, in his report on the colloquy on 
aeronautical consortia, will certainly touch on 
many of the elements referred to in the reply of 
the Council. His only comment is that the 
NATO or European organisations with activi-
ties in the field of standardisation of armaments 
or common armaments production have very 
little to show although the Standing Armaments 
Committees of WEU and NATO were formed 
more than 25 years ago. He is therefore rather 
sceptical about the results of the project group 
established for the European combat aircraft 
within the framework of the Independent Eur-
opean Programme Group. The question 
which Mr. Wilkinson should answer is whether 
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the composition of these committees should not 
be drastically overhauled. During the last 
session of the Assembly it was suggested that 
ministers or secretaries of state should from 
time to time attend such meetings in order to 
demonstrate the political willingness of the 
member countries to achieve results. How-
ever, the political will can be expressed even at 
the highest level without practical results being 
achieved. For example, three times it was 
decided at the highest possible level that France 
and Germany should join in building a tank. 
This idea started in the early 1960s, continued 
in the 1980s and at the last Franco-German 
summit the political will to build such a tank 
on a joint basis was expressed. However, no 
results are yet in sight. 
Space activities 
I 03. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out 
regarding the European Space Agency's future 
activities in the 1980s that there seems to be a 
feeling in the larger ESA countries that it would 
be less cumbersome if they started up their own 
national programmes again, basing them on 
ESA's achievements. This feeling certainly 
exists in Germany which, with France, has now 
embarked on its own television satellite. As 
the Council states in its reply to Recommenda-
tion 369 on the future of European space 
activities, ESA is essentially a research and 
deVelopment organisation and should not 
undertake commercial programmes. But this 
line of reasoning is not entirely correct. 
Firstly, the ESA convention states clearly that 
national programmes should be brought into 
the ESA framework to become European 
programmes. If, as in the case of Spot, 
national programmes are carried out because 
other member states do not wish to participate, 
only then should the Agency assure liaison 
between national programmes. 
104. Larger countries should . not forget that 
their own developments are possible only 
because of work done within the ESA frame-
work and that it is contrary to the spirit of the 
convention to exclude smaller countries from 
the industrial benefits of ESA's research and 
development. It is regrettable that France and 
Germany are building the TV -Sat since a joint 
design would have been cheaper and technically 
more advanced. The problems which have 
arisen could moreover have been solved 
earlier. For instance, it is a pity that Italian 
technology, which is available, is not being used 
in the Franco-German satellite. 
105. Europe has to work as a unit if it hopes 
to obtain its share of the market; there is 
expected to be a huge market in telecommuni-
cation satellites in the 1980s and the 
1990s. At one point the OTS was the most 
advanced satellite in the world but if the 
Europeans want to safeguard this lead they will 
have to work together. This is the basis of the 
long-term and short-term proposals for future 
activities of the Agency. 
106. The short-term plan goes up to 1985 and 
the long-term programmes, although not yet 
fully defined, extend into the 1990s. The 
financing of these plans is based on a percen-
tage of the GNP and on participation in 
clearly-defined programmes. 
107. In the case of Ariane there is a clear 
borderline between the development and oper-
ational phases. For the latter, Arianespace has 
been set up and ESA will deal with further 
research and technology. 
108. In the field of satellites the borderline is 
not so clear because of continual developments, 
as in telecommunications for instance. The 
frequency bands in satellites are becoming more 
and more sophisticated; for its new satellites 
ESA is developing the 12 to 14 gigahertz bands 
and for the new L-Sat this will be in the order 
of 20 to 30 gigahertz. 
109. From NASA's experience one can see 
how dangerous it is to abandon certain develop-
ments. After building experimental telecom-
munications satellites NASA was ordered to 
leave their further development to industry. 
However, industry did not take up the 
challenge as it is not inclined to invest large 
sums in such long-term projects. The United 
States therefore lost its lead in this field to 
Europe and Japan; now NASA is again 
receiving research and development funds for 
telecommunication satellites. 
110. The Meteosat programme consists of two 
satellites now in orbit and three or four more 
meteorological satellites of the same type which 
have to be built. Germany plays a key role in 
the setting up of a European system of oper-
ational satellites as it has to contribute 
25 %. If the German Government agrees to 
the system being set up, this will be of world-
wide importance. Even the Russians are 
interested and in the EEC framework the 
system could be incorporated in development 
aid arrangements for the African countries. 
111. In the long run, the Meteosat system will 
be incorporated in the earth observation pro-
grammes. ESA is first preparing the ocean 
monitoring satellite system, the memorandum 
of understanding for which will be signed in 
1982 and the first satellite will be launched in 
1987. The second step will be the earth obser-
vation programme. The ocean monitoring 
satellite will cost some 300 million accounting 
units. 
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112. As Marecs is now finalised it is to be 
incorporated in the Inmarsat system. 
113. The present ESA budget is fixed arbitrar-
ily at 450 million accounting units (at 1980 
value), an amount on which a viable organisa-
tion can hardly live with a baseline program-
me. A valid and effective space programme 
for Western Europe cannot be implemented 
over the next ten years unless it is based on 
space projects which are of interest to the 
member countries, science and industry. To 
base space policy on a sum fixed arbitrarily in 
advance might strangle the Agency's lifeline 
and eventually threaten its survival. Without 
the Agency, space Europe would no longer 
exist. This inverse reasoning is due to the 
present unwillingness of member governments 
to earmark funds for new joint projects. There 
is also growing competition from ambitious 
national space programmes of some important 
Western European countries, the United States 
and Japan. 
114. As the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions has already 
often stated, contracts for both civilian and 
military space programmes should be placed 
with European aerospace companies. In order 
to survive, these industries must have new 
programmes to meet United States and Japan-
ese competition. European-made communica-
tions and observation satellites could be 
designed to meet the needs of NATO and its 
member countries. If orders in these fields 
were placed, the European aerospace industries 
could become more competitive with the 
United States industries. 
115. As far as Ariane is concerned, after his 
visit to the United States and NASA in July 
1981, your Rapporteur wishes to draw attention 
to the fact that the United States space shuttle 
will represent a formidable alternative to 
Ariane and other space vehicles. Although 
still under development, great progress is now 
being made and the American shuttle will 
certainly start a new era in space develop-
ments. Within two or three years it might 
become operational and the advantages over 
existing space vehicles will become clearer as 
the shuttle takes off like a rocket, operates in 
orbit as a spacecraft and lands like an aero-
plane. 
116. The second conference on the explora-
tion and peaceful uses of outer space, Unispace 
1982, which will be held in Vienna from 9th to 
21st August 1982, is actively being prepared by 
ESA and its member countries. Common 
positions on the major issues on the agenda of 
the conference have now to be formulated. 
How would it otherwise be possible to show the 
developing states the real and potential advan-
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tages of European space science and space 
applications? 
117. ESA has already some experience in 
collaboration with third world countries and it 
should enlarge upon the advantages of further 
co-operation in space. The European example 
has shown that such a co-operation is possible 
and beneficial for all member countries what-
ever the different stages of industrial develop-
ment. 
118. ESA could also act as a consultant to any 
country wishing to invest in the installation of 
telecommunication, meteorology and remote-
sensing services. 
119. As space is inherently a world-wide 
activity, it is logical that the United Nations 
should play a major role in multilateral co-
operation. This is already being done in the 
World Meteorological Organisation, the World 
Weather Watch and its work on the Global 
Atmospheric Research Programme. Other 
examples are the International Telecommuni~­
tions Union and the Intergovernmental Man-
time Consultative Organisation which has led 
to the establishment of Inmarsat. 
VIII. Conclusions 
120. The committee's three principal ideas for 
action by the Council are set out in the 
recommendation. 
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121. First, it wishes the Council to authorise 
the SAC to help it to prepare the second half of 
this report. This request is based on the 
Council's reply of 18th November 1981 to 
Recommendation 365 on the application of the 
Brussels Treaty in which it stated that it might 
examine the possibility of co-operation between 
the SAC and a committee of the Assembly and 
on the statement made to the Assembly on 3rd 
December 1981 by Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of 
State to the French Minister of Defence. 
122. With reference to the Council's reply to 
Recommendation 331 stating that the Council 
would consider the possibility of allowing the 
SAC to work on subjects which may be 
suggested by the Assembly, the committee 
thinks it is justified in asking the SAC also to 
draw up a list of military research and develop-
ment programmes. 
123. Second, it exposes anew the dangers of 
over-dependence on Soviet gas while there a~e 
still many energy resources to be developed m 
Western Europe. 
124. Third, the committee has set out its 
proposals with a view to achieving the much 
needed harmonisation of European research 
and development efforts. It does not wish to 
fit all activities into a strait-jacket of one orga-
nisational type but seeks practical ways of 
achieving common solutions taking into 
account the fact that together France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the United 
Kingdom spend 80% of Western Europe's 
research and development funds. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Japan: Industries considered to have 
high growth potential• 
Housing 
Environmental protection 
Urban redevelopment 
Labour-saving equipment 
Industrial recycling equipment 
Communications and data processing 
Leisure 
Ocean development 
Nuclear power 
Highly-processed foods 
Medical equipment 
Fashion and apparel 
I. Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 
Japan. 
262 
APPENDIX 11 
Document 917 
Amendment 1 
Harmonisation of research in civil and military 
high technology fields - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report 
of the Council 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Blaauw and the Liberal Group 
14th June 1982 
I. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add " and report to the Assem-
bly within a year". 
Signed: Blaauw and the Liberal Group 
I. See 2nd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
7th February 1982- Rodmell 
Dr. Mary Kaldor, National Council Member, European Nuclear Disarmament. 
8th February 1982- London 
Mr. Michael Legge, Head of DS 17, Ministry of Defence; 
Mr. John Weston, Head of Defence Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Mr. 
Richard Gosney, Assistant for Nuclear Arms Control. 
4th to 6th Apri/1982- Washington 
The Rev. Peter G. Henriot S.J., Director, Centre of Concern; 
Mr. Robert Grey, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Dr. James Timbie, 
Special Adviser; Major McCracken; 
Mr. Robert Bell, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff; 
Mr. Frank Gaffney, Senate Armed Services Committee Staff; 
Mr. Robert Dean, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; 
Mr. Adam Kline, Counsel, House Armed Services Committee Staff; 
Mr. Robert Huber, Staff Consultant, House Foreign Affairs Committee; 
Mr. Ronald Lehman, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security 
Policy; 
Colonel C.C. Thudium, TNF Modernisation, Department of Defence; Mrs. Elaine Bunn; 
Mr. Lee Minichiello, Director of START Task Force, Department of Defence; Mrs. Sally Horn; 
Ambassador Theodore C. Achilles, Vice-Chairman and Director of the Atlantic Council; Ambas-
sador Kenneth Rush, former Deputy Secretary of Defence, Ambassador to France, Germany, 
Chairman of the Atlantic Council; Lt.-Gen. George M. Seignious, US Army (Retd.), former CinC 
SAC, Chief of Staff SHAPE; Mr. Joseph J. Wolf, former Minister on Delega-
tion to NATO; Mr. Francis 0. Wilcox, Director General of the Atlantic Council. 
The committee as a whole met in London on 8th February when it was addressed by Mr. Chris-
toph Bertram, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, on the subject of the report. 
It discussed an outline of the present report. 
The committee met in Canada from 8th to 12th March where it was addressed by: 
The Hon. J. Gilles Lamontagne, Minister of National Defence; 
Mr. P. deW. Mathewson, Chief, Policy Planning, Department of National Defence; 
Mr. T .C. Hammond, Director, Defence Relations Division, Department of External Affairs; 
Mr. John Legg. 
The committee also met with Mr. Marcel Prud'Homme, Chairman of the Standing Committee 
on External Affairs and National Defence of the Canadian House of Commons and members of his 
committee and of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Canadian Senate, and with 
Mr. Leo Hopkins, Chairman of the Canadian Parliamentary Delegation to the Nofth Atlantic 
Assembly, and members of his delegation. 
The committee met at the Headquarters of NATO, Evere, Brussels, on 19th April when it was 
addressed by Dr. Fredo Dannenbring, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; 
Admiral Robert H. Falls, CF, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee; it proceeded to SHAPE 
where it was addressed by Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Terry, RAF, Deputy SACEUR; Lt.-Gen. 
Gariboldi, Italian Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics; Air Vice Marshal Tony Skingsley, RAF, 
Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans and Policy; Colonel Peter Heck, German Air Force, Nuclear Policy 
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Section; Colonel John Craig, USAF, Nuclear Policy Section; Colonel Roelef Ubels, Netherlands 
Army, Arms Control Section. 
The committee met finally in Lancaster House, London, on 19th May 1982 when it adopted the 
report as a whole. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials, senior officers 
and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the committee and replied to questions. 
The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the 
committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on tile problem of IUICietJr wapo111 ;, &rope 
The Assembly, 
(i) Believing that the balance of all nuclear forces can be assessed only as a whole, but noting that 
the Soviet Union has a disturbing superiority in heavy intercontinental missiles and in intermediate-
range forces, while the United States lead in total numbers of nuclear warheads has been reduced; 
(ii) Believing that arms control and adequate defence measures are two sides of a balanced security 
policy designed to prevent war, not only nuclear war; 
(iii) Stressing the importance of the conventional component of the NATO deterrent forces; 
(iv) Reiterating its belief that the NATO dual decision of 17th December 1979 remains the basis 
both for adjusting the imbalance in intermediate-range forces, an imbalance which has been increased 
by the deployment of 300 SS-20s so far reported, and for negotiating the zero option; 
(v) Regretting that SALT 11 remains unratified although at the time of its signature endorsed by 
the Assembly and all NATO governments as a step in a necessarily continuous process of strategic 
. arms control negotiations, and that nearly three years have elapsed since its signature without further 
progress; 
(vz) Believing that in view of the mutual benefits of such control the strategic arms reduction talks 
should be opened urgently and pursued independently of other aspects of East-West relations, and 
welcoming therefore President Reagan's speech of 9th May 1982 calling for them to open at the end 
of June, and making realistic proposals for significant reductions of strategic nuclear weapons; 
(viz) Hoping also that the opening of those talks will have a beneficial effect on the INF negotiations 
which must be conducted in the framework of START; 
(viiz) Stressing the need for a verifiable comprehensive test ban in order to block the development of 
ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons; 
(ix) Stressing the importance of concrete confidence-building measures of the type agreed at Hel-
sinki as a precursor and complement of balanced reductions in the armouries of both sides; 
(x) Seeing in most peace demonstrations both in Europe and the United States, an expression of 
deep and justified concern about the dangers of an unrestricted arms race and the possibility of 
nuclear war; 
(xz) Regretting however the unilateral trends and over-simplifications apparent within movements 
which ignore the need for military stability, both nuclear and conventional, and for objective analysis 
of the facts in order to negotiate reductions; 
(xiz) Welcoming the publication of" NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons" for which 
the Assembly has repeatedly called, and believing that a continuing effort must be made by govern-
ments and parliamentarians to inform the public objectively about the nature of the threat and the 
basis of allied defence and arms control policies; 
(xiiz) Regretting that in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union public opinion has no opportunity to 
discuss freely the concepts on which European and international security should be based, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
A. Call on member governments acting in the North Atlantic Council, 
I. To continue the present much improved close and continuous consultations to ensure that an 
agreed allied position is maintained on all aspects of nuclear deterrence and nuclear arms control; 
2. To ensure that preparations continue in the countries concerned for the deployment from 
1983 of the agreed levels of ground-launched cruise and Pershing 11 missiles less any reductions 
previously agreed in the INF talks; 
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3. To press for the earliest agreement in the INF talks on the zero option for land-based missiles, 
and the step-by-step pursuit of these talks to include other weapons systems, and the eventual inclu-
sion of battlefield systems in these or the MBFR talks; 
4. To welcome the resumption of the SALT process through the proposed opening of START in 
June, and to press for the closest linking of these to the INF talks and the continued mutual respect 
of all SALT limits during the negotiations; 
5. To give increased emphasis to the negotiation and adoption of effective procedures for verifi-
cation, as essential for any agreement on arms control and reduction; 
6. To ask the United States Government to examine seriously Senator Jackson's proposal for a 
joint United States-Soviet Union command post in a neutral country to deter the possibility of war by 
accident or miscalculation; 
7. To bring up to date and publish from time to time on an agreed objective basis the NATO 
comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, and to urge the Soviet Union to be equally forth-
coming and objective in publishing force comparisons; 
B. Call on member governments to pursue active information policies, to ensure that public 
opinion is objectively informed both about the nature of the threat and about the purposes of allied 
defence and arms control and reduction policies. 
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ExpltJnatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. The committee produces this report on 
nuclear weapons following two earlier reports 
and Assembly recommendations on the sub-
ject1. On 21st October 1981, the Presidential 
Committee at short notice requested this 
comp~ittee to prepare a preliminary version of 
the present report for discussion at the Decem-
ber 1981 session, but the committee found itself 
unable to comply in the time available. The 
Assembly, however, on 2nd December 1981 
adopted a further recommendation on the 
subject2 on a motion for a recommendation 
with urgent procedure which had been tabled 
by a number of representativesJ. 
1.2. Since the committee last reported in June 
1981, there have been a number of significant 
developments. On 2nd October 1981, the 
Reagan administration plans for modernisation 
of United States strategic forces were announ-
ced and there have been extensive committee 
hearings on the subject in the United States 
Congress. The Reagan administration defence 
policy as a whole emerges in the record $ 258 
billion defence budget for fiscal year 1983 put 
forward in February this year, an increase of 
$ 62 billion over the $ 194.6 billion of the last 
Carter defence budget for fiscal year 1982. 
Soviet deployment of the SS-20 continued 
steadily, numbers rising from 220 when the 
committee last reported to 300 by 16th March 
when Mr. Brezhnev offered a unilateral freeze. 
NATO continued methodically to implement 
its December 1979 decision to deploy up to 572 
intermediate-range missiles in Europe while 
negotiating to secure mutual reductions; the 
NATO Nuclear Planning Group on 21st Octo-
ber 1981 referred to zero-level deployment as 
" a possible option under ideal circumstances ". 
1.3. More slowly than its defence policy, the 
Reagan administration has begun to formulate 
its arms control policy with the zero option 
proposals for what it calls the INF talks put 
forward by President Reagan on 18th Novem-
ber 1981 followed by the resumption of these 
bilateral talks between the United States and 
1. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces, 
Document 859, 17th November 1980 (Recommendation 
360); Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear 
forces in Europe, Document 879, 3rd June 1981 (Recom-
mendation 367). 
2. Recommendation 375 on negotiations on theatre 
nuclear forces. 
3. Document 900. 
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the Soviet Union in Geneva on 30th November 
(they had been briefly begun at the end of 1980 
under the Carter administration), and their 
adjournment for two months on 16th March. 
NATO continues to link the INF talks to others 
on the limitation of strategic weapons (now 
called START) but the United States has not 
yet announced a date for their opening (expec-
ted "in the summer"). Nor has the United 
States administration completed its review of 
other related arms control topics such as 
nuclear test bans and outer space. 
1.4. The intervening period has also seen the 
appearance of more numerous official publica-
tions from both East and West on the levels of 
forces, particularly nuclear forces. Particularly 
significant for European politicians has of 
course been the manifestations of various forms 
of popular opposition to nuclear weapons 
which culminated in mass demonstrations in a 
number of Western European countries in 
October and November 1981 and which may 
be seen again in June during the NATO 
summit. These movements now find their 
counterpart in the United States and have ins-
pired a number of resolutions tabled in the 
Senate. 
1.5. The committee reviews these various 
developments in the following pages, paying 
particular attention first to a careful examina-
tion of the nuclear balance. 
11. Levels of nuclear forces 
(a) Information sources 
2.1. The year since the committee last repor-
ted has seen some growth in official publica-
tions and statements, some now from the Soviet 
Union as well as the West, on the levels of 
forces of the two sides. Unprecedented were 
the two substantial pamphlets " Soviet military 
power", published by the United States 
Department of Defence in September 1981, and 
the rejoinder " Whence the threat to peace ", 
published in six languages by the Soviet Minis-
try of Defence and released with a full western-
style press conference in Moscow on 15th 
January 1982. These two particular docu-
ments, with their coloured illustrations, are 
public relations exercises clearly aimed at 
western public opinion; the most significant 
deduction to be made from their appearance is 
a recognition by both the United States and the 
Soviet Union that there is a victory to be won 
in persuading that opinion. The West does not 
have any comparable access to public opinion 
in the Soviet Union, nor, if it did, could that 
opinion play any role like that of public opi-
nion in the West. 
2.2. The United States document is devoted 
exclusively to a description of Soviet military 
capability, which is impressive, but makes no 
attempt to compare it with NATO military 
capability either in the areas where NATO is 
inferior, or in those where it is superior. The 
Soviet publication, written as a reply to the 
United States document, concentrates on des-
cribing the size of the United States and in 
some cases British and French forces, and 
NATO forces as a whole, but also provides a 
few comparisons of the forces of the two sides. 
It claims, in its introduction, to present 
" alongside data provided by competent Soviet 
quarters, some facts and figures of the London 
International Institute for Strategic Studies and 
of its official United States sources, none of 
which can be suspected of the least sympathy 
for the Soviet Union". The data in both 
publications portrays the adversary's military 
power in maximum terms, but there is no 
reason to doubt their validity within these 
limits; they tally with other well-known 
sources. 
2.3. The long-awaited NATO comparison of 
the forces of the two sides•, agreed by the 
NATO countries, was finally published on 4th 
May: " NATO and the Warsaw Pact - force 
comparisons. " The committee warmly wel-
comes this objective comparison of forces 
agreed by 14 countries. Although published 
after the bulk of the present report of the 
committee was drafted, the data in the NATO 
study broadly confirm data used in the present 
report, from other authoritative sources, when 
the particular definitions and categories used in 
the study are taken into account. The study 
confirms the well-known areas of NATO inferi-
ority and superiority, but where Warsaw Pact 
superiority is claimed, the proportions are more 
moderate than those of some official United 
States statements. 
2.4. The basis on which the NATO study is 
prepared should be understood. In particular, 
because France does not participate in the inte-
grated military structure of NATO, all French 
forces are excluded - in terms of its defence 
expenditure in 1981 inclusion of the French 
defence effort would result in an increase of 
some 10 % in the defence effort of the rest of 
NATO, and a larger proportional increase in 
conventional forces present in Europe and of 
I. For which the Assembly has repeatedly called in 
Recommendations 367 and 375. 
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course an increase in NATO's nuclear forces. 
The study avoids, as far as possible, political 
assumptions and scenarios concerning in parti-
cular reinforcements, and is therefore limited to 
forces assigned to NATO on the one hand and 
Warsaw Pact forces primarily designated for use 
in Europe. It is thus concerned with the forces 
in position in Europe with their planned esta-
blishment of manpower and excludes all Bri-
tish, Canadian and United States forces sta-
tioned on their own territories, and excludes 
Soviet forces in the Moscow, Volga, Ural and 
all trans-Ural military districts. The categories 
in which forces are compared are also, in some 
cases, different from those of longer established 
sources as the annual report of the United 
States Secretary of Defence or the IISS Military 
Balance. Thus, strategic nuclear forces in the 
NATO study include more than the SALT-
counted forces (adopted in the report) - it 
includes Soviet Backfire, United States 
FB-111 A aircraft and the British Polaris missile 
force, whereas these in other studies have 
usually been considered in the European INF 
(long-range) context. Usefully, the NATO 
study includes figures for total numbers of 
warheads on the strategic forces, showing 
NATO superiority of some 9,100 to 8,400 on 
the definitions employed, comparable informa-
tion has been given in the past in annual 
reports of the United States Secretary of 
Defence, although omitted this year in Mr. 
Weinberger's first report. 
2.5. The usual official annual and other 
reports have been available to the Rapporteur 
in preparing this report. They include the 
following (dates of the latest reports given in 
brackets): 
- United States Secretary of Defence 
annual report (for fiscal year 1983, 5th 
February 1982); 
- United States military posture prepared 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (fiscal year 
1983, February 1982); 
- Arms control impact statements sub-
mitted to Congress by the President of 
the United States (for fiscal year 1982, 
February 1981); 
- Strategic weapons proposals - hearings 
of the United States Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations on the foreign 
policy and arms control implications of 
President Reagan's strategic weapons 
proposals (3rd-l3th November 1981); 
- United Kingdom statement on the 
defence estimates (April 1981) 
In addition the well-known IISS Military Balance 
has of course been heavily drawn upon. 
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Other sources, which include articles by Soviet 
military commentators, have been noted where 
used. 
(b) Categories of forces 
2.6. As the committee has stressed in past 
reports, the concept of nuclear balance can only 
be viewed as a whole; any attempt to assess 
balance in separate categories for strategic 
weapons (by which is usually meant the inter-
continental weapons of the two superpowers) 
and theatre weapons raises the following 
objections: 
- so-called theatre nuclear forces are stra-
tegic as far as the Europeans are 
concerned because they can be used to 
attack European cities; 
- 400 of the 5,200 United States Posei-
don SLBM warheads, classed as stra-
tegic in the SALT context, are in fact 
assigned to SACEUR and targeted by 
him as part of his theatre forces; 
- many Soviet strategic weapons could 
be used against Europe, and indeed the 
Soviet SS-11 and SS-19 ICBMs in the 
Ukraine are known to be dual-capable, 
targeted at will on Europe or the 
United States (as are some submarine-
launched missiles, e.g. those in the 
Baltic), so that in military terms one 
consequence of the deployment of the 
SS-20 against Europe has probably 
been to increase the threat to the 
United States through the retargeting of 
SS-11 s and SS-19s on targets in that 
country; 
- United Kingdom and French nuclear 
forces, although regarded as strategic by 
those countries, are of course counted 
by the Soviet Union as part of the total 
threat from theatre weapons; moreover, 
the United Kingdom weapons are assi-
gned to SACEUR for similar purposes 
to the 400 Poseidon warheads mentio-
ned above; 
- the optimum military response to a 
threat from a particular weapon is not 
necessarily by means of a weapon of 
comparable range or characteristics; 
NATO has always relied in part on 
United States strategic systems to coun-
ter the threat from Soviet theatre sys-
tems and any attempt to achieve a 
separate artificial theatre balance 
would weaken the essential linkage 
with major United States nuclear forces 
on which deterrence is based. 
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2.7. With the advent of serious negotiations 
on nuclear weapons limitations in the SALT 
process, however, a distinction between cate-
gories of weapon systems had to be made for 
the purpose of the negotiations, and for several 
reasons: to attempt to negotiate a package of 
limitations covering all weapons systems would 
have been too complicated, and would have 
delayed or prevented agreement; France and the 
United Kingdom were not prepared to see their 
relatively small nuclear forces limited in any 
way - at least not while the superpowers 
retained much larger forces; the European 
countries in particular were anxious to keep 
what the Soviet Union called forward-based 
systems out of the early SALT process. 
2.8. Thus for the purposes of negotiations on 
arms limitations a category of strategic weapons 
has been defined, which could be better termed 
SALT -counted weapons - these are the 
weapons of the two superpowers, based on 
their own territory or in submarines, which are 
capable of reaching the territory of the other 
superpower. 
(c) SALT-ctn~llt«l systems 
2.9. The table on the Soviet and United States 
strategic systems covered by SALT, at Appen-
dix 11, shows that while the Soviet Union has a 
31 % lead in numbers of launchers and aircraft 
(2,500 against 1 ,900), the United States has a 
24% lead in numbers of warheads (8,700 
against 7 ,000) - a measure of the number of 
targets that can be attacked simultaneously. 
2.10. These crude totals represent the maxi-
mum number of deployed systems - not all on 
either side would be immediately available for 
use. The submarine-launched missiles in par-
ticular depend on the submarines being at sea. 
Probably an absolute maximum of two-thirds 
of the United States force would be at sea at 
any one time; the Soviet pattern of deployment 
is much lower, perhaps less than one-third 
actually on patrol at any one time. Both of 
these proportions could be raised in a period of 
tension. 
2.11. The crude totals hide significant asym-
metries in the forces of the two sides. The 
Soviet Union has 400 more ICBMs than the 
United States. These are inherently more 
accurate, and more vulnerable, than the sub-
marine-launched missiles. One of the Soviet 
ICBMs - the SS-18 - is very large with a throw-
weight in excess of 7,000 kg compared with less 
than 1,000 for the United States Minuteman 
Ill. The SS-18 is reported to exist in various 
models with warheads ranging from 2 to 50 
megatons, and one model with an accuracy 
supposedly as good as about 200 metres CEP. 
These characteristics of the SS-18 have given 
rise to speculation about the possible vulnerab-
ility of the United States Minuteman missiles to 
a first strike from the Soviet Union. 
2.12. However, to provide something like a 
90 % probability of destroying a Minuteman 
missile in its silo, the Soviet Union would have 
to fire two warheads in ground burst mode 
against each silo. To attack the whole United· 
States ICBM force would require a strike by 
2,100 warheads aimed at the missile fields. 
This has been estimated in many studies to pro-
duce anything from 800,000 to 20 million dead 
as incidental collateral damage1• As the 
ground burst needed to crack missile silos pro-
duces a maximum amount of radioactive 
fallout, there would inevitably be far higher 
casualties from radioactivity over a period of 
many weeks following such a strike. Even 
then, anything up to 10% of the ICBM force 
could be expected to survive, and the whole of 
the United States submarine missile force, with 
5,000 warheads, would be intact and available 
for retaliatory strikes against the Soviet Union. 
2.13. In fact, the other asymmetry in the 
United States favour in having some 5,000 war-
heads on submarine-launched missiles compa-
red with only 1,300 for the Soviet Union, is 
that the United States is in a far better position 
to deliver a devastating second strike from its 
highly-survivable submarine forces. 
2.14. Public debate on the issue of United 
States superiority or inferiority in strategic 
weapons was heightened most recently when at 
a press conference on 31st March President 
Reagan was quoted in response to a question as 
saying: 
" On balance the Soviet Union does have 
a definite margin of superiority, enough 
so that there is what I have called, as you 
all know, several times, a window of 
vulnerability ... 
The Soviets' great edge is that they could 
absorb our retaliatory blow and hit us 
again ... " 
President Reagan was immediatedly challenged 
by two Senators who have favoured strong 
defence programmes against the Soviet Union. 
Senator Henry Jackson, on 4th April, said: 
" In the aggregate we have the capability 
now of deterring the Soviets... The quali-
tative advantages that we have, both in 
our bomber force and in our submarine 
force ... " 
l. See in particular "The Effects of Nuclear War", 
United States Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 
May 1979, pages 81-90 "Case 3: a counter force attack 
against the United States". 
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balance Soviet advantages in heavy missiles. 
Senator Patrick Moynihan, the same day, 
said: 
" Either side could destroy the other side 
in a counter-strike. " 
2.15. The official figures published by the 
United States Department of Defence, con-
firmed by the Rapporteur's discussions in 
Washington, show clearly that the United States 
still has a lead in the total number of warheads 
in its strategic systems. The understandable 
anxieties of the United States military author-
ities at the state of the balance arise from three 
factors. First the overwhelming nuclear super-
iority enjoyed by the United States after 
completion of the Kennedy programme of 
Minuteman missiles and Polaris submarines, 
and which it enjoyed again when it was the first 
to deploy multiple, independently targetable 
re-entry vehicles (MlR Vs), which increased 
four- or five-fold the total numbers of warheads 
in its forces, had been eroded by the Soviet 
Union which has overtaken the United States in 
numbers of missiles deployed, and considerably 
reduced the gap in total numbers of warheads. 
Secondly, the United States is understandably 
concerned at the characteristics of some of the 
very heavy Soviet ICBMs, in particular the 
SS-18 with its enormous throw-weight and 
warhead. The characteristics of this missile 
cannot be explained except on the assumption 
that it was designed as a counter-force weapon 
to destroy Minuteman missiles in their silos. 
Thirdly, the underlying concern of the United 
States is with the relative age of the weapons 
systems in service: 450 of the Minuteman 
missiles date from 1966, the remaining 550 
from 1970; the Polaris SLBM dates from 1964, 
the Poseidon from 1971. Against this the 
Soviet ICBMs SS-17, 18 and 19, all date from 
1975 and two of the SLBMs from 1977 and 
1978. The fear that the technology of 
deployed systems might be overtaken by the 
momentum of the more recent Soviet program-
mes, has been the spur for the United States 
strategic modernisation programme. 
(d) United States strategic modernisation programme 
2.16. A major modernisation programme for 
the United States strategic nuclear forces has 
been in existence for some years, and was 
drawn up in detail in the last year of the 
Carter administration. The version as presen-
ted by the present administration in the annual 
report of the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Wein-
berger, for fiscal year 1983 (February 1982) is 
described here. 
(i) ICBMs 
2.17. The programme to fit a heavier Mark 
12A re-entry vehicle with a higher yield war-
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Characteristics of chief United States and Soviet Union ballistic missiles 
Year 
first 
deployed 
United States: 
ICBM 
Titan 11 1962 
Minuteman 11 1966 
Minuteman Ill 1970 
MX1 1986 
SLBM 
Polaris 1964 
Poseidon 1971 
Trident C-4 1980 
Trident D-St 1989 
Soviet Union: 
ICBM -
SS-11 1966 
SS-13 1968 
SS-17 1975 
SS-18 1975 
SS-19 1975 
SLBM 
SS-N-5 1964 
6 1969 
8 1972 
17 1977 
18 1978 
1. Not yet deployed. 
head to 300 of the 550 Minuteman Ill is near-
ing completion - a t{)tal of 900 warheads. A 
new, heavier and more accurate, ICBM - the 
MX - has been under development for some 
years. Its gross weight will be 87,000 kg 
compared with 35,000 for Minuteman Ill, and 
overall length 21.6 metres compared with 
18.3. It will be MIRVed, capable of carrying 
up to 12 Mark 12A re-entry vehicles (the 
SALT 11 limit is 10). The programme calls for 
the production of 100 missiles, an initial 40 to 
Range Throw 
weight Warheads km tonnes 
15,000 3.4 1 x9 mt 
11,300 ·o.s-0.7 1 x 1-2 mt 
13,000 0.7-0.9 { 3 X 165 kt; 3 X 350 kt 
3 X 350 kt 
4,600 0.5 3 X 200 kt 
(not MIRV) 
4,600 0.9 10x 50 kt 
7,400 1.4 + 8 X 100 kt 
11,000 14 X 150 kt 
{, l x l-2 rnt 
10,500 0.7-0.9 3 X 100-300 kt 
(not MIRV) 
10,000 0.5 1 x 1 mt 
10,000 2.7 4 x900 kt; 1 x5 mt 
1 x 18-25 mt; 
10,500 7.6 8x2 mt; 
1 x 10-50 mt 
11,000 3.4 6 X 550 kt 1 x5 mt 
1,120 1 x 1-2 mt 
1 x 1-2 mt; 
2,400 0.7 2 x 3 kt range 
(not MIRV) 
8,000 0.7 1 x 1-2 mt 
5,000 1.4 1 X mt range 
8,000 2.3 3 x 1-2 mt 
scheme was cancelled; the Reagan administra-
tion proposed that the 40 early production MX 
should be placed in specially strengthened 
Minuteman silos pending a final decision on a 
basing mode to be chosen from: deep basing 
(storage in a deep underground cavern); ballistic 
missile defence (possibly with ABMs); or conti-
nuous patrol aircraft (maintaining the MX 
airborne over the United States in special 
aircraft from which it could be launched). 
enter service in late 1986 in a provisional 2.18. More recently the proposal for early 
basing mode. The plan of the Carter adminis- deployment of 40 MX in specially hardened 
tration for a multiple protective shelter basing Minuteman silos has been pronounced unsatis-
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factory. There is clearly considerable confusion 
in Washington about the likely final basing 
mode for the MX and Congress has so far 
refused the administration's request for funding 
for production of the missile, pending final 
decision on basing. Research and development 
continues. 
(ii) Sea-based missiles 
2.19. The Trident C-4 SLBM with eight war-
heads has been progressively entering service in 
12 out of the 31 Poseidon submarines which 
are being refitted - the twelfth should be fin-
ished in late 1982 or early 1983. 
2.20. The larger Trident-class submarine, with 
24 instead of 16 missiles in the earlier subma-
rines, is about to enter service - the first was 
delivered in October 1981, a total of 9 have 
been authorised, funds for two more are reques-
ted in fiscal year 1983 and procurement at one 
per year is programmed up to fiscal year 1987. 
2.21. An improved Trident 11 (D-5) missile is 
now to be developed for the Trident-class sub-
marine with increased range and 14 warheads 
instead of 8 in the C-4. It is due to enter ser-
vice in December 1989. This missile will have 
improved accuracy providing " a capability to 
attack the full spectrum of targets from a 
reliable and enduring platform "1• 
2.22. In addition "nuclear armed sea-launched 
cruise missiles will be deployed on attack sub-
marines beginning in fiscal year 1984. These 
weapons will provide some near term hard tar-
get kill capability, while contributing to a stra-
tegic reserve " 1• The numbers of SLCM to be 
deployed are not specified in the Secretary of 
Defence's report but administration spokesmen 
have confirmed that there will be several hun-
dred. 
(iii) Airborne systems 
2.23. There are three programmes for impro-
ving the existing force of B-52 strategic bomber 
aircraft. In the first place, air-launched cruise 
missiles are to be fitted to existing B-52G and 
B-52H aircraft, beginning in 1982. Secondly, 
I 00 of an improved version of the new B-1 
bomber, cancelled by President Carter, to be 
known as the B-1 B, are to be produced, the first 
entering service in 1986. The B-IB will also 
carry air-launched cruise missiles, of which a 
total of over 3,000 is to be produced. 
2.24. Finally, an advanced technology bomber 
(A TB), incorporating stealth characteristics 
(making it difficult to detect by radar), is to be 
developed to begin entering service in the 
1990s. 
1. Secretary of Defence annual report to Congress, fiscal 
year 1983, page Ill-59. 
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(iv) Warheads 
2.25. The strategic modernisation programme, 
together with the programme for deployment of 
cruise missiles in Europe, will require the pro-
duction of large numbers of new nuclear war· 
heads The total inventory of all United States 
nuclear warheads on all types of weapons is 
variously reported at from 24,000 to 25,000. 
According to press reports1, Mr. Charles 
Gilbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear 
Materials in the United States Depart-
ment of Energy, implied in Washington on 28th 
February 1982 that the total stock of United 
States nuclear warheads was to be increased 
from the present 24,000 to about 
40,000. Other reports, however, refer to the 
production of about 17,000 new warheads to 
replace existing warheads in a stockpile of 
25,000 without significant net increase in total 
numbers. President Reagan's warhead produc-
tion programme signed on 5th March 1982 
included only about 380 more warheads than 
the programme for increased production signed 
by President Carter in October 1980. 
(v) Miscellaneous 
2.26. The strategic forces modernisation pro-
gramme also involves considerable improve-
ments to command control and communica-
tions arrangements for strategic forces, designed 
primarily to ensure survivability of the com-
mand system. The importance of this pro-
gramme for a stable deterrent has been stressed 
by the administration. The programme also 
provides for the study of ballistic missile 
defence - various ways in which ICBMs might 
be protected involving special basing modes in 
deep underground caverns or possibly a return 
to the abandoned anti-ballistic missile defence. 
(e) E11ropeflll systems 
2.27. The problem of describing the levels of 
intermediate-range nuclear weapons - weapons 
in range of Europe, which are not interconti-
nental (SALT -counted) weapons - is immensely 
complicated because of the large variety of dif-
ferent weapons systems that could be taken into 
account; the dual-capability of many of them 
(capable of delivering conventional or nuclear 
weapons) and the difficulty of deciding on the 
range of weapons systems to be included (over 
1,000 km? over 500 ? ... ). There is the ques-
tion of including or excluding British and 
French strategic systems. These are relatively 
small forces; the two governments have made it 
clear that they are not prepared to negociate 
I. The Guardian, 1st March 1982; International Herald 
Tribune, 23rd March 1982. 
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Historical levels of SS-4, SS-5 et SS-20 missiles 
Total Total Total Total Total Year ofSS-4 SS-20 
missiles warheads• yield equivalent Notes 
and SS-5 MT2 megatons3 
1962 200 - 200 200 200 200 Period of SS-4 
and SS-5 
build-up 
1963 700 - 700 700 700 700 
1964 800 - 800 800 800 800 Probably over-
estimate 
1965-1967 750 - 750 750 750 750 
1968 725 - 725 725 725 725 
1969-1971 700 - 700 700 700 700 
1972-1976 600 - 600 600 600 600 
1977 600 (20) 620 660 609 617 
1978 590 lOO 690 890 635 675 Start of SS-20 
deployment 
1979 590 120 710 950 644 692 
1980 440 160 600 920 512 576 
1981 380 230 610 1,070 483 575 
19814 350 250 600 1,100 462 562 
Source : Successive editions of IISS Military Balance. 
I. Assuming 3 warheads on all SS-20 missiles, but ignoring any reloads. 
2. Assuming I MT on SS-4, SS-5 warheads; 0.15 MT on SS-20 warheads. 
3. Total ofYl where Y is yield of each warhead in MT. 
4. Figures from NATO NPG communique of 21st October 1981. 
any reductions in their modest levels, at least 
while the levels of the nuclear weapons of 
the superpowers remain substantially greater; 
moreover, French nuclear weapons are not 
assigned to NATO. On the other hand, Soviet 
military planners cannot be expected to exclude 
these weapons in their assessment of the threat. 
2.28. There are in fact two distinct problems to 
be addressed in describing the levels of these 
weapons. On the one hand, there can be a 
relatively short and clearly-defined list of wea-
pons systems that could be the subject of nego-
tiations on reductions in the INF talks. Such 
lists are a matter for the negotiations. On the 
other hand, an attempt can be made to describe 
the levels of all nuclear weapons systems in the 
area. 
2.29. The simplest statement of levels concerns 
surface-to-surface missiles with ranges in excess 
of 1 ,000 km because these are the most 
threatening weapons as far as NATO is concer-
ned, with very short flight times giving no 
warning of arrival and capable of destroying 
both military and civilian objectives anywhere 
in Europe. In this category of weapon system, 
the Soviet Union, according to western figures 
of March 1982, has 300 SS-20s (with a total of 
900 warheads); 275 older SS-4 and 25 SS-5 mis-
siles. NATO has none. 
2.30. This is not, however, a meaningful repre-
sentation of a balance. Soviet intermediate 
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and medium-range ballistic missiles are 
deployed in three main areas: European Soviet 
Union (Byelorussia and Ukraine, where they 
are clearly targeted on Western Europe); each 
side of the Urals (the so-called "swing posi-
tion" where they are in range of South West 
Asia and Europe); Asian Soviet Union (Tomsk 
area, and Chita area near the Chinese fron-
tier). Of the SS-20s, about one-third, and of 
the SS-4 and 5, about one-quarter are said to be 
deployed in the Asian Soviet Union where they 
are not in range of Europe1• Historically, since 
the early 1960s, the Soviet Union has had 600 
SS-4s and SS-5s deployed, of which 450 were in 
range of Europe, and, according to NATO 
figures for March 1982, these have been replaced 
by the SS-20 on a one-for-one basis thereby 
increasing the total number ·of warheads 
although actually reducing the total yield of the 
weapons - while the accuracy has increased -
see table. There is evidence that the SS-20 
launcher has a retire capability - i.e. that seve-
ral missiles could be fired successively from one 
launcher - but it would not be cost-effective for 
the Soviet Union to deploy several missiles 
with each launcher. Missiles cost many times 
I. However, the NATO publication NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact- force comparisons of 4th May 1982 shows 
the SS-20 with a range of 4,600 to 5,000 km. At the lower 
range, missiles in the Tomsk area could reach Norway, 
Denmark and Turkey; at the higher, Benelux and Germany 
also. 
more than launchers. In the absence of evi-
dence of production of significantly more SS-20 
missiles than the 300 launchers observed by 
satellites, official United States and NATO figu-
res have not increased the estimates of SS-20 
levels beyond the numbers of observed laun-
chers. 
2.31. During the 1960s and 1970s, NATO 
clearly considered that the threat of the SS-4 
and SS-5 was offset by other NATO weapons, 
including nuclear-capable aircraft; United King-
dom and possibly French nuclear weapons, 
including strategic weapons; part of the United 
States strategic weapons including those Polaris 
submarines assigned to SACEUR which were 
the precursors of the present 400 Poseidon war-
heads mentioned in paragraph 2.5 above. The 
net increase in the warheads threat to Europe 
from these three Soviet weapons is about 3 7 5 as 
shown in the following table. NATO has lived 
with the threat from 450 missiles since 1963, 
and considered it to be offset by the other 
weapons. 
Nos. missiles deployed Nos. within 
range of Europe 
Missiles Total 
SS-4, SS-5 SS-20 SS-4, SS-5 SS-20 war-
heads 
1963 
to 1976 600 nil 450 nil 450 
March 
1982 300 300 225 200 825 
Net increase increase in warheads ....... 375 
2.32. However, once aircraft are included in an 
estimate of nuclear weapons systems in Europe, 
the different possible figures are legion because 
of all the different criteria for choice of aircraft 
to be included: 
- Which type of aircraft to include in 
terms of range and payload. If 1,000 
km combat radius is the criterion, all 
tactical aircraft are excluded except the 
Soviet Su-24 Fencer and the United 
States A-6; if the threshold is lowered 
to 500 km, then the Soviet MiG-27 
Flogger and Su-17 and Su-7 Fitter are 
included together with NATO F-104, 
F-4, Jaguar and Mirage aircraft as well 
as the A-7 carrier-based aircraft. 
- How many of each type should be 
counted as nuclear weapons systems ? 
E.g. out of 219 Anglo-French Jaguar 
aircraft, only 80 are said to have 
been constructed as nuclear-capable 
aircraft, but only 40 of these are 
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believed to be assigned to a nuclear 
role. From an external verification 
standpoint, 219 aircraft might be 
classed as nuclear weapons systems; 
from an intention standpoint, only 40 
would be. 
- Assumptions about numbers of aircraft 
carriers in range of Europe. The 
nominal strength of United States air-
craft carriers is 2 in the 6th Fleet in the 
Mediterranean; 5 with the Atlantic 
Fleet. Each carries a total of some 30 
A-6 and A-7 aircraft which can be used 
in a nuclear strike role. Nowadays, 
however, the bulk of these carriers and 
aircraft in the Atlantic are assigned to 
(conventional) sea control roles; at 
times there have been no aircraft car-
riers in the Mediterranean. Thus the 
perceived threat to the Soviet Union 
can vary from 0 to 238 aircraft (476 
nuclear bombs). 
- Inclusion of British and French strate-
gic nuclear forces. Whether negotiable 
or not the Soviet Union must count 
these as part of the threat. 
- Where based? Should dual-based 
United States aircraft - based in the 
United States but earmarked for imme-
diate reinforcement in Europe be inclu-
ded ? Should similar Soviet aircraft 
based East of the U rals be included ? 
There is a strong case for including 
both on the grounds that flying time 
involved in reinforcement is only a few 
hours. 
One difficulty in equating aircraft with missiles 
is that aircraft are capable of flying more than 
one sortie to deliver nuclear weapons. 
2.33. For the past year, there has been a new 
development in that various Soviet experts have 
begun to publish figures for their estimate of 
the balance. In May 1981, the Soviet press 
agency Novosti distributed a short article by 
Lt.-Gen. Nikolai Chervov quoting IISS Military 
Balance figures to give NATO 1 ,5 50 nuclear 
means of delivery with ranges from 720 km 
upwards, in the European theatre. It claimed 
that these systems could deliver 1.5 times as 
many warheads as comparable Soviet sys-
tems. In a more recent paper entitled " Main 
regional topic - on the balance of military for-
ces between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation 
and NATO " distributed by Novosti in the 
week of 5th October 1981, General Chervov 
provided another estimate of western weapons 
systems with ranges from 1,000 to 4,500 km 
comprising United States forward-based systems 
- F-111 and F-4 aircraft based in certain Euro-
pean countries, the FB-lllA fighter bombers 
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based in the United States and carrier-borne A6 
and A 7 aircraft, totalling 700 units (without 
providing a breakdown). United States allies 
were stated to have more than 300 medium-
range delivery vehicles, including more than 
160 land- and sea-based missiles. The paper 
claimed that the total of Soviet SS-20, SS-4 and 
SS-5 missiles did not exceed the NATO total 
(of 1,000). 
2.34. Most authoritatively, Mr. Brezhnev him-
self in the interview he gave to the German 
magazine Der Spiegel on 1st November 1981 in 
preparation for his visit to Bonn offered figures 
closely following_ those of General Chervov in 
October: 
" If one includes in medium-range wea-
pons the principal nuclear missiles and 
aircraft of the NATO countries, capable 
of reaching targets in the territory of the 
Soviet Union from the territory of Wes-
tern European countries and the seas 
washing the coasts of the European conti-
nent, i.e. with ranges from 1 ,000 km 
upwards (but less of course than intercon-
tinental range), and the corresponding 
Soviet weapons with similar range statio-
ned in the European part of the USSR, 
there exists at the present time in Europe 
an approximate equality in these wea-
pons between the NATO countries and 
the USSR. The NATO countries have 
in this area 986 delivery vehicles of 
which the United States provides more 
than 700 (F-111, FB-111, F-4 aircraft, 
aircraft on aircraft-carriers cruising in the 
seas and oceans surrounding Europe). 
Further the ijritish capacity represeQ.ts 
64 ballistic missiles and 55 -bombers. 
France has 144 units (98 missiles and 
46 bombers). 
The Soviet Union has 975 similar wea-
pons. The situation has not changed 
since the USSR began to replace the SS-4 
and SS-5 missiles which were outdated by 
the improved SS-20 missiles. When we 
put a new missile in place we dismantle 
one or two old missiles which, with their 
launching ramps, are sent for scrap. 
The SS-20 can carry three warheads, but 
their total yield is less than that of one 
old warhead. Consequently the number 
of launchers diminished as the old equip-
ment was replaced and, at the same time, 
the total yield of our medium-range 
nuclear capacity has been reduced. " 
2.35. The Soviet Union has been claiming 
from about 1979 that a balance existed in 
medium-range systems in Europe of about 
1 ,000 on each side, and makes the same claim 
today. But in that period the number of SS-20 
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missiles deployed has increased from 120 to 
300 which, allowing for the simultaneous 
reduction in the numbers of SS-4s and SS-5s 
deployed, represents a net increase of 360 war-
heads in the Soviet force - this considerably 
weakens the longstanding Soviet claim of 
approximate balance in the European theatre. 
2.36. IISS Military Balance figures for 
mid-1981 show 1,512 NATO systems for 4,430 
Warsaw Pact systems for the European theatre. 
Calculations from non-attributable United 
States sources show ratios in favour of the War-
saw Pact rang_ing from 4:1 to 6:1 with different 
assumptions. The table at appendix tabulates 
various assessments of force levels that have 
been made quoting the source. 
2.37. In conclusion, it can be said that no rea-
sonable assumptions support the Soviet figures, 
although truly worst case assumptions from the 
Soviet standpoint can show more than the 
1,000 systems that the Warsaw Pact claims 
NATO has. At the same time, the NATO 
calculations have been including all the 
presently deployed 300 SS-20s although 100 of 
these, and some 75 SS-4s and SS-Ss are not 
currently deployed within range of Europe. 
Certainly too the only western systems that 
could respond as instantaneously and as accur-
ately to a strike by the SS-20 are the 18 French 
IRBMs, and of course the United States 
Minuteman ICBMs. Among the 572 NATO 
systems to be deployed from 1983 onwards 
under the 1979 decision, only the Pershing 11 
will have a comparable short flight time 
response. 
(f) British tUUl French uc/ear forces 
2.38. Since the committee last reported speci-
fically on British and French nuclear forces', 
the United Kingdom has announced its decision 
to acquire the Trident D-5 missile instead of 
the C-4 for its strategic replacement programme 
to be operational by the mid-1990s. The Uni-
ted States C-4 missile has a range of 4,000 nau-
tical miles and is fitted with eight 100 kt war-
heads. The D-5 under development will have 
a 6,000 n.m. range and is designed to carry 14 
warheads of 150 kt. The design accuracy of 
the D-5 is intended to be good enough to give it 
a counter-silo capability against Soviet ICBMs. 
2.39. In his announcement in the House of 
Commons on 11th March 1982, the United 
Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. 
Nott, said, however: 
" The number of warheads that the Tri-
dent 11-D-5 missile will carry, and there-
1. SALT and the British and French nuclear for-
ces, Document 859, 17th November 1980. 
fore Trident's striking power, remains 
wholly a matter of choice for the British 
Government. Our intention is that the 
move to D-5 will not involve any signi-
ficant change in the planned total num-
ber of warheads that we originally envi-
saged for our Trident I-C-4 force." 
2.40. The United Kingdom does not appear to 
have been specific about the number of war-
heads the force will carry. Although the mis-
sile, and presumably the delivery part of the 
MIRV ed warhead system, are to be procured 
from the United States, the actual nuclear war-
heads themselves under the terms of the United 
States-United Kingdom agreement (and indeed 
under the terms of the non-proliferation treaty) 
are to be manufactured and assembled in the 
United Kingdom, so that they will not necessa-
rily have the same yield as United States war-
heads for this missile, although a counter-silo 
capability will remain as the accuracy will be 
determined by the missile. Assuming that the 
intention was to fit eight warheads on the C-4 
missile, this would increase the total striking 
power of the British force from the present 64 
with the Polaris A-3 missile, to a maximum of 
512, although with decoys it can be assumed 
that not all re-entry vehicles would be war-
heads. However, Mr. Nott went on to say in 
response to a question: 
" We intend to have approximately the 
same number [of warheads] as Trident I. 
So in terms of quantity it is not, in 
our present planning, an escalation. The 
number of warheads on the missile need 
not necessarily be more than we now 
have on Polaris. That is a matter of 
choice for the British Government of the 
time." 
2.41. From an arms control standpoint, the 
picture must be regarded somewhat differently. 
Under the terms of the bilateral SALT 
agreements between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, relying on external means of 
verification, the number of independent war-
heads in a MIRV ed missile is to be assumed 
equal to the greatest number with which that 
particular missile has been tested. Under these 
rules the British Trident force would have to be 
assumed to carry a total of 896 warheads. The 
SALT 11 agreements do not of course ap~ly to 
the British force, but they have set an mter-
national precedent for counting rules with 
external means of verification. Any future 
arms control agreement that might apply to the 
British force would presumably require more 
intrusive means of verification if it was to be 
counted as having fewer than 896 warheads. 
2.42. The cost of the Trident force of four 
submarines with D-5 missiles was estimated by 
Mr. Nott to be £6 billion at 1980 prices and 
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exchange rates, or £7.5 billion at 1981 prices 
and exchange rates, which was just over 3 % of 
the total defence budget. 
2.43. On 29th October, Sir Philip Goodhart, 
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
the Army until his ministerial post was 
abolished earlier this year, published a memor-
andum he had sent, prior to his departure from 
office, to the British Secretary of State for 
Defence Mr. Nott. In it he recommended that 
the Trident programme be postponed for four 
years, and United States cruise missiles replaced 
in existing submarines instead of on land. The 
memorandum said: 
" It would be quixotic to believe 
that any alternative left-wing government 
would divert Trident money to bring fri-
gates into service... A move to roll back 
the Trident costings could therefore 
reduce the existing vulnerability of 
the Royal Navy." 
2.44. At relatively little cost, the United King-
dom could retain its present tactical nuclear 
weapons which include those for strike aircraft 
in Europe, as well as United States supplied 
tactical weapons for British army units, and 
thus retain a finger on the nuclear trigger at the 
very point where the use of nuclear weapons 
might have to be initiated. The present uncer-
tainties facing the Soviet Union- the chief jus-
tification for the British and French nuclear for-
ces - would remain. In the view of the 
committee, finance for the Trident programme 
would be better devoted to maintaining the pre-
sent level of the Royal Navy's surface fleet. 
2.45. Further to the plans for the future of the 
French nuclear forces on which the committee 
has reported•, the present government has 
confirmed that the sixth, improved, ballistic 
missile submarine with M-4 missiles will enter 
service in 1985, and announced: a seventh sub-
marine of a new generation to enter service in 
1994; a programme for a mobile ICBM, and a 
new tactical missile Hades with a range over 
250 km to replace Pluton. Development of a 
nuclear medium-range air-to-ground missile 
and an enhanced radiation weapon continues. 
(g) Battlefield IUICiear weapou 
2.46. The preceeding sections have not exam-
ined the relatively short-range battlefield 
nuclear weapons comprising tube artillery and 
surface-to-surface missiles with ranges up to 
about 100 or 150 km. Less information has 
been available in the past about the numbers of 
such weapons systems deployed by the Warsaw 
Pact, or indeed which of its artillery pieces were 
l. Document 859, 17th November 1980. 
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to be assumed to have nuclear ammunition 
available. ~ll such artillery is, of course, dual 
capable, havmg a normal conventional role as 
well. The NATO publication of 4th May 
1982 on force comparisons shows an overall 
NATO superiority of short-range nuclear forces 
in Europe with 950 for the Warsaw Pact com-
pared with 1,100 for NATO, to which should 
be added 42 French Pluton missiles. These 
overall totals, however, are built on large asym-
metries with NATO superiority in nuclear-
capable tube artillery of 1,000 compared with 
300 for the Warsaw Pact, and Warsaw Pact 
superiority in surface-to-surface missiles of this 
range of 650 compared with 100 for NATO 
(plus 42 Pluton). The artillery pieces, of 
course, are capable of firing more than one 
nuclear round, although it is unlikely that all of 
them would ever be assigned to the nuclear role 
simultaneously so that a better measure of 
balance of nuclear-capable artillery would be 
the number of nuclear rounds available to each 
side - information which, if known, is not 
published. The Warsaw Pact superiority in 
missiles of this category, with greater range than 
artillery, gives the Warsaw Pact the advantage 
of superior target cover. 
2.47. A NATO study of future force require-
ments for nuclear weapons in this category is 
expected to be completed in the NATO High 
Level Group once it has finished its studies of 
the INF forces. The NATO force comparisons 
referred to above consider the new Soviet mis-
siles SS-22 and SS-23 with ranges up to 1 ,000 
and 350 km respectively in the category of 
shorter-range intermediate nuclear forces, com-
parable with the NATO Pershing I. They are 
linked to the INF problem to the extent that 
they could be used to circumvent an INF agree-
ment if deployed in forward positions. 
(A) GloiHU IHIIluree 
2.48. A rough statement can be attempted of 
the global East-West balance in nuclear forces 
in terms of nuclear warheads, ignoring the large 
asymmetries in terms of different characteris-
tics of different weapons systems. In the 
strategic field as has been seen the balance at 
present favours the United States in a ratio of 
about 9,000 warheads to 7,000; in the Eur-
opean field, on the basis of the moderate IISS 
assessment of warheads available, the balance 
favours the Warsaw Pact by 2,000 warheads to 
about 1,170 for NATO. On this basis a global 
balance can be represented by 10 170 for 
NATO compared with 9,000 for the' Warsaw 
Pact. They take no account of the Chinese 
nuclear force which is certainly taken into 
account by the Soviet Union. 
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2.49. An authoritative statement has recently 
been made concerning total numbers of war-
heads believed in the stockpiles of each 
side. Ambassador Gerard Smith, former 
Director of the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and chief SALT I nego-
tiator, and President Carter's special represen-
tative for non-proliferation, in evidence to the 
United States Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on 13th November 1981 said: 
"The United States already has an esti-
mated inventory of some 24,000 nuclear 
weapons, of which nearly 10,000 are for 
intercontinental delivery systems and 
many more are stationed in Europe or 
the Far East within striking distance of 
the Soviet Union. By contrast the 
Soviets are believed to have in the order 
of 16,000 nuclear weapons, some half of 
which are deployed on systems of inter-
continental range. "t 
2.50. It has been a well-known part of NATO 
strategy for more than twenty years to initiate 
the use of nuclear weapons should that ever be 
necessary to arrest a Soviet conventional attack 
that had not been stopped by NATO conven-
tional forces. The NATO Nuclear Planning 
Group has at various times considered the 
options concerning the use of nuclear weapons 
in different circumstances, and there is nothing 
new in recent remarks2• The widespread 
publicity they have received is a symptom of 
present public anxiety about the whole subject 
of nuclear weapons. 
Ill. Negotitltions 
(•) l•termeditlte-nmge 1111Cieu forces (INF) 
(z) United States position 
3.1. The dual decision, taken on 12th Decem-
ber J 919 by the special meeting of NATO 
Foretgn and Defence Ministers, provided for 
negotiations on what were then called " long-
range theatre nuclear forces " in the following 
terms: 
" Ministers fully support the decision 
taken by the United States following 
l. Hearings before United States Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 13th November 1981, page 17. 
2. By President Reagan on 16th October and lOth 
N?vember, by Mr. Haig on 4th November 1981 (see The 
Ttmes, 5th November 1981; International Herald Tribune 
11th November 1981). ' 
consultations within the Alliance to 
negotiate arms limitations on LR TNF 
and to propose to the USSR to begin 
negotiations as soon as possible along the 
following lines which have been elabor-
ated in intensive consultations within the 
Alliance: 
A. Any future limitations on United 
States systems principally designed for 
theatre missions should be accompanied 
by appropriate limitations on Soviet 
theatre systems. 
B. Limitations on United States and 
Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems 
should be negotiated bilaterally in the 
SALT Ill framework in a step-by-step 
approach. 
C. The immediate objective of these 
negotiations should be the establishment 
of agreed limitations on United States 
and Soviet land-based long-range theatre 
nuclear missile systems. 
D. Any agreed limitations on these sys-
tems must be consistent with the prin-
ciple of equality between the sides. 
Therefore, the limitations should take the 
form of de jure equality both in ceilings 
and in rights. 
E. Any agreed limitations must be ade-
quately verifiable. " 
3.2. The bilateral talks between the United 
States and the Soviet Union formally opened in 
Geneva a year later at the end of the Carter 
administration without real business being trans-
acted. They were adjourned, in fact, for a 
year until 30th November 1981 while the 
Reagan administration was considering its 
negotiating position, the NATO Special 
Consultative Group on negotiations meanwhile 
co-ordinating positions within the Alliance. 
On 21st October 1981, the NATO Nuclear 
Planning Group meeting at Gleneagles in 
Scotland announced what has become known as 
NA TO's zero option position on negotiations: 
" With regard to arms control, Ministers 
welcomed the recent announcement by 
the United States Secretary of State and 
the Soviet Foreign Minister on the open-
ing of the theatre nuclear force arms 
control negotiations in Geneva on 
30th November... They noted the sub-
stantial progress made by the United Sta-
tes in preparation of these negotiations 
and fully endorsed the close consultations 
that are taking place in NATO including 
NA TO's Special Consultative Group ... 
Ministers fully supported the United 
States commitment to achieve equitable 
and verifiable agreements, within the 
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SALT framework, on the theatre nuclear 
forces at the lowest attainable levels. On 
the basis of reciprocity the zero-level 
remains a possible option under ideal cir-
cumstances ... " 
·3.3. The United States approach to these talks 
was then set out in a little more detail in Presi-
dent Reagan's speech to the National Press 
Club on 18th November 1981 when he revealed 
that he had sent a message to the Soviet lea-
dership proposing " the mutual reduction of 
conventional, intermediate-range nuclear, and 
strategic forces". The first point on the 
agenda concerning the long-range theatre 
nuclear force negotiations - now renamed by 
President Reagan intermediate-range nuclear 
forces - contained the following proposal: 
"The United States is prepared to cancel 
its deployment of Pershing 11 and ground-
launched cruise missiles if the Soviets 
will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and 
SS-5 missiles." 
President Reagan made it clear that Soviet mis-
siles in the swing position east of the U rals, 
where they were within range of Europe as well 
as the Middle-East, would also have to be 
included in the negotiations: 
" Soviet spokesmen have suggested that 
moving their SS-20s beyond the Ural 
mountains will remove the threat to 
Europe... The SS-20s, even if deployed 
behind the U rals, will have a range that 
places almost all of Western Europe ... all 
within range of these missiles which inci-
dentally are mobile and can be moved on 
short notice. " 
3.4. In evidence to a Congress committee, 
however, Mr. Eugene Rostow, Director of the 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, made clear that the scope of the nego-
tiations includes all SS-20s including those 
deployed in the Far East which are not in range 
of Europe: 
" We are not negotiating - I want you to 
notice right away - about the weapons 
facing Europe. They are often called 
Euromissiles. We are talking and we are 
going to negotiate about intermediate-
range missiles and we are going to nego-
tiate about them on a global basis, 
because it is not a contribution to world 
security if these things are moved out of 
range of European targets so that they are 
aimed at Japanese targets ... The Japanese 
are immensely conscious of that fact. "1 
1. Briefing of the United States House Sub-Committee on 
International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs, 20th November 1981, page 4. 
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3.5. European attention has not been drawn 
to the increased threat to Japan represented by 
the SS-20. The two Soviet missile areas in 
Asia, where the intermediate-range missiles are 
out of range of Europe, are in the general area 
of Tomsk in Central Asia and Chita near the 
Chinese frontier. The SS-5 missile, with its 
4,000 kin range in the first of these locations, 
could threaten China but was out of range of 
Japan. SS-20 missiles, with a 5,000 km range, 
can cover the whole of Japan from that area. 
From the area of Chita, Japan has been within 
range of the 4,000 km SS-5 since it was first 
deployed there. The SS-20 is an additional 
threat. The SS-4 · missile, with a 1 ,900 km 
range is a threat only to China. NATO has 
confirmed that the zero option proposal invol-
ves Soviet missiles world-wide: 
" [Ministers] reiterated their full support 
for the United States negotiating posi-
tion ... to cancel the deployment of Persh-
ing 11 and ground-launched cruise mis-
siles if the Soviet Union eliminated its 
SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles world-
wide."• 
3.6. In his evidence to the Congress commit-
tee, Mr. Rostow made other significant points 
about the negotiations dealing both with data 
on numbers of missiles and verification: 
" There is going to be a war of num-
bers... As you know the Soviets have 
never taken the responsibility for figures 
in public before or in the negotiations. 
Last August we notified them that in 
these upcoming negotiations we were 
going to need verification beyond natio-
nal technical means, and we were not 
going to negotiate on the basis of figures 
we had supplied... We have now had a 
reply from them on the first point, but 
not yet the second. In Mr. Brezhnev's 
interview with Der Spiegel... and then 
later in diplomatic and official communi-
cations, the Soviets have responded to 
our question of last August and have said 
that while they regard national technical 
means as the primary method of verifi-
cation in these treaties, that under 
circumstances of trust, co-operative 
means to supplement national technical 
means might be possible... We publish 
our figures. So far they have not 
published theirs, but we expect their 
figures to be published in the very near 
future, or an attempt at it. " 
3.7. The Soviet publication "Whence the 
threat to peace " appeared shortly afterwards, 
and it is known that in the Geneva talks the 
1. Communique of NATO Nuclear Planning Group 
ministerial meeting, Colorado Springs, 24th March 1982. 
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Soviet Union has been putting forward its 
version of the balance. 
3.8. The scope of limitations to be included 
in the treaty, in the United States view, appears 
to go beyond that attempted in SALT: 
" We will want to know about produc-
tion of missiles and warheads. We can-
not confine ourselves just to what is 
deployed... If we are going to change the 
method of counting here from deployed 
launchers which you can photograph to 
warheads or even the megatonnage of 
warheads which you cannot photograph, 
then you are going to have to supplement 
the national technical means... The new 
and creative ideas will be means of co-
operation that go beyond the national 
technical means. Maybe on-site inspec-
tions; maybe television cameras. There 
may be challenge inspections ... " 
3.9. NATO has stressed that the INF negotia-
tions must be held in the framework of SALT, 
now START. Mr. Rostow, addressing this 
point, said: 
" We are having the negotiations in the 
same city so that the negotiating teams 
can talk to each other and co-ordinate. 
We will have one backstop committee in 
Washington servicing... both delega-
tions... It may be ... that at a given point 
we could combine them. After all, they 
are separate only for reasons of historical 
accident. " 
(iz) Soviet position 
3.10. The position of the Soviet Union was 
spelt out publicly in Mr. Brezhnev's speech at 
the Trades Union Congress in Moscow on 16th 
March 1982 where he again proposed a freeze 
on missiles (at a time when the Soviet Union 
had completed deployment of its 300 SS-20s): 
"The Soviet leadership has taken a deci-
sion to introduce, unilaterally, a morato-
rium on the deployment of medium-
range nuclear armaments in the Euro-
pean part of the USSR. We are freezing, 
in both the quantitative and qualitative 
respects, the armaments of this kind 
already stationed here, and are suspend-
ing the replacement of old missiles, 
known as the SS-4s and SS-Ss, by newer 
SS-20 missiles. 
This moratorium will be in force either 
until an agreement is reached with the 
United States to reduce, on the basis of 
parity and equal security, the medium-
range nuclear weapons intended for use 
in Europe, or until the time, if and when, 
the United States leaders, disregarding the 
security of the nations, actually go over 
to practical preparations to deploy Persh-
ing 11 missiles and cruise missiles in 
Europe. 
Furthermore, we stated earlier that if the 
two sides reached agreement on a mora-
torium, we should be prepared, as a sign 
of goodwill, to carry out a unilateral 
reduction of the number of our nuclear 
weapons in Europe as part of the future 
reduction agreed upon. Now we have 
decided to take a new step demonstrating 
our resolve for peace and our faith in the 
possibility of a mutually-acceptable 
agreement. The Soviet Union intends, 
already this year, unless there is a new 
worsening of the international situation, 
to reduce by a certain number its 
medium-range missiles on its own 
initiative. 
At the same time we regard it as our duty 
to make the following perfectly clear: If 
the governments of the United States 
and its NATO allies, in defiance of the 
will of the nations for peace, were 
actually to carry out their plan to deploy 
in Europe hundreds of new American 
missiles capable of hitting targets on the 
territory of the Soviet Union, a different 
strategic situation would arise in the 
world. There would arise a real additio-
nal threat to our country and its allies 
from the United States. This would 
compel us to take retaliatory steps that 
would put the other side, including the 
United States itself, its own territory, in 
an analogous position. This should not 
be forgotten. " 
3.11. President Brezhnev responded to certain 
western criticisms of the Soviet position in a 
speech to the 19th Communist Youth 
(Komsomol) Congress on 18th May. Referring 
to the disputed missiles beyond the U rals he 
said that no extra intermediate-range missiles 
would be deployed within range of Western 
Europe, and implied that limitation and reduc-
tion of these missiles in the east could be nego-
tiated only separately with China - the United 
States has called for them to be included in the 
bilateral INF talks in Geneva (paragraph 3.4 
above). He also made it clear that the uni-
lateral Soviet freeze covered preparations for 
deployment: 
"To facilitate the matter, the Soviet 
Union has recently unilaterally suspen-
ded deployment of intermediate-range 
missiles in the European part of the 
Soviet Union and decided to reduce their 
number somewhat. I can say now that 
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we are in the process of reducing a consi-
derable number of these missiles. 
These peaceful concrete acts by our 
country have been welcomed throughout 
the world. However, some in the West 
try to throw doubt on their scope. 
For example it is said that the decision of 
the Soviet Union will not prevent us 
from continuing to install missiles so that 
they can " reach ", even from beyond the 
U rals, West European countries. I can 
declare formally that no intermediate-
range missile will be additionally 
deployed where the Federal Republic of 
Germany or other Western European 
countries would find themselves within 
the limits of their range. 
It is also asked if our decision concerning 
a unilateral moratorium includes also a 
suspension of preparations for deploy-
ment of missiles. Yes it provides also 
for stopping work on preparing launching 
sites for these missiles. 
One more comment. The Government 
of the United States insists that the Soviet 
Union should freeze also, if not liquidate 
purely and simply, missiles deployed in 
the eastern part of our country. This 
really is an absurd demand! Questions 
concerning these missiles can be settled -
their limitation and their reduction. But 
only by negotiating with those who have 
the nuclear means which our missiles 
offset. And, of course, once again on the 
basis of reciprocity. We do not object to 
this sort of talks. But it is indisputably a 
separate question. " 
(iii) Prospects for INF 
3.12. The first round of talks from 30th 
November 1981 to their adjournment on 16th 
March 1982 are said to have been businesslike, 
but the positions of the two sides remain far 
apart. From the Soviet standpoint, claiming 
erroneously that there is a rough balance of 
theatre nuclear forces in Europe, the NATO 
zero offer appears to be a demand for the dis-
mantling of all Soviet missiles in exchange for 
agreement not to deploy missiles which NATO 
does not at the present time possess. From the 
NATO standpoint, there is an imbalance in 
theatre nuclear forces, although realistic esti-
mates show that it is not as great as some Ame-
rican claims of 4: I or 6:1 inferiority had made 
out. Certainly NATO is concerned at the type 
of threat posed by the SS-20 which is different 
in kind from that posed by nuclear-capable 
aircraft. 
3.13. When the INF talks resume in Geneva 
later in May, the next session is expected to be 
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devoted to detailed arguments about numbers 
and types of weapons systems on both sides. 
The Soviet Union for the first time is beginning 
to be slightly more forthcoming about the levels 
of its own forces, as Mr. Rostow acknowledged 
and as this report points out in the previous 
chapter. There is, however, a long way to go. 
Concrete offers on actual reductions which 
might be acceptable to NATO are not to be 
expected until later sessions as the deadline at 
the end of 1983 approaches for the deployment 
of the cruise and Pershing 11 missiles. 
(b) START 
(z) United States position 
3.14. The approach of the Reagan administra-
tion to strategic arms talks with the Soviet 
Union is different from that of previous admi-
nistrations. Mr. Rostow, in his evidence1, 
remarked that SALT 11 was an admirable solu-
tion to the problems of the late 1960s: 
" SALT 11 and SALT I... were based on 
the notion that there would be a regula-
tion of deployed launchers; deployed 
launchers could be measured readily by 
satellite photography, and you did not get 
into complicated and disagreeable pro-
blems of trying to verify the number of 
the weapons. We knew perfectly well that 
deployed launchers were not an accurate 
measure of the destructive power of these 
weapons. Some weapons were retalia-
tory, others had other characteristics. 
Some were accurate, some were inac-
curate, some were big, some were small. " 
3.15. He outlined the alternative approach: 
" What I am trying to do is to devise a 
new method of counting as a substitute 
for deployed launchers... Should it be 
warheads? Should it be throw-weight? 
Should it be megatonnage? Do we 
want the treaty to last indefinitely like ' 
the ABM Treaty, or do we want a treaty 
for five years or ten years?... Do we 
have specific sub-limits in the treaty? 
How do we deal with bombers when we 
get away from the deployed launcher 
counting method? "2 
More succinctly: 
"Warheads, throw-weight, megatonnage, 
will it be an overall limit on the destruc-
tive power which you can use in any way 
you see fit or will there be special sub-
limits for ICBMs and SLBMs and so on? 
1. Briefing op. cit., pages 15, 16. 
2. Idem, page 17. 
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Chairman Zabloski: and ALCMs? Mr. 
Rostow - absolutely yes. " 1 
3.16. President Reagan, in his 18th November 
1981 speech, defined his aims for START: 
" We will seek to negotiate substantial 
reductions in nuclear arms which would 
result in levels that are equal and verifi-
able. Our approach to verification will 
be to emphasise openness and creativity -
rather than the secrecy and suspicion 
which have undermined confidence in 
arms control in the past. While we can 
hope to benefit from work done over the 
past decade in strategic arms negotiations, 
let us agree to do more than simply begin 
where these efforts previously left off. 
We can and should attempt major quali-
tative and quantitative progress... Let us 
see how far we can go in achieving truly 
substantial reductions in our strategic 
arsenals. To symbolise this fundamental 
change in direction, we will call these 
negotiations START - Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks." 
3.17. The United States will in fact retain parts 
of the unratified SALT 11 agreement, and claim 
that its strategic arms modernisation pro-
gramme at the present time does not exceed the 
SALT limits. Mr. Weinberger has said: 
" In selecting our modernisation pro-
gramme, the primary consideration was 
to ensure that it met our national security 
needs. We did not plan this programme 
so that it would avoid conflicts within 
our expired SALT I or the SALT 11 
agreements negotiated by our predeces-
sors, nevertheless, it is a fact that this 
programme will have no near-term 
conflicts with either of those documents. 
Accordingly it is consistent with our 
stated policy that, while our SALT 
review is underway, we will take no 
actions which will undercut existing 
agreements so long as the Soviet Union 
does likewise. "2 
The Rapporteur understands that this self-
denying ordinance will be stretched to include 
at least the opening phase of the START nego-
tiations. However, Mr. Weinberger continued: 
" Some concern has been expressed with 
regard to the arms control implications of 
the decision to deploy nuclear armed 
SLCMs on our attack submarines. I 
would first note that this deployment will 
occur well after the SALT 11 protocol 
would have expired, had that treaty come 
1. Idem, page 22. 
2. Hearings before the United States Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, 3rd November 1981, page 5. 
into force. Hence, the deployment 
would have been consistent with the 
terms of that treaty. "t 
Asked whether that implied that there was no 
intention to extend that protocol, Mr. Weinber-
ger confirmed: 
" I have not seen any such intention... I 
think on the cruise missile the impor-
tance is that this is the one strategic 
weapon we can get in place quickly. "2 
3.18. President Reagan finally outlined his pro-
posals for START in his speech at Eureka on 
9th May, when he also expressed the hope that 
the negotiations would begin by the end of 
June. As expected, the proposals for reduc-
tions and ceilings focused on numbers of 
warheads, rather than numbers of missiles that 
previous agreements concentrated on. Presi-
dent Reagan intended " to reduce significantly 
the most destabilising systems - ballistic 
missiles - the number of warheads they 
carry, and their overall destructive potential ". 
In a first phase, he proposed to reduce ballis-
tic missile warheads to " equal ceilings at least 
a third below current levels ... no more than half 
of those warheads [to] be land based". Phase 
two would aim at " an equal ceiling on other 
elements of our strategic nuclear forces inclu-
ding limits on ballistic missile throw-weight at 
less than current American levels". In a tele-
vised press conference on 13th May, President 
Reagan added that he was also willing to nego-
. tiate reductions in bombers and cruise missiles, 
but had focused on intercontinental ballistic 
missiles because they were more destabilising. 
3.19. Officials had earlier referred to specific 
figures that did not in fact appear in President 
Reagan's speech. It was said that a common 
ceiling of 850 ballistic missile (SLBMs and 
ICBMs) would be proposed with a total of not 
more than 5,000 warheads, of which only 500 
warheads could be ICBMs. It was suggested 
that this would involve a reduction of 1 ,500 
Soviet missiles and 1 ,300 warheads compared 
with the reduction of 850 United States missiles 
and 2,200 warheads, the reductions to be 
carried out over ten years. It was also sugges-
ted that the decision to defer restrictions on 
missile throw-weight to a phase two represented 
a victory for the views of the Secretary of State, 
Mr. Haig, supported by the Chiefs of Staff, 
against Mr. Weinberger, the Secretary of 
Defence. 
(iz) Soviet position 
3.20. The public Soviet reaction to President 
Reagan 's speech of 9th May came in President 
1. Idem, page 13. 
2. Idem, page 25. 
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Brezhnev's address to the 19th Communist 
Youth Congress on 18th May when he wel-
comed the decision to resume talks to limit and 
reduce strategic weapons, but complained that 
the United States proposals would affect the 
Soviet Union unilaterally while leaving Wash-
ington free rein to increase its strategic wea-
pons. President Brezhnev put forward three 
very general principles for negotiations, includ-
ing the preservation of positive achievements so 
far (i.e. SALT 11), and proposed a bilateral stra-
tegic freeze: 
" In the same speech the President 
[Reagan] said that the United States at 
the talks would be in favour of substan-
tial reductions. Well, we have always 
been in favour of substantial reductions 
of strategic arms. There is no need to 
persuade us in this respect. 
But if one looks at the essence of the 
ideas voiced by the United States Presi-
dent on such reductions, one reveals 
unfortunately that the American position 
is absolutely unilateral in nature. Above 
all, because the United States would like 
in general to exclude from the talks the 
strategic arms it is now most intensively 
developing. 
It is directly prejudicing the security of 
the USSR and at the same time leaves 
Washington a free hand in the imple-
mentation of American programmes of 
building up strategic arms. 
One can hardly avoid drawing the 
conclusion that the position stated by the 
United States President is oriented not to 
searching for an agreement but to provi-
ding conditions for the continuation of 
Washington's attempts to achieve mili-
tary superiority over the Soviet Union. 
What is needed for the talks to proceed 
successfully and to bring about an agree-
ment? 
To put it briefly, this requires, first, that 
the talks should actually pursue the aim 
of limiting and reducing strategic arma-
ments rather than be a cover for a conti-
nued arms race and the breakdown of the 
existing parity. 
Second, it is necessary that both sides 
should conduct them with due regard for 
each other's legitimate security interests 
and strictly in accordance with the prin-
ciple of equality and equal security. 
Lastly, it is necessary to preserve every-
thing positive that has been achieved 
earlier. The talks do not start from 
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scratch but a good deal of far from use-
less work has been done. 
It is likewise very important to effectively 
block all the channels for the continua-
tion of the strategic arms race in any 
form. This means that the development 
of new types of strategic weapons should 
be either banned or restricted to the 
utmost by agreed upon characteristics. 
We would be prepared to reach agree-
ment that the strategic armaments of the 
USSR and the United States are frozen 
already now, as soon as the talks begin. 
Frozen quantitatively. And that their 
modernisation is limited to the utmost. 
It is also necessary that neither the Uni-
ted States nor the Soviet Union take such 
actions which would lead to an upsetting 
of the stability of the strategic situation. 
Such a freeze, an important thing in 
itself, would also facilitate headway 
towards a radical limitation and reduc-
tion of strategic arms. 
(iil) Prospects for START 
3.21. Following the declaration of martial law 
in Poland in December 1981, the United States 
had deliberately refrained from announcing a 
date for the opening of the START talks - the 
announcement had been expected in normal 
circumstances when Mr. Haig met Mr. Gro-
myko in Geneva on 26th January. In his 
speech on 9th May President Reagan finally 
announced that he hoped they would begin by 
the end of June. It is too early to assess the 
prospects for these talks and the acceptability to 
the Soviet Union of the increased scope 
announced by President Reagan. 
3.22. Certainly the proposed reductions, al-
though to equal ceilings, would involve greater 
reductions for the Soviet Union than the United 
States because they involve categories where the 
Soviet Union is superior. Thus although a 
ceiling of 5,000 BM warheads would probably 
involve a reduction of about I ,800 Soviet war-
heads and 2,150 United States warheads, the 
subceiling of 2,500 warheads on ICBMs would 
involve a reduction of 3,000 Soviet warheads, 
but would permit an increase of 350 in United 
States warheads. Phase two limits on throw-
weight below present United States levels would 
affect five models of Soviet missiles all of which 
exceed the heaviest United States missile - the 
Trident C-4. As United States Senators 
Muskie and Kennedy have already pointed out, 
the proposals would not in themselves prevent 
the United States modernisation programme 
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going forward - the B-1 and stealth bombers 
and sea-launched ·cruise missiles would be 
unaffected1, although the introduction of MX 
and Trident would require offsetting reduction 
in existing weapons. 
3.23. Some aspects of the strategic weapons 
modernisation programme may have a negative 
effect on arms control as the arms control 
impact statements have implied: 
" The Trident 11 missile and warhead 
programmes may have some effects 
which could be adverse from an arms 
control perspective. The additive effects 
of two potential advances (Trident 11 and 
MX) in United States counter-silo capa-
bilities by the early 1990s could put a 
large portion of Soviet fixed ICBMs at 
risk. This could have significant desta-
bilising effects, and thus a potential 
negative arms control impact. " 2 
3.24. Certainly, however, President Reagan's 
proposals are intended to produce a more stable 
strategic balance at significantly lower levels 
and are a welcome first step. 
(c) Condusions on nucleu wetqJOns negotiations 
3.25. The Reagan administration is facing the 
Soviet Union with much tougher demands for 
nuclear arms control than have previous admi-
nistrations. But the Soviet Union is already on 
record as rejecting President Carter's proposals 
for " deep cuts " in 1977, which came as a sur-
prise departure from the outline agreement 
reached with the previous administration at 
Vladivostock in 1974. The Soviet Union 
now has confusing experience in dealing with 
successive United States administrations which 
have changed every four years and sometimes 
more frequently. There are now three out-
standing arms control treaties that have been 
signed by the United States- the threshold test 
ban treaty signed by President Nixon in 1974; 
the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty signed by 
President Ford in 1976; and the SALT 11 treaty 
signed by President Carter in 1979 - that have 
been ratified by the Soviet Union but not yet by 
the United States despite the urging of its 
allies The trilateral negotiations on a compre-
hensive test ban, which had nearly reached 
agreement in 1980, have been suspended. The 
l. But President Reagan subsequently expressed readiness 
to negotiate reductions in bombers and cruise missiles - see 
paragraph 3.18 in fine above. 
2. Fiscal year 1982 arms control impact state-
ments submitted to Congress by the President. Digest pre-
pared by Congressional Research Service, page VIII. 
3. A list of certain relevant treaties and agreements 1s at 
Appendix V. 
shifts in United States policy have not always 
been the responsibility of the administration in 
office; changing attitudes in the Senate have 
been an important factor, but a confusing one 
from the Soviet Union's point of view. 
3.26. Now the West may be faced in the near 
future with a new Soviet leadership which, for a 
period of years, while consolidating its position 
at home, may feel unable to make significant 
concessions in the arms control field. 
3.27. The Reagan administration has taken one 
year to prepare its position on INF and one and 
a half years on START. With only three or 
three and a half effective years in any adminis-
tration, that leaves only one and a half to two 
years for serious negotiations with the Soviet 
Union. However, with its much tougher line 
on defence, the present administration is in a 
better position to secure ratification from the 
Senate of any arms control agreements that it 
concludes with the Soviet Union. 
3.28. Attention has also been drawn recently to 
the alternative routes for arms control agree-
ments in the United States if there is a risk of 
blockage through the two-thirds majority requi-
rement for ratification in the Senate. Ambas-
sador Gerard Smith, a former arms control 
negotiator for several previous Democrat and 
Republican administrations, in evidence said: 
" But I think this question of whether the 
United States is able to act through the 
treaty route is of central importance. I 
would urge you ... to consider the alterna-
tive route which the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Act provides for arms 
control agreements to be approved by a 
majority of both houses of the Congress. 
You will recall that that was the route 
chosen in 1972 for SALT 1... That was 
not submitted as a treaty ... " 1• 
IV. Public opinion 
and nuclear weapons 
4.1. There are today many diverse movements 
in western (and even in some eastern) coun-
tries opposing nuclear weapons, some calling 
for unilateral nuclear disarmament, some for a 
bilateral East-West freeze or reductions. These 
movements have found support among many 
different bodies including some churches, paci-
fists, ecologists, some representatives of profes-
sional bodies such as scientists and doctors, and 
some political parties. Since it is impossible to 
arrive at a definition of what constitutes a peace 
movement which is generally applicable to all 
I. Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 13th November 1981, page 23. 
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countries and commonly accepted, in this chap-
ter the term peace movement is used for any 
organisation that advocates some form of 
nuclear disarmament - be it unilateral, bilateral 
or multilateral - in its programme. This chap-
ter does not attempt to analyse the specific 
policy of each movement· in detail, but to pro-
vide a general summary of the state of public 
opinion concerning nuclear weapons, and the 
activities of the various movements. An 
attempt is made to describe the relationship 
between the movements and the principal poli-
tical parties in the WEU countries on the basis 
of press reports and replies to a questionnaire1 
sent to the parties by the Rapporteur. In their 
replies they were asked to identify the peace 
movements in their respective countries which 
they considered relevant. 
(a) Western Europe 
(z) Belgium 
4.2. A number of opinion polls in Belgium 
have shown growing opposition to the NATO 
decision of December 1979 which would 
involve the stationing of 48 cruise missiles on 
Belgian territory2• While the NATO decision 
was endorsed by the Belgian Government, the 
deployment of 48 cruise missiles on Belgian 
territory has been accepted in principle only, 
and with particular reservations. A poll 
undertaken by the Polling Institute of Brussels 
University, published at the beginning of Octo-
ber 1981, claimed that opposition to the deve-
lopment of cruise missiles in Belgium had risen 
from 41.7% in 1980 to 50.2% in 1981. A 
poll commissioned by two Flemish newspapers, 
published on 27th October, reported 41.8% of 
Belgians as viewing deployment of cruise mis-
siles in Belgium as " very unfavourable ", and 
24.1 % as " rather unfavourable". "Rather 
favourable " and " very favourable " views were 
reported for 13.3% and 5.2% ofthe population 
respectively. The poll had covered 1,621 
voters between 14th and 18th October. 
4.3. On Sunday 25th October 1981, a 
demonstration in Brussels organised by the 
Comite national pour la paix et le deve/oppe-
ment (CNAPD) brought about 200,000 persons 
onto the streets with reports of some thousands 
remaining behind in stations in Ghent and Ant-
werp because there were an insufficient number 
of trains3• Placards carried slogans such as 
"we want to live" and "give peace a chance". 
1. The questionnaire, a list of parties to which it has been 
sent and a list of those which have replied can be found at 
Appendix VI. 
2. International Herald Tribune, 3rd October 1981; Eco-
nomist, 31st October 1981. 
3. Le Monde, 27th October 1981. 
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4.4. The theme of the demonstration orga-
nised by the CNAPD was " Refuse nuclear 
missiles in Europe- one step towards disarma-
ment ". The organisers had made clear their 
opposition to Soviet SS-20 missiles as well as to 
cruise missiles. A delegation was received by 
Mr. Charles Ferdinand Nothomb, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, who expressed his personal 
gratification that the demonstration had not 
been organised against NATO. 
4.5. The CNAPD comprises some thirty 
youth organisations and movements, with the 
Young Socialist Movement being a founder 
member. The Socialist Party (PS) itself has 
been regularly associated with the principal 
demonstrations in aid of peace and disarma-
ment organised by the CNAPD, and this was 
also the case on 25th October. The PS called 
on its members to participate in the demonstra-
tion and has also furnished organisational assis-
tance for the October demonstration. The 
position of the Belgian socialists concerning the 
Geneva talks on INF systems can be found in a 
motion adopted by the General Council on 8th 
December 1979 calling for balanced limitation 
and reduction of INF systems on both sides at 
the lowest possible leveJI. The Social Chris-
tian Party (PSC) also officially took part in the 
peace demonstration of 25th October. Yet the 
PSC is not a member of the CNAPD nor does 
it provide any material assistance to peace 
movements. Many party members are mem-
bers of certain peace movements, either on an 
individual basis in groups such as the MCP 
(Christian Peace Movement), or on an organi-
sed basis through the youth organisation 
(Young Social Christians), which is a member 
of the CNAPD. The PSC supports any peace 
movement that is in favour of balanced and 
controlled disarmament; the party is strongly 
opposed to any form of unilateral disarma-
ment2. 
4.6. The Belgian Liberal Reform Party (PRL) 
on the other hand is firmly opposed to any 
association with the peace movements; it consi-
ders pacifism to be " naive " and neutralism 
" unacceptable ". It calls for the strict adhe-
rence by Belgium to its international obliga-
tions, especially towards NATO. The PRL-
seeks confirmation that Belgium would accept 
the NATO modernisation programme3. 
(iz) France 
4. 7. France has not participated in the NATO 
decision on the deployment of cruise missiles, 
but the present government has given public 
support to the need to counter the SS-20. 
l. PS reply, 26th January 1982. 
2. PSC reply, 12th February 1982. 
3. PRL reply, 27th January 1982. 
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France has a significant national nuclear 
weapons programme. 
4.8. A demonstration was organised in Paris 
on Sunday 25th October by the Mouvement de 
la Paix, the French Communist Party and the 
Communist Trades Union Federation, the 
CGT1• It was also supported by the Jeunesse 
ouvriere chretienne, by the Mouvement des 
Jeunes radicaux de gauche, by various ecologist 
movements and Green Peace. Five other 
peace organisations and the French Parti Socia-
liste Unifie held a press conference on 20th 
October 1981 to explain that they would not 
participate in the 25th October demonstration 
because it was considered pro-Soviet and did 
not take account of the Soviet SS-20 missiles2. 
4.9. The demonstration itself, variously esti-
mated at 100,000 by the organisers and over 
50,000 in other press reports, was held at the 
Porte de Pantin. The Mouvement de la Paix 
adopted a Paris appeal calling for a reduction 
in the number and power of nuclear weapons, 
the opening and success of negotiations on all 
medium-range nuclear missiles of concern to 
Europe, in the first place American and Soviet 
weapons, the universal prohibition of the neu-
tron b<:>mb and for a part of world military 
expenditure to be devoted to the fJght against 
hunger and underdevelopment. Some placards 
read "neither Pershing nor the SS-20 ". Mr. 
Jospin, First Secretary of the French Socialist 
Party, criticised the demonstration for unfairly 
concentrating on American weapons: " The 
SS-20 is an immediate direct threat to Europe 
which must be removed " he is quoted as 
saying, stressing that a western build-up was an 
essential pre-condition for obtaining any Soviet 
concessions. 
4.10. The Mouvement de la Paix, which com-
prises communists, socialists, gaullists and 
christians of the left, was faced with a dilemma 
after the military intervention in Poland -
whether it was possible to separate the fight for 
peace from the defence of liberty. This debate 
has set back the activities of the movement 
which intended to renew its campaign in the 
spring3· 
4.11. Given that the French political parties 
did not have to take a stand with regard to the 
NATO modernisation programme, it is not sur-
prising that the controversy over the deploy-
ment of INF systems in Western Europe did not 
enter into the French domestic debate. The 
Union for French Democracy (UDF) expressed 
itself against the peace movements which ins-
pired by illusionary pacifism, negate the 'exte-
l. Le Monde, 27th October 1981. 
2. Ibid, 22nd October 1981. 
3. Le Matin, 1st February 1982. 
rior threats and are founded on an impossible 
neutralism. Furthermore, the UDF approves 
of the NATO modernisation programme1• 
The Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) 
points out that peace cannot be based on one-
sided renunciations and neutralism but Qllly on 
a global equilibrium of the great powers as well 
as a regional one. While the RPR sees a 
global balance between the superpowers, it is 
concerned about the military superiority of the 
Soviet Union vis-a-vis Western Europe2• The 
French Socialist Party identifies the "Mouve-
ment de la Paix " originating from the Stock-
holm appeal as the most important of numer-
ous diverse bodies concerned with peace and 
disarmament in France, and which are consi-
dered to have only limited influence. The 
party maintains relations with most of these 
bodies on a mutually independent basis, with-
out thereby supporting or attempting to lead 
them. Membership of the Socialist Party is not 
incompatible with membership of the peace 
movements. The Socialist Party prepares its 
own overall proposals on security and disarma-
ment, discusses them with the various peace 
bodies, but has not so far sought to draw up a 
common programme with them. It could do 
so only if agreement were reached on funda-
mental points: 
- independence of French security policy 
and the credibility of the deterrent; 
- the existence of an unstable strategic 
balance between the two superpowers 
and the need to restore at the lowest 
level the balance in medium-range 
nuclear weapons which the Soviet 
Union has upset. 
(iii) GermanyJ 
4.12. Germany is in a key position concerning 
the NATO decision of December 1979 in that 
the proposal calls for 96 cruise missiles and 1 08 
Pershing 11 missiles to be deployed on German 
territory - a larger total than in any other 
NATO country. Although all parties in the 
German Parliament have time and again accep-
ted the NATO dual decision4, there has been 
vociferous opposition outside parliament. 
4.13. Opposition to the missile deployment has 
been steadily growing, initially through Protes-
tant church groups which organised a demons-
tration of 100,000 persons in Hamburg in June 
I. UDF reply, 26th January 1982. 
2. RPR reply, 4th February 1982. 
3. See Le Monde, 20th. October 1981; The Economist, 
17th October 1981; The Times, 5th November 1981; Inter-
national Herald Tribune, 12th October 1981; Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung, 15th June 1981. 
4. Regierungserk/iirung und Aussprache, 3rd December 
1981. 
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1981, but with growing support from young 
Catholics, in the Pax Christi movement 
as well as parts of the SPD party branches. 
While the opposition CDU continues to 
support the decision, some young speakers at 
that party's congress in Hamburg on 4th 
November 1981, many of whom were not party 
members but invited to participate in the 
debate, spoke against the NATO programme. 
4.14. Public opinion polls have found varying 
attitudes in the population as a whole, depend-
ing on the formulation of the question put. A 
survey in July 1981, asking about NA TO's mis-
sile deployment to counter Soviet systems, 
found 44 % opposed and 29 o/o in favour; where-
as the question linked to NA TO's double track 
decision to combine deployment with negotia-
tions on reductions found 52 o/o in favour and 
21 o/o against. The same question put in Sep-
tember/October 1981 (i.e. on the eve of the 
peace rally in Bonn) resulted in 50 o/o in favour 
and 22 o/o against. On the whole public opi-
nion polls, based on the same questions put 
over a number of years, clearly indicate that the 
German population does not wish to disengage 
from the Atlantic Alliance or become neutral. 
In November 1981, 53 o/o of those questioned 
favoured an Alliance with America (1975: 
49 o/o) while 33 o/o wanted a neutralist policy 
(1975: 36 %)1• 
4.15. The tone of demonstrations in Germany, 
since the advent of the Reagan administration 
in the United States, appears to have taken on 
some anti-American attitudes. There was a 
hostile demonstration of 70,000 during the visit 
of the United States Secretary of State, Mr. 
Haig, to Berlin on 13th September 1981. 
4.16. One of the largest public demonstrations 
seen in Germany since the war was organised in 
Bonn on Saturday 1Oth October 1981 with an 
attendance of 250,000. The rally, under the 
slogan " Against nuclear threat concerted action 
- for disarmament and detente in Europe ", was 
sponsored and organised by the " action for 
peace " and " action for reconciliation/peace " 
service of the Protestant church. 760 different 
groups decided to participate, among them 
about 80 extremist groups (including the Ger-
man Communist Party). Five march columns 
to Bonn were organised by the communist-
inspired committee for peace, disarmament and 
co-operation; the other marching columns were 
organised by the Green movement, the 
socialist youth organisation Die Fa/ken, young 
socialists and the communist-oriented socialist 
German youth2• The main trend of the 
1. All figures in Al/ensbacher Archiv, ljD- Umfragen 
3011, 3060, 3074, 3084, 3098, 3099, 4000, 4103, 
4110. See also The Economist, 27th February 1982. 
2. Written answer by the Federal Government to a 
parliamentary question (9/841), October 1981. 
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demonstration appears to have been " stop 
NATO missiles " with less reference to Soviet 
SS-20 missiles. Speakers from both the SPD 
and FDP parties addressed the meeting but in a 
personal capacity. 
4.17. The Communist Party in Germany, 
which dominates the committee for peace, 
disarmament and co-operation, remains numer-
ically very small so that although it has been 
active in organising peace demonstrations, its 
membership cannot possibly account for the 
number of people who have become involved. 
According to the German Government, there 
is evidence that both the Communist Party 
(DK.P) and the German Union for Peace (DFU) 
receive regular funds from the German Demo-
cratic Republic; yet there is no evidence that 
the peace movements in Germany have been 
directly financed by East Berlin or Moscow1• 
Thus the government is of the opinion that not 
all the participants of the various peace move-
ments and demonstrations adhere to communist 
aims. 
4.18. While about one-quarter of the SPD 
members of the Bundestag have now opposed 
the deployment decision, both the German 
Government and the opposition remain com-
mitted to the dual decision of deployment and 
negotiations. Both CDU and CSU in opposi-
tion are against the peace movements' goal to 
obstruct the NATO decision and are therefore 
not associated with the activities of the peace 
movements2• When Chancellor Schmidt asked 
for a vote of confidence on government policies 
in February, his foreign and security policy was 
· included3. In Bonn on lOth November 1981, 
Chancellor Schmidt is reported as saying4 that 
despite overstatements by individual United 
States politicians; the " basic position of the 
German people and the political class is pro-
American ". The German standpoint was also 
made clear to President Brezhnev during his 
visit to Bonn. Chancellor Schmidt stated that 
the Soviet Union knew that no one could 
" manipulate " Germany o.ut of' the NATO 
Alliance. 
4.19. Although there is a broadly-based 
consensus in Germany with regard to the 
NATO dual decision, the vociferous opposition 
to the missile deployment and other groups 
advancing the cause of disarmament are not 
likely to relinquish their activities in 
1982. Already, a peace manifesto '82 for 
Easter has been called for by 28 theologians, 
1. Written answers by the Federal Government to ques-
tions on 19th November 1981 (9/1057), 20th January 
1982 (9/1287) and 13th November 1981 (9170). 
2. CDU reply, 8th March 1982 and CSU reply, 4th 
February 1982. 
3. International Herald Tribune, 6th-7~ February 1982. 
4. International Herald Tribune, 11th November 1981. 
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scientists, writers and politicians, including 
such personalities as the Protestant minister 
Albertz, the writer Heinrich Boll and the SPD 
politician Eppler1• Not only will this peace 
manifesto be published at Easter but also 
various marches and rallies are being plan-
ned. In early February the first conference for 
action by various anti-nuclear weapon groups 
convened in Bonn to co-ordinate their activities 
for 1982. Although the 600 representatives of 
about 250 groups could not agree on the impact 
of the military intervention in Poland on the 
disarmament debate, it was accepted that major 
demonstrations should take place in connection 
with the SPD Party congress in Munich in 
April and the visit of President Reagan to Bonn 
in June2• At that congress a motion to reject 
the 1979 NATO decision to deploy missiles 
was defeated by about two to one on a show of 
hands, and a proposal endorsed by Chancellor 
Schmidt supporting NATO strategy but post-
poning a ·final decision on missile deployment 
until late 1983 was adopted by about a two-
thirds vote. 
(iv) Italy 
4.20. Until very recently there has been relati-
vely little obvious opposition to the NATO 
decision which calls for 112 cruise missiles to 
be deployed on Italian territory. On 2nd Octo-
ber 1981, the Italian Chamber of Deputies 
rejected a communist proposal to scrap the plan 
by 261 votes to 1923, although the left wing of 
the Socialist Party voted with the communists. 
Work began in November on the site chosen for 
the deployment of 112 missiles on an unused 
·airport at Comiso in south-eastern Sicily, work 
for which it is reported the United States is 
paying$ 3 million4• 
4.21. Although there have been demonstrations 
and marches organised by the Communist 
Party, like the march for peace between Perugia 
and Assisi on 27th September 1981 which was 
also supported by the three major trade unions, 
the general response has been reserveds. A fur-
ther communist demonstration against the 
Comiso deployment on 11th October 1981 
brought together about ro,ooo participants but 
was not supported by other political parties. 
Despite the fact that the Italian Communist 
Party co-operates with other political parties 
and organisations, on local and provincial level, 
in various activities concerning the renuncia-
tion of nuclear weapons and the promotion of 
1. Die Welt, 5th February 1982. 
2. Frank;/Urter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8th February 1982. 
3. The Guardian, 3rd October 1981. 
4. International Herald Tribune, 16th October 1981. 
5. Frank;/Urter Al/gemeine Zeitung, 25th and 29th Sep-
tember 1981. 
peace, it is not officially represented on the 
controlling organs of the various peace move-
ments. The party is associated, however, with 
the broad aims of these movements through its 
federation of young communists, which orga-
nises its activities independently, and other 
individual representatives. The Italian Com-
munist Party had proposed a moratorium on 
the SS-20 deployment prior to the NATO dual 
decision in order to facilitate further negotia-
tions between the superpowers•. 
4.22. Against this background, the size of the 
demonstration in Rome on 24th October 1981, 
again organised by the Communist Party, cau-
sed some surprise when between 200,000 and 
300,000 persons marched through Rome in a 
column which took six hours to pass2• It is 
said to have been the largest demonstration in 
Italy for ten years and attracted participation of 
Protestant churches as well as ecologist groups, 
and the left wing of the Socialist Party. The 
organisers delivered a protest " against all wea-
pons systems in Europe, in the West and in the 
East", to the United States and Soviet Embas-
sies. Placards in the demonstration denounced 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact and some were 
anti-American. 
(v) Netherlands 
4.23. The Netherlands is scheduled in prin-
ciple to receive 48 cruise missiles on its terri-
tory under the dual decision of December 
1979. The previous Netherlands Government 
stated, however, that a final decision on deploy-
ment would depend on the results of the nego-
tiations also provided for in the NATO deci-
sion. Since the elections in May 1981, the 
problem of deciding policy on the deployment 
of cruise missiles has been a factor in delaying 
the formation of the government, although this 
issue was not responsible for the subsequently 
withdrawn resignation of the three party coali-
tion on 16th October 1981. The decision to 
site or not to site the missiles on Dutch soil has 
already been delayed twice, pending arms talks 
between the superpowers. A public opinion 
poll in April 1981 found 68 % opposed to 
deployment of the missiles in the Netherlands 
and 28% in favour3. 
4.24. The peace movement in the Netherlands 
has been inspired particularly by the churches, 
nine of which set up the Inter-confessional 
Council for Peace (IKV) in 1966. This move-
ment in 1977 launched a campaign on 
" Nuclear weapons out of the world, and out of 
the Netherhmds :first .. 4• A mass rally., organ-
1. Italian Communist Party reply, 3rd March 1982. 
2. Le Monde, 27th October 1981. 
3. The Economist, 31st October 1981. 
4. Le Monde, 22nd October 1981. 
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ised by the IKV, took place in Amsterdam on 
21st November 1981 at which, according to 
various reports, between 300,000 and 400,000 
people took part. The theme of this rally was 
specifically to oppose the deployment of cruise 
missiles in the Netherlands, the three slogans 
being: (z) We do not want nuclear weapons in 
Europe - not in the Netherlands, not in any 
other country; (ii) We want the government to 
rescind its agreement with the NATO decision; 
(iiz) We want the Netherlands to ask its NATO 
partners to go back on the NATO decision. 
4.25. The NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Luns, 
accused the IKV of being financed by the 
Soviet Union, an accusation which was refuted 
by the Netherlands Minister of the Interior who 
said that movements of the IKV type 
"enriched Netherlands parliamentary demo-
cracy ". Mr. van Mierlo, the Dutch Minister of 
Defence, took the unusual step of releasing the 
text of a speech he had made at the NATO 
Nuclear Planning Group meeting on 20th Octo-
ber 1981 in which he refuted the suggestion [of 
Professor Waiter Laqueur] that his country was 
suffering from " Hollanditis ". He said in part: 
" What we experience in the Netherlands 
- and in some other countries - is a 
genuine concern about the destructive 
potential of nuclear weapons and the 
frightening perspective of a nuclear war ... 
Some elements of the peace move-
ment may adhere to pacifism and may be 
far too lenient towards the Soviet Union. 
But by and large we are dealing with 
common people who are just afraid, who 
are concerned with the fierce military 
competition and the resulting nuclear 
build-up... We are living with the para-
dox that only by the threat of direct des-
truction can we hope to deter war. 
There are clear signs that the growing 
awareness of this paradox brings people 
to the limits of comprehension and 
acceptance. If this tide is not turned this 
may mean that our democratic systems ... 
will be less and less able to cope with the 
problem of nuclear weapons. ". 
4.26. The anti-nuclear issue has been carried 
into the internal debate of the Dutch political 
parties. Nominally, the liberals are strongly 
supportive of the deployment decision; the 
christian democrats (CDA) and the Democrats 
'66 are split over this question although both 
favour retaining the threat of deployment as a 
bargaining chip against the Soviet stationing of 
INF systems. The Labour Party is officially 
against the deployment. 
4.27. The christian democrats do not officially 
aid the various peace movements (the three 
most important being the IKV, the anti-nuclear 
weapons debate and the anti-neutron bomb 
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movement), but there exist regular contacts 
with these movements. The CDA has regular 
discussions with the IKV. The CDA partici-
pates in the anti-nuclear weapons debate. 
Although the CDA offered to explain its 
defence and security policy at the mass 
demonstration in Amsterdam on 21st Novem-
ber, this was refused by the organisers. Several 
CDA members serve on the IKV in a private 
capacity'. The Democrats '66 did participate in 
the Amsterdam peace rally. The Democrats 
'66 are prepared to provide support for those 
peace movements which are calling for the 
reduction of nuclear arms in all parts of the 
world. They are convinced that some initia-
tives are badly needed and certain well-defined 
unilateral steps are not excluded from this 
concept, provided the broad balance of power 
between East and West is not essentially affec-
ted. In general, Democrats '66 do not provide 
material assistance for peace movements; they 
only share in their activities on an ad hoc 
basis. Like the CDA, Democrats '66 belongs 
to the anti-nuclear debate, a co-ordinating body 
which informally discusses actions concerning 
the reduction of nuclear weapons2• The Dutch 
Liberal Party (VVD), on the other hand, does 
not co-operate with any peace movement nor 
does it furnish any assistance. The VVD iden-
tifies with the broad aims of peace movements 
insofar as they concern the simultaneous and 
bilateral disarmament of the two sidesl. 
4.28. All main parties in the Netherlands 
regard continued membership of NATO as a 
cornerstone of Dutch foreign and security 
policy. The Labour Party (PvdA), which is 
opposed to the missile deployment, will remain 
a critical member of NATO even if the moder-
nisation programme is realised4• Although the 
PvdA is sympathetic to the activities of the 
various peace movements in the Netherlands 
and participates in conferences and other acti-
vities, it is not officially represented on the 
controlling organs of the peace movements nor 
does it provide any material assistance for these 
organisationss. 
4.29. In January 1982, Dutch pacifists blocked 
several special trains carrying munitions for the 
United States Army in Germany6; a step that 
was condemned by all parties in parliament. 
Only days later, some 5,000 Dutch protes-
ted against the blocking of the railways by 
pacifists7• Although there is an active minority 
1. CDA reply, 9th February 1982. 
2. Democrats '66 reply, February 1982. 
3. VVD reply, 24th February 1982. 
4. FrankfUrter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22nd February 1982. 
5. PvdA reply, lOth March 1982 . 
. International Herald Tribune, 21st January 1982; Le 
Matin, 2nd February 1982. 
7. FrankfUrter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27th January 1982; 
Neue Ziiricher Zeitung, 28th January 1982. 
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which can organise effective public demonstra-
tions against military installations, and although 
there exists a widespread unease about the sta-
tioning of cruise missiles on Dutch soil, the 
majority of the Netherlands population sup-
ports continued membership of NATO as polls 
have recently indicated'. Also a new Inter-
church Committee for Bilateral Disarmament 
has been set up which enjoys growing member-
ship. The Labour Party, which participates in 
the present coalition government, has declared 
that its ministers will be withdrawn if the 
government decides to deploy cruise missiles in 
the Netherlands; the leader of the Parliamen-
tary Labour Party repeated this emphatically on 
1st May. The Prime Minister, Mr. Van Agt, 
said in the United States recently that as long as 
labour was in the coalition, a positive decision 
on deployment would be difficult. 
(vz) United Kingdom 
4.30. The present Conservative Government 
under Mrs. Thatcher is firmly committed to the 
deployment of cruise missiles, 160 of which are 
scheduled to be deployed on two existing mili-
tary airfields - Greenham Common and Moles-
worth. A public opinion poll2 in April 1981 
found 50 % opposed to the deployment and 
only 41% in favour, whereas in September 
1980 a similar poll had found 43 % opposed 
and 49 % in favour. Another poll on 26th and 
27th October 1981 found 53% in favour of 
removing American bases from Britain; 67 % in 
favour of retaining the British nuclear deterrent 
and 23% in favour of its unilateral abandon-
ment; 73 % in favour of remaining in NATO 
and 12% for leaving; 57% thought President 
Reagan's foreign policy was making nuclear war 
more likelyl. 
4.31. In the United Kingdom there exist 
various peace movements concerned with diffe-
rent aspects of disarmament. The Campaign 
for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), which was 
very active prior to the signature of the partial 
nuclear test ban in 1963, has recently found 
renewed life, its membership having risen from 
3,000 to 32,000 over the last 18 months, with 
another 200,000 in 1 ,000 local groups but not 
paying fees individually to the central organi-
sation. The CND maintains many specialist 
groups for students, youth, Labour Party, Libe-
ral Party, christians, teachers and trade unions 
(some 12 trade unions are affiliated nationally 
to the CND). At its annual conference in 
November 1981 four members of the Commu-
nist Party were elected to the 20 strong CND 
national council. The Chairman of CND is a 
former labour parliamentary candidate. Other 
1. NATO Review, October 1981. 
2. The Economist, 31st October 1981. 
3. The Observer, 8th November 1981. 
disarmament groups are the European Nuclear 
Disarmament campaign (END), which was 
founded in April 1980 and which promotes the 
concept of a nuclear-free zone from Portugal to 
Poland; and the World Disarmament Campaign 
(WDC), which was set up by two labour peers, 
Lords Brockway and Noel-Baker, at the end of 
1979. The WDC enjoys the support of anum-
ber of religious organisations like the Metho-
dists and the Quakers. The British Peace 
Assembly (BPA), established in April 1980, is 
pledged to promote the policies of the commu-
nist-dominated World Peace Council. The 
Chairman of the BPA is also a Vice-President 
of the World Peace Council. 
4.32. The demonstration organised by the 
CND in London on Saturday, 24th October 
1981, assembled 150,000 according to the 
police but 250,000 according to speakers for the 
movement•. Mr. Michad Foot, the leader of 
the Labour Party, and a number of other labour 
MPs took part in the demonstration, the aims 
of which appeared to be broadly anti-nuclear 
weapons in general, with specific appeals 
against the neutron bomb and the British Tri-
dent programme, as well as expressing opposi-
tion to cruise missiles and the Soviet SS-20s. 
4.33. The Labour Party is officially represented 
on the Council of the WDC. Prominent mem-
bers of both the party and the trade unions are 
on the council and executive committees of 
both CND and END in their personal capa-
city. The party has been officially represented 
at the conferences and meetings of CND, END 
and woe in 1981 and the 1980 and 1981 
annual conferences of the Labour Party both 
carried resolutions supporting the peace move-
ments. The party, furthermore, assisted the 
peace movements with advice on organisational 
matters and stewarding of demonstrations. 
The Labour Party's policy is for a non-
nuclear defence posture for Britain within 
NATO. According to the Labour Party, mem-
bers and local organisations are encouraged to 
play an active role in the activities of the peace 
movements2. 
4.34. The Conservative Party is opposed to the 
arguments of the peace movements and seeks 
multilateral disarmament on the basis of balan-
ced reductions. Members of the Young 
Conservatives helped form an organisation cal-
led Youth Multilateral Disarmament to oppose 
the unilateralist case3• 
1. International Herald Tribune, 26th October 1981; Le 
Monde, 27th October 1981; Sunday Times, 25th October 
1981. 
2. Reply by the Labour Party, 21st January 1982. 
3. Reply by the Conservative Party, 27th January 1982. 
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(viz) Scandinavia 
4.35. The Scandinavian NATO countries, 
Denmark and Norway, while participating in 
NA TO's dual decision of December 1979 as 
members of the Defence Planning Committee, 
are less directly affected by its implementation 
because of their long-standing policy of not 
accepting the stationing of nuclear weapons on 
their territory in peacetime. These countries 
retain close ties with neutral Sweden in the 
Scandinavian Council and with Finland in the 
Nordic Council. In 1963 the former President 
Kekkonen of Finland proposed the establish-
ment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone - a propo-
sed agreement whereby the Nordic countries 
would exclude nuclear weapons from their ter-
ritory and the United States and Soviet Union 
would undertake not to use nuclear weapons 
against them. The proposal has been discussed 
sporadically by the four countries and Iceland, 
and the proviso formulated that as part of such 
a plan nuclear weapons should be removed 
from adjoining territory of the Soviet Union, 
which at the present time has SS-4 and SS-5 
medium-range missiles deployed in the Kola 
peninsula. No clear statement of Soviet reac-
tion has ever been forthcoming beyond a vague 
reply by Mr. Brezhnev to a question from a 
Finnish newspaper in June 1981 to the effect 
that he could not exclude the possibility of 
additional measures. The last meeting of the 
Nordic foreign ministers to discuss the idea was 
held in Copenhagen in the week of 31st August 
1981, apparently without progress being made1• 
4.36. The peace movement in Scandinavia 
finds support especially from the women, and 
within the Social Democrat Party. In Sweden, 
within the Social Democrat Party, there has 
been growing opposition to the Swedish policy 
of remaining relatively well-armed despite neu-
trality, with demands for Sweden to set a good 
example through unilateral disarmament and 
the prohibition of armaments' exports. In 
Denmark and Norway latent anti-Americanism 
has been fanned following the NATO decision 
of December 1979 and the announcement on 
the production of the neutron weapon. Some 
Danish Social Democrats have formed the 
Association of Anti-Militarist Social Democrats 
and the No More War Movement. In Norway 
there was opposition in some labour circles to 
the labour government's decision concerning 
the stationing of equipment in Norway for Uni-
ted States Marines. Women's movements 
organised a demonstration throughout the Nor-
dic countries on 13th May 1978 which led to a 
march of some 10,000 in Stockholm protesting 
against neutron weapons and Swedish military 
expenditure. In July 1980, a peace petition 
signed by more than 520,000 women was han-
1. The Times, 7th September 1981. 
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ded to the United Nations Secretary-General in 
Copenhagen. Then from 22~d. June to _6th 
August Nordic women's orgamsatlons organised 
the " March for Peace 1981 " from Copenhagen 
to Paris, received with disappointing apathy at 
its destination1• 
4.37. Recent events, however, have led to a 
certain disillusionment in Scandinavia. Besi-
des the Polish crisis, in which the Scandinavian 
countries have taken great interest, the scandal 
surrounding the Swedish Institute fo~ Interna-
tional Peace Research (SIPRI), a leadmg mem-
. her of which has been sentenced for " unautho-
rised concern for military installations ", and 
the charge that SIPRI publications are increas-
ingly unbalanced in favour of the Warsaw 
Pact have resulted in some re-thinking in Scan-dina~al. Furthermore, the grounding of the 
Soviet W -class submarine near the Swedish 
Karlskrona. naval base on 28th October 1981, 
which was boarded by Swedish naval officers 
who found evidence that it might have been 
carrying nuclear weapons, may, without having 
fired a shot, have nevertheless torpedoed the 
Nordic nuclear-free zone proposal. The Stock-
holm newspaper Aftonbladet wrot~: '' O':e~­
night the Soviet Union has lost all Its credibi-
lity " and Mr. Falldin, the Swedish Pt:ime 
Minister, noted that it was the end of the Idea 
of a " sea of peace "3• 
(b) Eastern Europe 
4.38. The massive peace and anti-nuclear 
demonstrations in the Western European coun-
tries have not been entirely devoid of echo in 
Eastern Europe, particularly in East Germany, 
where the authorities are clearly concerned lest 
the strong anti-nuclear movement in West Ger-
many spreads across the frontier. A joint Ger-
man letter, signed by 27 East Germans _in~lud­
ing Robert Havermann, a 71 year old dissident 
under house arrest in East Berlin, and some 150 
West Germans was sent to Mr. Brezhnev on 
13th October 1981 asking the Soviet leader to 
use his forthcoming visit to Bonn to find a solu-
tion to "the present dangerous development". 
The letter noted the growing opposition to 
the stationing of American medium-range mis-
siles to the construction of the neutron bomb 
and 'to nuclear weapons now stationed in Eur-
ope, and noted that these were claime~ to b~ a 
response to Warsaw Pact arms efforts mcludmg 
the SS-20 and the Soviet numerical superiority 
in tanks4• 
1. Le Monde, 23rd October 1981. 
2. Neue Zilricher Zeitung, 5th February 1982. 
3. International Herald Tribune, 11th November 1981; 
Die Welt, 5th March 1982. 
4. International Herald Tribune, 14th October 1981. 
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4.39. On Sunday 25th October, the East. Ger-
man Communist Party, SED, no doubt m an 
attempt to channel any spontaneous disarma-
ment movements to its own ends, organised a 
demonstration of 50,000 in Potsdam protesting 
solely against NATO proposals for cruise Jl!iS-
sile deployment1• There have been gr?wmg 
demands in East Germany for an alternative to 
military service in the form of a pea~e ser-
vice. As a result of an agreement with the 
Protestant church, there already exists an alter-
native service for conscientious objectors in 
East Germany known as construction troops -
but the new request goes further2• Addressing 
theological students at the Humboldt University 
in East Berlin in September 1981, the East Ger-
man State Secretary for Religious Affairs, Mr. 
Klaus Gysi, rejected proposals for a peace ser-
vice explaining that East Germany w~ l?art of 
the Warsaw Pact and already found It difficult 
to raise the necessary contingents. A demand 
for a social peace service, he said, would tend 
to suggest that military service was anti-sociaP. 
4.40. In early February 1982, it was reported 
that East Germany's Protestant church has cal-
led for moves towards disarmament. An initia-
tive entitled " Berlin appeal - creating peace 
without weapons ", has been signed by 200 East 
Germans and has asked for the withdrawal of 
all nuclear weapons and all foreign troops from 
both parts of Germany and the conclusion of a 
peace treaty between the wartime allies and the 
two German states according to the Potsdam 
Agreement of 19454• On 14!h February 198_1, 
the anniversary of the bombmg of Dresden m 
1945 which resulted in 35,000 dead, some 
5,000 people gathered in Dresden for a peace 
forum. Under the watchful eye of the state 
security organs, the predominantly young parti-
cipants met at a church and gave expression to 
their desire to have peace education rather than 
para-military training included in th~ school 
curriculum. Furthermore, the quest10n was 
asked repeatedly why the official party view 
welcomed the peace demonstrations in Western 
Europe as progressive while similar activities in 
Eastern Europe were considered detrimental to 
peaces. Although it is still difficult to gauge 
the real impact of the East German peace 
movement, there can be no doubt that the East 
German authorities are truly worried about the 
spillover of the West German peace movement 
to East Germany. 
l. Le Figaro, 31st October 1981. 
2. Die Welt, 3rd February 1982. 
3. Le Figaro, 31st October 1981. 
4 -Die Welt and International Herald Tribune, lOth Feb~ 1982; Le Monde, 12th February 1982; Financial 
Times and Die Welt, 13th February 1982. 
5. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Welt, 15th 
February 1982. 
4.41. On 26th October 1981, the Romanian 
leader Mr. Ceausescu, in interviews with two 
West German newspapers, Frankfurter Rund-
schau and Die Zeit, was quoted as saying that 
decisive actions were necessary to stop the 
nuclear arms race, adding: " This applies just as 
much to stopping the stationing of rockets pro-
duced by the United States as to withdrawing 
the Soviet rockets". He also expressed opposi-
tion to production ofthe neutron weapon1. 
4.42. It would appear that even in the USSR 
itself the spread of pacifism cannot be totally 
contained. The Chief of Staff of the Soviet 
armed forces, Marshal Orgarkov, warned 
against pacifism which has affected a part of the 
Soviet youth and which seriously underesti-
mated the dangers of war2• Furthermore, there 
have been reports that some 38 dissidents in the 
Soviet Baltic states have called for a nuclear-
free Baltic including the adjacent area of the 
USSR3• 
(c) U11ited States 
4.43. Surprisingly within 18 months of an elec-
tion campaign fought in part on a platform cal-
ling for an increased United States defence 
effort, both conventional and nuclear, in the 
face of growing Soviet military power, anti-
nuclear weapons movements have been growing 
in the United States over the last twelve 
months. As in Europe, the recent nationwide 
expression of opinion emanates from a wide 
variety of different movements with many diffe-
rent primary interests. Senator Kennedy has 
claimed that the nuclear freeze resolution, 
which he and colleagues tabled in the Senate on 
1Oth March, was endorsed by 32 different 
movements plus a further 19 religious bodies. 
4.44. One of the most noticed nationwide 
movements is ground zero, founded in 1980 by 
Roger Molander, an expert on nuclear strategy 
who served on the staff of the National Security 
Council from 1974 to 1981 formulating United 
States policy in the SALT negotiations. The 
organisation has a headquarters in Washington 
with a staff of 10 and volunteer staffed branches 
in 140 cities. The organisation claims to be 
strictly educational and non-partisan, designed 
" to pose the straightforward questions across 
the country as to precisely what is the reality 
and what are the dangers of a nuclear 
war "4• The movement organised ground zero 
week from 18th to 25th April 1982, organised 
demonstrations in more than 600 towns 
throughout the country and 350 college campu-
ses, but had varying results attracting small 
1. International Herald Tribune, 27th October 1981. 
2. Die Welt, Ist March 1982. 
3. The Guardian, 3rd March 1982. 
4. Time, 29th March 1982. 
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audiences in New Mexico but doing better in 
Los Angeles. Mr. Molander's book " Nuclear 
war - what's in it for you ? " with the provoca-
tive question on the cover " Why do you feel 
scared with 10,000 nuclear weapons protecting 
you ? " claims to have 250,000 copies in circu-
lation1. 
4.45. A more specialised organisation, Physi-
cians for Social Responsibility, was revived in 
1979 by Helen Caldicott, a doctor in a Boston 
hospital, and now has a membership of 10,000 
doctors with 22 staff in its Boston headquarters, 
85 branches throughout the country and an 
annual budget of $ 600,000. This movement 
has organised symposia throughout the Uni-
ted States where members have lectured on the 
consequences of a nuclear attack; it advocates a 
bilateral nuclear weapons freeze as a first step. 
4.46. There is growing, but far from majority 
opposition to nuclear weapons among church 
circles in the United States. 54 of the 301 
Roman Catholic bishops in the country are 
members of the international Catholic peace 
organisation Pax Christi, and 29 of these 
bishops have signed a statement declaring that 
"even to possess nuclear weapons is wrong "2• 
Some leaders of Protestant churches in 
the United States are also associated with the 
protests. 
4.47. There is a spate of books on the pro-
blems of nuclear weapons now appearing in the 
United States - nearly two dozen are reported 
in the first half of 1982. Apart from the 
Molander publication referred to above, consi-
derable advance publicity has gone into selling 
" The fate of the earth " by Jonathan Schell 
released at the end of April which is a lengthy 
description of imagined nuclear attacks on the 
United States, postulating the extinction of the 
human race and concluding that there is no 
safety without complete world disarmament and 
world government. 
4.48. In a mid-term election year, which 1982 
is, this widespread demonstration of public 
concern about nuclear weapons has had a stri-
king impact in Congress. On 1Oth March, a 
joint resolution was tabled by the Senators Ken-
nedy (Democrat) and Hatfield (Republican) in 
the Senate and by Representatives Markey 
(Democrat) and Conte (Republican) in the 
House of Representatives, which called on the 
United States and the Soviet Union to: 
" (a) pursue a complete halt to the 
nuclear arms race; 
(b) decide when and how to achieve a 
mutual and verifiable freeze on the 
testing, production, and ~rther 
1. Newsweek, 12th Aprill982. 
2. Sunday Times, 18th Aprill982. 
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development of nuclear warheads, 
missiles, and other delivery systems; 
and 
(c) give special attention to destabilising 
weapons whose deployment would 
make such a freeze more difficult to 
achieve. 
2. Proceeding from this freeze the United 
States and the Soviet Union should pur-
sue major mutual and verifiable reduc-
tions in nuclear warheads, missiles and 
other delivery systems, through annual 
percentages or equally effective means, in 
a manner that enhances stability." 
By early April that resolution had attracted the 
signatures of 22 senators and 150 representa-
tives. 
4.49. On 17th March a significantly different 
resolution was tabled in the House of Represen-
tatives by Representative Zablocki, Chairman 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This 
called on the United States and the Soviet 
Union to: 
" Immediately begin the strategic arms 
reduction talks (START) and that those 
talks should have the following objec-
tives: 
1. Preserving present limitations and 
controls on current nuclear weapons 
and nuclear delivery systems while 
pursuing .substantial equitable and veri-
fiable reductions through numerical 
ceilings, annual percentages, or any 
other equally effective and verifiable 
means of strengthening strategic stabi-
lity. 
2. Seeking every possible means to 
avoid the testing and deployment of 
new and destabilising nuclear weapons 
which complicate further progress in 
preserving deterrence and encouraging 
strategic arms reduction. 
3. Incorporating ongoing negotiations 
in Geneva on land-based intermediate-
range nuclear missiles into the START 
negotiations. " 
4.50. On 30th March a further resolution was 
introduced in the Senate by Senators Jackson 
(Democrat) and Warner (Republican) which 
proposed: 
" 1. The United States should propose to 
the Soviet Union a long-term, mutual 
and verifiable nuclear forces freeze at 
equal and sharply reduced levels of for-
ces; 
2. The United States should propose to 
the Soviet Union practical measures to 
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reduce the danger of nuclear war through 
accident or miscalculation and to prevent 
the use of nuclear weapons by third par-
ties including terrorists ... 
4. The United States should continue to 
press month after month, year after year, 
to achieve balanced, stabilising arms 
reductions, looking, in time, to the elimi-
J\ation of all nuclear weapons from the 
world's arsenals. " 
4.51. The three texts quoted above are repre-
sentative of some 25 resolutions now being dis-
cussed in Congress. The Kennedy-Hartfield 
text calls for a global freeze on existing levels of 
nuclear weapons, preventing further develop-
ment and deployment, while negotiations on 
reductions take place. The Zablocki text calls 
chiefly for the immediate opening of talks on 
reductions and continued respect for the SALT 
II limits, whilst seeking to avoid deployment of 
new weapons systems. Both would inhibit 
deployment of new United States weapons in its 
strategic modernisation programme. The Jack-
son-Warner text calls simply for a freeze in the 
future after negotiations on reductions and does 
little more than encourage the administration in 
its present policies. It was endorsed by Presi-
dent Reagan after publication, although Senator 
Jackson denied that he discussed the draft with 
the administration beforehand. The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee is now engaged in 
hearings on the progress of the INF talks and 
will also examine ten of the various " freeze " 
resolutions and is expected to submit its own 
compromise text to the Senate before the sum-
mer recess. 
4.52. Other developments in Congress reported 
in early May' were new demands by a number 
of senators and representatives for ratification 
of SALT II as an interim measure. Senator 
Jackson, in refuting President Reagan's remarks 
about a Soviet nuclear " edge " as noted else-
where, has also emphasised the need for 
contacts between Presidents Reagan and Brezh-
nev, proposed that the United States-Soviet 
Union " hot line " be improved and suggested a 
"joint United States-Soviet command post to 
deter the possibility of war by accident or 
miscalculation "2 which would be located in a 
neutral country such as Austria or Switzerland. 
4.53. One of the most remarked developments 
in expression of informed American opinion on 
nuclear weapons problems was the article pro-
posing a " no-first-use " of nuclear weapons 
policy3. The four authors have held positions 
I. International Herald Tribune, 5th May 1982. 
2. New York Times, 5th April 1982. 
3. Nuclear weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, Foreign 
Affairs, spring 1982, by McGeorge Bundy; George F. Ken-
nan; Robert S. McNamara; Gerard Smith. 
of high responsibility in the Kennedy adminis-
tration, three of them directly responsible for 
defence and nuclear weapons policy. Their 
opening proposition is as follows: 
" A major element in every doctrine has 
been that the United States has asserted 
its willingness to be the first... to use 
nuclear weapons to defend against aggres-
sion in Europe. It is this element that 
needs re-examination now. Both its 
cost to the coherence of the Alliance and 
its threat to the safety of the world are 
rising while its deterrent credibility 
declines. " 
They propose a careful study by governments 
'and the public of ways of moving to a new 
policy: 
" that nuclear weapons will not be used 
unless an aggressor should use them 
first. " 
They note current disagreements in the 
Alliance arising from nuclear policy - disagree-
ment over the deployment of cruise missiles in 
Europe or the neutron warhead - and note that: 
" Any use of nuclear weapons in Europe, 
by the Alliance or against it, carries with 
it a high and inescapable risk of escala-
tion into the general nuclear war which 
would bring ruin to all and victory to 
none. " 
The only firebreak is that between any use of 
nuclear weapons, and all other kinds of con-
flict. The authors recognise that the original 
American pledge to the Alliance in Article 5 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty was understood to be 
a nuclear guarantee, and agree that any modifi-
cation should not be made without the most 
careful exploration of its implications. In any 
case " it would still be necessary to be ready to 
reply with American nuclear weapons to any 
nuclear attack on the Federal Republic". It is 
recognised that a policy of no first use would 
require improved conventional forces, espe-
cially on the central front, but the authors 
believe that the Alliance can provide them, 
possibly at a cost greater than the 3 % annual 
increase in real terms currently agreed for 
defence budgets, but the article is less certain as 
to whether the political will exists. It claims, 
however, that: 
" Once the military leaders of the Alli-
ance have learned to think and act stead-
ily on the " conventional " assumption, 
their forces will be better instruments for 
stability in crises and for general deter-
rence ... ". 
The authors suggest that such a policy should 
be seen not as evidence of reduced American 
interest in the Alliance but that it would draw 
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new attention to the importance of maintaining 
and improving the specifically American 
conventional forces in Europe. They suggest 
in passing that other policies such as " no early 
first use " might be examined but believe that 
" the value of a clear and simple position [no 
first use] would be great ". 
4.54. Among the advantages of a policy of no 
first use perceived by the authors would be 
easier management of the nuclear retaliatory 
forces it would be necessary to retain which 
would be reduced to adequately survivable and 
varied second strike forces, resulting in more 
modest requirements for modernisation of 
nuclear systems, although " it is clear that large, 
varied, and survivable nuclear forces will still 
be necessary for nuclear deterrence " in the 
conditions of the 1980s. Secondly, a no-first-
use policy would go far to meet anxieties on 
nuclear policy both in Europe and the United 
States and, thirdly, the authors claim, it would 
reduce the risk of conventional aggression in 
Europe. They recognise that even if a no-first-
use declaration were made by the allied nuclear 
countries and the Soviet Union, neither side 
could act on the assumption that the other 
would respect it. However " a posture of effec-
tive conventional balance and survivable 
second-strike nuclear strength is vastly better 
for our own peoples and governments, in a 
deep sense more civilised, than one that forces 
the serious contemplation of limited nuclear 
scenarios that are at once terrifying and implau-
sible". The policy would help in relations 
with the Soviet Union and open the path to 
serious reduction of nuclear armaments on both 
sides. In conclusion, the authors point out 
that " there has been no first use of nuclear 
weapons since 1945, and no one in any country 
regrets that fact ". 
4.55. The United States administration took 
the no-first-use article sufficiently seriously for 
the Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, to refute its 
argument in his address at the Georgetown 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
on 6th April 1982, the day before the article 
was officially released. The expression of opi-
nion as a whole, in the country and in 
Congress, has already led the administration to 
give greater priority to its arms control policy 
culminating in President Reagan's speech at 
Eureka College on 9th May in which he propo-
sed that START should open before the end of 
June - despite the fact that martial law is still 
in force in Poland. 
(d) lntmultioul movements 
4.56. The independent Commission on Disar-
mament and Security Issues was set up by the 
former Swedish Prime Minister, Mr. Olaf 
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Palme, in 1980. It includes the former Uni-
ted States Secretary of State, Mr. Cyrus Vance, 
the former United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, 
Dr. David Owen, Mr. Egon Bahr, a member of 
the Bundestag, the Netherlands Minister of 
Social Affairs and former Prime Minister, Mr. 
Joop den Uyl, as well as Mr. Georgy Arbatov, a 
member of the Soviet Central Committee and 
prominent Nigerian and Egyptian members. 
The Commission held a meeting in· Paris 
concluding on 27th October which called for a 
reduction in military spending in general, and 
agreed that the increased defence SPending pro-
posed by President Reagan to match Soviet 
spending was likely to damage the world econ-
omy. At its previous meeting in Moscow from 
12th to 14th June 1981, the Commission called 
for a rapid resumption of the SALT nego-
tiations1. 
4.57. The Physicians Against Nuclear War 
held a first conference in Washington in March 
1981 attended by some 40 physicians from 12 
countries, including Professor. Chazov, Presi-
dent of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences 
and personal physician to President Brezhnev, 
and also attended by prominent American and 
British doctors. The Washington meeting pro-
duced an estimate that an all-out nuclear war 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
would lead to 200 million killed and that the 
60 million injured would be left without atten-
tion as four-fifths of hospital facilities and 
medical staff would have been destroyed. The 
meeting concluded that any organised medical 
response to nuclear war could make "no signi-
ficant.difference to its catastrophic effects ". A 
preparatory group met in Ascot, United King-
dom, on 3rd and 4th October 1981 to prepare 
the second conference to be held in Cambridge 
in '1982. The meeting concluded with a press 
conference addressed by Professor Chazov and 
the American cardiologist Professor Bernard 
Lown, who said: "We have to compel society 
to face the simple fact that nuclear weapons 
and human beings cannot coexist "2• 
4.58. A new group was set up on 1st February 
1982 in Paris calling itself the Comite pour le 
desarmement nuc/eaire en Europe (CODENE)3. 
Re~resentatives of some 20 groups (including 
pacifists, socialists,- communists, women's move-
ments, ecologists) from France, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, West Ger-
many, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Norway met 
in Paris for " six hours against war " during 
which they expressed themselves for a non-
1. Le Monde, 17th June 1981; International Herald Tri-
bune, 28th October 1981. 
2. Soviet News, Soviet Embassy, London, 6th October 
1981. 
3. Le Matin, lst February 1982; Le Monde, lst and 3rd 
February 1982. 
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aligned Europe free of all nuclear weapons. 
Among those present were British and German 
MPs (Labour and SPD), the Mayor of Saar-
briicken and leading SPD opponent to the mis-
sile deployment, Oskar Lafontaine, and a mem-
ber of the Revolutionary Council of Portugal. 
The committee rejected the stationing of 
cruise missiles and Pershing lis in Europe and 
also the logic of two opposed military blocs. 
One Dutch representative declared himself in 
favour of " Finlandisation " if this meant that 
the Europeans in East and West could work 
together for their independence. A German 
representative contended that Poland could not 
be liberated by Pershing 11 missiles. 
4.59. One international movement that was in 
existence before the current peace initiatives 
were founded is the World Peace Council. 
Established by the Soviet Union in 1949, its task 
is to spread the communist peace offensive 
around the globe. For this the World Peace 
Council, according to United States Govern-
ment figures, received in 1979 the equivalent of 
$ 49 million from the USSR. Although the 
World Peace Council has been able to influence 
some western peace movements1, there is no 
evidence that it has been successful in doing so 
on a large scale. 
4.60. Both British based organisations END 
and WDCI work for international disarmament 
yet they can only claim limited contacts with 
other European groups. Most contacts are 
confined to personal exchanges or occasional 
lectures and goodwill presentations. Notably 
the desired contacts with Eastern European 
peace initiatives, which are not officially 
recognised, are almost non-existent. While the 
END and Woe are proud of their links with 
other groups in the western hemisphere the 
woe could only comment, after the visit to the 
Soviet Union by a delegation at the invitation 
of the official Soviet Peace Committee in 
December 1981, that " we are also trying to 
develop these kinds of links with groups in the 
Soviet Union and this process has been helped 
by the recent visit to the USSR ... " 2• 
(e) Genertll collthlalbm 011 p11blk opillio11 
4.61. In the various nuclear protest movements 
in Western Europe, in the United States, and 
even sporadically in Eastern Europe, there are 
many strands in the policies advocated, ranging 
from unilateral nuclear disarmament to bilate-
ral or multilateral agreements. A common fac-
tor in all these movements and protests is 
1. See paragraph 4.31 above. 
2. WDC Bulletin 5, February 1982. For the visit, see 
also Soviet News, Soviet Embassy, 19th January 1982. 
genuine public concern at the threat of nuclear 
weapons, which has been heightened by impru-
dent or sometimes misunderstood remarks, in 
particular by United States leaders, on intricate 
problems of nuclear strategy. The Soviet 
Union is well aware of this growing public 
concern about nuclear policy in the West and 
has tried to stimulate the protest movements 
which can but help its information policy 
aimed at weakening European defence. 
4.62. Three specific proposals, referred to in 
the sections on the various countries concerned 
above, should be mentioned in this general 
conclusion. First is the proposal for an imme-
diate nuclear freeze on all nuclear weapons -
strategic and European-based weapons. Al-
though there is still an overall United States 
superiority in total numbers of nuclear war-
heads, one basis on which Senator Kennedy for 
example is advocating a freeze, nevertheless 
such an undertaking could freeze a severe imba-
lance in the characteristics of certain strategic 
missiles which are of concern to the United 
States as noted in paragraph 2.15 above, and 
would freeze a significant imbalance in interme-
diate-range weapons systems in Europe. The 
committee, therefore, does not endorse this pro-
posal, although it does support the early open-
ing of START and the continued respect of the 
SALT 11 limits. The second proposal to 
attract attention is the no-first-use of nuclear 
weapons proposal which the committee also 
rejects at the present time. The overwhelming 
Soviet superiority in certain categories of 
conventional weapons and forces on the central 
front has led NATO from the outset to reserve 
the right to initiate the use of nuclear weapons 
if a conventional attack cannot otherwise be 
halted. The large degree of uncertainty which 
such a policy leaves in the minds of Soviet 
military planners is an essential part of the stra-
tegy of deterrence. A third specific proposal of 
some of the peace movements is for a nuclear-
free zone from the Atlantic to the frontier of 
the Soviet Union (" from Portugal to Poland " 
is the alliterative slogan). Such a proposal 
would do nothing to remove the threat of 
nuclear weapons from Europe because the 
whole of Europe is in range of so many nuclear 
weapons based in the Soviet Union itself. 
4.63. While the committee rejects, at the pre-
sent time, these three themes of the peace 
movements, in view of the authoritative sup-
port for the first two of these proposals - a 
nuclear freeze, and a policy of no-first-use - it 
may be desirable for the committee to report in 
more detail on these subjects in the future. 
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V. Conclusions 
5.1. The committee's principal conclusions 
are set forth in the draft recommendation to 
which this explanatory memorandum relates as 
follows: 
Draft 
recom-
menda-
tion: 
Preamble: 
(l) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vz) 
(viz) 
(viiz) l 
(ix) ~ 
(x) 
(xi) 
(xiz) 
Explanatory memorandum: 
Chapter II. 
Chapter 11 (e); Chapter Ill (a) (l). 
Chapter Ill (b) (z) - see paragraph 
3.17. 
Chapter Ill (b) (l) - see paragraph 
3.18 et seq. 
Chapter Ill (a) (z)- paragraph 3.9. 
See 3.25. The Committee deals 
with nuclear test-ban proposals and 
confidence-building measures in 
another report (Document 909). 
Chapter IV; see in particular para-
graph 4.61 et seq. 
Chapter IV; see in particular para-
graph 4.62. 
Chapter 11 (a) - paragraph 2.3 et 
seq. 
Operative text: 
A.l 
2 Chapter 11 (e) 
3 Chapter Ill (a) (z) 
4 Chapter Ill (b) (z), especially para-
graph 3.18 et seq. 
6 Chapter IV (c), paragraph 4.52. 
7 Chapter 11 (a), paragraph 2.3 et seq. 
B. Chapter 11 (a); Chapter IV (e). 
VI. Opinion of the minority 
6.1. The report as a whole was adopted by 15 
votes to 4 with 0 abstentions. The minority 
objected to the way the report dealt with the 
peace movements. Some held that the " genu-
ine public concern at the threat of nuclear 
weapons ", referred to in paragraph 4.61 of this 
explanatory memorandum, was not in fact 
genuine. Another minority view held that the 
report attached insufficient importance to these 
movements, and was also opposed to paragraph 
A.2 of the draft recommendation which calls 
for preparations to continue for the deployment 
ofGLCM and Pershing 11. 
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Recommendations 367 find 375 find the Council's replies thereto 
RECOMMENDATION 3671 
on tfllks on the reduction of long-:rflnge thlfltre nucleflr forces in Europe'-
The Assembly, 
(z) Believing that the broad economic and cultural interdependence of Europe and the United 
States, and their shared concept of an open society, make a frank dialogue between the two both 
possible and desirable, especially on mutual security; 
(iz) Considering it desirable for the European countries of the Alliance to adopt a common cons-
tructive position in that dialogue, the better to influence the United States, in particular on security 
matters such as long-range theatre nuclear forces; 
(iiz) Noting with concern the vast modernisation of Soviet forces, both conventional and nuclear, 
and in particular the continued deployment of SS-20 missiles at the rate foreseen in Recommendation 
360; 
(iv) Reiterating its support for the twofold NATO decision of 12th December 1979 on LRTNF as a 
realistic basis for negotiating seriously on reductions in the levels of these weapons; 
(v) Believing that such negotiations should provide the political impetus for broad negotiations on 
the limitation and reduction of all nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, long-range and battlefield 
so as to forestall an unrestricted nuclear arms race in an already too dangerous world; 
(vz) Stressing the urgent need for the LRTNF negotiations with the Soviet Union to begin and to be 
' pursued in the general SALT framework, taking into account the whole continuum of nuclear wea-
pons on which deterrence depends, with a view to securing agreement on broad parity with reduced 
levels of all such weapons in an overall military balance; 
(viz) Aware of the Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces on the central front; 
(viiz) Aware that all defence policy must rely on the trust and support of properly-informed public 
opinion, that that opinion is both concerned and confused about nuclear weapons and calling there-
fore for objective comparable information to be published on the nuclear balance as a whole as per-
ceived both by NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 
(ix) Welcoming the decision of the United States to embark on negotiations on LRTNF with the 
Soviet Union before the end of the year; 
(x) Welcoming in particular the readiness of the United States to consult its allies on nuclear 
policy, in particular in the framework of the Nuclear Planning Group, the Special Consultative 
Group, and the High Level Group, which enable their European members to participate construc-
tively in formulating nuclear strategy and in the limitation and reduction of nuclear 
weapons, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL . 
Call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council : 
1. To ensure that negotiations on LR TNF reductions in the framework of SALT begin without 
further delay; 
2. To call for the urgent resumption of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms as a whole 
with a view to securing broad parity at greatly reduced levels of nuclear weapons; 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1981 during the First Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (3rd Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Mommemeeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments (Document 879). 
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3. To call meanwhile for the continued mutual respect of the SALT 11 limits and of the SALT I 
agreement and ABM treaty; 
4. To call subsequently for negotiations to secure a balance at much lower levels of battlefield 
nuclear and conventional weapons; 
5. To provide an objective and comparable assessment of the nuclear balance as a whole; 
6. To call for immediate pursuit of the proposal for a disarmament conferP.nce for Europe. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 367 
I. The Council take note of the ideas expressed by the Assembly in its recommendation on the 
talks relating to the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces and of the underlying concerns. 
The WEU member countries which participated in the dual decision of 12th December 1979 
(long-range theatre nuclear forces modernisation and negotiations on LRTNF limitations on both 
sides) share these ideas as a whole. They insist that the two aspects of this decision must be 
implemented. In this context, the Council note with satisfaction the intention expressed by both the 
United States and the Soviet Union to start TNF negotiations on 30th November 1981. 
2. The Council continue to hold the opinion that negotiations on the reduction of TNF should 
take place within the wider framework of the SALT process. They have noted the decision of the 
new United States administration to observe, in the meantime, limits set by the earlier agreements, 
which the Soviets apparently also intend to respect. 
3. The Council recall that, according to the allies who participated in the December 1979 deci-
sion, negotiations on arms control in the field of theatre nuclear weapons should proceed step by 
step. In keeping with this view, the first of these steps should be centred on the most immediate 
threat constituted by the Soviet long-range theatre missile systems, particularly the SS-20, which is 
the most modem and efficient of them. 
Subsequent steps could provide an opportunity for extending the range of systems dealt with 
and increasing the rigour of the limitations sought. In any case, any future limitation of American 
systems designed mainly for theatre use should be accompanied by appropriate limitations of Soviet 
theatre systems. 
4. The Council consider that it is for the allies who participated in the decision of 12th December 
1979, particularly the United States, to provide objective and comparable assessments of the balance 
of forces which would serve as a basis for negotiations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Furthermore, they welcome the fact that a new, objective and thorough analysis of the 
Soviet nuclear threat has recently been made available to the governments represented on the 
Nuclear Planning Group. They also welcome the fact that the United States Government has 
published the essentials 9f this documentation in an unclassified version (entitled " Soviet military 
power "), to enable the public to be aware of a set of facts, figures, proofs and assessments hitherto 
available only to ministers. 
5. The Council continue to support the French proposal for a conference on disarmament in 
Europe which would seek, in the first instance, to achieve agreement on a coherent set of confidence-
building measures which would be militarily significant, binding and verifiable, applicable to the 
whole continent of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. Taking account of the progress which 
has so far been possible towards agreement at Madrid on a specific, unambiguous mandate incorpora-
ting the above criteria, the Council hope that the eastern countries will now be prepared to resolve 
the main outstanding issue by agreeing to the application of these confidence-building measures from 
the Atlantic to the Urals, as proposed by the West, which would be a contribution to a substantial 
and balanced result of the Madrid meeting. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 22nd October 1981. 
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RECOMMENDATION 3751 
on negotiations on theatre nuclear forces2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Stressing the continued validity of Recommendation 367~ 
(ii) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 367~ 
(iii) Noting with concern the still growing number of Soviet land-based theatre nuclear forces in 
Europe~ -
(iv) Fully aware that public opinion in Europe and particularly youth are moved by feelings of 
insecurity and are deeply concerned about the present high levels of nuclear weapons and about the 
dangers of a new and unlimited arms race~ 
( v) Believing the growing expression of public concern about all aspects of nuclear weapons reveals 
also misunderstanding and a lack of objective information~ 
(vi) Convinced that governments and parliament should pay continuous attention to the fact that 
security policy must rely on the trust and support of properly-informed public opinion, thereby stres-
sing the point that only balanced and properly verifiable reductions are compatible with European 
security, and that such reductions will not be achieved without serious negotiations; 
(viz) Welcoming President Reagan's negotiating proposals of 18th November 1981; 
(viii) Welcoming the opening of talks on theatre nuclear forces in Geneva on 30th November 1981 
and the view of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group that "on the basis of reciprocity the zero level 
remains a possible option under ideal circumstances"; 
(ix) Stressing the importance of European-American co-operation in the Special Consultative 
Group~ 
(x) Hoping that the negotiations in Geneva will provide the political impetus for a gradual deve-
lopment of a broad negotiating process on the limitation and reduction of all nuclear weapons and 
will lead to a decisive turn in the armaments race; 
(xi) Believing that the failure of the major nuclear weapons powers to introduce the reductions 
provided for in Article 6 of the non-proliferation treaty undermines the aims of that treaty, thereby 
diminishing the chances of establishing generally-respected full safeguards on the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy and even increasing one risk of nuclear war, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Call on member governments: 
I. To urge the North Atlantic Council to continue to rely on the dual decision of 12th December 
1979 on long-range theatre nuclear forces as a realistic basis for negotiating seriously on reductions in 
the levels of these weapons; 
2. To· ensure that the public acquires a better understanding of the real situation drawing among 
other sources on the report to be prepared "within the Alliance as soon as possible which would 
compare, for the information of the public, NATO and Warsaw Pact forces". 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (11th 
Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Motion for a Recommendation tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and others with a request for 
urgent procedure (Document 900). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 375 
I. The Council take careful note of the views of the Assembly expressed in their recommendation 
on negotiations on theatre nuclear forces (now known as intermediate-range nuclear forces). The 
Council echo the opinion of the Assembly on points made in the recommendation, in particular: 
concern about the growing number of Soviet land-based intermediate-range nuclear systems; the wel-
come extended by the Assembly to President Reagan 's proposals announced on 18th November 1981; 
the importance of co-operation and consultation between the NATO allies concerned in discussion of 
intermediate-range nuclear forces in the Special Consultative Group as well as of the exchange of 
information in the North Atlantic Council. 
2. The Council also welcome the attention paid by the Assembly to the importance of the public 
presentation of the policies of member countries both on defence and deterrence and on arms control. 
3. Regarding the Assembly's recommendation that the North Atlantic Council should continue to 
rely on the double decision of 12th December 1979, the Council recall that it is the declared inten-
tion of the NATO allies concerned that they will move ahead with the December 1979 two-track 
decision on intermediate-range nuclear force modernisation and arms control. They reiterate the 
view expressed in December 1981 by the allies who participated in the 1979 double decision, namely 
that the dual-track decision opened the way to reducing. the threat to the Alliance through inter-
mediate-range nuclear force modernisation and arms control negotiations and that determination in 
implementing both tracks of the decision has been a key factor in convincing the Soviet Union to 
negotiate without preconditions, thus creating the opportunity of achieving genuine arms reductions. 
4. The Council attach the greatest importance to the positions and attitudes of the publics in 
member countries on the subject of nuclear weapons and their arms control. They believe that an 
important and continuing task is the explanation of the defensive nature of the North Atlantic 
Alliance, the rationale behind the strategy of deterrence and the essential role of arms control. The 
task of explanation is all the greater in the light of the sustained Soviet propaganda campaign which 
aims to undercut public support for agreed objectives and policies of the Alliance. In their task of 
providing their publics with accurate information, members of the Council will rely on material from 
their own national sources and, for those who participated in the drafting of it, on material co-
ordinated and agreed by the allies, in particular the forthcoming report which will compare NATO 
and Warsaw Pact forces. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1982. 
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Levels of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons 
(covered by SALT) 
ICBMs 
Titan 11 .............. 
Minuteman 11 ......... 
Minuteman Ill ........ 
Sub-total .............. 
SLBMs 
Polaris ................ 
Poseidon C-3 .......... 
Trident C-4 ........... 
Sub-total .............. 
BM total ............. 
Aircraft 
B-52 
TOTAL ................ 
United States strategic systems 
(covered by SALT) 
Maximum 
range (km) Number 
15,000 52 
11,300 450 
13,000 
{ 250 (160 kt) 
300 (353 kt-
Mk l2A) 
1,052 
4,600 80 
4,600 304 
7,400 160 
544 
1,596 
16,000 3162 
1,912 
I. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted. 
2. 570 reported in SALT 11 data base includes 220 in" deep storage". 
Note: 
Number of inde-
pendent warheads 
each 
l 
l 
3 
l 
10-14 
8 
up to 10 
Force loadings for aircraft deduced from total warheads (rounded to nearest hundred). 
United States forces estimated at mid-1982. 
Source: 
- IISS, Military Balance 1981-82. 
-United States Department of Defence Annual Reports fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 1983. 
- Soviet military power, United States Department of Defence, September 1981. 
- Whence the threat to peace, Soviet Ministry of Defence, January 1982. 
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Assumed total 
number of 
warheads 
52 
450 
1,5001 
2,000 
80 
3,648 
1,2801 
5,000 
7,000 
2,000 
9,000 
DOCUMENT 918 
Type 
ICBMs 
SS-11 ................. 
SS-13 ................. 
SS-17 ................. 
SS-18 ................. 
SS-19 ................. 
Sub-total 
SLBMs 
SSN-5 ................ 
SSN-6 ................ 
SSN-8 ................ 
SSN-17 ............... 
SSN-18 ............... 
BM total ............. 
Aircraft 
Bear Tu-95 ........... 
Bison Mya-4 .......... 
Sub-total 
TOTAL ................ 
Soviet atrategic ayatema 
(coreml by SALT) 
Maximum 
range (km) Number 
10,500 580 
10,000 60 
10,000 150 
9-10,500 308 
11,000 300 
1,398 
1,120 18 
2,400-3,000 453 
8,000 291 
5,000 12 
8,000 176 
2,348 
Combat 
radius (km) 
5-6,000 105 
4-6,000 45 
150 
2,498 
1. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted. 
Note: 
Number of inde-
pendent warheads 
each 
1 
1 
1 or 4 
1 or 8 
6 or 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2-4 
1-2 
Force loadings for aircraft deduced from total warheads (rounded to nearest hundred). 
United States forces estimated at mid-1982. 
Source: 
- IISS, Military Balance 1981-82. 
- United States Department of Defence Annual Reports fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 1983. 
- Soviet military power, United States Department of Defence, September 1981. 
- "Whence the threat to peace", Soviet Ministry of Defence, January 1982. 
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Assumed total 
number of 
warheads 
580 
60 
6001 
2,4641 
1,8001 
5,500 
18 
453 
291 
12 
528 
1,300 
330 
70 
400 
7,200 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Levels of intermediate-range nuclear weapons of interest to Europe 
Lt.-Gen. New York Times Maximum Assumed IISS- Nikolai 22.11.81 Lev NATO& 
range 
warheads Military Chervov- Semeiko(n) Warsaw 
or combat Weapons Soviet Pact-
radius per Balance Information Moscow News Force 
(km) system 1981-82 Bureau, Paris Soviet United States 17.1.82 Comparisons 
-May 1981 figures figures 4.5.82 
USSR: 
5,000 3 SS-20(a) 200 175 270 300(o) 
2,000 1 SS-4 210 340 340 
" Land-based " 4,000 1 SS-5 15 40 40 496 ~ 300 1,000 1 SS-12 650 350 
1,120 1 SS-N-5 57 157 " Sea-based " 
18 
4,000 3 or 4 Backfire 65 65 65 ~ 500 2,800 2 Badger 310 310 310 
3,100 2 Blinder 125 125 125 " Air-based " 
!2,500(•) 1,600 2 Fencer 480 480 
461 
720 1 F1ogger D(b) 500 500 
600 1 Fitter C/D(b) 700 
ToTAL 3,312 1,055 2,537 4,250 
NATO 
inc. 
France: 
1,900 2 F-111 156 156 156 156 
2,000+ 4 or 6 F-111A -{1) 60 60 (200)(q) 
750 1 F-4 324(K) 364(K) 324(K) 244Q) 723 I 800 1 F-104 318 318 ~ (800)(r) 1,000 2 A-6/A-7 60(h) 60(h) 60(h) 33(k) 
2,800 2 Vulcan 57 57 56 56 55 (200)(q) 
950 2 Buccaneer 60 60 
720 1 Jaguar( c) 80 80 
1,600 1 Mirage IV-A 33 33 33 33 46 (800)(r) 
560 2 Super 12(•) 
Etendard 
720 1 Pershing I(d) 180 180 180 180 180 
4,600 1 Polaris 64 64 64 64 64 
3,000 1 M-20 80 80 80 80 80 
3,000 10 or 14 Poseidon(e) 80 
TOTAL 1,142 1,550 1,031 924 986 1,180 
Notes: 
(a) Since the publication of the respective figures on SS-20 deployment, it has been reported that by mid-March 1982, when 
the USSR announced a freeze on further SS-20 deployment, the number of SS-20 missiles deployed had risen to 300 (of which 
100 were situated west of the Urals, 100 in the so-called "swing position"). The total number of SS-4 and SS-5 has been 
reduced to 275 and 25 respectively. 
(b) Although the Military Balance 1981-82 also lists 165 Fitter A and 400 Fishbed J-N aircraft under long- and medium-
range systems for the European theatre, these aircraft are not accounted for anywhere else, and it would appear that both types, 
although nuclear capable, are not primarily assigned to a nuclear role. The FrankfUrter A/lgemeine Zeitung of 8th March 
1982 reported that some 300 Soviet Flogger and Fitter are stationed in the GDR. 
(c) Military Balance 1981-82 assumes 80 nuclear-capable aircraft in Anglo-French inventory of219. Halfofthese are assu-
med retained for a nuclear role. See also (m). 
(d) 180 Pershing 1: 108 United States and 72 West German missiles. 
(e) 400 Poseidon warheads are assigned to SACEUR but are SALT -counted. 
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if) Military Balance 1981-82 assumes that (United States-based) FB-lllA are not available for theatre use; 60 FB-lllA are 
listed as medium-range bombers stationed in the United States. The precise combat radius of the FB-lllA is not available. 
The Military Balance 1981-82 gives the range as 4, 700 km. 
(g) The figure of 364 as opposed to 324 F-4, includes 40 F-4 of the Turkish air force which are presumably not intended for a 
nuclear role. See also (j ) .. 
(h) The number of 60 (i.e. 20 A-6 and 40 A-7) carrier-borne planes is based on the assumption that there are two carriers in 
the United States 6th Fleet (Mediterranean), and that half the available strike force is retained for nuclear targets on land - see 
Military Balance 1981-82. See also (k). Assumes no carriers from Atlantic fleet in nuclear strike role. 
(i) Assumes one out oftwo French carriers on station and within range. 
(Jj The figure of 224 F-4 comprises European-based planes only while the figure of 324 - see (g) - includes "dual-based" 
planes normally in the United States but deploying to Europe at times. 
(k) The number of 33 carrier-borne aircraft is based on the assumption that there has been only one United States carrier in 
the Mediterranean for the past two years - see The Economist of 17th October 1981. See also (h). 
(m) Available systems- updated to March 1982 for SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5. 
(n) Data correspond, but with more detail, with figures used by President Brezhnev in Der Spiege/ interview of 1st Novem-
ber 1981. 
(o) Not all in range of Europe. 
(p) Those used as bombers. 
(q) 200 total for F-Ill and Vulcan. 
(r) 800 total all other aircraft. 
(s) WP could employ up to 2,500 aircraft in a nuclear role. 
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Country National currency unit 
(0) (l) 
Belgium .................... Million B. Frs. 
France (c) .................. Million F. Frs. 
Gennany ................... Million DM 
Italy ...................... Milliard Lire 
Luxembourg ................ Million L. Frs. 
Netherlands ................ Million Guilders 
United Kingdom ........... Million £ Sterling 
TOTAL WEU ......... 
Canada .................... Million C. S 
Denmark .................. Million D. Kr. 
Greece ; ................... Million Drachmas 
Norway ................... Million N. Kr. 
Portugal ................... Million Escudos 
Turkey .................... Million L. 
United States ............... Million US S 
TOTAL NON-WEU ... 
TOTAL NATO 
••• 0 ••• 
--- -
-- --
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1977-1981 
A. FINANCIAL EFFORT 
Defence expenditure (national currency) Defence expenditure GDP in purchasers' values Population (thousand) Defence expenditure as % of 
1977 
(-5) 
89,480 
73,779 
40,184 
4,533 
1,029 
9,092 
6,810 
4,124 
6,343 
67,738 
5,934 
22,082 
49,790 
100,925 
current prices (current prices - US $ million) a (current prices - US $ million) a b GDP in purchasers' values 
1978 
(-4) 
99,726 
85,175 
43,019 
5,301 
1,154 
. 9,146 
7,616 
4,662 
7,250 
77,861 
6,854 
27,354 
66,239 
109,247 
1979 1980 1981 1 77 1978 1979 1980 1981 I 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 e 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 e 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 I 
(-3) (-2) (-I) ) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (16) ti7) (i8) -- (20) (12) (13) (14) (15) (19) 
106,472 115,754 124,055 2,497 3,175 3,632 3,958 3,341 79,341 97,328 111,231 119,114 100,844 9,830 9,841 9,849 9,857 9,871 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
96,439 111,672 129,365 5,016 18,874 22,668 26,425 23,804 383,558 474,376 573,377 651,884 570,548 53,077 53,277 53,478 53,713 53,874 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.2 
45,415 48,518 52,298 7,308 21,417 24,778 26,692 23,141 517,056 640,427 760,497 819,126 685,026 59,462 59,409 59,454 59,669 59,460 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 
6,468 8,203 9,850 5,137 6,246 7,785 9,578 8,665 215,419 261,887 324,551 393,955 350,560 56,446 56,697 56,888 57,042 57,247 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 
1,242 1,534 P27 29 37 42 52 47 2,823 3,509 4,164 4,402 3,635 362 362 364 365 365 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 
10,106 10,476 11,279 3,705 4,228 5,038 5,269 4,520 112,021 137,291 156,938 167,626 139,170 13,856 13,942 14,038 14,144 14,178 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.2 
9,029 11,503 12,418 1,887 14,619 19,155 26,759 25,183 250,552 315,713 407,140 523,373 505,566 55,919 55,902 55,946 56,010 56,021 4.7 4.6 4.7 5.1 5.0 
--------
5,579 68,596 83,098 98,733 88,701 1,560,770 1,930,531 2,337,898 2,679,480 2,355,349 248,952 249,430 250,017 250,800 251,016 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 
----------
4,825 5,355 6,150 3,878 4,087 4,119 4,579 5,130 199,155 205,845 229,449 255,393 283,580 23,280 23,493 23,690 23,941 24,288 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 
7,990 9,061 8,408 1,057 1,315 1,519 1,608 47,195 56,960 66,224 66,404 57,004 5,088 5,104 5,117 5,125 5,137 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 . . . . 
89,791 96,975 125,944 1,838 2,125 2,420 2,276 2,273 26,157 31,690 38,574 40,410 38,612 9,268 9,360 9,449 9,540 9,608 7.0 6.7 6.3 5.6 5.9 
7,362 8,242 9,447 1,115 1,307 1,454 1,669 1,646 35,979 40,647 46,746 57,413 56,359 4,043 4,060 4,073 4,087 4,094 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.9 
34,343 43,440 . 51,774 577 623 702 868 841 16,278 17,800 20,381 24,144 23,559 9,773 9,820 9,863 9,966 10,067 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.6 
93,268 185,656 313,067 2,766 2,728 3,001 2,442 2,970 47,937 52,499 69,371 56,873 61,958 42,177 43,123 44,089 45,078 46,110 5.8 5.2 4.3 4.3 4.8 
122,279 143,981 167,764 10,925 109,247 122,279 143,981 167,764 1,902,356 2,131,801 2,376,828 2,583,400 2,886,433 220,239 222,585 225,055 227,658 229,821 5.3 5.1 5.1 5.6 5.8 
----------
2,156 121,432 135,494 157,423 182,274e 2,275,057 2,537,242 2,847,573 3,084,037 3.407,505 313,868 317,545 321,336 325,395 329,125 4.9 4.8 4.8 5.1 5.3e 
----------
7,735 190,028 218,592 256,156 270,915e 3,835,827 4,467,773 5,185,471 5,763,517 5,762,854 562,820 566,975 571,353 576,195 580,141 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.4 4.1e 
Note a: GDP a~ defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States S at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by 
chanae exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency 
conversi 
For the period 1977·1981 
Country 
Belgium and Lwrembourg 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
ClliUlda 
-1977 
- 1978 
-1979 
-1980 
- 1981 
DenmtUk 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
France 
-1m 
- 1978 
-1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Fed. Rep. of Germany 
-1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Greece 
-1977 
- 1978 
-1979 
-1980 
- 1981 
~ following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Unit 
Franc 
Canadian Dollar 
D. Krone 
Franc 
. 
Deutschmark 
Drachma 
US S per unit 
0.02790 
0.03184 
0.03411 
0.03420 
0.02693 
0.94034 
0.87664 
0.85371 
0.85523 
0.83409 
0.16658 
0.18134 
0.19008 
0.17743 
0.14038 
0.20352 
0.22159 
0.23505 
0.23663 
0.18401 
0.43070 
0.49785 
0.54559 
0.55016 
0.44248 
0.02714 
0.02729 
0.02696 
0.02347 
0.01805 
Units per US S 
35.84100 
31.41000 
29.31860 
29.24260 
37.13101 
1.06345 
1.14073 
1.17136 
1.16928 
1.19891 
6.00319 
5.51462 
5.26097 
5.63593 
7.12337 
4.91343 
4.51276 
4.25445 
4.22604 
5.43458 
2.32178 
2.00863 
1.83288 
1.81767 
2.26000 
36.84435 
36.64843 
37.09694 
42.61666 
55.40842 
Note b: GDP (p.v.) =Gross domestic product in purchasers' values, current prices. 
Country Unit 
Italy 1,000 Lire 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Netherkmds Guilder 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Norway N. Krone 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Portugal Escudo 
- 1977 
- 1978 
-1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Turkey T. Lira 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
United Kingdom £ 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
-1980 
- 1981 
US $ per unit 
1.13329 
1.17832 
1.20357 
1.16761 
0.87969 
0.40745 
0.46224 
0.49849 
0.50299 
0.40077 
0.18785 
0.19076 
0.19747 
0.20246 
0.17423 
0.02613 
0.02276 
0.02044 
0.01998 
0.01625 
0.05555 
0.04118. 
0.03218 
0.01315 
0.00949 
1.74552 
1.91951 
2.12155 
2.32628 
2.02791 
Units per US S 
0.88239 
0.84866 
0.83086 
0.85645 
1.13677 
2.45428 
2.16336 
2.00608 
1.98812 
2.49520 
5.32351 
5.24224 
5.06406 
4.93922 
5.73951 
38.27693 
43.94021 
48.92344 
50.06208 
61.54642 
18.00225 
24.28216 
31.07752 
76.03811 
105.42629 
0.57290 
0.52097 
0.47135 
0.42987 
0.49312 
Prior to 1977, tables of defence statistics published in reports of the Committee used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wealth. In line with the practice of other international 
organisations, the tables are now given in terms of GDP which is somewhat higher than GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP are slightly lower 
than the percentages of GNP previously published. 
Note c: France is a member of the Alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures are indicative only. 
e = Preliminary estimate. 
f = Forecast. 
Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(81)20. 
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Defence expenditure per head Defence expenditure as % of total WEU (current prices - US$) a 
1977 1978 1979 1980 19811 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 I 
(21) -- (23) (24) (29) (30) (22) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
254 323 369 402 338 4.49 4.63 4.37 4.01 3.77 
283 354 424 492 442 27.02 27.51 27.28 26.76 26.84 
291 361 417 447 389 31.14 31.22 29.82 27.03 26.09 
91 110 137 168 151 9.24 9.11 9.37 9.70 9.77 
80 102 115 142 129 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
267 303 359 373 319 6.67 6.16 6.06 5.34 5.10 
213 262 342 478 450 21.39 21.31 23.05 27.10 28.38 
----------
223 275 332 394 353 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
----------
167 174 174 191 211 6.98 5.96 4.96 4.64 5.78 
208 258 297 314 . . 1.90 1.92 1.83 1.63 .. 
198 227 256 239 237 3.31 3.10 2.91 2.31 2.56 
276 322 357 408 402 2.01 1.91 1.75 1.69 1.86 
59 63 71 87 84 1.04 0.91 0.84 0.88 0.95 
66 63 68 54 64 4.98 3.98 3.61 2.47 3.35 
458 491 543 632 730 181.59 159.26 147.15 145.83 189.13 
--------
357 382 422 484 554e 201.80 177.02 163.05 159.44 205.00e 
----------
298 335 383 445 461e 301.80 277.02 263.05 259.44 305.00e 
&ana•- Accut'acy •nill 
C~b•t rli&h' ri .. Warheeda 
aadiu• of Hoot per 1-
We•pon i• IH_! Prec:he W.apone s,.t .. .! l~reahnev ~I 
Soviet 
SS-20 •i•i ile ~ 10•15 •io. )20 •• !I ) (87) f/ 
ss-, ••••il• 4100 I (40)-
ss-4 •iuile 1900 I (l40) 
SS-12 aieei.le 900 I uoco .. ate4 
SS-M-~ a he iJe 1120 I uac:ouru: ed 
' 
Hieeile eUbcotal (467) 
hckfire I bo.ber 401) 4 (U) 
1•4cer b-"•r 2100 2 UIOI 
ltinder bollber ]lOO 2 (125) 
Fencer fiahter-boabe~ 1600 2 uncounted 
fll)caer 0 fiahcer-H•ber 720 I uncouaced 
975 
Vanaw P.tct CaccordiR& 
Total Weapon• ':~:~~:&ed ta! ¥ 67) 
IIATO 
rerebina lA •i•eile 720 400 •• ., 1 10 or 110) !_/ 
Perehina 11 •i•eile(Plenne4 1667 ID-IS .Ta. ZD-40 •· _, 1 ---
Cruhe ai11ile 2500 1-J/4-Z lln. 10 •• iT 1 
---
lr it ill• Pollc ia •il• Ue 4600 I 64 
french aub •i••il• 3000 l 98 french bnd-baeed ailliaile 3000 I 
Hllllle eubtot•l (162 or )42) 
US f-1111/f filbter-ba.bor 1900 2 (156) 
US fi-IIIA 4708 (60) 
US P-4 750 I 024) 
US A-61/A-71 9oo-itloG 2 (60) 
lritieh Vulc•• 1-Z boaber 2100 2 ss 
Frenc~ Mir11e IV-A boaber 1600 I 46 
986 
IIATO l•ccord loa to 
Total Weapon I lt .. i&•d tall, 
161 or 1041) 11 
WAISAW Paet/IIATO a.tio 1:1 
, 
"l•oed on info ... tion In the Cbri••i•o Scl•nce Monitor, lov•.bor 2J, 1911. 
Chart incl .. ee onlr tho•• cateaoriee of luro,.aa-theatar weapon• cowere4 by ace&hnev 
in hie Mov. 2 interview in Der Spleaal. lt aacludae IDJ varheada 4ivarted to luropeaa 
theeter fra. centrel (euperpouer to euperpover intercoatineotel) •rete .. under SALT. 
lt •Ieo exclude• weepon1 under J~G- or 728-~ reaae. 
~/ lnternetionel lnethute for Streceaic Studiee (JISS) infor .. tion, .. i•lr froa 
1he Hllitarr lelance 1911-1912, unleee otbetviee •te4. 
~/ Der Spieael. Piauree for •r•te .. apparent&, loclu4e4 la Soviet·reckonioa but 
unquentified •~e taken fro. the The MilltacJ lelence unleet in4ic•ted, aA4 put in 
Pllt•ntbeaea. 
!:_/ Ortober 17, 1911 loouo of Der Splecel. 
!1 Lewrence freedMan. "Ar .. Coacrol ia lurope," pp. 21-~1. publi•~•• bp The lopal 
lnatitute of lntern•tional Affalca, London. lriti-' ao4 Preach •iaeilaa added on 111uap• 
tioR Df et&bility in preeent deplor .. at. 
~I Weet Ce~r .. n Oefenae Hiaietry. 
!I lreahnev appear• to iacluda only Sl-20e beae4 veat of Ural•, ••elude• 11•201 
••et of Urele but e~Je to hit l~rope. Hence lreahnev fiau~• helf of 11&1 aa4 lcoooaiet. 
1~ Econoaut ficur• aubetitute4 .for out••t•• IllS fiaura, eiac:a 1111 Hllitery lal-
ance lute SS.-20 nu.bere et preea ti-. eH •ev deploy.ente added in .. aatiM at rate 
of ORe ev~r)' five dare. l111 Hi.lherr hliiJIC8 li_lte4 total SS-20. lltllll. OR Europe 
l!:ui••ted Inventory \9&Y 
if Full laapleaent•t ien 
1-TOIY IIARIIIADS !f HATO Plono f!/ 
liSS ICCHIC:.dlt !:_/ A'41•il•ble Arrivina Weap01u Warhe-ede 
11) .. , 11) )2) b/ )17 b/ 200 600 
40 40 40 - u- ~ )40 )40 )40 11 S0-200• S0-200• "!I l50 u 27 1/ l9 ~/ 51 )9 • Il 
659 "2 1009 462 200-SOO• 6SD-8SO+ 
u ., 104 r/ H 100 400 
liO liO 248 '' 
46 300 600 
125 125 
100 '' 
22 
410 410 
192 '' 44 0 or 500 ,i/ soo 0 or 200 l.J..I o"or 50 J! 
.. 
16]9 or 2442 vhb 16Sl or 609 or 650 to 1650 to 
2U9 J! 3502 ... rh• ad• 1151 .i/ 659 .i/ 900+ 1150+ 
0 or 110 110 0 or 110 0 Ot 91 
--- --- --- ---
108 101 
--- --- --- ---
464 464 
64 64 •• 20 64 64 aq 10 10 26 80 80 
11 11 11 I 18 18 
162 or 342 ,l 342 162 Ot )42 i.l 54 Ot 145 j/ 134 734 
156 156 Jl2 45 170 J40 
'UAacctNnted eince b11ed iD u.a. 
324 264 11 97 c/ 14 
60 ll J_/ 
]0 '' 
10 
57 56 112 b/ 19 
]) 3] u- 6 
J92 Ot ... vitb 746 or 141 or 904 1074 
972J! ll09 ... rto ... 926 j/ 239J! 
2.1:1 or ... _. 2.21 2.211 or ~.1:1 ar 0.7:1 ea 1.):1 ta 
2.2:1 ........... ,:2; 2:1 2_1,) Id I 7•1 
an4 Cllin•, oa4 lcooa.i•t •••d cwla-of-cll~ Wa•tora calcul•tion of rvo-cblrdo of cot•l 
coraot..t oo lucop•. . 
11/ &.tcapol•t .. fro. The Hillt•rJ a.l•••• with Ecana.i•t updato. 
T/ The Hllitory loleoco, p. 12. I! LA-c fia••• lf 72D-.._ una• •J•t- .,.dudetl, hipor .fiture if Included. 
~ 1111 oral ••••lnetlon. The Hlllt•rJ lal•••• liot• both G- and H-claao ouba, 
but H-cl••• le couated •• centr•l etr•teaic IJilea under SALt, 10 only the C-cl••• le 
li1ted here. . 
!/ latrepol•t .. fro. 1h• Hilit•rr a.l•ace. 
~I Tb~ Ka4er•l•atl .. of MAlO'• Me•iua-lanae Thaatar Nuclear Fat'ce•• Concree1ionel 
report LlbracJ of Conar•••• Dec. ll, 19801 en4 Weet Cer••• Oef~nee Hiniacry. 
~I Per•hlna I' une~le to reach lawiet tarrltorr froa Weat Cer .. n b••••· Uncleer 
if it ie couate4 la lcea .. ew 1 e Ruabe~•~ 10 both variant• a~ven bet'e in lr~&hne• aA4 IJSS 
lioti•&•· lifher •u.bor includedo 101 Porollina IA'o pluo 72 IA"o fro• Neat ee ... nJ 
2/ Deducte 10 •ircr•ft actuallr ••••• in U.S. ~ether tb•n lucope. 
!/ De4ucte 27 aircrafc on ••con4 carrier that h11 aot been in ~dit•~renean for 
paet two reara. 
r/ Lower fiaur• than .. th ... tical 
"IISS ; ...... oolr partial utili&otioa. 
Source: Stanley R. Sloan, " NATO theater nuclear forces: modernization and arms controf"; Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 19th February 1982. 
-= 
APPENDIX IV 
B. MANPOWER EFFORT - 1981 
Period of compulsory• Total in armed forces2 
military service military personnel 
(months) (thousands) 
Army Navy Air force (e) 
Belgium 103 103 103 109 
France 12 12 12 575 
Germany 15 15 15 495 
Italy 12 18 12 505 
Luxembourg voluntary 1 
Netherlands 14-16 14-17 14-17 107 
United Kingdom voluntary 331 
ToTAL WEU 2,123 
Canada voluntary 82 
Denmark 9 9 9 32 
Greece 22-32 26 24 186 
Norway 12 15 15 40 
Portugal 16 24 24 90 
Turkey 20 20 20 741 
United States voluntary 2,120 
ToTAL NON-WEU 3,291 
ToTAL NATO 5,414 
Sources: 
1. IISS Military Balance, 1981-82. 
2. NATO press communique, M-DPC-2 (81) 20, 8th December 1981. 
3. Eight months if served in Germany. 
e = estimate. 
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Total armed forces2 
(military and civilian) 
as percentage 
of active population 
(e) 
2.8 
3.0 
2.5 
2.4 
0.8 
2.7 
2.1 
2.5 
1.0 
1.6 
6.2 
2.6 
2.3 
4.4 
2.9 
3.5 
2.8 
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APPENDIX V 
List of treaties with nuclear arms control implications 
Short title 
Antarctic 
Partial test ban 
Outer space 
Tlatelolco 
Non-proliferation 
Se abed 
ABM 
ABM protocol 
SALT I 
(Interim 
agreement) 
Threshold test 
ban1 
Date 
of 
signature 
1st December 1959 
5th August 1963 
27th January 1967 
14th February 1967 
1st July 1968 
11th February 1971 
26th May 1972 
3rd July 1974 
26th May 1972 
3rd July 1974 
Peaceful nuclear 28th May 1976 
explosions1 
SALT lP 18th June 1979 
l. Not ratified by the United States. 
No. 
of 
parties 
21 
112 
82 
22 
115 
70 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Nuclear weapons 
powers 
which 
are not 
parties 
China 
China, France: 
China 
None 
(Protocol 11) 
China, 
France 
China, 
France 
(bilateral 
United 
States-
Soviet 
Union) 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
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Chief provisions 
affecting nuclear weapons 
Bans nuclear weapons or tests in 
Antarctica 
Bans nuclear tests in atmosphere, 
under water, in outer space 
Bans nuclear weapons in orbit or 
on celestial bodies 
Bans nuclear weapons in Latin 
America 
Prohibits transfer of nuclear ex-
plosive devices by a nuclear 
weapon state to any other state; 
prohibits nuclear weapons states 
from assisting non-nuclear 
weapons states manufacturing 
nuclear weapons 
Bans nuclear weapons on seabed 
Limits anti-ballistic missiles to 
two sites 
Limits sites to one 
5-year freeze with limits on 
ICBMs and SLBMs 
Bans underground tests over 
150Kt 
Regulates nuclear explosions for 
peaceful purposes . 
Limits ICBMs; SLBMs; heavy 
bombers; ASBMs 
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APPENDIX VI 
Questionnaire on the attitude of the 
principal political parties in the WEU countries 
to the. various peace movements 
Introduction 
Mr. Joseph Mommersteeg has been 
appointed Rapporteur of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments to prepare a 
report on "The problem of nuclear weapons in 
Europe". Among other aspects of the subject, 
the report will study the balance of forces in 
Europe; the NATO decision on the modernisa-
tion of theatre nuclear forces in Europe; and 
the progress and prospects of the Geneva talks 
on intermediate-range nuclear forces. It will 
also examine the state of public opinion on 
these issues. 
In this latter connection, Mr. Mommer-
steeg hopes to provide authoritative information 
on the policy of the principal political parties 
with respect to the various "peace" movements 
in the seven WEU countries (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom) or similar movements which 
advocate nuclear disarmament or disarmament 
in general (reference in the body of this ques-
tionnaire to "peace movements" is to be taken 
to refer to any such similar organisation). 
To provide a factual basis for this assess-
ment, Mr. Mommersteeg has asked for this 
questionnaire to be sent to the principal politi-
cal parties represented in the parliaments of the 
WEU countries. In order to meet the time-
table for the preparation of his report, Mr. 
Mommersteeg would be most grateful if answers 
to the questionnaire could be sent to the Office 
of the Clerk at the following address by 1st 
February 1982: 
Office of the Clerk of the 
Assembly of WEU 
43, avenue du President Wilson 
7 577 5 Paris Cedex 16 
Telephone: (I) 723.54.32 
Questionnaire 
I. Please give the full titles of any peace 
movements to which replies to any of the fol-
lowing questions refer. 
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2. Does your party officially support in any 
way the peace movements in your country? 
If so, please state which movements, and 
whether: 
(a) your party is officially represented on 
the controlling organs of the peace 
movement; 
(b) your party has been officially repre-
sented at public demonstrations orga-
nised by the peace movement - give 
dates and places of demonstrations 
concerned; 
(c) your party provides general political 
support for the peace movement (party 
resolutions, speakers, participation in 
conferences, etc.); 
(d) your party has provided any material 
assistance to the peace movement 
(finance, administrative facilities, offi-
ces, staff, etc.). 
3. In the absence of official party support 
for the peace movement, is it generally known 
that many members of your party are active in 
the peace movements? Which movements? 
4. Do any other aspects of party policy 
indicate support for the peace movements in 
any other particular way? Do the broad aims 
of the peace movements form part of your party 
manifesto? 
5. (a) Alternatively, does party policy in any 
way oppose the aims of the peace movements? 
(b) Does your party in any way consider 
membership of or association with the peace 
movements to be incompatible with member-
ship of the party (specify movements con-
cerned)? 
General 
Please add any more general comments 
you may have concerning the policy of your 
party towards the peace movements, or 
concerning the other topics to be covered in the 
report (see Introduction). It would be appre-
ciated if you would send copies of any recent 
party statements, or pamphlets concerning these 
issues. 
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List of p11rties to which the questionnaire 
w11s 11ddressed 11nd replies received 
Replies 
received 
Belgium: Social Christian Party X 
CVP 
Socialist Party X 
SP 
PRL X 
PVV 
France: RPR X 
Communist Party 
Socialist Party X 
UDF X 
Germany: CDU X 
csu X 
SPD 
FOP 
Italy: PCI X 
PSI 
Christian Democrat Party 
Luxembourg: Social Christian Party 
Socialist Party X 
Democratic Party 
Netherlands: CDA X 
Labour Party X 
Liberal Party X 
Democrats '66 X 
United Kingdom: Conservative Party X 
Labour Party X 
Liberal Party 
Social Democratic Party X 
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Amendment 1 
The problem oi nuclear weapons in Europe 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Gessner 
14th June 1982 
1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Welcoming that the United States Government has declared itself ready to respect the 
SALT 11 agreements on condition that the Soviet Union does too; " 
1. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (amendment withdrawn). 
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Signed: Gessner 
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Amendment 2 
The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe 
AMENDMENT 21 
tllbled by Mr. Pignion 
14th June 1982 
2. In paragraph A of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "A. Call on member govern-
ments acting in the North .Atlantic Council, " and insert " A. Develop a European approach to dis-
cussions in the North Atlantic Council so as:". 
Signed: Pignion 
l. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendments 3 and 4 
The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe 
AMENDMENTS 3 and 41 
tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg 
15th June 1982 
3. After paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Welcoming the declaration of the United States Government that it will refrain from actions 
which undercut existing strategic arms agreements as long as the USSR shows equal restraints, 
and comparable statements of the Soviet Union, and appealing to both governments to forma-
lise those statements at the opening of the START negotiations;". 
4. In the draft recommendation proper, renumber paragraph B. as B. I. and add a new paragraph 
as follows: 
" B.2. Develop a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North 
Atlantic Council. " 
Signed: Mommersteeg 
1. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (amendments agreed to). 
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The Assembly; 
Application of Order 55 -
Exchange of letters between Mr. Mulley, 
President of the Assembly, 
and Mrs. Veil and Mr. Dankert, 
successive Presidents of the .European Parliament 
ORDER SS 
on European union and WEU 
Sth April 1982 
Considering that being composed of representatives of the parliaments of member coun-
tries gives it exclusive responsibility for ensuring the application of the provisions of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, particularly its Articles IV, V and VIII; 
Considering that the European Parliament, elected by direct suffrage, is logically the parlia-
mentary interlocutor of the Community bodies; 
Noting that in fact the Ten tackle many matters relating to the security of Europe, parti-
cularly in their political consultations, but accepting that the Community has no direct responsibi-
lity for defence matters; 
Considering that progress in co-operation and consultation between the Ten can lead to 
the establishment of a future European union; 
Considering that legally WEU is still the only available instrument for European co-
operation in defence matters allowing a dialogue between governments and parliamentarians; 
Considering that these facts demonstrate the need for co-operation .between the WEU 
Assembly and the European Parliament and for the establishment of a sub-committee of the 
General Affairs Committee to keep under review the role of WEU in the context of this important 
report and of further developments; 
Considering that co-operation between the two assemblies is their responsibility but must 
not prejudice any decisions which member countries may take subsequently, 
1. INVITES the President of the Assembly to contact the President of the European Parliament 
to ensure: 
(a) that invitations are sent regularly to observers from the European Parliament to attend 
sessions of the WEU Assembly and to observers from the WEU Assembly to attend 
sittings of the European Parliament when the agenda includes debates on matters affect-
ing Europe's security; 
(b) that a standing committee drawn from both assemblies is set up by the most appropriate 
means to ensure harmonisation of their work; 
2. INVITES the President of the Assembly to make the necessary contacts with the President of 
the European Parliament with a view to encouraging harmonisation of views on economic and 
political matters which affect Europe's security. 
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14th December 1981 
At its recent session, the Assembly of Western European Union, in the framework of its 
debate on the report by Mr. De Poi on European union and WEU, adopted an order on the estab-
lishment of co-operation between our two assemblies. 
This order, a copy of which I am enclosing, refers to an exchange of observers, the setting up 
of a standing committee and the harmonisation of views on economic and political matters 
which affect Europe's security. 
The Assembly invited me to contact you to examine these problems and I have therefore 
asked the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly to get in touch with your secretariat in order to 
arrange a meeting on a date convenient to both you and I. 
Mrs. Simone VEIL, 
President of the European Parliament, 
32, rue de Babylone, 
75007 Paris 
Dear Mr. President, 
* 
* * 
(Signed) Fred MULLEY 
Luxembourg, 8th January 1982 
You were kind enough to forward to me, by letter of 14th December 1981, the order 
adopted by the Assembly of Western European Union on the establisment of co-operation bet-
ween our two assemblies. 
The matter will be submitted to the enlarged Bureau of the European Parliament which is to 
be elected at our next part-session, and the President of Parliament will inform you of the out-
come of the enlarged Bureau's deliberations on this subject. 
The Rt. Hon. Fred MULLEY, 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union, 
· 43, avenue du President Wilson, 
75775 Paris Cedex 16 
* 
* * 
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Yours sincerely, 
(Signed) Simone VEIL 
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Brussels, 31st March 1982 
Dear Mr. President, 
Referring to the conversation we had yesterday in Brussels on the subject of the relations 
between the Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament, I now formally repeat the decision 
taken by the enlarged Bureau of the European Parliament at its meeting of 28th January 1982: 
"The enlarged Bureau, 
- having regard to the respective responsibilities of the two assemblies; 
- considered that it was not necessary to institutionalise relations with the Assembly of 
WEU, but 
- considered that observers could be sent by either Assembly whenever the debates in the 
European Parliament or the Assembly of WEU were of interest to either institution;". 
As a consequence of our meeting and the decision taken by the enlarged Bureau, I have 
now instructed the secretariat of the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament to 
forward to your secretariat all the documents which may be of interest to your institution. 
Equally, I have instructed them to inform you in due course whenever a document relevant 
to your institution is discussed by the European Parliament and conveyed to them our decision 
to increase the exchange of views, in particular at the level of rapporteurs. 
Finally, may I say how much I enjoyed our conversation. 
The Rt. Hon. Fred MuLLEY, 
President of the Assembly of WEU, 
43, avenue du President Wilson, 
7 577 5 Paris Cedex 16 
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Yours sincerely, 
(Signed) P. DANKERT 
Document 920 16th April1982 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 372 to 377 
RECOMMENDATION 372 1 
on European union and WEU 2 
The Assembly, 
Taking note of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 358 ; 
Aware of the interest again shown by certain governments in setting up a European union ; 
Noting the development of consultations between members of the EEC on questions of foreign 
policy; 
Accepting the urgent need for European consultation and co-operation on defence matters for 
which WEU is the appropriate framework in order to preserve Europe's security and to allow it to 
play an active role in disarmament negotiations ; 
Noting nevertheless that the development of co-operation between members of the EEC in the 
defence field is still encountering difficulties which are far from solution ; 
Considering that WEU is still the only available instrument for such co-operation and that the 
modified Brussels Treaty obliges the seven member countries to use it, but deploring the fact that 
member countries have so far interpreted this obligation in a formal and restrictive manner ; 
Recalling that WEU is indivisible and that the Assembly can play its role only insofar as the 
Council will engage a true dialogue with it ; 
Considering that progress in co-operation and consultation between EEC member countries 
helps to promote the establishment of a future European union ; 
Emphasising that WEU is the only forum in which member countries of the NATO integrated 
military organisation and France can discuss military matters, particularly those relating to nuclear 
weapons, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Take all necessary measures and action to ensure that the duties exercised by the WEU Assem-
bly under the modified Brussels Treaty are effectively strengthened ; 
2. Reform the structure and essential activities of WEU only after a thorough and adequate dia-
logue with the Assembly ; 
3. Hold effective consultations on matters relating to disarmament or the limitation of both 
conventional and nuclear weapons ; 
4. Acquaint the United States Government with the collective viewpoint of all member states on 
the negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe ; 
5. As long as no substantial progress has been made in this field, ensure that Europe provides 
itself with the means necessary for playing an effective part in measures taken in the framework of 
the Atlantic Alliance for its own security ; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session 
(9th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. De Poi on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
894). 
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6. In the framework of the European Council, foster the formation of a working group: 
(a) to define areas in which the European union cannot be established in the framework of the 
Community; 
(b) to examine how the secretariat of the WEU Council can co-operate with that of the ten-
power political consultations ; 
(c) to propose a definition of the respective responsibilities of the European Parliament and of 
the WEU Assembly in the framework of a European union ; 
(d) thus to pave the way for establishing a European union based on the harmonisation of the 
Rome and Brussels Treaties ; 
7. Invite countries which are members or which have applied for membership of the EEC to 
accede to the modified Brussels Treaty, the only present reference of European unity in security and 
defence matters. 
322 
DOCUMENT 920 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 372 
1. The Council have noted with interest Recommendation 372, which again confirmed at parlia-
mentary level the importance of WEU as the organisation competent, under the terms of its treaty, 
for European defence problems. Considering WEU's important contribution to the development of 
co-operation between the member states, achieved through their statutory commitments, in particular 
to collective self-defence (Article V) and to promoting unity and encouraging the progressive integra-
tion of Europe (Article VIII), the Council note with satisfaction the Assembly's recommendation that 
the duties exercised by the WEU Assembly under the modified Brussels Treaty should be effectively 
strengthened. In this connection, and taking into account the importance of the positive part played 
by the Assembly, which is the only European parliamentary body where members of national parlia-
ments discuss, undt;r the terms of a treaty, common security problems, the Council have endea-
voured, particularly at the last session of the WEU Assembl~ to encourage direct contacts between 
those responsible within defence ministries of member countries and the Assembly. The latter has 
thus been duly informed in detail of the main lines of the member countries' military policies in the 
present state of international affairs. 
The Council assure the Assembly that, should the case arise, no substantial reforms of WEU 
will be undertaken without prior consultation with the Assembly. 
2. As regards Europe's part in consultations on disarmament and the control of armaments, the 
Council assure the Assembly that the member countries regularly and effectively consult within the 
framework of political co-operation among the Ten, either with respect to specific problems raised at 
the United Nations and at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, or, more generally, to co-
ordinate their policies in multilateral negotiations on such problems. 
On matters relating to arms control, consultation takes place at various levels within the Atlan-
tic Alliance, of which the WEU countries are members. In this context, these countries are able to 
put forward their interests and aspirations in the framework of the regular meetings of the Atlantic 
Council. In particular, for the question of the limitation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons 
(INF) an ad hoc body, the Special Consultative Group (chaired by the United States), brings together 
all the countries which took part in the decision to modernise NA TO's intermediate-range nuclear 
forces for the purpose of consulting closely on, and following developments in, the negotiations which 
opened in Geneva on 30th November 1981. 
3. The Council assure the Assembly that European countries will continue, in the appropriate 
fora, to seek and implement means of co-operation aimed at co-ordinating their efforts to ensure the 
most effective use of resources for the defence of the Alliance. The European countries which are 
members of the integrated military structure contribute also to allied defence by participating in 
NATO's long-term defence plan (LTDP) which, as all are aware, was approved at the Washington 
summit in May 1978 and provides for the strengthening of certain fundamental sectors of allied 
conventional forces. Finally, it is within this framework that direct participation by certain Euro-
pean countries in the recent adoption of a position on intermediate-range nuclear forces has assumed 
importance. This led to the dual decision of December 1979 to modernise these forces and, simulta-
neously, to offer to negotiate with the Soviet Union about them. 
4. The Council endorse the Assembly's desire that Europe should provide itself with the means 
necessary for playing an effective part in measures taken in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance 
for its own security. 
5. The Council note with interest the proposals put forward by the Assembly under points 6 and 
7 of its recommendation and intend to reply to them carefully when the contacts and conversations 
now taking place in other fora, and which relate to several ideas underlying these points, are suf-
ficiently advanced to make such a reply possible. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1982. 
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RECOMMENDATION 3731 
on European security and the South Atlantic'-
The Assembly, 
(z) Recognising that the countries of the Alliance are highly dependent on imports of petroleum 
and of certain minerals originating in a few cases from a very small number of countries ; 
(iz) Noting that many of the countries of origin of these raw materials are in areas of local tension 
where insurgency, subversion, racial tension and potential local conflict pose a threat to continuity of 
production and local transport ; 
(iiz) Aware that the shipping routes for these materials are potentially vulnerable, particularly in 
straits and narrows in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic and the Caribbean ; 
(iv) Concerned at the Soviet Union's long-standing superiority in submarines and its large construc-
tion programme for ocean-going surface combat ships; 
(v) Observing the expanding world-wide deployment of the Soviet navy with permanent bases in 
the Indian Ocean, a presence in the South Atlantic and occasional visits to the Caribbean, but aware 
that in the event of major hostilities in Europe the priority task for Soviet naval forces must be to 
attempt to prevent the reinforcement and resupply of Europe through the Caribbean and North 
Atlantic; 
(vz) Believing however that the situation in southern Africa and the South Atlantic should not be 
interpreted in terms of East-West antagonism, and that the attitude of countries in the area makes it 
unlikely that European security could be furthered through a search for bases or the extension of 
military pacts; 
(viz) Convinced that there has to come a fundamental political change in South Africa, based on the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the interest of all the inhabitants of South 
Africa and in the interest of world peace and that the western world has to do its utmost to promote 
such a change, 
REcoMMENDs THAT THE CoUNciL 
Urge member governments: 
1. To continue to consult with their allies and seek common objectives in the framework of Euro-
pean political co-operation and in the North Atlantic Council concerning events in any part of the 
world which may jeopardise the security interests of allied countries ; 
2. To give priority to the search for political solutions to reduce causes of local tension and 
potential conflict, to secure: a settlement of the outstanding problems in the Middle East; the inde-
pendence of Namibia in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 435; and a just 
solution based on the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the policies in the 
Republic of South Africa; 
3. To take steps to reduce the vulnerability of their petroleum and mineral imports, where poss-
ible and as most appropriate through diversification of the source of supply; the search for alternative 
materials and energy sources; conservation, recycling and stockpiling; 
4. To improve their naval forces with a view to ensuring that those of the NATO countries 
collectively provide an adequate East-West balance bearing in mind the allied need for substantial 
anti-submarine forces of all types and ocean-going surface combatants to keep open the sea lanes of 
communication in contingencies where these may be threatened outside the NATO area; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary 
Session (I Oth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Dr. Miller on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Document 888). 
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5. To use bilateral interservice or intergovernmental channels to make co-ordinated arrangements 
outside the NATO area: 
(z) for occasional flag-showing naval visits in the South Atlantic and other areas with a view 
to fostering good relations with the littoral countries; 
(iz) for joint exercises with local navies in appropriate cases; 
(iiz) for naval deployments to protect the right of passage of allied shipping in accordance with 
international law if jeopardised by local conflicts; 
6. To support measures of properly verified arms control and disarmament that will 
preserve a balance of forces, in particular the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Wea-
pons in Latin America; proposals for a nuclear weapon-free zone in Africa; and proposals 
to regulate the international transfer of armaments. 
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to Recommendation 373 
The Council have. taken note of the remarks expressed by the Assembly in the preamble of 
Recommendation 373. The various points of.this recommendation call for the following observa-
tions: 
1. The Council of course fa'vour the continuation of political consultations, both in the political 
co-operation machinery of the Ten and in the North Atlantic Council. Such consultations lead to a 
better understanding and analysis of situations which have an influence on European security. They 
help to strengthen the cohesion of the institutions concerned and the stability of international rela-
tions. In the same spirit, the member states of WEU intend to continue to consult each other at the 
appropriate time on situations affecting their common interests, taking into consideration the fact that 
these interests may be affected by events occurring in other parts of the world, and to work with other 
countries in order to reduce causes of tension, particularly in the South Atlantic. In this connection, 
the Council recall the terms of paragraph 9 of the final communique adopted at the conclusion of the 
ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on lOth and 11th December 1981. 
2. The Council totally subscribe to the remarks expressed by the Assembly on the need to find 
political solutions to crises and conflicts that may occur in the world, particularly in the South Atlan-
tic, and in so doing to abide fully by the Charter of the United Nations. It remains true that the 
reduction of causes of tension is not solely a political issue. Peace, economic development and 
progress, social justice, are closely interrelated and contribute to the evolution of contemporary socie-
ties. International co-operation must accompany this evolution and at the same time the right of 
countries to develop their own political and economic systems must be respected. 
3. In order to ensure, as far as possible, continuity in the supply of energy for European countries 
and to reduce the vulnerability of their imports of energy products and raw materials, the Council 
share the Assembly's concerns and consider that it is desirable to diversify the sources of supply. 
This supply policy falls within the wider objective of achieving less dependence in energy matters, 
a more rational and economic use of energy, and finally the development of coal, nuclear energy and 
other sources of energy that are renewable, such as solar energy. 
4. The modernisation of naval forces is a long-term undertaking to which the member countries 
of WEU remain deeply committed. They are, moreover, conscious of the particular requirement of 
the tasks performed by the allied navies, especially in the protection of western sea lanes throughout 
the world. 
5. The establishment of a stable and just international order flows from the development and 
intensification of relations at all levels between states. The Council therefore consider that every-
thing must be done to prevent East/West rivalry from spreading to the third world. It follows that 
outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, the improvement of international relations 
calls for initiatives which are based on the consent of the countries concerned and the willingness of 
others to respect and help them maintain their independence. Such initiatives may be adapted to 
each case. 
6. The Council are naturally anxious to support in the South Atlantic region any measures of 
verifiable and balanced disarmament. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1982. 
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RECOMMENDATION 3741 
on the reappraisal of global dangers to western peace and security2 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the balance of forces that has ensured peace for thirty years is seriously jeo-
pardised by the accumulation in Europe of Soviet conventional and nuclear arms which the Atlantic 
Alliance does not have the means of countering at the present time; 
Considering that this situation calls for a significant and sustained effort by all the members of 
the Alliance so that the negotiations on the limitation of armaments may be conducted with deter-
mined vigour to allow a balance to be re-established at the lowest possible level; 
Considering that this effort must seek to give the Atlantic Alliance the ability to deter any 
aggression, whatever means a possible aggressor may employ; 
Welcoming the efforts made by the United States and by some European members of the 
Alliance to correct the imbalance; 
Regretting that these efforts do not receive adequate backing and are not accompanied by a 
similar effort by certain other countries; 
Considering that the moral cohesion and determination to provide itself with the means necess-
ary for its defence are an essential part of the deterrent exercised by the Atlantic Alliance and that 
this determination is too easily being undermined by Soviet propaganda, which should and could be 
far more vigorously rebutted; 
Recognising that decisions taken now to strengthen the defensive potential of Western Europe 
cannot take full effect for several years; 
Considering also that present crises in many areas of the world not covered by the Atlantic 
Alliance constitute a serious threat to Western Europe's supplies of raw materials and energy; 
Considering that the development of Soviet naval power and the system of alliances that the 
USSR has elaborated in the last ten years increase the risks that these crises involve for international 
peace; 
Considering in particular that the evolution of the situation in the Near and Middle East can 
endanger the vital interests of Western Europe and that events in Egypt in October 1981 may cons.-
titute serious threats to peace ; 
Considering that unless they are accompanied by meaningful consultations between the 
members of the Atlantic Alliance such crises may divide them and weaken the deterrent capability of 
the Alliance ; 
Considering that Western European interests make it incumbent upon the member countries 
of WEU " to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever 
area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability ", according to Article VIII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Promote by all means at its disposal the re-establishment of the balance of all military forces 
between East and West on the lowest possible level ; 
2. Promote with no less determination the development of negotiations, particularly between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, on the limitation of armaments, including theatre weapons, with 
a view to re-establishing this balance ; · 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (11th 
Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Baume1 on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
887). 
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3. Ensure that its members respect the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council on 19th 
December 1979 in the field of armaments ; 
4. Examine the action to be taken on the study conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee 
on the European armaments industries with a view to gaining maximum efficiency from military 
investment expenditure in the member countries ; 
5. Ensure that Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty is applied in all circumstances and, to 
this end, organise within WEU machinery to improve its means· for crisis management ; 
6. Urge the North Atlantic Council: 
(a) to consult with each other in the event of a crisis outside Europe endangering international 
peace; 
(b) to strengthen the solidarity of the members of the Atlantic Alliance should one or several of 
them be compelled to engage their forces for the maintenance of peace and security in areas 
not covered by the treaty. 
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The Council intend to act in order to maintain the global balance of forces - which is the 
condition for ensuring peace - if possible at the lowest level. In this spirit, the WEU member coun-
tries support the holding of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning 
their respective nuclear arsenals and designed to lead to significant and verifiable reductions and limi-
tations. 
The Council, however, are clearly aware of the considerable and continuous growth of Soviet 
military power and offensive potential which today is evident, in particular, in the sphere of the 
intermediate-range weapons directly threatening Western Europe. This is especially true in as much 
as this development of the Soviet arsenal, which affects the overall balance of forces between East and 
West, adds to the Soviet Union's increasing ability to deploy its potential on a global scale. The 
WEU member countries are therefore determined to maintain their deterrent potential at the required 
level. 
The Council, at the appropriate moment, will examine in depth and with the aim of efficiency, 
the action to be taken on the study conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee on the "Arma-
ments sector of industry in the WEU member countries". It is hoped that this study will assist the 
governments of the WEU member countries to move towards greater co-operation in their program-
mes and military investment expenditure. 
The Council of WEU, which, under the terms of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
are the political decision-reaching body, wish to point out that they have always endeavoured to 
carry out fully and rigorously the tasks devolving upon them. In this spirit, they pay particularly 
close attention to the various aspects of the development of East-West relations and in this connec-
tion examine the possible sources of tension or crisis and the means of remedying them. This is also 
true of the North Atlantic Council. It is impossible to dissociate the security and welfare of the 
peoples living within the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty from events occurring in other 
parts of the world. The WEU member countries, therefore, support any machinery for concerted 
political action which would enable a common assessment to be made of crisis situations endangering 
international peace, whenever they consider it necessary. They point out, however, that it is up to 
each member country to define the contribution that it can make to establish a more stable and just 
international order. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1982. 
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RECOMMENDATION 3751 
on negotiations on theatre nuclear forces2 
The Assembly, 
(l) Stressing the continued validity of Recommendation 367; 
(iz) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 367; 
(iiz) Noting with concern the still growing number of Soviet land-based theatre nuclear forces in 
Europe; 
(iv) Fully aware that public opinion in Europe and particularly youth are moved by feelings of 
insecurity and are deeply concerned about the present high levels of nuclear weapons and about the 
dangers of a new and unlimited arms race; 
(v) Believing the growing expression of public concern about all aspects of nuclear weapons reveals 
also misunderstanding and a lack of objective information; 
(vz) Convinced that governments and parliament should pay continuous attention to the fact that 
security policy must rely on the trust and support of properly-informed public opinion, thereby stres-
sing the point that only balanced and properly verifiable reductions are compatible with European 
security, and that such reductions will not be achieved without serious negotiations; 
(viz) Welcoming President Reagan's negotiating proposals of 18th November 1981; 
(viiz) Welcoming the opening of talks on theatre nuclear forces in Geneva on 30th November 1981 
and the view of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group that "on the basis of reciprocity the zero level 
remains a possible option under ideal circumstances"; 
(ix) Stressing the importance of European-American co-operation in the Special Consultative 
Group; 
(x) Hoping_ that the negotiations in Geneva will provide the political impetus for a gradual deve-
lopment of a broad negotiating process on the limitation and reduction of all nuclear weapons and 
will lead to a decisive turn in the armaments race; 
(xz) Believing that the failure of the major nuclear weapons powers to introduce the reductions 
provided for in Article 6 of the non-proliferation treaty undermines the aims of that treaty, thereby 
diminishing the chances of establishing generally-respected full safeguards on the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy and even increasing one risk of nuclear war, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Call on member governments: 
1. To urge the North Atlantic Council to continue to rely on the dual decision of 12th December 
1979 on long-range theatre nuclear forces as a realistic basis for negotiating seriously on reductions in 
the levels of these weapons; 
2. To· ensure that the public acquires a better understanding of the real situation drawing among 
other sources on the report to be prepared "within the Alliance as soon as possible which would 
compare, for the information of the public, NATO and Warsaw Pact forces". 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (11th 
Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Motion for a Recommendation tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and others with a request for 
urgent procedure (Document 900). 
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1. The Council take careful note of the views of the Assembly expressed in their recommendation 
on negotiations on theatre nuclear forces (now known as intermediate-range nuclear forces). The 
Council echo the opinion of the Assembly on points made in the recommendation, in particular: 
concern about the growing number of Soviet land-based intermediate-range nuclear systems; the wel-
come extended by the Assembly to President Reagan's proposals announced on 18th November 1981; 
the importance of co-operation and consultation between the NATO allies concerned in discussion of 
intermediate-range nuclear forces in the Special Consultative Group as well as of the exchange of 
information in the North Atlantic Council. 
2. The Council also welcome the attention paid by the Assembly to the importance of the public 
presentation of the policies of member countries both on defence and deterrence and on arms control. 
3. Regarding the Assembly's recommendation that the North Atlantic Council should continue to 
rely on the double decision of 12th December 1979, the Council recall that it is the declared inten-
tion of the NATO allies concerned that they will move ahead with the December 1979 'two-track 
decision on intermediate-range nuclear force modernisation and arms control. They reiterate the 
view expressed in December 1981 by the allies who participated in the 1979 double decision, namely 
that the dual-track decision opened the way to reducing the threat to the Alliance through inter-
mediate-range nuclear force modernisation and arms control negotiations and that determination in 
implementing both tracks of the decision has been a key factor in convincing the Soviet Union to 
negotiate without preconditions, thus creating the opportunity of achieving genuine arms reductions. 
4. The Council attach the greatest importance to the positions and attitudes of the publics in 
member countries on the subject of nuclear weapons and their arms control. They believe that an 
important and continuing task is the explanation of the defensive nature of the North Atlantic 
Alliance, the rationale behind the strategy of deterrence and the essential role of arms control. The 
task of explanation is all the greater in the light of the sustained Soviet propaganda campaign which 
aims to undercut public support for agreed objectives and policies of the Alliance. In their task of 
providing their publics with accurate information, members of the Council will rely on material from 
their own national sources and, for those who participated in the drafting of it, on material co-
ordinated and agreed by the allies, in particular the forthcoming report which will compare NATO 
and Warsaw Pact forces. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1982. 
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RECOMMENDATION 3761 
on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology2 
The Assembly, 
Referring to its Recommendation 316 on United States-European co-operation and competi-
tion in advanced technology, adopted in June 1978, and the Council's reply dated 16th November 
1978; 
Considering that some useful progress has been made in the development of European-
American links in the military sector of industry; 
Regretting that its proposal in Recommendation 316 for a high-level European-United States 
special committee to promote European-United States co-operation in advanced technology projects 
had been ignored by the governments concerned, although such a special committee could have 
played an important rOle in the co-ordination of advanced technology; 
Considering the growing need to co-operate for economic, financial, political and military rea-
sons, and, inter alia, because of budgetary restraints, with a view to avoiding. overlapping in research 
programmes and needless delays and wastage of necessarily scarce financial resources; 
Considering the slow start and development of transatlantic technology transfer because of diffi-
culties in overcoming differences in standards; 
Aware of the serious problems between NASA and ESA due to respective priorities with regard 
to scientific programmes such as the joint international solar-polar mission; 
Conscious of the present American administration's stated willingness to inject new life into 
American-European collaboration in many fields of high technology, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Invite member governments: 
1. To study jointly how to bring military requirements into line with budgetary resources, for 
instance by the further joint development of new composite materials for military hardware, in order 
to halt the spiral of ever-increasing costs within military budgets, or by using an existing platform as 
was the case with the Boeing 707 and the Nimrod for AWACS or could be the Tornado for electronic 
jamming devices; 
2. To study - in comparison with other systems - the various merits of the competing systems 
offered by the Lockheed/Dassault-Dornier Alpha-Jet trainer, the McDonnell Douglas/British Aero-
space Hawk trainer and the Grumman-Beechcraft project for the jet flight training of American navy 
pilots (VTXTS programme); 
3. To bear in mind the need for an up-to-date and as comprehensive as possible European milit-
ary pilots' training system promoting harmonisation in the training systems and finally conclude that 
the best system should also be adopted generally in the European theatre; 
4. To foster, within the framework of the International Energy Agency related to the OECD, 
where appropriate, a co-ordinated research and development programme, especially with regard to 
solar and wind energy which have to be funded by governments in order to avoid developments 
within national boundaries which fail to take account of developments in the same fields in other 
countries; 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (12th 
Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalfofthe Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions (Document 889). 
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5. To invite the French Government to participate in the efforts in the International Energy 
Agency towards a collaborative and imaginative research and development programme; 
6. To examine and use to good avail work carried out in the United States in its national wind 
energy programme; 
7. To instruct their diplomatic missions in the United States to follow closely developments in 
respect of: 
(a) the international solar-polar mission which should have priority for NASA funding as 
otherwise confidence would be lost in the future of American-European space collabor-
ation.; 
(b) the use of Spacelab components or elements for building and developing future space 
stations or platforms; 
(c) the use of European remote-sensing satellite systems first for oceanic observation and later 
for land resources surveillance; 
(d) the space telescope programme; 
8. With regard to the law of the sea conference, to seek to avoid a split between the policies of 
Western European nations on the one hand and between the attitudes of Europe and the United 
States on the other hand, and to reconcile the need for developing countries to have access to ocean 
resources, with the essential requirement of guaranteed access to scarce minerals vital to NA TO's 
ongoing defence programme. 
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1. WEU member governments are well aware of the need to contain equipment costs and of the 
opportunities for economy which might be afforded by the use of new materials or the adaptation of 
existing weapons platforms. The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) which is the 
central focus for multinational European equipment co-operation and to which all WEU members 
belong is actively engaged in identifying opportunities of this type. 
2. Member governments naturally examine the systems which industries have to offer but the 
ultimate decision as to which system best suits their requirements will be made by governments on 
the basis of their own evaluation of their needs. 
3. It is recognised that there are many advantages in co-operation in pilot training and much has 
been achieved in this field. Pilots and navigators from three member countries together are learning 
to fly the new Tornado. And by 1984 twelve NATO nations who are members ofEurogroup will be 
represented at the Euro NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training establishment in the United States where they 
will undergo training according to a common syllabus. 
4. The Council have reservations however about making judgments on the relative merits of diffe-
rent training systems. Nations have developed their training regimes over long periods to meet their 
perceived needs and the fact that practices differ does not necessarily mean that one system is 
superior to another. 
5. The lEA implementing agreements enable the WEU member countries which participate in 
that body to co-ordinate work on solar and wind energy conversion systems funded by governments 
as well as by private enterprise. 
6. The lEA implementing agreement on large-scale wind energy programmes already facilitates 
close co-operation between those states, including the WEU member states concerned and the United 
States, who have national programmes. 
7. (a) The diplomatic missions in the United States continue to follow closely developments in 
respect of the international solar-polar mission. 
(b) Under an agreement signed in 1973 the United States Government are committed to using 
European-built spacelabs, components and spares where these are available in accordance 
with agreed schedules and at reasonable prices. The United States Government has also 
agreed not to duplicate the spacelab development. 
(c) The European Space Agency are completing definition studies of a programme for an ocea-
nic observation satellite ERS-1 which could be launched in 1987. The European partners 
welcome international collaboration in the development and utilisation of remote sensing of 
the earth. Later, as these developments become operational the establishment of reciprocal 
arrangements for the exchange of data or mutual access will be an important goal. 
(d) The space telescope is due to be launched from the shuttle in late 1985 and will enable 
extensive stellar investigations to be made from outside the earth's atmosphere. NASA has 
indicated that it attaches high priority to this project for which ESA will be supplying the 
solar arrays and faint object camera. 
8. Since the announcement by the United States Government in the spring of 1981 of a policy 
review there have been continuing consultations between European countries and with the United 
States Government about the Law of the Sea Conference. These exchanges of view have covered 
inter alia the deep sea mining provisions of the present draft convention. WEU member govern-
ments hope that an overall assessment of the balance of advantages of the present draft will be agreed 
and will continue to try to ensure that the outcome of negotiations will be satisfactory to all parties to 
the conference. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 7th Aprill982. 
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RECOMMENDATION 3771 
on the implications of the law of the sea conference2 
The Assembly, 
Considering that a single comprehensive treaty on the law of sea appears to be the best solution 
for all 160 participating countries because of the inter-relationship between all uses and activities 
connected with the oceans; 
Aware that this approach to the negotiations on the law of the sea treaty means that vital secu-
rity interests, commercial, scientific and general maritime interests, as well as environmental protec-
tion and dispute settlement procedures are all being interwoven, some interests offsetting others; 
Considering that a. successful outcome of the law of the sea conference and widespread adop-
tion of the resultant treaty would extend the scope of the law - including agreed procedure for third 
party settlement of disputes - over two-thirds of the earth's surface and could thus avoid and prevent 
military conflicts, which is of the greatest interest to the western world; · 
Considering that all the 200-nautical-mile zones of the countries of the Warsaw Pact, their sea 
and ocean surfaces, add up to 4.56 million square kilometres whereas the NATO and other Western 
European countries and Japan together have an ocean and sea area of 28 million square kilometres in 
the northern hemisphere alone which is of great economic and strategic value; 
Aware that the law of the sea conference has sought to cover the navigational, seabed mining 
and fishing interests of the participating countries although the results now achieved, especially in 
seabed mining arrangements, lean strongly towards dirigism and protectionism; 
Regretting that the negotiations on seabed mining arrangements and related institutional 
problems have not yet produced results acceptable to the United States and some Western European 
countries such as Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
1. To examine carefully the convention on the law of the sea as now laid down in the official text 
of the convention drawn up by the conference and its political and military aspects, since western 
maritime security requires a generally-accepted convention on the law of the sea; 
2. To recognise the legitimate interests of third world countries in seabed mining and acknow-
ledge their share in seabed resources of all kinds as part of the common heritage of mankind and con-
vince them that a generally-accepted convention diminishes the danger of conflicts and promotes the 
establishment of peace; 
3. To promote consultation between the main democratic industrialised countries and between 
member countries of the EEC on the remaining issues of the law of the sea conference, and especially 
on the deep-sea mining arrangements and institutional problems, in order to reach a common policy 
at the next, eleventh session in New York in spring 1982 with regard to acceptance of the results of 
the law of the sea conference. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (12th 
Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions (Document 890). 
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The Council welcome the interest taken by the Assembly in the third United Nations Law of the 
Sea Conference. They share the views of the Assembly with regard to the great importance of this 
conference for the political, economic and security interests of the WEU member states. 
The governments of the member states are prepared to continue the already existing intensive 
consultations among themselves and with all other states and groups of states represented in this 
conference, in order to reach a universally accepted international convention on the law of the 
sea. These consultations especially include NATO, the European Community and the third world 
countries. 
Member governments are particularly aware of the advantages a new international convention on 
the law of the sea may have with respect to a better establishment of the rule of law on the world 
oceans for numerous aspects of the use of the seas outside and within maritime zones under national 
jurisdiction. Such rule of law can forestall in the future many difficulties and therefore constitutes a 
factor in maintaining peaceful and friendly relations between states. They are also aware of the 
importance of such a convention for relations between western industrialised countries and develop-
ing countries of the third world. 
In spite of the fact that there are many items of the conference which are dealt with in the actual 
draft convention (of 28th August 1981) in a satisfactory manner, member governments consider, in 
accordance with the majority of states participating in the conference, that there are still some sub-
jects of the conference which need further discussion. Acknowledging this fact the conference deci-
ded at its last session iri Geneva in August 1981 to devote part of the 11th Session in New York (8th 
March to 30th April 1982) to continued informal negotiations. 
The future regime for deep seabed-mining is among the subjects needing further discussion. A 
satisfactory international regulation of deep seabed-mining is strategically and economically of great 
importance especially for industrialised Western European countries which are highly dependent on 
imports of raw materials to be extracted from the deep seabed. A generally acceptable treaty is also 
important to the developing countries, inter alia because of the financial benefits they would gain 
from the sharing of revenues resulting from the exploitation of the raw materials concerned. WEU 
member governments are prepared to take part in a constructive manner in the forthcoming consulta-
tions and negotiations, with a view to setting up a fair regime for exploitation of the seabed, compris-
ing a system of adequate access that takes into account all interests concerned. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th Aprill982. 
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Document 921 11th June 1982 
Written questions 228 and 229 and reply 
of the Council to written question 228 
QUESTION 228 
put by Mr. Mulley 
on 15th December 1981 
In its reply to Recommendation 370, the 
Council stated that " the governments will 
continue to maintain a regular exchange of 
views on the assessment of developments 
in Poland and will consult in the appropriate 
fora on a common position ". 
Can the Council say what exchanges of 
views have been held between its members as a 
result of events in Poland on 13th December 
1981 and what common position has it been 
possible to adopt? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 17th December 1981 
At their meeting on 16th December, the 
WEU Council expressed their deep and serious 
concern about developments in Poland. They 
assure the Assembly that the member states are 
in close contact and intend to remain so. 
The Council take this opportunity to 
recall their reply to Recommendation 370 in 
which it is stated that the governments would 
continue to maintain a regular exchange 
of views on the assessment of developments in 
Poland and would consult in the appropriate 
fora on a common position. 
Thus, the representatives of WEU mem-
ber countries participated in discussions on the 
situation on 14th December in the Council of 
Europe in Strasbourg and on 14th and 
16th December in the North Atlantic Council 
in Brussels. Moreover, the foreign ministers ·of 
the member countries participated in the 
meeting of the Ten in London on 14th 
and 15th December at the conclusion of which 
the following declaration was issued: 
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" 1. The foreign ministers of the member 
states of the European Community are 
concerned at the development of the situ-
ation in Poland and the imposition of 
martial law and the detention of trade 
unionists. They have profound sympathy 
for the Polish people in this tense and 
difficult time. They look to all signatory 
states of the Helsinki Final Act to refrain 
from any interference in the internal 
affairs of the Polish People's Republic. 
They look to Poland to solve these prob-
lems herself and without the use of force, 
so that the process of reform and renewal 
can continue. 
2. Foreign ministers of the Ten are conti-
nuing to follow events in Poland with 
particular attention, and agreed to remain 
in close consultation on this ques-
tion. " 
QUESTION 229 
put by Mr. Valleix 
on 5th May 1982 
Two military transport aircraft, the 
Franco-German second-generation Transall and 
the Franco-Italian military version of the 
regional transport aircraft ATR-42, are to be 
built in the 1980s. 
Are other member countries being invi-
ted to participate in the construction of one or 
both of these aircraft? 
What will be the consequences of the 
construction of the aircraft for a possible mili-
tary version of the Airbus? 
What consequences will building the 
ATR-42 have for the possible building of a 
150-seat Airbus (A-320)? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
Document 922 
The Assembly, 
Situation in the Middle East 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER1 
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and others 
with a request for urgent procedure 
In view of the grave situation in the Middle East, 
AsKS THE GENERAL AFFAIRS CoMMITTEE 
14th June 1982 
To present a draft recommendation on that matter during the present part-session. 
Signed: Bennett, Spies von Bill/esheim, Valiante, Althammer, Eijsink, Atkinson, Giinther 
Miil/er, De Poi, Reay, Stainton, Hawkins, Knight, Lenzer, Pack, Giust, Agrimi, Sprung, Page 
I. See 1st sitting, 14th June 1982 (urgent procedure and order agreed to). 
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Document 923 16th June 1982 
Situation in the Middle East 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION• 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee2 
by Mr. Del/a Briotta, Rapporteur 
The Assembly, 
Deploring the outbreak of war in the Middle East; 
Recalling WEU Recommendations 341 and 349 adopted by the Assembly by overwhelming 
majorities; 
Endorsing Resolutions 508 and 509 of the United Nations Security Council; 
Recalling its often-repeated condemnation of acts of terrorism anywhere in the world and 
asserting that retaliatory military actions, especially those involving the maiming and killing of 
innocent civilian population, are totally unacceptable; 
Noting that the establishment of lasting peace in the area is essential for Europe's security and 
for stability in the world ; 
Regretfully noting that the provisions of the Camp David accord relating to the future status of 
the Palestinians have still not been carried into effect; 
Considering that the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government over the whole 
Lebanese territory is essential for the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East; 
Wishing its General Affairs Committee to follow developments in the Middle East and to 
report to it at its next session, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Express clearly Europe's determination to uphold Lebanon's sovereignty and to assist in its 
restoration; 
2. Condemn unreservedly the present Israeli aggression and call for the evacuation of all non-
Lebanese armed forces from Lebanon other than the United Nations interim force in Lebanon which 
should be strengthened; 
3. Recall that the problems of maintaining peace in the Middle East cannot be solved without 
ensuring the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination within a national territory and 
recognising the right of the state of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised 
frontiers. 
1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 1 with 0 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett 
(Chairman); MM. De Poi (Alternate: Cavaliere), Urwin 
(Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens (Alternate: Pensky), Mrs. 
Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile, Del/a Briotta, 
Conti Persini, De Bondt, van Eeke1en (Alternate: Blaauw), 
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Gessner, Hardy, Kurt Jung, Lagneau, Lagorce, Lord 
McNair, MM. Mangelschots, Mommersteeg (Alternate: 
Scholten), Giinther Muller (Alternate: Kittelmann), Prou-
vost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Thoss (Alternate: 
Glesener), Valiante, Vecchietti, Wilquin. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
Document 923 
Amendment 1 
Situation in the Middle East 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Blaauw, Lord McNair and M.r. van den Bergh 
16th June 1982 
1. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "war" and insert 
"hostilities". 
Signed: Blaauw, McNair, van den Bergh 
I. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (amendment negatived). 
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Document 923 
Amendments 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
Situation in the Middle East 
AMENDMENTS 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 1 
tabled by Mr. Blaauw and Lord McNair 
16th June 1982 
2. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "especially 
those involving the maiming and killing of innocent civilian population, ". 
3. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "totally 
unacceptable" and insert "no solution to this ghastly phenomenon;". 
4. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble and insert a new paragraph as follows: 
"Welcoming the progress so far of the Camp David accord and pressing for speedy solutions in 
that framework to the problem concerning the future status of the Palestinians; ". 
5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after" aggression" insert "and the indis-
criminate rocketing and shelling of civilians in the north of Israel by the PLO". 
6. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert "in mandate, in area of 
operation and in strength;". 
Signed: Blaauw, McNair 
1. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (amendments 2, 4 and 6 negatived; amendments 3 and 5 withdrawn). 
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Document 923 
Amendments 7, 8 and 9 
Situation in the Middle East 
AMENDMENTS 7, 8 and 9 1 
tabled by Dr. Miller 
16th June 1982 
7. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 2 and insert a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Deeply regret the present Israeli intervention in Lebanon while recognising the extreme 
provocation over many years of PLO rocket attacks on Israeli villages resuhing in the death of 
innocent civilians and call for the evacuation from Lebanon of all non-Lebanese armed forces 
other than a greatly strengthened and more effective United Nations interim force as soon as 
possible;". 
8. In paragraph 3 of draft recommendation proper, leave out from "solved" to the end and insert 
"without recognising the right of the state of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-
recognised frontiers, and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination". 
9. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows: 
"Condemn unreservedly all terrorist activities.". 
I. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (amendments 7 and 8 negatived; amendment 9 withdrawn). 
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Signed: Miller 
Document 923 
Amendments 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 
Situation in the Middle East 
AMENDMENTS 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 151 
tabled by Mr. Dejardin 
16th June 1982 
10. At the end of the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add "due to the 
invasion of the sovereign state of Lebanon by the armed forces oflsrae1;". 
11. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "innocent". 
12. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to tl;le draft recommendation, leave out "is" and, at the 
end, add "implies the de facto recognition of the' Palestinian people in national rights, as well as the 
right of each people of the area to live in peace;". 
13. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert a new 
paragraph as follows: 
"Regretting the refusal of Israel to respect wholly the Camp David accords in not following up 
the provisions concerning the status of the Palestinians;". 
14. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "evacuation" to the end 
and insert " of the Israeli armed forces as well as the reinforcement of the United Nations peace-
keeping force in Lebanon; ". 
15. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
" Propose the adoption of economic sanctions against Israel, such as an embargo on delivery of 
weapons and munitions and the import of Israeli products, so long as Israeli troops remain on 
Lebanese territory. ". 
I. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (amendments negatived). 
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